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Viewing cable 09SEOUL1739, SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 2, 2009

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SEOUL1739 2009-11-02 08:13 2011-08-30 01:44 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Seoul
VZCZCXRO5915
OO RUEHGH
DE RUEHUL #1739/01 3060813
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 020813Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6098
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 9341
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC//DDI/OEA//
RHHMUNA/USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI//FPA//
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC//DB-Z//
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0459
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 6857
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO 6922
RUEHGH/AMCONSUL SHANGHAI 1440
RUEHSH/AMCONSUL SHENYANG 5237
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI 4185
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE 7395
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1681
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2989
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 2068
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2675
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 07 SEOUL 001739 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV MARR ECON KPAO KS US
SUBJECT: SEOUL - PRESS BULLETIN; November 2, 2009 
 
TOP HEADLINES 
------------- 
 
Chosun Ilbo 
Glut of Unsold Apartments Weighs on Regional Economies 
 
JoongAng Ilbo 
Survey: ROK's Top 30 Conglomerates 
See the Economy Recovering 
 
Dong-a Ilbo 
Building Science and Business Belt in Chungcheong Province Emerges 
as Possible Alternative to Sejong City Plan 
 
Hankook Ilbo, Segye Ilbo, All TVs 
Feud Intensifies in Ruling Camp over Sejong City Plan 
 
Hankyoreh Shinmun 
Survey: 59 Percent of Respondents Favor 
Revising Controversial Media Reform Bills 
 
Seoul Shinmun 
Spending on Basics Back to Pre-Crisis Levels 
 
 
DOMESTIC DEVELOPMENTS 
---------------------- 
 
According to an ROKG source, the ROK and the U.S. have completed a 
joint operation plan in case of emergencies in North Korea. Under 
the so-called "Operational Plan (OPLAN) 5029,"most operations will 
be led by the ROK army, but the U.S. military will be responsible 
for removing nuclear facilities and weapons. (All) 
 
The U.S. welcomed the ROKG's plan to reinforce its civilian 
reconstruction team in Afghanistan and send an unspecified number of 
troops to protect them. White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs was 
quoted as saying in an Oct. 30 statement: "This is an important 
contribution to the international effort in Afghanistan and to 
fostering reconstruction and stability in the region." (Hankyoreh) 
 
 
INTERNATIONAL NEWS 
------------------ 
 
Ri Gun, Director General of American Affairs at North Korea's 
Foreign Ministry, told reporters on Oct. 30 after attending a 
seminar in New York that he had useful talks with U.S. officials. 
(Dong-a, Hankyoreh) 
 
On Oct. 30, the EU and Japan submitted to the UN a draft resolution 
on human rights abuses in North Korea for review for the fifth 
consecutive year. The ROK co-sponsored the resolution for the second 
year running. (Chosun, Dong-a, Hankook, Segye) 
 
 
MEDIA ANALYSIS 
--------------- 
 
-Aid for Afghanistan 
-------------------- 
The ROKG's Oct. 30 announcement - that it will reinforce its 
civilian reconstruction team in Afghanistan and send an unspecified 
number of troops to protect them - received wide press coverage on 
Saturday.  According to media reports, the specifics of the 
dispatch, including its size and location, will be determined after 
a government fact-finding team completes its on-site investigation. 
 
Most media predicted difficulties in the ROKG receiving 
parliamentary approval for the dispatch because of possible 
objections from opposition parties, including the main opposition 
Democratic Party. 
 
 
SEOUL 00001739  002 OF 007 
 
 
White House Spokesman Robert Gibbs was quoted as saying in an Oct. 
30 statement: "This is an important contribution to the 
international effort in Afghanistan and to fostering reconstruction 
and stability in the region." 
 
Conservative Chosun Ilbo editorialized: "The troops and police 
officers to be deployed this time are not combat forces.  Other 
countries have also sent military and police forces for protection 
when they sent their PRT to help with the rebuilding work in 
Afghanistan.  Currently, there are 68,000 U.S. troops and 100,000 
military forces from 40 countries in Afghanistan.  With battles with 
militants, such as the Taliban, becoming increasingly fierce, 
however, they are not in a position to ensure the safety of the PRTs 
from each country.  It is essential that the ROK deploy troops to 
protect its PRT." 
 
Right-of-center JoongAng Ilbo editorialized: "It is not easy to 
accept the ROKG's explanation as it is.  There may be unofficial and 
indirect requests from the U.S.  The ROKG said that it decided to 
deploy troops, considering its own national interests, but it will 
be difficult for the government to provide a direct explanation to 
the people (for the troop deployment) because the issue is likely to 
be contentious.  Still, the ROKG's stance is understandable.  We 
support the Lee Administration's decision to deploy troops to 
Afghanistan. ...  The ROKG must find the best way to minimize the 
sacrifice while maximizing efficiency." 
 
Left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun argued in an editorial: "Whether the 
goal is to protect civilian workers or to engage in combat, sending 
troops to Afghanistan is madness, given the country's current state. 
 ... For the Lee Administration to rush into a decision on its 
military deployment at this point in time cannot be read as anything 
but an attempt to curry favor with the U.S. prior to U.S. President 
Barack Obama's upcoming visit to the ROK.  Seeing the government 
endangering young lives by redeploying forces even as the U.S. 
itself remains undecided on additional deployments, one cannot help 
asking who the Lee Administration really represents.  The Lee 
Administration should cancel plans for redeployment." 
 
ΒΆN. Korea 
Conservative Dong-a Ilbo and left-leaning Hankyoreh Shinmun today 
quoted Ri Gun, Director General of American Affairs at North Korea's 
Foreign Ministry, as telling reporters on Oct. 30 after attending a 
seminar in New York that he had useful talks with U.S. officials. 
 
 
OPINIONS/EDITORIALS 
------------------- 
 
CONSENSUS BEFORE DISPATCH 
(JoongAng Ilbo, October 31, 2009, Page 34) 
 
The Lee Myung-bak Administration announced yesterday that it has 
formulated a plan to send a group of civilians to Afghanistan to 
support the provincial reconstruction team and troops.  Where in 
Afghanistan and how many will be sent has not yet been finalized. 
The government is considering sending around 130 civilians and a 
300-strong contingent of troops.  Afghanistan is where 23 
missionaries from Korea's Saemmul Church were kidnapped in 2007 by 
the Taliban.  Two were murdered.  The captives - aside from the two 
who were murdered - were released after 40 days.  The government has 
since withdrawn its Dasan and Dongui medical support military units 
from Afghanistan. Two soldiers from the units died in action.  The 
government has decided to send troops again to this high-risk 
region, and there's bound to be some controversy and debate until 
the deployment receives approval of the National Assembly. 
 
The reason for the deployment lies in the need to solidify the 
Korea-U.S. alliance by supporting the United States' military 
campaign in the war-torn nation.  The government, however, said 
Washington did not make any specific demand for troops and Seoul 
made its own decision to send personnel based on its desire to raise 
the country's position in the international community.  It is not 
easy to accept the ROKG's explanation as it is.  There may be 
 
SEOUL 00001739  003 OF 007 
 
 
unofficial and indirect requests from the U.S.  The ROKG said that 
it decided to deploy troops, considering its own national interests, 
but it will be difficult for the government to provide a direct 
explanation to the people (for the troop deployment) because the 
issue is likely to be contentious.  Still, the ROKG's stance is 
understandable.  We support the Lee Administration's decision to 
deploy troops to Afghanistan.  We agree with the government's 
explanation that Korea must make a contribution to the international 
community that matches its national power.  Above all, we believe 
the deployment is necessary, taking into account the gains that 
Korea will see from the reinforced alliance with the United States. 
 
Minister of National Defense Kim Tae-young said at the National 
Assembly on October 29, "There could be inevitable hostilities and 
casualties."  It was right for the ROKG not to hide any of the 
dangers of the troop dispatch.  The ROKG should give more convincing 
reasons why Seoul should send troops to Afghanistan despite its 
associated dangers.  Where the troops will be sent should be 
carefully selected based on security. Casualties may be inevitable; 
however the deployment is not being carried out to fight in combat 
but to provide support for reconstruction.  Therefore, the ROKG must 
find the best way to minimize the sacrifice while maximizing 
efficiency.  Based on such efforts, the government must persuade the 
people and send the troops after winning a consensus from the 
nation. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper.  We compared the 
English version on the website with the Korean version and added 
some sentences in English to make them identical.) 
 
 
LEE GOVERNMENT MUST CANCEL TROOP REDEPLOYMENT TO AFGHANISTAN 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, October 31, 2009, Page 23) 
 
Yesterday the Lee Administration and ruling Grand National Party 
(GNP) announced their plan for assistance in Afghanistan, which 
involves a large-scale increase in Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) personnel and the deployment of soldiers to protect them.  The 
reason they are giving is that the deployment of soldiers is 
inevitable to protect civilian workers, but anyone can see that 
redeployment of military forces is at the heart of the assistance 
plan.  An emphasis on sending PRT personnel is merely a smokescreen 
to avoid criticism of the deployment of more than twice as many 
military troops than civilian workers.  In essence, the Lee 
government is acknowledging that this is a deployment without 
legitimacy or justification. 
 
Whether the goal is to protect civilian workers or to engage in 
combat, sending troops to Afghanistan is madness, given the 
country's current state, and it must be stopped.  Since the whole 
region has now been transformed into a battlefield, it cannot be 
said that the South Korean troops being sent to provide protection 
for PRT workers will not experience combat.  From the standpoint of 
Afghanistan's rebel army, all foreign soldiers deployed to 
Afghanistan are enemies who should be killed.  Given that more than 
50 U.S. troops died in October alone, there is a very strong chance 
we will see casualties among the South Korean forces.  Even Defense 
Minister Kim Tae-young said in his response to the National Assembly 
the day before yesterday, "There could be inevitable hostilities and 
casualties." 
 
Deployments and losses are acceptable as long as the public's 
sympathy for the justification has been established.  However, the 
Lee government has been unable to produce any worthy justification 
thus far.  Foreign Minister Yu Myung-hwan says that South Korea has 
an obligation to contribute to the war on terror in order to become 
a "global Korea," and, in support of this, he says that assistance 
in Afghanistan is necessary in order to establish conditions for the 
continued stable stationing of U.S. Forces in South Korea, but this 
is utterly unconvincing.  The war in Afghanistan has long since gone 
beyond the level of the "war on terror" to become a full-scale war, 
and the talk about conditions for stationing USFK appears to be 
nothing more than a cheap ploy to legitimize deployment by provoking 
citizens' anxieties about national security.  If some of the USFK 
 
SEOUL 00001739  004 OF 007 
 
 
are transferred to Afghanistan, it would be in accordance with the 
"strategic flexibility" agreement between South Korea and the U.S. 
and has nothing to do with the issue of South Korean troop 
deployments to Afghanistan, something that Yu Myung-hwan surely 
knows better than anyone. 
 
For the Lee Administration to rush into a decision on its military 
deployment at this point in time cannot be read as anything but an 
attempt to curry favor with the U.S. prior to U.S. President Barack 
Obama's upcoming visit to the ROK.  Seeing the government 
endangering young lives by redeploying forces even as the U.S. 
itself remains undecided on additional deployments, one cannot help 
asking who the Lee Administration really represents.  The Lee 
Administration should cancel plans for redeployment. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
TIME FOR DIALOGUE NOT OPLAN 5029 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, November 2, 2009, Page 27) 
 
OPLAN 5029, the South Korea-U.S. Combined Forces Command operational 
plan that serves as a blueprint for dealing with a "sudden change" 
in North Korea's political situation, is once again becoming the 
topic of controversy.  Yesterday, the Yonhap News reported a 
high-ranking source in the government as saying that the plan's 
draft is based on five or six scenarios of upheaval in North Korea, 
including the outflow of nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), a civil war resulting from a regime change or 
coup d'etat, a South Korean hostage incident within North Korea, a 
large-scale defection of North Korean residents, and a large-scale 
natural disaster.  South Korea's Joint Chiefs of Staff issued an 
immediate denial statement calling the account "contrary to the 
facts," while officials with the Cheong Wa Dae (the presidential 
office in South Korea or Blue House) and Defense Ministry have 
either refused to comment or have given an answer along the lines 
of, "We have had an agreement with the U.S. regarding OPLAN 5029 in 
place since last year."  In other words, they have effectively 
acknowledged that some exchange has taken place behind the scenes. 
It also follows along with an Oct. 30 remark made by General Walter 
Sharp, U.S. Forces Korea Commander, that the two countries have 
agreed that, even after wartime operational command has been 
transferred to South Korea., the U.S. military will take the 
initiative in any elimination of North Korean WMDs and in any Marine 
Corps assault landing. 
 
Close cooperation and thorough planning between South Korea and the 
U.S. to prepare for the possibility of internal strife in North 
Korea are necessary.  However, it is exceedingly dangerous to make 
preparations that emphasize military operations. Even if some sudden 
upheaval should arise in North Korea, it could settle down of its 
own accord over time, and there are always ways to calm the 
situation that do not involve military operations, including 
international cooperation and inter-Korean dialogue.  OPLAN 5029, 
which presumes military operations in the event of an upheaval in 
North Korea, could very likely shut off a path to a peaceful 
resolution and provoke a war.  There are also quite a number of 
sensitive issues that need to be considered, including the lack of 
agreement between the U.S.  and its focus on eliminating nuclear 
weapons and other WMDs, and South Korea and its focus on preventing 
war, as well as the sovereignty dispute between the two countries 
over operational command and the possibility of international 
warfare resulting from Chinese intervention.  It is for these very 
reasons that discussions had been limited to conceptual plans 
instead of extending into operational plans during the Roh Moo-hyun 
Administration. 
 
Currently, the trend in the political situation on the Korean 
Peninsula has been to move away from sanctions and towards dialogue 
following Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao's visit to North Korea. 
North Korean leader Kim Jong-il, whose rumored ill health the South 
Korean government considered the most important factor influencing a 
potential North Korean upheaval, has been confirmed through various 
 
SEOUL 00001739  005 OF 007 
 
 
channels to be quite well. Now is the time for our government to 
focus all its energies on restoring inter-Korean dialogue in order 
to avoid falling behind the international current, rather than 
fixating on a revival of OPLAN 5029, which could easily lead to the 
calamity of war. 
 
(This is a translation provided by the newspaper, and it is 
identical to the Korean version.) 
 
 
WILL ROK AND U.S. PUSH AHEAD WITH OPCON TRANSFER? 
(Dong-a Ilbo, November 2, 2009, Page 35) 
 
USFK Commander Gen. Walter Sharp said last week that even after the 
OPCON transfer and the dissolution of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces 
in 2012, the U.S. military will be taking the initiative in any 
elimination of North Korean WMDs and in a Marine Corps assault 
landing.  He stated at an international conference, hosted by the 
Council on Korea-U.S. Security Studies and the Dong-a 
Ilbo-affiliated Hwajeong Peace Foundation, "The ROK and the U.S. 
recently reached the agreement, considering that the ROK does not 
have the military capability to carry out such special operations." 
In a situation where the ROK military is undergoing difficulty 
securing its own sophisticated military capability, Gen. Sharp's 
remarks considerably eased public anxiety over national security. 
 
In the event of an emergency, we must destroy about 1,000 targets in 
the North, such as nuclear arsenals, missile launch bases and major 
command posts.  Our military capability is, however, not enough to 
hit these targets accurately and quickly.  State-of-the art bombers, 
aircraft and cruise missiles must be mobilized from all around the 
world, including the U.S. territories and U.S. military bases in 
Japan.  Aegis destroyers and interceptor missiles are also needed to 
counter a missile attack by North Korea.  It is virtually impossible 
to handle these high-tech weapons on the Korean Peninsula without a 
U.S. commander.  In that the ROK and the U.S. acknowledged the 
realistic limits (of the OPCON transfer) and came up with military 
alternatives, Gen. Sharp's statements are somewhat comforting. 
 
Gen. Sharp noted, "If the operational control is transferred, the 
ROK-U.S. combined army and navy forces will be led by an ROK 
commander, and the combined air force will be led by the commander 
of the 7th U.S. Air Force in Korea, both under the control of the 
ROK Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff."  This is a type of role 
division.  However, this means that the unitary command system under 
the commander of ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command (CFC), a position 
held by the USFK commander, will be separated into two systems in a 
more multi-layered and complicated way.  Even if the U.S. military 
leads key landing operations and operations to remove weapons of 
mass destruction, joint operations may not go smoothly in general. 
 
The U.S. repeatedly declared that it would establish a new military 
cooperation system in place of the ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command 
and would continue to provide nuclear deterrence and complementary 
war capabilities to the ROK.  However, Gen. Sharp's statement 
confirmed once again that the ROK's sole exercise of operational 
control would be limited.  Therefore, we wonder whether we really 
need to push ahead with the early transfer of operational control. 
It would likely only weaken the combined defense capabilities. 
 
The ROK and the U.S. should confront our security situation and the 
level of our military power and start again from the beginning in 
reassessing the timing for the OPCON transfer. 
 
 
GUARD FORCES ARE NOT COMBATANT FORCES 
(Chosun Ilbo, October 31, 2009, page 31) 
 
The ROKG announced on October 30 that it will increase the number of 
Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) personnel to 150 from the 
current 24 and send police officers and guard forces to protect 
them.  The ROKG did not reveal the size (of the contingent), but 
sources say that 200 to 300 troops and police officers will be 
deployed to Afghanistan.  A Foreign Ministry Spokesman said that new 
 
SEOUL 00001739  006 OF 007 
 
 
PRT members will work to enhance the administrative capabilities of 
the local government, rebuild the economy, establish social 
infrastructure and provide humanitarian support.  He added, "Troops 
and police will devote themselves to defense and will not take part 
in combat operations." 
 
The ROKG sent 200 military medics and engineers to Afghanistan in 
2002 but pulled them out of the country in late 2007.  Early next 
year, ROK troops will again be sent to Afghanistan to protect PRT 
personnel. 
 
Medics and engineers withdrew after 20 ROK missionaries were taken 
hostage by armed rebels and two of them were killed.  This is why 
ROK people may raise concerns over redeployment of troops even 
though they will be dispatched only for self-defense. 
 
The troops and police officers to be deployed this time are not 
combat forces.  Other countries have also sent military and police 
forces for protection when they sent their PRT to help with the 
rebuilding work in Afghanistan.  Currently, there are 68,000 U.S. 
troops and 100,000 military forces from 40 countries in Afghanistan. 
 With battles with militants, such as the Taliban, becoming 
increasingly fierce, however, they are not in a position to ensure 
the safety of the PRTs from each country.  It is essential that the 
ROK deploy troops to protect its PRT. 
 
The ROK ranks among the top 15 economies in the world and will host 
the next G20 summit.  What would have become of the ROK without 
international support during the Korean War and afterwards?  The 
ROK, which is so indebted to the international community, should not 
neglect to help others.  We will not be able to play a leading role 
(in international relations) and gain true international recognition 
if we turn a blind eye to the world's most urgent issues such as the 
war in Afghanistan. 
 
The ROKG should make sure that its planned troop deployment is not 
(intended) for military involvement but is aimed at helping rebuild 
Afghanistan.  In particular, we should be cautious not to incite the 
Islamic nations.  The National Assembly also should discuss this 
matter while considering the safety of personnel being sent there 
and the ROK's national interest. 
 
 
FEATURES 
--------- 
 
POLL: SIXTY PERCENT SAY CONSTITUTIONAL COURT RULING ON MEDIA REFORM 
LEGISLATION IS WRONG 
(Hankyoreh Shinmun, November 2, 2009, Page 5) 
 
By Reporter Park Chang-ik 
 
Research Plus poll shows that the Four Major Rivers Restoration 
Project is the most unpopular Lee Administration project, and that 
concern about protecting freedom of expression is spreading among 
young voters 
 
In the Oct. 28 National Assembly by-elections, the Grand National 
Party (GNP) suffered complete defeat in strategic regions such as 
the Seoul area and Chungcheong Provinces.  In consideration of these 
recent results combined with President Lee Myung-bak's relatively 
high approval rating, there is an increased interest in the real 
undercurrents of public opinion. 
 
An opinion poll conducted Saturday by Research Plus at the behest of 
the Hankyoreh put forward six controversial Lee Administration 
policies and asked respondents to indicate which ones they found 
most problematic.  The overwhelming top choice regardless of region, 
age or political party support is the Four Major Rivers Restoration 
Project at 41.4 percent. 
 
When broken down by age groups, 48.1 percent of those in their 30s 
and 53.7 percent of those in their 40s chose the Four Major Rivers 
Restoration Project as the most problematic.  Those in their 50s and 
 
SEOUL 00001739  007 OF 007 
 
 
60s count the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project as the most 
problematic, but at lower levels of 37.3 percent and 29.8 percent, 
respectively.  It is noteworthy that those in their 30s and 40s, the 
age brackets that drive public opinion, are most strongly opposed to 
the Four Major Rivers Restoration Project.  The poll also confirms 
that negative feelings towards the Four Major Rivers Restoration 
Project increase in relation to an increase in education levels and 
income. 
 
The second and third choices are the handling of the media-related 
legislation (11.2 percent) and the press policy that includes the 
ousting of television hosts (MCs) Kim Je-dong and Son Seok-hee (8.9 
percent).  It is noteworthy that 19.8 percent of those in their 20s 
and 16.7 percent of those in their 30s list the railroading of the 
media related bills through the National Assembly as most 
problematic.  Some 15.8 percent of those in their 20s indicate the 
ousting of Kim Je-dong and Son Seok-hee as the most problematic. 
This reveals that concerns about violations of freedom of expression 
have spread widely among those in their 20s and 30s.  The remaining 
list of problematic issues include the emphasis on pushing through 
the reduced Sejong City Development Plan (8.5 percent), the handling 
of the Yongsan tragedy (7.8 percent) and the labor policy that 
includes the banning of wages to full-time unionists (5.6 percent). 
 
This strong concern among young people about (possible infringements 
of) the freedom of expression is also revealed in response to 
questions about the Constitutional Court's recent decision on the 
media reform legislation.  Some 60.4 percent of respondents feel 
that the Constitutional Court's decision was wrong.  On this same 
survey item, 74.7 percent of those their 20s, 71.8 percent of those 
in their 30s and 66.8 percent of those in their 40s feel the 
decision was wrong.  Moreover, 71.3 percent of those currently 
enrolled in a university and 67 percent of those with undergraduate 
degrees or higher believe the decision was wrong, and 71.3 percent 
of those making more than 4 million Won per month also believe the 
decision was wrong.  Opinions regarding the Constitutional Court's 
decision on the media reform legislation grow more negative as 
education levels and income increase. 
 
On the policy of redeploying troops to Afghanistan, opposition (49.8 
percent) was slightly higher than support (42.4 percent).  Men and 
women were at odds, with 54.4 percent of men supporting the troop 
deployment and 41.3 percent opposing it, and 30.8 percent of women 
supporting it and 58.0 percent opposing it. 
 
The phone survey results are taken from a nationwide sample of 1000 
adults, 19 years old and older.  The results indicate a margin of 
error of plus or minus 3.1 percent at a confidence level of 95 
percent. 
 
 
 
STEPHENS