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Viewing cable 09CHIANGMAI178, PM'S PLANNED NOV. 29 VISIT GALVANIZES RED-SHIRTS TO ACT IN

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CHIANGMAI178 2009-11-25 11:10 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO8305
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0178/01 3291110
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 251110Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1220
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1312
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000178 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/25/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV SOCI PHUM CASC ASEC TH
SUBJECT: PM'S PLANNED NOV. 29 VISIT GALVANIZES RED-SHIRTS TO ACT IN 
CHIANG MAI 
 
REF: A. CHIANG MAI 173 (DIALOGUE EXPANDS) 
     B. CHIANG MAI 3 (RED-SHIRTS FLEX) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000178  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
-------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
1.  (C) In the wake of anti-government red-shirt rhetoric 
tantamount to death threats against Prime Minister Abhisit 
Vejjajiva, red-shirts and supporters of former Prime Minister 
Thaksin are gearing up for a potential showdown with security 
forces in Chiang Mai during Prime Minister Abhisit's planned 
November 29 visit to the province to address a national 
gathering of the Thai Chambers of Commerce.  Potential 
flashpoints include the airport and Le Meridien Hotel (the 
meeting venue).   Unable to rule out protests turning violent, 
the Consulate has issued a warden message and a security notice. 
 
 
 
2.  (C) Comment: Had the red-shirts stuck to their plan to 
convene a national rally in Bangkok beginning on November 28 
designed to bring down Abhisit's government, splits between 
moderates and hardcore Thaksin supporters in Chiang Mai would 
have become evident to even the most casual observer.  The 
former were planning to join the red-shirt rally in Bangkok, 
while the latter, led by the militant Rak Chiang Mai 51 (RCM51), 
were poised to spearhead this weekend's actions in Chiang Mai. 
The moderates are likely to keep their distance from any 
violence this weekend, but the numbers of Thaksin supporters 
expected to travel to Chiang Mai from other provinces in the 
wake of today's cancellation of the November 28 national rally 
may only serve to embolden RCM51 and swell its ranks. 
 
 
 
3.  (C) Comment Cont.: Though its membership in the inner city 
is declining, RCM51 is still capable of mobilizing up-country 
masses to join rallies on important occasions, largely through 
financial support from pro-Thaksin politicians.  For now, its 
voice resonates much more with the rural populace than does that 
of less-well-funded moderate groups like the Confederation for 
Grassroots Democracy and other red-shirt groups in the nascent 
Coalition for a Peaceful and Livable Chiang Mai.  We will 
monitor the situation closely, but given RCM51's record of 
clashes with the security forces and other political groups (Ref 
B and previous), violent clashes are a real possibility.  End 
Summary and Comment. 
 
 
 
------------------------------ 
 
Come to Abhisit's Cremation 
 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
4.  (SBU) In a November 19 broadcast on his pro-Thaksin radio 
station, RCM51 leader Phetcharawat Wattanaphongsirikul and a 
Bangkok-based UDD ( United Front for Democracy Against 
Dictatorship. Or "red-shirts") leader invited listeners to 
attend a cremation ceremony for PM Abhisit on November 29 in 
Chiang Mai, where he plans to address a national gathering of 
the Thai Chambers of Commerce.  Describing the action as 
retribution for the Government's handling of the red-shirt 
demonstrations in Bangkok and Pattaya in April, during which 
they asserted (without presenting evidence) that demonstrators 
were killed and their corpses disposed of, they called on 
listeners to encircle the airport and eliminate "the root cause" 
of the country's pain.  In order to make this a reality, they 
also called on all red-shirt groups to put aside their 
ideological and tactical differences to join together.  They 
asserted that PM Abhisit could travel anywhere he wanted in 
Thailand except the eight upper northern provinces. 
 
 
 
5.  (C) A moderate red-shirt leader told us on November 24 that 
hardcore red-shirt protestors would be stationed at the airport 
and at the conference venue (Le Meridien hotel).  He claimed 
they would be ready to set off fireworks and flares to prevent 
the PM's plane from landing, and to forestall any evacuation 
aircraft (helicopters) that may try to land or takeoff from the 
meeting venue.  Some red-shirt supporters at the airport would 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000178  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
also wear yellow shirts and provoke what would appear to be 
red-on-yellow clashes, he asserted.  He opined that these 
actions are designed to provoke a violent reaction by local 
authorities and security forces.  The same source told us a day 
later - after UDD's decision to cancel its November 28 Bangkok 
rally - that many northern red-shirt supporters who had been 
planning to travel to the Bangkok rally would now instead come 
to Chiang Mai to participate in the anti-Abhisit protest on the 
29th.  Separately, the Chiang Mai Vice Governor also told us 
that he expected participation in the Nov. 29 Chiang Mai rally 
to swell with northern red-shirt supporters who otherwise would 
have gone to the Bangkok demonstration. 
 
 
 
6.  (C) Separately, we note that while the Provincial Government 
(RTG-appointed) is in favor of the PM's visit going ahead as 
planned, the (elected) President of the Provincial 
Administrative Organization and former Chiang Mai Mayor Boonlert 
Buranupakorn - a known hardcore red-shirt supporter - has 
publicly recommended that the PM not come to Chiang Mai. 
According to the Vice Governor, Boonlert and pro-Thaksin Puea 
Thai MPs are bankrolling RCM51 and other militant red-shirt 
groups.  (Note: Boonlert's nephew is the current Mayor, though 
he is facing legal challenges surrounding his election. 
Boonlert's brother is a former Thai Rak Thai MP and former 
Chiang Mai mayor, and is one of the 111 TRT politicians banned 
from holding political office.)  The Vice Governor observed that 
this network of financial support from pro-Thaksin politicians 
provided RCM51 and other hardcore red-shirt groups in the north 
with resources that moderate red-shirt groups could not match. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
The Government Responds 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
7.  (C) Armed with an audio tape of the November 19 broadcast, 
Chiang Mai's Provincial Government sought an arrest warrant for 
Phetcharawat, which the court has yet to issue, arguing it needs 
more evidence.  Chiang Mai's Vice Governor blamed the provincial 
police for not securing additional evidence, such as witnesses 
who actually heard the broadcast.  It remains unclear whether 
the police are actively seeking such evidence, or whether the 
pro-Thaksin bias of many rank and file police officers in Chiang 
Mai will stall this investigation, as the Vice Governor claims 
it has in other cases.  (Note: Phetcharawat has complied with 
other arrest warrants issued for him, but publicly stated that 
he will not comply if one is issued in this case.) 
 
 
 
8.  (C) Beyond seeking the arrest warrant, the Vice Governor 
outlined for us other measures that will be in place to prevent 
protestors from interfering with the PM's program.  On a 
regional level, governments in nearby northern provinces are 
collaborating on steps to slow down the flow of red-shirt 
supporters into Chiang Mai - with the aim of delaying their 
arrival until after Abhisit's departure (he is expected to be in 
Chiang Mai from about 9:00 to noon on the 29th).  Neighboring 
provinces are also sending personnel and equipment to Chiang Mai 
to enable local authorities to screen all protestors in the 
vicinity of the meeting venue.  The Vice Governor described 
these as "full scale" measures.  Separately, two Chiang Mai 
Chamber of Commerce (COC) executives scheduled to participate in 
the November 27-29 conference told us they are concerned for 
their personal safety, and are making arrangements to escape 
from the meeting venue on short notice if necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
Moderate Voices Speak Up, But Lack Influence 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
 
 
9.  (C) Fearful of the violence that could unfold, Chamber of 
Commerce and Federation of Thai Industries (COC and FTI) 
representatives belonging to the Coalition for a Peaceful and 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000178  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Livable Chiang Mai (Ref A) convened an urgent meeting of the 
group on November 24.  The Provincial Government did not send 
representatives, but COC, FTI, yellow-shirt members and moderate 
red-shirt leaders attended.  They were joined this time by three 
military intelligence officers, two religious leaders, and two 
representatives of a network of local government officials.  All 
sides characterized the situation as worrisome, noting that 
up-country red-shirt supporters were actively being mobilized on 
instructions from Bangkok, and that there was no way to stop 
them.  The military participants remarked that they expected at 
least 5,000 protestors to converge on Chiang Mai.  (Comment: 
this figure is likely to be revised upward following the 
postponement of the November 28 red-shirt rally in Bangkok). 
 
 
 
10. (C) The local government officials reportedly asked the COC 
and FTI participants why the national Chamber gathering had to 
take place now, and if they had given any thought to the costs 
of providing security for the PM.  COC and FTI participants 
replied that plans had been laid as far back as 2007 for this 
event, a venue had been set, and that it was very important for 
them to have a dialogue directly with the PM.  A moderate 
red-shirt leader reportedly asked whether the two million plus 
residents of Chiang Mai province should let themselves be held 
hostage by a few hundred troublemakers, noting the importance of 
the silent majority speaking out forcefully and renouncing 
violence.  Attendees agreed to hold a press conference on 
November 25, which was attended by COC, FTI, and both yellow and 
(moderate) red-shirt leaders.  At that event, participants, 
including the Vice Governor, appealed for calm, and for the 
public not to disrupt the PM's visit. 
 
 
 
11. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. 
MORROW