VZCZCXRO7242
PP RUEHDE
DE RUEHBUL #3504/01 3071302
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 031302Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2712
INFO RUEHAD/AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI 2012
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 8056
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 3089
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 7416
RUEHDE/AMCONSUL DUBAI 7097
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC 0930
RHMFISS/HOMELAND SECURITY CENTER WASHINGTON DC 0051

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 003504 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR S/SRAP, SCA/A, AND EEB 
TREASURY FOR M. KAPLAN, A. WELLER, AND J. CASAL 
DHS FOR IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT - OPERATIONS 
DHS FOR CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION - INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN SNAR ETRD KCRM KCOR PGOV AF
SUBJECT: HELPING AFGHANS CHECK FOR UNDISCLOSED CASH MOVEMENTS AT 
KABUL'S INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT -- OPERATION FLY AWAY I 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary: On October 25 and 26, an Embassy Kabul 
interagency team worked with Afghan authorities to conduct an 
information gathering operation at Kabul International Airport, 
examining whether both arriving and departing passengers properly 
document currency they are bringing into or out of the country.  The 
operation also provided a force multiplier for Afghan customs during 
peak hours and contributed to a more robust revenue collection 
environment.  Concerns identified out of the exercise include 
failure to screen VIPs and their luggage adequately, lack of control 
over access to the inbound customs areas, lack of adequate ramp 
access control, and no examination of handheld personal property 
carried by airline employees leaving the ramp through the customs 
area.  The following are among the recommendations emerging from the 
exercise:  better control sheets and standard operating practices to 
verify the amounts of currency carried by travelers and to seize the 
money if warranted, improved measures to facilitate customs 
examination and the collection of any duties owed, tighter screening 
of VIPs and their luggage, and strengthened procedures governing 
access to the ramp and other airport facilities.  To help implement 
the recommendations, U.S. BMTF will deploy two Customs and Border 
Police monitors at the airport within the next 30 days.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) On October 25 and 26, a team comprised of Afghan Customs 
Department (ACD) and Afghan Border Police (ABP)officers, with 
support from the U.S. Border Management Task Force, Treasury, Drug 
Enforcement Administration, the UK Serious Organized Crime Agency 
(SOCA), and the Transportation Security Agency, conducted an 
information gathering operation -- "Operation Fly Away" -- at Kabul 
International Airport.  The operation focused on ensuring both 
arriving and departing passengers had completed all currency 
declaration forms.  The operation also identified several important 
gaps in the areas of customs and general airport security. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Afghan officials conducting the operation identified two 
money couriers with undeclared currency leaving Afghanistan.  The 
two turned out to be from the Russian Embassy in Kabul and were 
traveling with $50,000 and $15,000 respectively.  When asked by the 
Afghan Customs Department to complete a currency declaration, the 
travelers asked someone from the Russian Embassy to come and help 
complete the form.  The Embassy sent someone to help the two staff 
members.  Both passengers stated they were unaware of the 
requirement to declare money coming or going from Afghanistan. 
Under Afghan law, anyone carrying one million Afghani ($20,000) must 
declare the cash to Afghan Customs authorities upon departure or 
arrival (Note: the amount is $10,000 in the U.S.).  There was no 
protest at the airport by the Russians of their treatment by the 
Afghan officials. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) No passengers were detected bringing money into 
Afghanistan during the operation.  However, several passengers did 
fail to declare goods and Afghan Customs officials had them pay the 
requisite duties. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) In addition to the identified couriers, the operation 
revealed several procedural gaps: 
 
-- When passengers arrive into or depart from Kabul they are not 
asked if they are carrying more than one million Afghani (or the 
equivalent). 
 
-- The Currency Declaration forms are not numbered/sequenced. 
 
-- There are problems with the translations the Currency Declaration 
forms and an inadequate number of forms are available at the 
airport. 
 
-- Neither the inbound nor the outbound area of the terminal has a 
private room to count money for verification purposes. 
 
-- Standard procedures for fund verification are not in place, nor 
are there the money counting machines, scales, or other items 
necessary to routinely enforce the law. 
 
THE NEED TO IMPROVE CUSTOMS INSPECTION AND COLLECTION 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶6.  (SBU) The operation also uncovered several serious gaps in how 
customs duties are assessed, collected, and catalogued.  These gaps 
 
KABUL 00003504  002 OF 004 
 
 
include: 
 
-- Afghan officers rely heavily on the x-ray machine to do all 
examinations.  There are also too many people at the x-ray machine. 
 
-- There are no signs posted showing what the duty rates are and 
what each Afghan citizen is allowed to bring into the country.  The 
staff lacks a Standard Operating Procedure for collecting duties 
owed and supervisors rarely engage employees. 
 
-- The customs officers do not itemize goods for duty collection. 
 
-- The "green" and "red" zones are reversed and do not operate 
effectively. 
 
-- Customs officers do not engage with the traveling public. 
 
-- There is insufficient supervision of customs officials' 
activities. 
 
AIRPORT SECURITY CONCERNS 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (SBU) Also during the operation, participants observed a number 
of serious security concerns at the airport.  These security 
concerns affect other aspects of airport operation and should be 
remedied.  Specific security concerns include: 
 
-- VIPs are not thoroughly screened and are allowed to bypass 
security. 
 
-- VIPs do not need to be present to claim their baggage and 
frequently utilize a third party to introduce and/or collect 
baggage. 
 
-- Arriving and departing conveyances are not properly screened for 
contraband. 
 
-- Lack of control over who enters the Passport Control Area. 
 
-- Lack of control over who enters the inbound customs area where 
baggage is collected. 
 
-- Passengers are allowed to leave the customs area and re-enter 
with their hand luggage. 
 
-- No examination of handheld personal property of airline employees 
leaving the ramp through the customs area. 
 
-- Ramp access is not controlled; there is no valid security 
presence on the ramp.  Vehicles come and go on the ramp without 
adequate controls.  No foreign object detection is done on the 
vehicles entering the ramp area. 
 
RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE AIRPORT OPERATIONS 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) After the operation concluded, the Border Management Task 
Force, in consultation with other participating agencies, put 
forward several recommendations to improve procedures at Kabul 
International Airport: 
 
a) Enhancing cash declaration compliance 
 
-- Control sheets and Standard Operating Procedures should be 
developed for the Afghan Customs Department for the verification of 
currency entering/leaving and the seizure of money. 
 
-- All passengers should be asked if they are carrying more than one 
million Afghanis (or equivalent in negotiable instruments) and, if 
the answer is yes, complete a currency declaration form.  If the 
person cannot read or write, someone at the airport should be 
available to assist. 
 
-- The Currency Declaration Form should be revised, translation 
problems corrected, and the forms numbered sequentially.  The forms 
should also be separately available in triplicate, vice bound in 
books as they are now. 
 
 
KABUL 00003504  003 OF 004 
 
 
-- An audio/video message should be made and broadcast in the 
airport for passengers describing the cash declaration laws (in 
Pashtu, Dari, and English). 
 
-- Two rooms should be identified for verifying currency (one in the 
inbound and as well as one in the outbound area).  These rooms 
should be equipped with an adequate number of machines to count 
currency. 
 
-- An Afghan Customs Department officer and an Afghan Border Police 
officer should be stationed at the final search point prior to 
entering the outbound lounge. 
 
b)  Increasing compliance with Afghan customs regulations 
 
-- Establish clear green and red zones. 
 
-- A Standard Operating Procedure must be written for customs duty 
collection, along with one for compliance and enforcement. 
 
-- Reasonable goals need to be established for the collection of 
customs revenues at the airport. 
 
-- All VIPs must be present for baggage collection and customs 
declaration. 
 
-- Only Afghan Customs and Border Police should be allowed behind 
the x-ray machine. 
 
-- Other law enforcement must submit a request and plan in order to 
be in the customs area. 
 
-- An Afghan Border Police officer should be placed at all entrances 
of the customs area to ensure only authorized personnel have 
access. 
 
-- The Afghan Customs Supervisor should be required to sign off on 
all duty collection forms. 
 
-- Central Bank personnel should be provided space in the customs 
area to take physical possession of duty payments. 
 
-- No travel expeditors should be allowed in customs area. 
 
-- No airline personnel other than those with flights are allowed in 
the customs area. 
 
c)  Tightening security procedures at KIA 
 
-- Standard Operating Procedures for security should be written and 
discussed with staff. 
 
-- An Airport Security Taskforce should be established, led by the 
authority responsible for coordinating implementation of security 
controls. 
 
-- A new VIP process should be developed to serve as interim 
operating procedures and incorporated into the airport security 
program. 
 
-- A formal checkpoint to control passenger and employee access to 
the new airport terminal is necessary. 
 
-- A new badge access system should be implemented.  The system 
should include a mechanism for temporary workers as well.  An 
interagency committee of Afghan law enforcement/transportation 
officials should issue the badges.  A color-coding method should be 
used to delineate access to various parts of the airport. 
 
-- The ABP should deploy necessary physical security to control the 
ramp.  Global Security (a private contractor providing security at 
the airport) could help provide an additional layer of security for 
the building's interior. 
 
-- Procedures are needed for authorized agencies requiring access to 
airport security areas. 
 
-- A closed circuit TV (CCTV) system should be installed and 
appropriate secure location in the airport identified where the CCTV 
 
KABUL 00003504  004 OF 004 
 
 
can be monitored and security tapes stored.  This location will also 
require communication upgrades to ensure connectivity with 
appropriate law enforcement and airport officials.  Established 
operating procedures for ABP personnel and training in those 
procedures should be established. 
 
WAY AHEAD - OPERATION FLY AWAY II 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Moving forward, plans are underway for Operation Fly Away 
II, incorporating the DHS ICE program "Hands Across the World." 
Doing so will require the government of the UAE to participate along 
with DHS/ICE personnel assigned to Dubai.  All participating 
agencies in Operation Fly Away I will be included the next 
operation. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) In a concerted effort to implement the recommendations 
outlined above, BMTF will deploy two Customs and Border police 
mentors at the airport within the next 30 days. 
 
EIKENBERRY