VZCZCXRO6006
PP RUEHROV
DE RUEHJM #1971/01 3060827
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 020827Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6516
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JERUSALEM 001971 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA FOR FRONT OFFICE, SEMEP, AND IPA. NSC FOR SHAPIRO/KUMAR. 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER KWBG KPAL IS EG
SUBJECT: EGYPTIAN REPRESENTATIVE TO THE PA UPDATES ON GOE 
INTRA-PALESTINIAN RECONCILIATION STRATEGY 
 
REF: JERUSALEM 1891 
 
Classified By: CG Daniel Rubinstein for reason 1.4 (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In an October 28 meeting with the Consul 
General in Jerusalem, Egyptian Representative to the PA Yasir 
Othman provided an update on Fatah-Hamas reconciliation 
efforts.  He said the GOE continues to press Hamas to sign a 
draft Egyptian reconciliation text, but does not anticipate 
that Hamas will do so, due to opposition from Syria, Iran, 
and the Hamas military wing in Gaza.  For the GOE, the most 
important part of the agreement is a joint security committee 
under "Arab supervision," which will supposedly pave the way 
to remobilize PA security forces in Gaza.  He acknowledged 
USG concerns over the GOE strategy, but insisted it remains 
preferable to the status quo.  Othman said reconciliation 
through elections must occur before Abu Mazen can engage 
seriously in negotiations with the GOI.  End Summary. 
 
GOE Contines to Press Hamas to Sign, 
Knowing Hamas Remains Unready 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Othman began by noting that the GOE continues to press 
Hamas to sign a draft reconciliation proposal tabled earlier 
this month (reftel).  However, Othman said, it is unlikely 
Hamas will sign in the near future.  Gaza-based Hamas leaders 
Ismail Haniya and Mahmoud Zahar want to sign "with 
observations," he claimed, but Gaza military wing commander 
Ahmed Ja'bari remains adamantly opposed, since the current 
Egyptian text prohibits "unauthorized military structures." 
Hamas' Damascus-based leadership is also being pressured by 
Iran and Syria not to sign, he claimed. 
 
¶3. (C) As a result, Othman said, "our assessment is that 
Mish'al is buying time" and cannot agree to the current text. 
 Nonetheless, the GOE contines to press Hamas to agree.  "Our 
position remains the same," Othman said, adding, "Abu Mazen 
has signed already.  With Hamas, we are saying come to Cairo, 
sign, and then we can discuss your reservations."  The Consul 
General noted the importance of USG-GOE consultations before 
taking any additional steps. 
 
For GOE, Security Commmittee Key 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) For the GOE, Othman noted, the joint security 
committee is the most important component of the 
reconciliation proposal, as it would supervise implementation 
of key aspects of the agreement, such as Palestinian 
elections.  Othman said the committee would be under the 
supervision of Egyptian and Arab personnel based in Gaza.  By 
calling for the remobilization of 3,000 PA security force 
members in Gaza, it would allow the PA to re-establish a 
foothold there.  He acknowledged that, on paper, the 
committee's mandate would extend to PA security forces in the 
West Bank as well, but the GOE had kept the language on this 
point "intentionally vague" in order to exploit the 
"constructive ambiguity" in its discussions with Hamas. 
 
Political Rollback of Hamas Control 
Only Viable Strategy for Gaza 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) "Hamas is a reality on the ground," Othman noted, and 
rolling back its control can only be accomplished over time. 
He admitted that the agreement "shelves" the issue of 
demobilizing Hamas' military wing (the Izzedin al Qassam 
Brigades) for now.  "The Qassam brigades are a fact on the 
ground and cannot be addressed right away," he said, 
comparing the approach to that adopted by the international 
community toward Hizballah's military wing in Lebanon.  What 
the GOE proposal offers, he said, is for the PA to move from 
a situation in which it has no control over Gaza to one in 
which it has "partial" influence there. 
 
Flawed Reconciliation Preferable to Status Quo 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6. (C) Othman acknowledged USG concerns over this approach. 
He defended the GOE strategy as an imperfect resolution to 
the situation for an interim phase only, between now and 
Palestinian elections.  "It's not a permanent agreement," he 
said.  He also warned of the dangers of continued stalemate. 
Hamas is solidifying its security and political control in 
Gaza, he noted.  Control of the tunnel economy has 
strengthened its hand, and Hamas is buying up real estate, 
including significant portions of the evacuated Israeli 
settlements.  Over the longer term, its policies are 
 
JERUSALEM 00001971  002 OF 002 
 
 
contributing to a "lost generation" of Gazans subjected to 
Hamas' educational and social policies. 
 
¶7. (C) Stalemate also does not benefit Hamas' interests, 
Othman said.  He claimed resistance to Hamas' authority is 
growing among disaffected ideologues, some of whom have split 
off from Hamas' military wing to join Salafist groups.  While 
these problems do not challenge Hamas' control, they 
increasingly complicate its ability to advance a coherent 
agenda.  He also said that the "lesson" the GOE had learned 
from Hamas' decision to breach the border fence in January 
2008 is that the situation cannot be left to fester.  "Gaza 
is a time bomb," he said, "and it will explode in someone's 
face" if the status quo prevails. 
 
¶8. (C) Othman then provided his assessment of how 
reconciliation affects the USG's effort to restart 
Israeli-Palestinian negotiations.  "Abu Mazen can't sign an 
agreement without reconciliation," he said.  Othman cautioned 
that the absence of a political horizon for Palestinians, and 
efforts by rejectionists to exploit tensions over Jerusalem, 
were further undermining peacemaking efforts.  "So our 
assessment is that the only way Abu Mazen can move forward is 
through elections." 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶9. (C) We have generally found Othman a candid interlocutor 
on reconciliation and other issues, though we defer to 
Embassy Cairo as to the extent his statements accurately 
reflect GOE policy.  The GOE's preferred sequence of 
reconciliation before negotiations may present problems, 
though it is not inconsistent with Fatah's own strategy of 
renewing its legitimacy through Palestinian elections (or by 
painting Hamas as the party standing in the way of 
elections). 
 
RUBINSTEIN