VZCZCXRO0317
PP RUEHBC RUEHDA RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHGB #2993 3171355
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 131355Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5421
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHFSI/DIR FSINFATC WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002993 
 
//////// C O R R E C T E D  C O P Y -- ADDRESSEE ADDED //////// 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
NEA/I FOR PDELLY, WWEEMS 
NEA/SA/EX/I FOR HTOWNSEND 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: APER AFSI AMGT AFIN IZ
SUBJECT: MANDATORY FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE FOR PROVINCIAL 
RECONSTRUCTION TEAM (PRT) MEMBERS 
 
¶1. (U) This message is Sensitive but Unclassified; handle 
accordingly.  Not for distribution on the Internet. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Summary:  This is an action request.  Embassy Baghdad 
requests that State include a mandatory military field training 
component in the series of training courses currently required for 
civilians going out to assignments in PRTs.  Current Iraq PRT 
pre-deployment training includes 15 days of predominantly 
classroom-based training that comprises three mandatory FSI courses: 
PRT Training (AR-420), Iraq Familiarization (FT-610), and 
Diplomatic Security Foreign Affairs Counter-threat (OT-610).  The 
field training component includes two voluntary options of different 
lengths and focus: a nine-day joint PRT-U.S. Army Brigade dynamic 
field exercise and a five-day military familiarization and PRT 
Training course culminating exercise.  The Embassy requests that 
NEA/I now make the civil-military field training initiatives a 
mandatory part of PRT pre-deployment training for career State 
employees and 3161s going to PRT positions in Iraq. USAID also 
recognizes the potential value of the additional pre-deployment 
training for its PRT Representatives, and will consider the option 
of sending its PRT staff, while taking into consideration the 
individuals' prior experience, the timing of vacancies, and the cost 
of the additional training.  End summary. 
 
¶3. (SBU) A field-based exercise is needed to complement the 
classroom-based coursework and offer PRT personnel the opportunity 
to learn and develop the skills necessary to function effectively 
from the moment they arrive in Iraq.  Team Leaders (TLs) have urged 
us to institute such training. Most PRT personnel do not have the 
training or the experience to prepare them for a PRT's intense 
partnership with and reliance on the military, nor for the special 
demands of the high-stress, high-ambiguity circumstances they will 
face in Iraq.   As a result, it takes them months on the ground 
before they become effective.  Intense and immersive field training 
dramatically accelerates this learning curve. 
 
¶4. (SBU) NEA/I has initiated a voluntary nine-day field training 
exercise to complement current classroom training with a dynamic 
field exercise.  Currently, select members of the PRT (Team Leaders, 
reporting and public diplomacy officers, program managers, and USAID 
reps) are approved to attend these exercises at Combat Training 
Centers (CTCs) in Fort Irwin, CA and Fort Polk, LA, where they train 
with a U.S. Army brigade slated to deploy to Iraq. NEA/I is also 
developing a shorter five-day military familiarization and 
culminating exercise at Camp Atterbury, IN for those who cannot 
attend a CTC rotation. 
 
¶5. (SBU) During a CTC rotation, trainees enter a simulated Iraqi 
province and interact with Iraqi officials, tribal and religious 
leaders, and community groups (all Iraqi role players) in the course 
of pursuing PRT and brigade objectives.  They become familiar with 
the structure, function and rhythm of a brigade and conduct joint 
military-PRT planning and operations, learning to navigate the 
inherent tensions between a brigade's priorities and time horizon 
and those of a PRT.  The field exercise is completely immersive, 
intense, and challenging. Participation will dramatically improve 
the performance and effectiveness of PRT personnel, especially in 
the first months of their tour. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Recently-arrived PRT leaders who completed the field 
Q6. (SBU) Recently-arrived PRT leaders who completed the field 
training endorse it enthusiastically for its realism and for the way 
it surpasses the "crash and bang" course in preparing civilians for 
Iraq.  Team leaders have urged us to institute such training, noting 
that it immerses the team member in real life situations -- from 
meetings with key local officials, to convoy operations, to attacks. 
It goes beyond lectures by providing actual practice at interacting 
with actual military units preparing to deploy. To quote one team 
leader," Such training should be mandatory. No responsible military 
leader would send troops or officers into such situations without 
such training and neither should we." 
 
¶7. (SBU) The sophistication of training offered at the Combat 
Training Centers (CTC) in Fort Irwin and Fort Polk makes it 
qualitatively superior to the training at Camp Atterbury.  However, 
the CTC training is longer and requires trainees to be fit into a 
pre-existing schedule of brigade rotations. 
 
¶8.  The Embassy requests that NEA/I send as many PRT trainees as 
possible to the CTCs for field training, instead of limiting this 
opportunity to the PRT's leadership core.  Camp Atterbury would 
remain the more flexible field training venue for the remainder 
unable to attend a CTC. 
 
¶9. (SBU) CTC participation will cost approximately $1154 per person. 
The Camp Atterbury course will cost $805 per person.  NEA/I has 
already budgeted for these costs.  Emphasis should be on maximizing 
attendance at the CTCs, but those unable to attend a CTC rotation 
should go to Camp Atterbury.  Post strongly encourages other 
agencies contributing personnel to PRTs to make the field training 
mandatory for their detailees.  Other agencies will have to bear 
responsibility for scheduling and paying the attendance costs of 
their own personnel. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Administration has made clear that the PRT program 
remains one of its highest priorities for Iraq, and will continue 
through at least December 2011.  It is important that we send 
well-prepared individuals into the field who are able to immediately 
deal with a lingering insurgency, political strife, and weak 
governance, while operating in thorough coordination with their 
military counterparts. 
 
HILL