VZCZCXRO1006
PP RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH RUEHTRO
DE RUEHCHI #0167/01 3101050
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 061050Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1197
INFO RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1288
RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0076
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000167 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, DRL, INL, IO, PRM 
PACOM FOR FPA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  11/6/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM SNAR PINR PREF BM
SUBJECT: THAI INTELLIGENCE KEEPS WARY EYE ON BURMA BORDER 
 
REF: A. RANGOON 704 (A HEART-TO-HEART WITH THE WA) 
     ¶B. CHIANG MAI 130 (SHAN STATE UPDATE) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000167  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Mike Morrow, CG, ConGen, Chiang Mai. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
----------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
----------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶1. (C)  Thai intelligence service "Burma Watchers" in northern 
Thailand do not believe  conflict is imminent between the Burma 
Army and United Wa State Army (UWSA).  In their view, the Wa's 
military and economic strength, the degree of support the Wa 
enjoy from China, and the regime's hope that it can "handle" the 
Wa by exploiting reported differences among Wa leaders, mitigate 
against near-term action by the Burma Army.  Nonetheless, Thai 
analysts report contingency planning by the Wa in the form of 
setting up temporary reception centers on the Thai border for Wa 
who could be displaced by fighting.  The Thais downplayed the 
possibility of Burma Army "hot pursuit" incursions into Thai 
territory in the event of conflict with the Wa (or Shan), but 
nonetheless have deployed troops to the border area to 
discourage and/or block any such attempt. 
 
 
 
¶2. (C)  Comment:  Northern Thailand's lengthy border with Burma 
has long been a flashpoint for fallout from clashes between the 
Burma Army and various armed ethnic groups.  The fallout 
includes refugees, narcotics and other illicit goods, 
cross-border violence among rival ethnic groups, and - in the 
not too distant past - skirmishes between Burmese and Thai 
troops.  Thai intel's assessment that the Wa are probably too 
tough for the regime to want to take on at this time tracks with 
other views in the region, but likely gives Thai policymakers 
only a thin comfort level as they contemplate cross-border 
scenarios.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
Thai Intel:  Imminent Burma Army Conflict with Wa Unlikely 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---------------- 
 
 
 
¶3. (C)  Consul General discussed Thai-Burma border issues 
November 3 and 5 with the heads of the National Intelligence 
Agency's Northern Intelligence Coordination Center (NIA/NICC) 
and Chiang Mai province's Internal Security Operations Center 
(ISOC).  Both offices keep a close watch on northern Thailand's 
lengthy border with Burma, where tensions and clashes between 
the Burma Army and various armed ethnic groups occasionally 
spill over to the Thai side and/or generate significant refugee 
flows. 
 
 
 
¶4. (C)  Our contacts in both meetings downplayed the possibility 
of imminent conflict between the Burma Army and United Wa State 
Army (this tracks with Ref A reporting from Embassy Rangoon). 
Nonetheless, they believe the Burma Army's August action against 
the Kokang was intended to send a message of intimidation to the 
Wa and other ethnic groups in Eastern Burma who have resisted 
the regime's proposal to join a Border Guard Force under the 
control of the Burma Army.  And the main target of this message 
are the Wa, whom the NIA see as the most formidable fighting 
force among the ethnic groups, with about 30,000 active-duty 
troops. 
 
 
 
¶5. (C)  In the NIA's assessment, several factors mitigate 
against near-term Burma Army action against the Wa: 
 
 
 
--  the high military cost of taking on the well-armed and 
well-organized Wa; 
 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000167  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
--  the potential for economic disruption, given the Wa's 
substantial economic interests throughout Burma; 
 
 
 
--  the Burmese Government's doubts  that the Chinese would 
support a move against the Wa, given China's historical sympathy 
toward the Wa's Burma Communist Party roots; and 
 
 
 
--  the regime's hope that it can "handle" the Wa by reaching 
out to "softliners" within the political leadership and driving 
a wedge between them and hard-core anti-regime Wa leaders.  The 
NIA characterized Wa "softliners" as those with the greatest 
economic stake in avoiding confrontation with the regime, in 
order to protect their investment in the sizeable network of 
businesses the Wa control in Rangoon and around the country. 
The NIA asserted that this group includes Wa narco-traffickers - 
who generate much of the funding the Wa have invested in Burma - 
and specifically named UWSA Commander Pao Yu Hsiang as well as 
Wei Hseu Kang.  Wa "hardliners," on the other hand, are far more 
uncompromising in their attitude toward the regime. The NIA 
identified recently deceased United Wa State Party leader Chao 
Nyi Lai (aka Kyaut Nyi Lai) as part of that group. 
 
 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 But Wa Are Ready Nonetheless 
 
---------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶6. (C)  While believing imminent conflict between the Wa and 
Burma Army is unlikely, the NIA reported indications that the Wa 
are preparing for a fight should it come to that.  The Wa are 
mobilizing their civilians to be moved quickly out of potential 
fighting areas, and are setting up two temporary reception 
centers for those who could be displaced.  Both are adjacent to 
the Thai border, near crossing points at Chiang Mai's Chiang Dao 
and Faang districts - presumably for ease of movement into 
Thailand should the need arise. 
 
 
 
¶7. (C)  The NIA also reported that the UWSA has 105mm howitzers 
obtained from China, but provided no details on the number or 
condition of the pieces, or how they were obtained. 
 
 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
Shan State Army Also a Target 
 
-------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
¶8. (C)  The Shan State Army-South (SSAS) is also a potential 
target for the Burma Army, the NIA and ISOC reported.  However, 
because a major regime attack on the SSA-S could compel it and 
its erstwhile enemy, the UWSA, to find common cause over mutual 
opposition to the Border Defense Force proposal, the NIA 
believes the regime would put off action against the SSA-S 
unless and until it can come to terms with the Wa. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
Burma Army Hot Pursuit into Thailand? 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
 
 
¶9. (C)  We asked whether, should new fighting break out inside 
Burma, the RTG had contingency plans in the event the Burma Army 
were to try to move through Thai territory in "hot pursuit" of 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000167  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
Wa or Shan forces.  While not ruling out such an attempt - 
particularly if moving into Thai territory would provide more 
favorable ground from which to attack the Wa or Shan - the NIA 
considered such an incursion unlikely, because: 
 
 
 
--  the Royal Thai Army (RTA) has deployed forces to the border 
area to discourage and/or block any such attempt (this tracks 
with a mid-September report to us by the RTA's Fifth Special 
Forces commander); and 
 
 
 
--  the RTA successfully prevented the Burma Army from such hot 
pursuit during fighting in 1998-2000. 
 
 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
Thais Consider Refugee Scenarios 
 
------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶10. (C)  The NIA acknowledged the potential for Wa and/or Shan 
refugees to flee into Thailand in the event of new fighting with 
the Burma Army.  Likely entry points would be Chiang Mai's 
Chiang Dao and Faang border crossings (across from where the Wa 
are reportedly setting up contingency reception centers), as 
well as Chiang Rai province's Mae Fah Luang district.  The NIA 
was aware of no detailed RTG plans to handle a potential influx 
in these areas, and surmised that the government would initially 
respond as it had when several thousand ethnic Karen fled into 
Tak province last June:  by providing temporary shelter in 
existing schools and temples. 
 
 
 
¶11. (U)  This cable was coordinated with Embassy Rangoon. 
MORROW