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S E C R E T GENEVA 000934 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-VI): 
TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP MEETING, OCTOBER 21, 2009 
 
REF: GENEVA 0875 (SFO-GVA-V-042) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-VI-011. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  October 21, 2009 
                Time:  3:00  - 6:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) On Wednesday, October 21, 2009, at 3:00 P.M., a 
meeting of the START Follow-on (SFO) Treaty Text and 
Definitions Working Group (TTDWG) took place at the U.S. 
Mission.  The TTDWG was chaired by Ambassador Ries on the 
U.S. side and Mr. Koshelev on the Russian side.  The meeting 
began with discussion of the draft treaty's final provisions, 
which include withdrawal and extension.  The sides reached 
agreement on the extension provision but remained in discord 
over the withdrawal clause. 
 
¶4.  (S) Ms. Kotkova presented the Russian side's response to 
the U.S.-proposed joint draft text (JDT) on the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission (BCC).  The sides were able to agree 
on most provisions, but the Russian side reserved on the 
issue of provisional application.  The sides agreed to leave 
brackets around the section of the draft protocol dealing 
with convening a special session of the BCC. 
 
¶5.  (S) Finally, Adm Kuznetsov delivered a proposal, based on 
his personal experience negotiating START, on how to tackle 
the issue of terms and definitions by forming a subgroup to 
discuss and resolve differences.  Ries took his proposal for 
further consideration. 
 
¶6.  (U) SUBJECT SUMMARY:  Discussion of Previously Exchanged 
Texts for Final Provisions; BCC Protocol Dj Vous; and How 
to Address Terms and Definitions. 
 
------------------------- 
DISCUSSION OF PREVIOUSLY 
EXCHANGED TEXTS FOR FINAL 
PROVISIONS 
------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Ries began the meeting by introducing revised 
language on treaty extension (Article XV of the U.S. draft 
text).  She explained that the new formulation eliminated the 
phrase "at any time" since its absence implied that a Party 
could raise the issue of extension at any time.  Koshelev 
queried Ries on the meaning and application of the phrase "so 
decide" listed in the last sentence.  Ries commented that the 
phrase referred to the Parties having decided to extend the 
treaty, not to jointly consider the matter of extension. 
 
¶8.  (S) Koshelev asked whether the U.S. side had a new 
proposal on Treaty withdrawal.  Ries said that the United 
States could not accept a Russian condition of withdrawal 
that is linked to a quantitative or qualitative buildup in 
the capabilities of strategic missile defense systems.  Nor 
 
could the United States accept the Russian proposal to 
terminate the treaty three months from receipt of a Party's 
statement of an extraordinary event as having jeopardized its 
supreme interest.  (Begin comment:  The U.S. proposal is six 
months.  End comment.)  Koshelev acknowledged that the TTDWG 
would not be able to resolve the issue, but asked Ries 
whether both sides could agree on the remaining text.  Ries 
responded that if the Russians removed the phrase on 
conditional withdrawal, the United States could accept the 
rest of the paragraph as shown in the JDT. 
 
---------------------- 
BCC PROTOCOL DJ VOUS 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Kotkova handed over a Russian-proposed JDT on the BCC 
and mentioned that, to a great extent, the Russian side had 
accepted U.S.-proposed language from the U.S.-proposed JDT of 
the BCC Protocol dated September 30, 2009 (REFTEL); however, 
there were a few provisions that would remain bracketed. 
Methodically, and at some length, Kotkova provided an 
analysis on each paragraph of the text.  She emphasized that 
many differences were structural and once the sides had 
agreed on the treaty structure, many brackets could be 
removed. 
 
¶10.  (S) The following summarizes the content of Kotkova's 
analysis of the BCC by section and paragraph. 
 
- Section I. Composition of the Commission 
 
   -- Paragraph 1.  Difference was only an issue of structure. 
 
   -- Paragraph 2.  Russian side accepted U.S.-proposed 
language. 
 
   -- Paragraph 3.  This paragraph was carried forward from 
START's JCIC Protocol and dealt with the alternating 
chairmanship of meetings during a session, restrictions on 
what should be decided, and which Party should preside.  An 
earlier sentence suggested that the "head representative," 
could be. Koshelev mentioned that these issues had never 
caused problems in the past, the heads of delegation could 
decide and this paragraph could be deleted in its entirety; 
Ries agreed to delete the paragraph. 
 
   -- Paragraph 4.  The difference was structural (section 
versus sub-section). 
 
- Section II. Convening a Session of the Commission 
 
   -- Paragraph 1, Subparagraph b.  Added references to 
Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the request to 
convene a session. 
 
   -- Paragraph 2.  This provision was acceptable to the 
Russian side as the United States had proposed. 
 
   -- Paragraph 3.  Regarding the location of BCC sessions, 
Russia proposed "unless otherwise agreed" to replace "or, as 
appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties" since it 
is shorter and used elsewhere in the BCC Protocol.  Ries and 
Koshelev agreed to a new formulation proposed by Mr. Comeau 
that combines paragraphs 2 and 3 into a new sentence in the 
 
paragraph:  "A session of the Commission shall be convened in 
Geneva, Switzerland, and shall remain in session for no more 
than 15 days, unless otherwise agreed."  Additionally, both 
sides confirmed their understanding that the provision 
"unless otherwise agreed" applied equally to the location 
where the commission is to be convened and the length of the 
session. 
 
   -- Paragraph 4.  This provision was acceptable to the 
Russian side as proposed by the United States. 
 
- Section III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission. 
 
   -- This entire provision was bracketed by the Russian 
side.  Koshelev reiterated that this provision was supposed 
to respond to an urgent situation but in reality it had never 
been used.  The Russian side believed the mechanism was 
inefficient since either Party had a period of 7 days in 
which to respond and up to 10 days to meet after a response, 
by which time the urgent matter would have passed.  It would 
be more beneficial to address immediate concerns through the 
Commissioners' direct communication.  Ries said the United 
States viewed the provision as a valuable mechanism and tool 
available to both sides which obligated the sides to have a 
meeting in the event a serious concern arose.  Just because 
it had never been used did not mean it was not useful to have 
available.  Ries said the U.S. side would consider the 
Russian points. 
 
- Section IV. Agenda 
 
   -- Paragraph 1.  The difference was an issue of the 
ultimate structure for the documents. 
 
   -- Paragraph 2.  Regarding "immediately preceding or" with 
reference to questions which may arise before a meeting. 
Ries commented that, since this was already accommodated in 
Section I, paragraph 2, the United States was willing to 
delete the text.  In the last sentence Russia proposed to 
retain the opportunity to agree during a session on the date 
of the next session.  Ries deferred agreement until the 
United States had an opportunity to study the legal aspects 
and determine whether the right existed already in Section 
II, paragraph 2. 
 
   -- Paragraph 3.  Russia proposed to delete this provision 
since it was spelled out in Section II, paragraph 1 that the 
Commission would meet no fewer than two times each year, 
unless otherwise agreed.  The right to meet existed 
irrespective of the number of questions a Party proposes for 
the agenda.  Ries agreed to delete this paragraph. 
 
- Section V. Work of the Commission 
 
   -- Russia proposed to delete text referring to number, 
languages, and authenticity of the Commission's recorded 
agreements.  After much discussion between Kotkova and Mr. 
Dean on the merits of retaining and deleting the text, Mr. 
Dunn provided the convincing argument.  Dunn indicated that, 
in his experience in other bilateral venues when documents 
were prepared in two languages without completing a formal 
conforming process, it was discovered after signature that 
there were errors in interpretation of the language.  By 
including an obligation that in effect required the sides to 
 
complete a formal conforming process, it would avoid 
potential misunderstandings after BCC documents were agreed. 
The Russian side decided to leave the text in the paragraph 
as the United States had proposed. 
 
- Section VI. Costs 
 
   -- Russian side had no differences with the U.S.-proposed 
text. 
 
- Section VII. Communications 
 
   -- The first bracket was purely structural but the second 
bracket referring to the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers 
(NRRC) could be reduced in length by deleting some of the 
explanatory text.  Ries accepted the Russian proposal to 
delete "of the Russian Federation, and the Nuclear Risk 
Reduction Center of the United States of America" and making 
the reference to the NRRCs plural. 
 
- Section VIII. Additional Procedures 
 
   -- Paragraph 1.  This provision was acceptable to the 
Russian side as the United States had proposed. 
 
   -- The remaining paragraphs dealt exclusively with the 
concept of provisional application and would be solved 
simultaneously with the concept of provisional application 
for the treaty writ large.  Dean clarified the intent behind 
paragraph 3; without provisional application of the treaty 
article, provisional application of a protocol on its own 
would not make sense.  He further explained that the protocol 
drew its mandate from the treaty article whereas the 
procedures governing the operation of the BCC were in the 
protocol; this paragraph meant that both the treaty article 
and the protocol would operate provisionally in conformity 
with each other.  Ries asked whether the Russian side had 
concerns with the content of the section.  Kotkova said it 
was not a matter of the concept of provisional application 
but rather that Russia believed a decision should be taken 
when the concept of provisional application for the treaty as 
a whole was decided. 
 
Kotkova said she would prepare a clean text of the document 
and hand it over to the U.S. side. 
 
-------------------- 
HOW TO ADDRESS TERMS 
AND DEFINITIONS 
-------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Regarding two U.S. non-papers on terms and 
definitions, Ries said the first list was based on those 
terms and definitions that the United States believed would 
be easily agreed upon by the United States and Russia since 
both sides had identical texts and the second list conveyed 
those terms on which the sides' proposals were relatively 
close.  Kuznetsov claimed it was the first time he had seen 
the documents provided by the U.S. side but allowed that he 
was prepared to work in any format on any issue.  Kuznetsov 
further proposed a mechanism and format to address terms and 
definitions.  He proposed a TTDWG subgroup be formed to 
discuss the issue.  Ries thanked Kuznetsov for his desire for 
efficiency, but mentioned the idea was new for the U.S. side 
 
and the delegation would need to consider it. 
 
¶12.  (S) Ries said it was important to consider how the terms 
were used in the treaty because there might be different 
interpretations on both sides.  Also, she mentioned that the 
TTDWG must continue to work through the treaty articles and 
it made sense to coordinate work on terms and definitions 
with work on the treaty articles but also to allow for both 
to proceed simultaneously.  She said there was a much shorter 
time to work on the terms and definitions than in the 
original START negotiations, but she would report Kuznetsov's 
suggestion, will discuss the proposal with her colleagues, 
and respond expeditiously. 
 
¶13.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- U.S.: 
 
   -- U.S. Non-Paper on Proposal for Discussion of Agreed 
Terms, October 21, 2009; 
 
   -- U.S. Non-Paper on Proposal of Terms for Discussion, 
October 21, 2009; and 
 
   -- U.S.-proposed Text, ((Article XV))1 ((XIV))2, Paragraph 
2, October 21, 2009. 
 
- Russia: 
 
   -- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text on Section VI, 
Bilateral Consultative Commission, October 21, 2009. 
 
¶14.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Amb Ries 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Connell 
Mr. Dean 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Taylor 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
Mr. Shkeyrov (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Ms. Fuzhenkova 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Kamenskiy 
Adm Kuznetsov 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Ms. Zharkih 
Mr. Gayduk (Int) 
 
¶15.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS