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TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE 0000

S E C R E T STATE 107748 
 
SIPDIS 
GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/16/2019 
TAGS: KACT KTIA PARM START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: SFO-VI GUIDANCE-001:  INSTRUCTIONS FOR U.S. 
DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON 
TREATY, GENEVA, SWITZERLAND, BEGINNING OCTOBER 19, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 099070 AND 099072 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-003) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 00869-00872 (SFO-GVA-V-031) 
     ¶C. GENEVA 0744 (SFO-GVA-IV-013) 
     ¶D. STATE 94665 (SFO-GVA-IV-005) 
     ¶E. STATE 97474 (SFO-V GUIDANCE-001) 
 
Classified By: Karin L. Look, Acting Assistant Secretary, VCI. 
Reasons: 1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, 
and Implementation Rose Gottemoeller will head the U.S. 
delegation to the sixth round of START Follow-on treaty 
negotiations with Russia in Geneva, Switzerland, beginning 
on October 19, 2009.  Following is guidance for the 
beginning of this round.  Delegation should request 
further guidance when needed. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
COUNTING OF "PHANTOM" DELIVERY VEHICLES 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) With respect to empty Minuteman III and 
Peacekeeper ICBM silos that are not in service and no 
longer capable of operationally launching an ICBM absent 
significant refurbishments, Delegation is authorized to 
offer that these silos will be eliminated within seven 
years after entry into force using simplified procedures 
to be specified in the START follow-on Treaty.  Because 
the Minuteman III ICBM will be an existing type under the 
treaty, the Minuteman III silos will remain accountable 
until eliminated.  Because, under the U.S. proposal, the 
Peacekeeper ICBM would not be an "existing type," the 
Peacekeeper silos would not be accountable under the 
treaty, even prior to their elimination. 
 
¶3.  (S) To ensure that the launchers on the four converted 
U.S. Ohio-class SSGNs do not count against the SFO treaty 
limits, Delegation should maintain the position that the 
C-4/Trident I will not be an "existing type" of SLBM under 
the SFO treaty.  Delegation is authorized to offer to 
conduct a one-time exhibition of a converted SSGN to 
demonstrate how it has been modified so that it is unable 
to launch a C-4/Trident I SLBM. 
 
¶4.  (S) As a means to settle and record agreement on the 
B-1B bomber issue, Delegation is authorized to propose the 
following approach: 
 
-- The United States will complete the conversion of the 
remaining B-1Bs to a conventional-only configuration, 
using the procedures that have been used previously to 
convert B-1Bs.  Each B-1B bomber will continue to count 
against the treaty limits until it is converted.  In 
addition, 1 B1-B will be converted to static display, 
using START procedures. 
 
-- The United States will convert or use simplified 
procedures to eliminate any B-1Bs currently stored at 
Davis-Monthan AFB that will not be converted to a 
non-nuclear capability.  Each of these 16 B-1B bombers at 
Davis-Monthan AFB will continue to count against the 
treaty limits until it is so converted or eliminated. 
 
-- The United States will agree to a prohibition on the 
storage of nuclear warheads at B-1B bases and on 
re-conversion of B-1Bs to a nuclear configuration. 
 
-- The United States will agree to confidence-building 
measures  at air bases for heavy bombers converted to a 
conventional-only role.  The purpose of these measures 
would be to confirm that the bombers have not been 
re-converted to a nuclear configuration.  This could be 
confirmed by conducting a spot check of a randomly chosen 
bomber once each year at a B-1B base chosen by the Russian 
Federation. 
 
¶5.  (S) Regarding the B-52G heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan 
AFB, Delegation should maintain the position that the 
B52-G will not be listed as an existing type in the SFO 
treaty and is excluded from accountability.  However, 
Delegation is authorized to agree to eliminate them using 
simplified SFO elimination procedures. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
COUNTING AND INSPECTING HEAVY BOMBER ARMAMENTS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶6.  (S) With respect to the question of counting and 
inspecting nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, Washington 
confirms the U.S. position that nuclear gravity bombs and 
long-range nuclear-armed ALCMs (LRNA) located either on a 
deployed heavy bomber or in a designated nuclear armaments 
weapons storage area associated with air bases where heavy 
bombers are deployed, should be counted and applied toward 
the aggregate limit on warheads associated with strategic 
delivery vehicles.  Regarding the inspection of Russian 
nuclear armaments, delegation should seek agreement that 
U.S. inspectors would be permitted to inspect the LRNA 
weapons storage areas associated with Russian heavy bomber 
air bases to count the number of LRNA that are stored 
there.  Note: Washington understands that the Russian 
practice is to store the LRNA warheads in a separate 
nuclear weapons storage area removed from the base, and 
therefore inspectors would adopt a "considered to contain" 
rule when counting LRNA at Russian and U.S. heavy bomber 
bases. End note. 
 
---------- 
MOU ISSUES 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Regarding warhead data in the MOU, Delegation 
should take the position that both Parties should report 
the number of warheads for each ICBM and SLBM launcher 
once each six months in a classified MOU data update 
notification, but should not provide a notification of 
every change in that warhead data, as is required for all 
other MOU data.  Washington notes that this position 
requires a tracking fix in the Notification Protocol to 
make an exception for warhead data from the general 
obligation to provide notification, no later than 5 days 
after it occurs, of each change in data with respect to 
items subject to the limitations provided for in the 
Treaty.  Washington also notes that this position is 
consistent with the Russian proposal on notifications, 
which includes the required tracking fix. 
 
¶8.  (S) Regarding the inclusion of throw-weight in the 
technical data for ICBMs and SLBMs, Washington confirms 
the U.S. position that for each type of ICBM and SLBM 
there should be listed "the greatest throw-weight 
demonstrated in flight tests" since START entry into 
force. 
 
¶9.  (S) Regarding whether to list in the MOU the maximum 
number of real and simulated warheads demonstrated during 
any flight test for each type of ICBM or SLBM, and the 
maximum number of nuclear armaments associated with each 
type of deployed heavy bomber, Washington has determined 
that there is no treaty basis for requiring that this data 
be provided in the MOU.  Therefore, the Delegation should 
not seek to include these categories of data in the MOU. 
 
¶10.  (S) Regarding the Russian proposal to combine space 
launch facilities and test ranges into one category in the 
MOU, Washington confirms U.S. opposition to this proposal 
on the grounds that the United States wants to maintain 
the right to conduct inspections at test ranges, but does 
not want to confer  inspection rights at space launch 
facilities. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
ADDITIONAL CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION ISSUES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (S) Delegation is authorized to revise the Ref A U.S. 
proposal on conversion or elimination procedures as 
follows: 
 
a.  Delegation is authorized to use the term "conversion" 
in the U.S. proposal to refer to procedures that render an 
SLBM launcher incapable of launching an SLBM or heavy 
bomber incapable of employing nuclear armaments, but allow 
its use for purposes not inconsistent with the treaty. 
Delegation is authorized to agree that converted items 
will remain subject to the treaty's verification regime, 
if Russia agrees that they will not be counted under any 
of the treaty's central limits. 
 
b.  Delegation is authorized to insert, as appropriate 
throughout the document, the option of other procedures, 
determined by the Party carrying out the conversion or 
elimination, that the other Party can confirm, and which 
shall be recorded within the framework of the BCC. 
 
c.  Delegation is authorized to change the term " 
demonstration" to "exhibition."  Delegation should clarify 
that exhibitions will be scheduled by the possessing 
Party.  For inspections to confirm the completion of 
elimination and conversion procedures, delegation should 
standardize the U.S. proposal to a 20-day inspection 
window in all cases.  Delegation also should develop and 
propose to Washington any new notifications required for 
these exhibitions and inspections related to elimination 
and conversion. 
 
d.  While recognizing the interest of both sides in moving 
procedural details to a third tier (ref B), Delegation 
should not propose moving any sections of the elimination 
and conversion provisions to a third-tier document. 
Provisions relating to removal from treaty accountability 
are central to the treaty, and should not be relegated to 
a document that is intended for procedural details. 
However, Delegation is authorized to trim unnecessary 
language from the existing procedural details to reduce 
the length of the Protocol. 
 
e.  Delegation should not agree to include specific 
mandatory elimination procedures, but should maintain the 
lists of procedures, any of which may be selected, as 
originally proposed in ref A. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
JOINT STATEMENT ON BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN 
AND UKRAINE TO BE ISSUED AT THE 
EXPIRATION OF THE START TREATY 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Background:  During START Follow-On (SFO) Geneva 
IV, the Russian Delegation handed over a Russian-proposed 
text for a Joint Statement by the Russian Federation and 
the United States on Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine in 
connection with the expiration of the START Treaty (Ref 
C).  Delegation Head Anatoliy Antonov solicited the views 
of the U.S. on the proposed text, as well as on questions 
including at what level such a Joint Statement should be 
signed, and whether and how such a statement should be 
coordinated with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine (Ref 
D).  Ref E authorized the SFO Delegation to indicate that 
the United States supports the idea of issuing a joint 
statement either bilaterally or by the five START Parties 
in connection with the START Treaty's expiration, and that 
it would be important to consult the other START parties 
regarding both the content and the timing of the 
statement. 
 
¶13.  (S) Guidance.  Washington has reviewed the 
Russian-proposed text and has developed a 
counterproposal.  Delegation is authorized to table this 
U.S.-proposed text (provided in para 18 below).  Further 
changes may be negotiated ad ref to Washington for final 
approval.  Any work on the text should take into account 
the priority of the delegation work, which is to finish 
the new treaty before December 5, 2009. 
 
¶14.  (S) Washington believes that the preferable approach 
would be for the United States and Russia to 
simultaneously inform Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine of 
our intention to issue a joint statement in connection 
with the expiration of the START Treaty.  The draft text, 
once agreed between the United States and Russia, should 
be shared with Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, but 
Washington has no intention of, and does not support, 
negotiating the text with the other three parties.  The 
United States and Russia could each present the 
information and text to the three parties through 
diplomatic channels on a coordinated date. 
 
¶15.  (S) Washington is still considering the issue of the 
level at which the Joint Statement should be issued. 
 
¶16.  (S) Because the United Kingdom was a cosignatory of 
the Budapest Memoranda on Security Assurances, Washington 
plans to inform the United Kingdom of our work with Russia 
on the statement to allow the United Kingdom time to 
consider whether it wishes to issue any statement of its 
own. 
 
¶17.  (S) In addition to any work on the Joint Statement, 
Delegation may present the views contained in paras 14-16 
above to the Russian delegation, solicit their reaction, 
and report it back to Washington for further 
consideration. 
 
¶18. (S) Begin text of U.S.-proposed Joint Statement: 
 
JOINT STATEMENT 
by the Russian Federation and the United States of America 
in Connection with the Expiration of the 
Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms 
 
     The Russian Federation and the United States of 
America recognize the significant contribution of the 
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine to successful implementation of the Treaty Between 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United 
States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty), and to the 
reduction in strategic offensive arms required by the 
Treaty. 
 
     The value of the START Treaty was greatly enhanced by 
the commitments of the Republic of Belarus, the Republic 
of Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to remove all nuclear weapons 
from their territories and accede to the Treaty on the 
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as 
non-nuclear-weapon states.  Their actions have enhanced 
the NPT regime, had a beneficial impact on international 
security and strategic stability, and created favorable 
conditions for further steps to reduce nuclear arsenals. 
 
     The United States of America and the Russian 
Federation deeply appreciate the contribution of the 
Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine to strengthening international peace and security 
as non-nuclear-weapon states under the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. In this connection, the United States of America 
and the Russian Federation would like to confirm that 
their assurances recorded in the Budapest Memorandum of 
December 5, 1994, remain in place after December 4, 2009. 
 
End text. 
 
----------------- 
Previous Guidance 
----------------- 
 
¶19. (S) Unless otherwise modified or superseded, previous 
guidance remains in effect. 
 
End guidance. 
CLINTON