VZCZCXRO4845
RR RUEHBZ
DE RUEHC #6023/01 3141916
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 101908Z NOV 09
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 7123
INFO RUEHBY/AMEMBASSY CANBERRA 5718
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 9921
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 5468
RUEHOT/AMEMBASSY OTTAWA 0248
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN 1230
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RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 4521
RUEHDL/AMEMBASSY DUBLIN 1247
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 2964
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 1195
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE 6907
RUEHNY/AMEMBASSY OSLO 9048
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 5212
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 3086
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 8452
RUEHSW/AMEMBASSY BERN 6863
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 7688
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 4407
RUEHWN/AMEMBASSY BRIDGETOWN 1639
RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 9707
RUEHBZ/AMEMBASSY BRAZZAVILLE 1703
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 7986
RUEHKG/AMEMBASSY KINGSTON 0260
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0597
RUEHUM/AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR 7560
RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA 3839
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY 2267
RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 2895
RUEHCH/AMEMBASSY CHISINAU 1149
RUEHDJ/AMEMBASSY DJIBOUTI 1220
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 1312
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEATRS/TREASURY DEPT WASHINGTON DC 0337

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 11 STATE 116023 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
TRESURY FOR DO/IDD AND OUSED/IMF 
SECDEF FOR USDP/DSCA 
EXIM PASS TO CLAIMS - MPAREDES 
USDA PASS TO CCC - WWILLER/JDOSTER 
USAID PASS TO CLAIMS - WFULLER 
DOD PASS TO DSCS - PBERG 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN ECON EAID XM XA XH XB SF FR
SUBJECT: October 2009 Paris Club Meeting 
 
¶1.  (SBU) SUMMARY: During the October 2009 Paris Club "Tour 
d'Horizon," creditors expressed consternation over the $939 million 
payment made by Congo-Brazzaville to litigating creditors (a.k.a. 
vulture funds), which violated the GOC's commitment to seek terms 
from private creditors comparable to its Paris Club treatment.  Due 
to a supposed calculation error, the discount on the deal appears to 
have been in the range of 25-37 percent, far short of the comparable 
65 percent the GOC originally claimed.  In addition, new information 
from the Congolese authorities indicated that $306 million of the 
payment covered the litigating creditors' alleged legal fees. 
 
¶2. (SBU) On Argentina, the Secretariat had pressed the GOA to send a 
formal letter to the Club regarding its intentions, and emphasized 
again that there could be no formal debt restructuring without an 
appropriate International Monetary Fund (IMF) program.  Argentina's 
Minister had reportedly instructed that he wanted to resolve the 
arrears by year-end.  For the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), the 
IMF reported it was still awaiting a signed copy of the amended 
project loan contract between the DRC and China, so it was unable to 
request financing assurances, a necessary precursor to moving forward 
with a new IMF program.  The agreement for a program under the 
Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) was to have started on 
July 1st and there were some questions as to whether it would have to 
be renegotiated given the resulting delay in producing a debt 
sustainability analysis. 
 
¶3. (SBU) Paris Club creditors also discussed Afghanistan, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Comoros, Cote d'Ivoire, Djibouti, Guinea, Jamaica, 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, and Mongolia.  Methodological issues discussed 
included the implications for the Club of the reform of IMF 
instruments and the debt sustainability framework, adjustments to the 
Club's debt service reduction methodology (both carried over from 
September), treatment of public sector and nationalized entities, and 
outreach to non-members.  After the plenary session, there was a 
meeting of the working group on loan guarantees that have not been 
called. End Summary. 
 
----------- 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The Fund reported that growth in the current fiscal year was 
expected to exceed 15 percent, on the bases of post-drought 
agricultural recovery and the stimulus effects of increased security 
expenditures.  The deteriorating security and uncertain political 
situations continued to cause serious concern, however.  The 
authorities and the Fund were in agreement on fiscal policy for the 
remainder of FY 2009-10, based on higher revenues.  All completion 
point triggers related to the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) 
 
STATE 00116023  002 OF 011 
 
 
initiative had been implemented or were at advanced stages, except 
for the mining law amendment and parts of pension reform.  Both 
awaited cabinet approval; the mining law amendment needed 
Parliamentary approval as well.  HIPC completion point could come as 
early as January 2010 assuming satisfactory performance on the sixth 
review (expected in early December) and triggers, and on the 
political situation. 
 
------------------- 
Antigua and Barbuda 
------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) The IMF reported that Antigua and Barbuda had been severely 
affected by the global economic crisis, with fiscal imbalances 
soaring and arrears continuing to accumulate.  Fiscal revenues were 
expected to fall by 20 percent in 2009 and GDP by 6.5 percent; the 
latter was expected to fall a further 1.5 percent in 2010.  The 
government was responding with expenditure cuts and tax increases, 
though a mission the previous week had concluded that significant 
further fiscal adjustment would be necessary. There were mounting 
banking problems in the wake of the Stanford financing scandal (Texas 
businessman accused of orchestrating a $9.2 billion investment ponzi 
scheme).  Arrears accounted for 16.8 percent of GDP, of which 6 
percent was to multilaterals, about 12 percent to the Club, 21 
percent to non-Club bilaterals, and the remaining 61 percent to 
private creditors.  There could be an IMF program with a subsequent 
debt restructuring, and financing assurances from the Club could be 
sought. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The World Bank noted the country's high income level 
($13,790 per capita in 2008), and said it had no record of ever 
having lent to the country, although it had made a modest grant for 
addressing fluorocarbons.  The country was part of a Bank project on 
improving the debt profiles of Caribbean clients; creditors were 
curious about this, but the Bank's representative could provide no 
further details. 
 
¶7. (SBU) The Secretariat noted a complexity in a potential 
restructuring, significant debt was tied up in the Stanford entities 
(6.5 percent of GDP, according to the Fund, vs. 12 percent to the 
Club).  The Secretariat also noted that Antigua and Barbuda was on 
the OECD's Non-Cooperative Countries and Territories (NCCT) grey list 
and asked whether this could affect creditors' willingness to provide 
treatment. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Several creditors reported arrears, including the 
Netherlands (2 million Euro), the UK (which also reported having 
received a very recent payment), the U.S. ($25 million), and France 
(10 million Euro).  Club members agreed to a data call. 
 
--------- 
Argentina 
--------- 
 
STATE 00116023  003 OF 011 
 
 
 
¶9. (SBU) Club Chairwoman d'Amarzit reported on her October meeting 
with Finance Secretary Lorenzino in Istanbul, noting that she had 
carried the traditional message that no formal rescheduling was 
possible without an appropriate Fund program.  She had told Lorenzino 
that Argentina needed to demonstrate a "real commitment" before 
discussions could progress, and that Argentina should write formally 
to the Club to describe its general intentions, if not a specific 
proposal.  She had also suggested that Argentina should resume making 
scheduled payments, as a sign of good faith.  (Since all U.S. debt is 
in arrears, the U.S. would not directly benefit from this.) 
Lorenzino had asked whether such payments would be applied to arrears 
or to servicing current maturities; d'Amarzit had replied that it did 
not matter, since all would be wrapped up in an eventual workout. 
Lorenzino reported that Minister Boudou wanted to resolve the Club 
issues by year-end, and had also mentioned that an offer to holdout 
private creditors was imminent.  The Club would need to "show 
creativity" in dealing with Argentina, d'Amarzit concluded, but only 
if the Argentines were being credible, which came down to "cash!" 
The ball, she said, was firmly in the Argentine court. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The U.S. delegation reported on Treasury DAS Lee's meeting 
with Minister Boudou in Istanbul, noting the Argentine desire to 
resolve the debt issue; their interest in improving relations with 
the Fund, though short of a program; and their reluctance to pay in a 
lump sum from reserves. 
 
¶11. (SBU) D'Amarzit responded that despite the law that had been 
enacted to enable payment in full from reserves, the central bank 
governor "had issues" with that mode of payment.  In her meeting, the 
Argentines had noted that Spain's unilateral restructuring had been 
for a five-year period; she had replied that since that period had 
ended in 2008, the Argentines should pay the Club immediately.  She 
also emphasized that there could be no reverse comparability of 
treatment with the holdouts, meaning that the deal with holdouts 
would not be a template for any restructuring with official 
creditors. 
 
¶12. (SBU) The Netherlands suggested that the arrangement facilitated 
by the Club in 2007 to clear Angola's arrears might guide relations 
with Argentina, and suggested that it be mentioned to the Argentines 
in bilateral contacts.  D'Amarzit replied that she had mentioned 
Angola to Lorenzino, but noted some significant differences, 
particularly the ratio of arrears to late interest and that the U.S. 
(which had very little flexibility to address past due interest) had 
not had arrears with Angola by the time that arrangement was 
concluded. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Fund noted that it had hoped to agree on a way forward 
for the Article IV consultation in Istanbul, but had been unable to 
do so.  The Bank reported a positive meeting in Istanbul, during 
which Argentina had expressed appreciation for the Bank's support. 
Net transfers from the Bank to Argentina would be positive in 2009 
 
STATE 00116023  004 OF 011 
 
 
for the first time in many years. 
 
------- 
Comoros 
------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) The Fund reported that the PRGF program was approved 
September 21.  Real GDP was expected to grow just 1 percent in 2009, 
though inflation was easing in the face of retreating food and fuel 
prices.  The fiscal deficit was expected to reach 6.2 percent of GDP 
in 2009; the debt to exports ratio was an unsustainable 260 percent. 
Total debt was $262 million at the end of 2008, 54 percent of GDP, 
while arrears were 5.1 percent of GDP.  HIPC eligibility still needed 
to be confirmed, though there appeared to be no serious doubts. 
Assuming it was, decision point could come in the first half of 2010. 
 
¶15. (SBU) The Secretariat noted that the Club held only a small share 
of Comoros' debts, so as agreed it had reached out to other 
creditors, without success - Kuwait had indicated that it did not 
want to participate in negotiations, the UAE had not replied, and 
Saudi Arabia was unlikely to participate.  The World Bank reported 
that its mission chief had also reached out to the Executive 
Directors from non-Club creditors to ask them to participate. 
 
¶16. (SBU) The Club agreed to extend an invitation to Comoros, which 
is now scheduled to negotiate Naples Terms treatment on November 19. 
The U.S. will only observe as it is not a creditor. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) At the time of the October meeting, the Fund still had not 
received a signed copy of the revised China project loan contract, so 
the planned request for financing assurances was not made.  The Bank 
reported that technical work was proceeding, especially on estimating 
the grant element of the package.  Bank staff were also helping 
authorities to prioritize infrastructure projects, including those 
being financed by the loan package, and were pleased that the 
authorities seemed committed to an economic return methodology. 
 
¶18. (SBU) The Netherlands noted the passage of time, asking whether 
the Fund planned to re-phase the agreed PRGF program (which was to be 
effective from July 1).  The IMF responded no, although they admitted 
that the July date "could not hold much longer."  The Secretariat 
asked about reports that the Chinese loan's interest rate had been 
raised to reflect the loss of guarantees; the Fund noted reports that 
the loan had been set at a fixed rate of 4.4 percent. 
 
¶19. (SBU) The Netherlands also asked whether there would be a new 
Club agreement rather than a reactivation of the old one, and noted 
substantial arrears, asking whether treatment of these could be 
deferred to completion point, to provide incentives for performance, 
 
STATE 00116023  005 OF 011 
 
 
regretting that this had not been done in the recent Burundi and Cote 
d'Ivoire cases.  Germany strongly supported this, and the Secretariat 
agreed that the Club could consider doing so, though it noted that 
given low capacity to pay, the action would be symbolic. 
 
¶20. (SBU) Russia reported that it had a $1.4 million short-term debt 
that had not been paid, and that it would "keep this in mind" in 
considering financing assurances.  The Secretariat retorted that 
there were arrears "left, right, and center." 
 
¶21. (SBU) Several creditors expressed concern about the details of 
the Chinese loan and its impacts, emphasizing the need for detailed 
information from the international financial institutions (IFIs) and 
for enough time to consider the forthcoming debt sustainability 
analysis carefully before deciding on financing assurances.  In 
September, the World Bank had reported that the country's interim 
HIPC treatment was to expire on October 15; the Bank representative 
was unable to provide an update on how the Bank planned to proceed. 
 
------------------- 
Congo - Brazzaville 
------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) The Secretariat had received a new letter from the 
authorities, following the earlier one in which the Congolese had 
admitted to "errors" in Congo's earlier submission on its settlement 
with private vulture funds.  According to the new letter, the payment 
made was $939 million, of which $306 million was allegedly to cover 
the funds' legal expenses.  Given the new data, it is clear that the 
settlement was not remotely comparable to the treatment provided by 
the Club.  Originally, the Congolese had claimed that the discount 
was a comparable 65 percent.  Based on the new numbers, they were 
claiming just a 25 percent discount although the Fund's preliminary 
analysis suggested 37 percent.  The Fund and Secretariat were unable 
to confirm the numbers, however, since the Congolese continued to 
refuse to provide the agreements or underlying data, claiming 
confidentiality requirements in the settlement.  The GOC letter 
passed blame to the international community, which it accused of not 
supporting Congo in its efforts to deal with private litigants. 
 
¶23. (SBU) Creditors were angry about the payment but recognized there 
was little they could do about a payment that had already been made. 
Some asked what additional support the international community could 
provide to debtors in future such cases, and some suggested the 
African Development Bank's (AfDB) African Legal Support Facility 
could help. 
 
¶24. (SBU) The U.S. delegation argued that while the IFIs would not, 
of course, become directly involved in country-creditor negotiations, 
as asserted in the GOC letter, they would have been willing to 
provide technical assistance on calculating comparable treatment, as 
would the Secretariat and even creditors.  The GOC had not sought 
such support.  We also noted that Congo had apparently negotiated the 
 
STATE 00116023  006 OF 011 
 
 
settlement without benefit of competent legal and financial advice. 
Clearly, if the Congolese authorities could find $306 million to pay 
the litigating creditors' legal expenses, they could have secured 
competent counsel for themselves, had they wished to - particularly 
given the magnitudes involved. 
 
¶25. (SBU) Creditors concluded the authorities' failure to seek 
advice, and the outcome, raised doubts about their true motivations - 
doubts exacerbated by their refusal to share the underlying 
information with the Fund and Secretariat, even on a confidential 
basis. 
 
¶26. (SBU) On the macro and HIPC fronts, the Fund reported significant 
fiscal consolidation, mostly attributed to an increase in discipline. 
 The non-oil primary deficit had fallen from 56 percent to 37 percent 
this year, and the country was pressing hard to reach completion 
point by the end of 2009.  A mission found that some triggers had 
been met and that progress was being made on others; the Bank 
reported that a final verification mission was planned for November, 
with a completion point target of December 22. 
 
------------- 
Cote d'Ivoire 
------------- 
 
¶27. (SBU) The Fund reported that the recent mission found the country 
to be reasonably resilient to the global economic crisis and that 
growth could be strong if the elections go well and progress 
continues on structural reforms.  Real GDP was expected to rise 3.7 
percent in 2009, after growing 2.3 percent in 2008, with the help of 
good rains and a strong showing by the mining sector; in 2010 it was 
expected to grow 4 percent.  The current account had strengthened, 
and the fiscal deficit was on target at 1.4 percent of GDP. The Bank 
reported some progress on HIPC completion point triggers, including a 
reduction in cocoa taxes and a cocoa strategy near completion. 
Implementation of the poverty reduction strategy paper (PRSP)(another 
completion point trigger) had begun, and was expected to be reflected 
in the 2010 budget. 
 
¶28. (SBU) The Secretariat reported on the agreement recently reached 
with London Club creditors.  The net present value (NPV) reduction 
was 22 percent, comparable with treatment provided by the Paris Club, 
and the London Club was also matching the exceptional cash flow 
relief provided by the Paris Club through 2011.  Talks with other 
private creditors, as reported in September, were proving more 
difficult.  Some had contacted the Secretariat to ask why they were 
being subjected to comparable treatment, since their loans were in 
CFA francs and governed by domestic law.  The Secretariat had replied 
that the Club regarded them as external creditors based on their 
residence. 
 
-------- 
Djibouti 
 
STATE 00116023  007 OF 011 
 
 
-------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) The Fund reported that the global economic crisis had hit 
Djibouti hard, though the current account deficit had fallen sharply, 
mostly because of foreign-financed investment.  Fiscal policy had 
been loosened, with the deficit more than doubling in the first half 
of 2009.  Borrowing had been mostly concessional, but the country was 
still at high risk of debt distress.  Performance on the IMF program 
had been mixed, with waiver of four benchmarks necessary to pass the 
last review in June. 
 
¶30. (SBU) Creditors holding commercial debt continued to report 
problems in concluding bilateral agreements.  France reported that 
Djibouti had asked for separate agreements on commercial and Official 
Development Assistance (ODA) debts, which France had refused, while 
Germany indicated that the Djiboutian authorities were refusing to 
implement the agreed minute at all, insisting on full relief.  Spain 
also reported difficulties on commercial loans.  Belgium and Italy, 
which had only ODA loans, reported that they had signed bilaterals, 
though Italy reported that some of the debt was committed to a swap 
that was not being implemented. 
 
------ 
Guinea 
------ 
 
¶31. (SBU) The IMF again reported that the situation in Guinea was 
worsening, with hard-won gains under the PRGF program and HIPC 
initiative unraveling.  As reported in September, the de facto 
authorities had attempted to fix the exchange rate at unrealistic 
levels while inflation had resumed, as had central bank financing of 
the government, to the extent of 0.7 percent of GDP in the first nine 
months of 2009.  Reserves remained stable, but at only one month of 
imports.  In response to a question, the Fund rep assured creditors 
that the de facto authorities were not able to access Guinea's 
Special Drawing Rights (SDR) allocation, and that based on a poll of 
its members, the IMF did not recognize or deal with any Guinean 
government. 
 
¶32. (SBU) The Secretariat reminded creditors of the Club's June 
letter to the GOG, noting that since there had been no IMF program 
review the second phase of Guinea's debt treatment had been 
suspended, so creditors could now invoice on the original payment 
schedule.  By the end of the year, the Club should decide whether or 
not to cancel the Paris Club agreement entirely.  France and the U.S. 
had received payments.  Several creditors expressed concerns about 
recently-reported loan deals with China, but there was no information 
beyond what had been reported in the press. 
 
------- 
Jamaica 
------- 
 
 
STATE 00116023  008 OF 011 
 
 
¶33. (SBU) The U.S. delegation had asked that Jamaica be added to the 
agenda, to seek an update on IMF program discussions.  The Fund noted 
that discussions were ongoing, with a mission planned for October 26. 
 GDP was expected to fall by 3.8 percent in the current fiscal year, 
and there had already been strong fiscal adjustment.  Major debt 
restructuring was likely to be needed, although the Fund 
representative didn't foresee a request to the Club.  The Bank 
indicated that it was discussing a $100 million development policy 
loan, in conjunction with the planned Fund program. 
 
---------- 
Kazakhstan 
---------- 
 
¶34. (SBU) The Secretariat reported that no response to its September 
12 letter to the GOK regarding banking restructuring had been 
received.  The IFIs noted that a term sheet had been signed between 
Alliance Bank and its creditors but that the process with BTA Bank 
was taking longer (the Club letter had insisted that creditors be 
given enough time to consider work-out proposals).  In the World Bank 
rep's view, creditors thought that government threats to revoke 
Alliance's license were credible; those regarding the bigger BTA were 
less so. 
 
¶35. (SBU) The Secretariat expressed concern that the proposed workout 
treated debts on a pari passu basis, rather than honoring the 
widely-accepted seniority of trade finance, and suggested that the 
IMF should communicate this concern to the authorities, noting that 
failure to respect the principle could raise the cost of future 
financing to Kazakhstan; the IMF did not respond directly.  Italy 
asked more broadly that the IMF mention Club support for Export 
Credit Agencies (ECAs), but the IMF demurred. 
 
------- 
Moldova 
------- 
 
¶36. (SBU) The IMF reported an economy hit hard, with GDP expected to 
fall by 9 percent in 2009, driven by sharp falls in exports, foreign 
direct investment (FDI) (now virtually zero) and remittances (down 40 
percent).  The budget deficit was expected to be 8-10 percent of GDP, 
impacted by election spending and weak revenues.  The banking system 
was fragile, with one license having been revoked and other 
revocations possible.  Heavy intervention in the first four months of 
the year had lowered reserves, and there were renewed discussions of 
a program.  An October mission was planned; if there was agreement, a 
program could come to the Board in December or January; it was still 
unclear whether a program would involve a request to the Club for 
debt treatment.  The Bank added that the new government was moving 
swiftly, but that the country faced significant financing needs in 
2010 and 2011.  (Note: An October 28 IMF press release reported 
preliminary staff-GOM agreement on a three-year Extended Credit 
Facility or Stand-by Arrangement.) 
 
STATE 00116023  009 OF 011 
 
 
 
-------- 
Mongolia 
-------- 
 
¶37. (SBU) Russia had asked that Mongolia be placed on the agenda so 
it could raise the issue of arrears.  Russia claimed that most data 
had been fully reconciled in 2006; the Mongolians had initially 
confirmed this reconciliation but later refused to confirm some 
categories of debt.  Russia stated that the outstanding claim was 
$180 million, of which 90 percent was in arrears.  Much larger claims 
- over $10 billion - had been forgiven in 2003; the current arrears 
were unrelated to this 'big debt' forgiveness.  Finland also reported 
$9 million of long-standing arrears, which it was still trying to 
reconcile.  It had offered debt reduction, most recently in August, 
but the Mongolian authorities had been non-responsive. 
 
¶38. (SBU) The IMF expressed concern, since under the Fund's lending 
into arrears policy the arrears could hold up the SBA's review, but 
it noted that if the debt was disputed, it would not be considered to 
be in arrears for program purposes.  Russia noted that some but not 
all of its claims were disputed; Finland merely appealed to the Fund 
to press the Mongolians to reply to their most recent letter.  The 
Secretariat said that Russia should clarify the situation so the IMF 
would know how to proceed.  Given the uncertainty, the Club would not 
become involved. 
 
¶39. (SBU) The Fund reported that implementation of April's SBA was 
strong, and that all conditions had been met on time.  A mission was 
planned in October to prepare the first review.  Tight fiscal 
controls had allowed the authorities to meet targets despite revenue 
weakness, and economic growth, expected to be 0.5 percent in 2009, 
could reach 7 percent in 2010, on the back of high copper prices, 
though the financial sector remained a major source of risk. 
Mongolia had just signed an agreement for a mining project that could 
generate export revenues of 50 percent of GDP; details remained 
scarce, however, and the financing could be non-concessional. 
 
--------------------- 
Methodological Issues 
--------------------- 
 
¶40. (SBU) Reform of IMF Instruments - Review of DSF and Debt Limits 
in IMF Programs/Impact on Paris Club: Discussion of how the Club 
should consider the revamped IMF program instruments was held over 
from the September meeting.  The only new instrument that seemed in 
question was the Flexible Credit Line (FCL), which is an upper credit 
tranche program (the Club criterion for treatment), but with only ex 
ante conditionality.  The Secretariat noted that few countries 
availing themselves of the FCL were likely to come to the Club, since 
in most cases the Club accounted for small shares of their debts, and 
because its comparability requirements would create too many issues 
regarding the remainder. 
 
STATE 00116023  010 OF 011 
 
 
 
¶41. (SBU) There was also further discussion of the new provisions for 
the treatment of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in debt 
sustainability analyses (DSAs), and particularly on whether the Club 
should presumptively exclude the debts of any SOEs excluded from a 
DSA.  There was general agreement that the decision should remain 
with the Club. 
 
-------------------------- 
Treatment of Public Sector 
and Nationalized Entities 
-------------------------- 
 
¶42. (SBU) In a related discussion, the Club considered how it should 
treat the debts of SOEs and newly-nationalized entities.  The 
discussion came about in response to recent cases involving Grenada, 
Djibouti, and Seychelles, when debts of certain SOEs were excluded 
from treatment; and Kazakhstan, where there was disagreement as to 
whether debt of nationalized entities should be considered sovereign. 
 
¶43. (SBU) The Secretariat had prepared a paper, which noted different 
definitions of public sector that had historically been used by the 
Club, and which suggested some criteria the Club could consider going 
forward - the treatment assumed by the IMF in programs and DSAs, and 
the individual criteria used by the IMF to make its determinations, 
such as managerial independence and relationship with the government. 
 
¶44. (SBU) On nationalized debtor entities, the paper stressed that 
nationalization did not imply government assumption of obligations, 
but that there might be a practical role for the Club in pressing for 
fair treatment, as it had been doing in the case of Kazakhstan.  The 
Secretariat made clear that it considered this only in the context of 
nationalizations carried out when the entities were defaulting and 
presented systemic risk, and not for nationalizations of choice. 
 
¶45. (SBU) There was little discussion, though Germany suggested the 
need for more economic criteria, not just legal and institutional 
ones.  The U.S. supported the Secretariat's approach and emphasized 
the importance of the IMF's sharing its plans for DSA exclusion as 
far in advance as possible. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
Debt Service Reduction (DSR) Methodology 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶46. (SBU) The discussion of DSR methodology, held over from 
September, was very brief.  The Secretariat had prepared a brief 
paper on how it calculates the treatment to be provided by creditors 
that selected the debt service reduction option in a previous 
treatment for the same debtor.  This is based on estimating the stock 
reduction, at the time of the second treatment that simulates 
equivalent treatment at the time of the first, using average interest 
rates for the intervening period.  There was no discussion. 
 
STATE 00116023  011 OF 011 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
Outreach - Request from Israel 
------------------------------ 
 
¶47. (SBU) Under the Club's agreed outreach policy the Secretariat had 
reached out to three occasional observer creditors - Brazil, Korea, 
and Israel - to invite them to cooperate more closely with the Club. 
Only Israel had replied, indicating interest not just in closer 
involvement, but in full membership.  Following the outreach policy, 
the Secretariat proposed that Israel be invited to attend full 
sessions of the Club, including methodology discussions (currently, 
non-members attend only the discussions of countries of which they 
are creditors).  Israel would be asked to provide comprehensive data 
to the Club, and to honor Club principles such as solidarity.  The 
path from that to full membership - including listing on the website 
- remained unclear, and could be considered after the Club had had 
more opportunity to work with Israel. 
Creditors agreed to the proposal, though some asked about how it 
would be presented to the outside world.  Until Israel became a full 
member, the only public notice would be Israel's listing among 
observers in negotiation press releases. 
 
--------------------------- 
Working Group on Guarantees 
--------------------------- 
 
¶48. (SBU) The working group on loan guarantees that have not been 
called discussed how to create more uniformity of treatment.  It was 
generally agreed that it would be useful to include such guarantees 
in future data calls, as had been done in the case of Sri Lanka.  The 
data call template would address whether a specific guarantee had 
been indemnified, and if not whether the creditor government could 
reschedule the underlying loan.  USdel stated that the USG would 
participate to the extent it could, but passed on warnings that U.S. 
ECAs do not always have full payment schedules for guaranteed loans. 
 
¶49. (SBU) In terms of action, it was generally agreed that any 
special cases identified in the data call could be discussed by 
creditors before a negotiation, to attempt to resolve questions of 
treatment.  There was no agreement on whether such guarantees should 
always be treated, however.  Some creditors argued that Agreed 
Minutes could be drafted with an "option," allowing the debts to be 
treated in the event of default as had been done in Pakistan's 2001 
treatment.  The issue will need to be discussed further.  The 
Secretariat subsequently issued a draft summary of the discussion, 
which Washington agencies are still reviewing. 
 
¶50. (U) For additional information on any of the countries or issues 
mentioned above, please contact EEB/IFD/OMA David Freudenwald at 
freudenwalddj@state.gov or Nicholle Manz at manznm@state.gov. 
 
 
CLINTON 
CLINTON