VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHVEN #0221/01 2880638
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 150638Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 6631

UNCLAS USOSCE 000221 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/CARC, 
SCA/CEN, SCA/RA, PM/WRA, ISN/CPI 
NSC FOR SHERWOOD-RANDALL, HAYDEN, MCFAUL, HOVENIER, 
NILSSON, FRIEDT 
OSD FOR ISA (WALLENDER, KEHL) 
JCS, EUCOM, USAREUR AND CENTCOM: FOR J-5 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KCFE OSCE PARM PREL RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC: RUSSIA AND GEORGIA EXCHANGE ON TAGLIAVINI 
REPORT 
 
¶1. (SBU)  Summary: The exchange between Russia and Georgia on 
the release of the report of the Independent International 
Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia (IIFMCG or 
Tagliavini Report) dominated the October 7 FSC discussion. 
Russia underscored Georgia's responsibility for the outbreak 
of the conflict, and noted that support from "some EU and 
non-EU members" had emboldened Georgia to violate 
international norms and law.  Georgia's response accepted a 
measure of responsibility for initiating the attack on 
Tskhinvali as an act of self-defense, but it challenged 
Russia to commit to an OSCE dialogue regarding the 
recommendations--presumably the 12 "observations"--contained 
within the Tagliavini Report, rather than polemics.  End 
Summary. 
Presentation on Principles of German Defense Policy 
¶2. (SBU)  German State Secretary of the Ministry of Defense 
Rudiger Wolf presented "Principles and Policies of German 
Defense Policy.  Wolf reviewed the German perspective on the 
twenty-first century's security risks and challenges.  Wolf 
emphasized cross-sectoral mechanisms that would build 
linkages among civil society political and civil-military 
entities as priorities in German security policy.  He said 
Germany required multilateralism for its international 
engagement.  He also underscored Germany's commitment to 
NATO, EU and OSCE, as well as to the UN, as 
mutually-reinforcing institutions that focus energies towards 
addressing common threats including, terrorism, WMD 
proliferation, organized crime (e.g., cybercrime, trafficking 
in persons), and dealing with weak or failed states (e.g., 
the absence or rule of law, democracy and good governance). 
He noted there was no longer a clear dividing line between 
national and international security. 
Russia and Georgia Spar on Tagliavini Report 
¶3. (SBU)  Russia Ulyanov highlighted the Tagliavini report's 
conclusion that Georgia bore responsibility for initiating 
the August 2008 war.  Russia then proceeded to read the 
Russian Federation's official statement regarding the 
conclusions of the report.  Ulyanov did, however, ad lib 
remarks about the involvement of "other" OSCE state members 
that were directly or indirectly involved in training and 
supplying the Georgian military.  He admonished those members 
to follow the report's recommendations for "maximum restraint 
and caution in the future" involving arms supplies. 
¶4. (SBU)  Ulyanov also noted "vagaries" in the report's 
reference to the disproportionate use of force by Russian 
troops during the conflict.  He justified Russian actions 
under Article 51 of the UN Charter and the requirement to 
stop Georgia's aggression, "using only the force that was 
necessary to remove the threat to South Ossetia.  Ulyanov 
also attributed some of the "vague conclusions" in the report 
to "political clout held by some EU states."  He concluded 
that, contrary to those who do not want to focus on the 
initiator of the conflict but want to focus on the future, 
"if it (the origin of conflict) is not important, then they 
would indulge future military adventurism," and hoped OSCE 
was not of the same mind. 
¶5. (SBU)  Georgia (Gaprindashvili) responded by agreeing with 
Russia on the importance of continuing discussion in the 
OSCE, especially the FSC, to find ways "to resolve the 
conflict between Russia and Georgia."  Gaprindashvili 
expressed "astonishment" that Ulyanov repeated the Russian 
MFA statement that focused on only two pages out of hundreds 
containing analysis and observations.  Gaprindashvili asked 
if Russia subscribed to the full findings of the whole 
report, and not limit its interests solely on the shelling of 
Tskhinvali?  He then began a point-by-point refutation of the 
Russian position, and challenged Russia to discuss at OSCE 
the recommendations contained within the Tagliavini report. 
¶6. (SBU)  Sweden (Byren) issued a reserved statement on 
behalf of the EU.  The U.S. (Neighbour) made a statement 
drawn from Assistant Secretary Crowley's September 30 
remarks.  Following the EU and U.S. statements, first Russia 
and then Georgia had a second exchange; Russia continued to 
bring the discussion back to blaming Georgia for the war, and 
Georgia challenging Russia to discuss the recommendations in 
the FSC.  Gaprindashvili said, "We don't disagree on who 
started the August action, but we want to focus on the 
future.  Please come up with an answer to how we proceed with 
the report's recommendations." 
OSCE Project on Stockpiles in Ukraine 
¶7. (SBU)  Denmark (Petersen) as FSC Coordinator on Stockpiles 
of Conventional Ammunition (SCA) reported on the 
late-September donors' visit to Crimea to assess the OSCE 
project of the Removal of Explosive Remnants of War (ERW). 
Noting WWII ERW contaminated areas within the vicinity of two 
 
cities in Ukraine, Petersen reported on the efforts to remove 
52,000 unexploded objects since 2001 (and the problems of 150 
casualties in Ukraine over the last ten years).  He thanked 
the Ukraine Ministry of Emergency Situations and the U.S. for 
their support. 
Russia on Naval CSBM (again) 
¶8. (SBU)  Russia Ulyanov introduced the revisions to its 
Proposal for a Draft Decision on CSBM measures in the naval 
area (FSC.DEL/120/08/Rev.2).  Ulyanov said the language on 
tonnage (page 1) for warships and submarines was amended upon 
the recommendation from Kazakhstan.  He asked for reactions 
to the Russian desire for an exchange of military information 
on naval vessels.  Discussion ended because no delegation 
responded to the Russian appeal.  (Comment:  Russia is 
keeping this issue on the agenda. End Comment.) 
Working Group "A" 
¶9. (SBU)  No current implementation issues were raised for 
discussion under Agenda Item 1.  Under Item 2, VD99, Russia 
Ulyanov deferred consensus on the draft decision on the 
Agenda and Modalities of the Twentieth Annual Implementation 
Assessment Meeting (FSC.DD/9/09) until it received 
instructions from Moscow.  Ulyanov suggested, however, the 
possibility of improvements to the AIAM agenda to reflect 
"shifting activities" and consequently "a change in 
modalities."  The UK Chair (Gare) noted the document was 
identical to last year's, and placed the draft decision on 
the next agenda. 
-- The draft decision on the Best Practice Guide for 
Implementation of VD99, Chapter IV, Contacts 
(FSC.DD/6/09/Rev.2) was moved out of the Working Group and 
will be on the agenda for the Joint FSC-PC plenary on October 
¶14. 
-- Turkey advised that it would soon release a revised 
version of its proposal for a draft decision on the use of 
digital cameras and GPS (FSC.DEL/124/09). 
¶10. (SBU)  Under Agenda Item 3, the Coordinator for SA/LW 
(UK-Hartnell) referred to his Food-For-Thought paper on SA/LW 
(FSC.DEL/151/09) as a technical update to the assistance 
request procedures.  Sweden, Denmark and France confirmed 
their co-sponsorship of the paper. 
¶11. (SBU)  There were no issues for discussion under Agenda 
Item 4 (SCA), Item 5 (Code of Conduct) or Item 6 (CSBMs). 
Under Item 7 (AOB) the CPC drew the FSC's attention to the 
Third Quarterly CPC Survey on CSBM Information Exchange in 
2009 (FSC.GAL/102/09) was circulated.  The CPC would welcome 
any report of omissions or inaccuracies. 
¶12. (SBU)  The next meeting of FSC Working Groups "B" and "A" 
will follow immediately after the Joint FSC-PC plenary on 
October 14. 
Fuller