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OO RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0171/01 3170708
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 130708Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1205
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1296

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 CHIANG MAI 000171 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EAP/MLS, NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/13/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINR PHUM PTER TH MY
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN THAILAND:  SKEPTICAL ARMY LEADERSHIP STEPPING 
ABOARD SECRET DIALOGUE PROCESS 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 2844 (Chavalit Stirs the Pot) 
     ¶B. CHIANG MAI 145 (PM Pushes Secret Dialogue) 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 2096 (HDC Dialogue Resumes) 
     ¶D. BANGKOK 2792 (Najib Wades In) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000171  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
----------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (S)  PM Abhisit appears to be bringing a skeptical Thai 
military leadership more fully on board with his policy to 
resume a secret dialogue with insurgents as a means to resolve 
the long-running ethnic Malay Muslim insurgency in the country's 
deep south.  At an Abhisit-chaired November 2 meeting of the 
RTG's southern security policy team, Army Commander Anupong 
joined for the first time and reportedly indicated he would not 
stand in the way of the talks, though he did not believe they 
would succeed.  Days later the latest round of talks were held 
in Manila.  It produced no movement on various 
confidence-building measures, and focused mainly on interference 
by Malaysian security officials who wish to "own" the dialogue 
for themselves, according to one Thai participant.  At a higher 
level, Malaysian PM Najib's recent comment advocating some form 
of autonomy for the southernmost provinces is seen by some 
observers here as an opportunity.  Although "autonomy" is a 
loaded term in the southern Thailand context, the concept of a 
greater local voice in governance has long been on the table as 
an essential element for ending the conflict.  Local empowerment 
in the South will be explored in depth at a high-level seminar 
at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University on November 30. 
 
 
 
¶2. (S)  Comment:  Having General Anupong apparently on board to 
be part of the peace process is, despite Anupong's pessimism, an 
important development.  If it holds, it leaves Abhisit less 
alone in pushing toward a political solution through dialogue -- 
though the negative reaction across much of the Bangkok 
political spectrum (including within Abhisit's own Democrat 
Party) to opposition leader Chavalit's "Pattani City" idea is an 
indication of the political challenge ahead (Ref A).  For now, 
however, the dialogue is making scant progress on 
confidence-building measures that must succeed if meaningful 
progress is to be made toward ending an insurgency that is 
unlikely to be resolved by force of arms.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
Southern Policy:  Bringing the (Skeptical) Army on Board 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (S)  Consul General met November 12 in Chiang Mai with Mark 
Tamthai, Director of Payap University's Institute of Religion, 
Culture and Peace and RTG point-man for secret talks with 
southern insurgents.  Tamthai referred to press accounts of a 
November 2 meeting of the RTG's southern security policy team, 
chaired by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva.  He said the media 
wrongly portrayed the gathering as intended to plot a 
counter-move to the public proposal by opposition Puea Thai 
Party leader Chavalit Yongchaiyut to create a separate, 
autonomous administrative unit for Thailand's three 
insurgency-plagued southernmost provinces (Ref A).  In reality, 
the meeting was held to prepare the RTG negotiating team for the 
latest round of talks that took place later that week in Manila. 
 The RTG typically holds such a meeting prior to every round of 
talks, Tamthai explained.  The November 2 meeting was 
particularly significant, however, for a couple of reasons: 
 
 
 
--  The group finally met with a full slate of members:  PM 
Abhisit chairing, NSC SYG Tawin Piansri, Army Commander Aunpong 
Paochinda, Democrat Party deputy leader Kraisak Choonhavan, MFA 
PermSec Virasak Futrakul, plus Tamthai and NSC Southern team 
lead Somkiat Boonchu. 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000171  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
--  The 90-minute meeting served not only to reaffirm that 
pursuit of a reconciliation track was indeed RTG policy, but 
also to "clear the air" of concerns and doubts about various RTG 
players' commitment to that approach.  Notably, General Anupong, 
who as recently reported was not at all on board with the 
dialogue approach (Ref B), indicated that - while he did not 
believe the talks were useful - he would not stand in the way of 
the process.  (Note:  Tamthai's readout and assessment of the 
meeting tracked precisely with the account the Embassy heard 
November 6 from Human Rights Watch's Sunai Phasuk, who is very 
close to multiple members of the southern policy team.  End 
Note). 
 
 
 
¶4. (S)  During the meeting Anupong was asked whether "not 
standing in the way" would include "not looking the other way" 
when extra-legal violent acts were committed by Army and other 
security-linked personnel.  Anupong replied that, when presented 
with evidence of wrong-doing, he would take appropriate action 
against the perpetrator(s).  He complained, however, that the 
all-too-frequent charges of extra-legal actions that reached 
him, sometimes including name-naming and finger-pointing, were 
rarely accompanied by actionable evidence. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
Malaysia Wants In:  Problems and Opportunities 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
 
 
¶5. (S)  The Manila round of talks, held late in the first week 
of November, was brief and intended mainly to address Malaysian 
"interference" in the peace process, Tamthai reported.  As in 
the past, the insurgent representatives in the negotiations - 
most of whom live in exile in Malaysia - continue to complain of 
harassment by Malaysian Special Branch police officials who wish 
to "own" the dialogue for themselves (Ref C).  The insurgents 
seek "protection" by the RTG, and suggested Bangkok issue them 
written documentation authorizing their travel to and from the 
talks.  (Note:  HRW's Sunai suggested to us that the RTG has now 
resumed paying for insurgent travel to the talks, which had 
occurred under the interim Surayud government in 2007 but was 
stopped in 2008 under the Samak and Somchai governments, due to 
the opposition of the then NSC SYG.  End Note).  The RTG, 
however, is unwilling to put anything in writing.  Through a 
high-level Foreign Ministry channel, the Thais do inform the 
Malaysians about each round of talks, but Tamthai doubts this 
then gets conveyed to other relevant players in the Malaysian 
bureaucracy, particularly the security authorities.  The Manila 
meeting did not produce a way forward on this. 
 
 
 
¶6. (S)  Malaysia's desire to be part of the peace process is 
both a problem and an opportunity for Thailand, Tamthai 
observed.  He said the RTG held the latest round of talks in 
Manila - instead of Jakarta, the usual venue - specifically to 
dispel Malaysia's concern that the Indonesian Government is 
somehow involved.  He also commented on Malaysian Prime Minister 
Najib Razak's late October remark that some form of autonomy for 
Thailand's southernmost provinces could serve as a solution to 
the violence (Ref D).  Tamthai said his insurgent contacts of 
course loved Najib's quote, whereas Democrat Party leaders, the 
RTG, and particularly the Royal Thai Army were more circumspect 
(though largely silent, per Ref D).  He expects the two Prime 
Ministers to again discuss the South on the margins of the 
upcoming APEC Summit, in part to prepare for their recently 
announced joint visit to southern Thailand in December (a topic 
that Tamthai said was not discussed during the Abhisit-chaired 
November 2 meeting on southern security policy). 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
Local Empowerment:  Political Football or A Way Out? 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000171  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
 
¶7. (S)  Not long after Najib's "autonomy" comments, opposition 
Puea Thai leader Chavalit stirred the pot with his proposal to 
create an autonomous "Pattani City" to administer the three 
southernmost provinces.  Tamthai believes Chavalit's engagement 
could be either very helpful to the peace process, or very 
harmful.  On the one hand, Chavalit's suggestion adds another 
(and powerful) voice to an idea that has long been discussed in 
various Thai circles as an essential element in ending the 
southern insurgency.  Tamthai himself is a proponent of 
empowering local communities in the South, often pointing out 
that the notion is workable within the framework of the Thai 
constitution, which provides for a special administrative status 
that is currently accorded to the cities of Bangkok and Pattaya. 
 He also notes that PM Abhisit has consistently stated his 
openness to any solution in the South that fits within the 
constitution.  On the other hand, Tamthai is concerned that in 
the current ultra-charged state of Thai politics, any proposal 
by an opposition leader is sure to be rendered dead on arrival 
by the governing side (see Ref A - our sense is that Chavalit's 
statement was aimed more at domestic political gaming than at 
resolving the southern conflict).  Tamthai is also worried that 
Chavalit's plan to travel to Malaysia to meet with PM Najib will 
further enflame the passions of those who oppose the 
autonomy/local empowerment concept.  He hopes Najib will 
delegate the meeting to a subordinate. 
 
 
 
¶8. (SBU)  Regarding Tamthai's advocacy of the autonomy/local 
empowerment concept, he said the matter would be explored in 
depth at a November 30 seminar at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn 
University.  The three featured speakers at this public event 
would be Tamthai, Deputy Minister of Interior responsible for 
the South Thaworn Senneam, and recently retired Armed Forces 
Supreme Commander Boonsrang Niumpradit. 
 
 
 
----------------------------- 
 
Key CBMs Still Stalled 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶9. (S)  Tamthai reported scant progress on any of the major or 
minor confidence-building measures we last discussed in early 
October (Ref B): 
 
 
 
--  June 8 mosque attack investigation.  Tamthai believes the 
RTG is sincere in saying it simply cannot find the subject of an 
arrest warrant in the case (who is widely assumed, Tamthai 
admitted, to be hidden and protected by a Royal Aide de Camp to 
the Queen).  This makes the RTG look feckless in the eyes of the 
insurgent negotiators, he rued. (Note:  Sunai has shared with us 
a copy of a "Wanted Dead or Alive" poster that has circulated in 
the South in recent weeks.  The poster has photos and bio 
details from the national ID cards of six suspects, and is not 
information the insurgents could have obtained on their own. 
Sunai suggested the poster was the result of security force 
personnel frustrated at the lack of progress and wanting to push 
the issue, sending a signal that some authorities do wish for 
the perpetrators to be found/punished.  End Note). 
 
 
 
--  Prisoner release.  The possible "good faith" release of an 
elderly Muslim spiritual leader, along with two former insurgent 
commanders imprisoned with him about 12 years ago, remains mired 
in a complex legal process.  All three cases are under (lengthy) 
appeal to the Supreme Court, which precludes the possibility of 
petitioning for a Royal pardon.  Tamthai has pitched the idea of 
dropping the appeals in order to pursue Royal pardons, but 
representatives of the incarcerated have turned down this option 
since no one in the RTG is in a position to guarantee that 
pardons would indeed be granted.  (Note:  The Democrat Party's 
Choonhaven told the Embassy in October that he took up the 
release issue with the Justice Minister at Abhisit's request, 
but got the same Catch-22 response.  End Note). 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000171  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
 
 
 
--  Academic study group/Track II approach.  Such a group, to 
consist of three scholars from each "side" who would serve as a 
think-tank arm of Tamthai's National Security Council team, is 
expected to be formed in the not-too-distant future.  Tamthai, 
who will chair the group and select its members, noted two 
difficulties, however.  Firstly, given the consensus that the 
three ethnic Malay Muslim scholars should be closely linked to 
and able to speak for the insurgent movement, nearly all 
credible candidates are living in exile, which would complicate 
the body's ability to meet.  At the same time, any such scholars 
still living inside Thailand (Tamthai knows several) are at risk 
of arrest or worse should they become identified with the 
insurgency.  Secondly, some Thai scholars approached by Tamthai 
have refused to serve if it means having to work with ethnic 
Malay Muslim academics linked to the armed insurgent groups. 
 
 
 
--  Joint development project.  There has been little movement 
on this notion of formulating a development project in the South 
that would marry RTG resources with local community involvement 
- and be backed by a local cease-fire in the locality of the 
project activity.  Although the King's Royal Project has 
expressed interest in engaging in the effort, it does not want 
its involvement to be linked to the broader peace process.  To 
Tamthai and the insurgent negotiators, this condition would 
defeat the purpose of demonstrating the fruits of the peace 
process.  (Note:  the joint development project concept has 
largely replaced long-standing efforts by Tamthai's team to push 
a more ambitious pilot cease-fire in Yala province.  Tamthai 
said there is still some consideration of setting up a pilot 
peace zone, not in Yala but in four districts of Songkhla 
province that have historical links to Pattani.  But since 
Songkhla is not one of the three southern provinces where the 
insurgency is focused, Tamthai lacks enthusiasm for the idea as 
he doubts it would have the public impact of the now-shelved 
Yala plan.  Sunai also lamented that the November 2 group had 
shifted the locale from Yala to Songkhla for the same reason, 
and suggested Army opposition was the deciding factor.  End 
Note). 
 
 
 
¶10. (U)  This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. 
MORROW