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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 SAO PAULO 000619 
 
C O R R E C T E D   C O P Y - TO ADD PARA MARKING 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2019/10/27 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PINR ES GT HO BR
SUBJECT: Sao Paulo Opinion Split on Honduras 
 
REF: BRASILIA 1210; (08) SAO PAULO 497 
 
SAO PAULO 00000619  001.5 OF 002 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: David C. Brooks, State, State, POL; REASON: 1.4(D) 
 
¶1.      (C) Summary: Sao Paulo pundits and politicos are strongly 
split on Brazilbs role in Honduras.  Mainstream academic experts in 
this generally pro-PSDB state criticized Brazilbs shielding of Zelaya 
as adventurist, counter-productive and contradictory of the countrybs 
traditional policy of non-intervention.  Workers Party (PT) contacts, 
in contrast, strongly defended the Lula governmentbs decision to 
shelter Zelaya.  They argue that permitting Zelayabs overthrow to go 
unchallenged would have a domino effect, putting at risk other 
left-oriented regimes in El Salvador and Guatemala and thereby 
endangering the PTbs bsocial democraticb (i.e. non-Chavez) vision for 
Latin America.  Evidently, at least some in the PT ranks now see 
democratically-elected, left-oriented Central American regimes as 
junior allies to be protected.   End Summary. 
 
¶2.      (SBU) This cable resulted from a wide range of interviews 
with foreign policy experts and Workers Party (PT) contacts, 
including: University of Sao Paulo Professor Jose Augusto Guilhon de 
Abuquerque; Felipe DbAvila and Rogerio Schmitt of the Center for 
Leadership Training; Professors Marcus Freitas and Gunther Rudzit of 
the Armando Alvares Penteado Foundation (FAAP); General Alberto 
Santos Cruz of the Brazilian Army; PT founder and Sao Paulo City 
Council member Jose Americo; and PT State Deputy Rui Falcao. 
 
The Critics: Brazil is Dancing to Chavezb Tune 
 
¶3.      (C) All the critics (Albuquerque, DbAvila, Schmitt, Freitas, 
Rudzit and Santos Cruz) thought that Hugo Chavez had set the agenda 
for Brazil in Honduras.  Most believed that Zelayabs September 23 
appearance at the Brazilian Embassy in Tegucigalpa had taken the GOB 
by surprise.  Moreover, they viewed Zelayabs subsequent use of the 
Embassy as a base of operation to provoke demonstrations in his favor 
as contradicting Brazilbs longstanding policy of non-intervention. 
This also completely undercut the GOBbs credibility as a mediator, 
leaving Brazil with less flexibility, they concluded. 
 
A Slide Into Greater Intervention 
 
¶4.      (SBU) Professor Albuquerque was more subtle than most 
critics, noting that President Lulabs predecessor, PSDB President 
Fernando Henrique Cardoso, also tried to influence his neighborsb 
politics.  Brazil, Albuquerque stated, blocked a coup against 
President Wasmosy of Paraguay in 1996 and pressured President 
Fujimori to resign in Peru in 2000.  These moves, though representing 
a departure from strict non-intervention, were low profile, supported 
bmid-term negotiated solutionsb and clearly had the object of 
preserving democracy as their goal.  The Lula administration has 
changed this logic, becoming an open protagonist for Zelaya, a man 
whose democratic credentials are questionable.  This may work well in 
the short term, Albuquerque said, but if the policy proves costly, 
Brazilian public opinion could react against it.  Brazil, unlike the 
other BRICs, has suffered no threats to its borders and, 
consequently, there is no popular consensus to support costly foreign 
interventions. 
 
PT Reps Defend the Policy as Principle, Zelaya as bFamilyb 
 
¶5.      (SBU) PT reps Rui Falcao and Jose Americo both stated flatly 
that, even though the GOB was likely bset upb by Chavez, a PT 
government had to defend Zelaya as a matter of principle.  As a party 
whose leaders had suffered under a former military regime, the Lula 
administration could not turn its back on Zelaya.  Had it done so, 
the partybs base would have reacted strongly.  Americo, in 
particular, acknowledged that Zelayabs own record had its blemishes, 
but he countered by saying that Zelaya was like ba bad son-in-law,b 
though he might cause trouble, he was still bfamilyb and the PT was 
obliged to come to his aid. 
 
Honduras is Not the Point 
 
¶6.      (SBU) Beyond family ties, Falcao and Americo both argued 
 
SAO PAULO 00000619  002.5 OF 002 
 
 
Honduras as a possible tipping point for Central America.  The PT has 
a bsocial democraticb (i.e. non-Chavez) vision for Latin America, and 
Zelayabs successful overthrow could have undermined two other key 
elected Central American leaders who fit into this: Mauricio Funes in 
El Salvador and Alvaro Colom in Guatemala.  (Note: Americo noted 
several connections between El Salvadorbs President Funes and Brazil. 
 He reminded Poloff that Funesb spouse is Brazilian and a member of 
the PT, said that Funes had visited Sao Paulo in August, and 
described how Funes had recently promoted a certain Colonel DbAvila 
in the Salvadoran Army, bumping him up over several other officers. 
This last, if correct, suggested a rather surprising level of 
detailed knowledge of Salvadoran politics for a state-level Brazilian 
politician.  End Note.)  Both PT reps stated that Funes and Colom had 
won recent elections by narrow margins.   If Zelayabs deposition had 
remained unopposed, the U.S.-trained armies in their countries might 
have felt tempted to try something similar.  The PT reps saw this as 
possible even under President Obama because, in their view, the 
Pentagon has its own agenda.  Americo justified the vigorous defense 
of Zelaya, saying that bdespite the good intentions of President 
Obama and Secretary Clinton, the Pentagon apparatus can enforce its 
own agendab in the region, and so a vigorous defense of Zelaya was 
required. 
 
Comment: 
 
¶7.      (C) Foreign Policy does not rate highly on the list of most 
Braziliansb concerns.  As such, the GOB can generally do what it 
wants in places like Honduras, so long as there are no significant 
economic or human costs to the policy.  PT insiders notions of 
Central American dominos could be significant.  While some dose of 
anti-Pentagon paranoia figured in their statements, it is clear that 
at least for some in the PT base, Brazil should act as a patron for 
democratically elected left-oriented regimes in Central America, a 
region that, heretofore, has lain outside Brazilbs traditional sphere 
of influence. 
White