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S E C R E T MOSCOW 002579 
 
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DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/14/2034 
TAGS: JCIC KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MOSCOW (SFO-MOSCOW): 
(U) PLENARY MEETING, OCTOBER 12, 2009 
 
Classified By: Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-MOS-001. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  October 12, 2009 
                Time:  10:05 A.M. - 12:00 P.M. 
               Place:  Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Moscow 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The first meeting of the two delegations to the START 
Follow-on (SFO) Treaty negotiations during the latest round 
in Moscow was held at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
October 12, 2009.  A/S Gottemoeller and AMB Antonov discussed 
the importance of the upcoming negotiating session in Geneva 
and agreed on the need to intensify work in order to resolve 
outstanding issues.  Antonov confirmed his government's 
support for work already done by the delegations, noting in 
particular President Medvedev's approval of these efforts. 
Gottemoeller noted high level U.S. Government interest and 
involvement in this work, and stressed the tasking she had 
received from senior U.S. leaders to finish all work on the 
treaty before the START expires on December 5. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Gottemoeller asked Antonov to explain, with regard 
to both philosophical and substantive grounds, the omission 
of a number of START provisions from the Russian-proposed SFO 
Treaty text.  Antonov requested a list of those provisions to 
facilitate a Russian response.  Antonov admitted that Russia 
may have misread the current U.S. Administration's position 
on disarmament and thus may have to revise the degree to 
which the Russian-proposed text has simplified START 
provisions, although this would be only after discussion 
among the experts.  On telemetry, Antonov continued to make 
the argument that the U.S. proposal on telemetry could be 
used to the detriment of the Russian Federation and that the 
U.S. had not yet explained the need for access to the other 
side's telemetry.  He also complained about the U.S. 
excessive constraints on mobile ICBMs, which he claimed was 
not based on reciprocity.  Finally, the agenda for the 
remaining two days of meetings was discussed and agreed. End 
Summary. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
STOCKTAKING OF INTERSESSIONAL WORK IN CAPITALS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5.  (S) AMB Antonov welcomed A/S Gottemoeller and the U.S. 
delegation to the MFA and offered his congratulations to 
President Obama for his selection as recipient of the Nobel 
Peace Prize.  Widely smiling, he added that this award would 
likely make things more difficult for the U.S. delegation 
during the START Follow-on Treaty negotiations. He indicated 
that the next two weeks of negotiations in Geneva will 
determine whether it would be possible to conclude a new 
treaty before START expires, and noted that the results of 
the previous session had been reported to President Medvedev, 
who had expressed his support for the results already 
achieved.  Antonov confirmed that the Russian delegation was 
prepared to intensify its work, commenting that it was very 
important that approaches that are based on matters of 
principle be addressed as rapidly as possible. 
 
¶6.  (S) Antonov said that Gottemoeller's ten key SFO Treaty 
issues (provided earlier) had been carefully examined by the 
Russian side and  expressed his hope that the U.S. side had 
worked as hard to address Russian concerns, adding that 
 
without real movement on key points it would be very 
difficult in Geneva. In order to begin this process, it was 
necessary to know what was the goal of the U.S. approach. He 
noted that there were still some "debts" owed by the U.S. 
side: a draft text on notifications; a U.S. response to the 
Russian proposed Joint Statement on Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine; and a U.S. response on the proposed JCIC agreement 
concerning Votkinsk, commenting that, in connection with this 
third item, Taylor and Koshelev should be instructed to 
finish work on this agreement very quickly. 
 
¶7.  (S)  Antonov then turned to "homework" done by the 
Russian side since the last Geneva round, mentioning that his 
military experts would be making a presentation later in the 
week and remarking that he hoped that the U.S. side would be 
able to make a presentation on the U.S. approach to counting 
as well.  In particular, Antonov remarked that it would be 
useful to know how the U.S. had evaluated the results of the 
recent session and what decisions had been made. 
 
¶8.  (S) Gottemoeller stated that she generally had the same 
view as that expressed by Antonov concerning the fundamental 
importance of their work.  She mentioned that, during the 
past week in Washington, she had found a very significant and 
high level of interest, including by President Obama, noting 
that both Secretary Clinton and U/S Tauscher were highly 
involved and interested in the SFO Treaty effort.  She said 
that she and Antonov should talk about how to prepare for the 
Clinton-Lavrov and Tauscher-Ryabkov meetings over the next 
two days, in order to have a coordinated approach.  She 
thanked Antonov for his words of congratulations on President 
Obama's selection as a Nobel laureate, adding that Antonov 
had been very timely on Friday morning in making this same 
comment during their telephone conversation.  She recalled 
that President Obama had made the comment that this award was 
about the future, which meant that the successful results of 
these negotiations need to be an important part of that 
future.  Gottemoeller noted that the future has an elastic 
quality to it: it could be the near, medium, or far distant 
future, and the quality of that elasticity depends upon the 
pace of work of their two delegations. 
 
¶9.  (S)  Gottemoeller remarked that the U.S. delegation had 
received the  same sort of very serious tasking from 
Washington, which was to complete all of its work on the 
treaty by December 5.  She stressed that the next few weeks 
of work will be decisive, not only that done in capitals but 
also during the next round in Geneva.  She recounted that the 
U.S. delegation had made very careful preparation in 
Washington, and she was glad to hear that the same had 
occurred in Moscow.  She said that the two sides were in 
agreement as to what should be done during the meetings in 
Moscow: she intended to talk about the Joint Statement on 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine, as well as about Votkinsk, 
and that, with respect to Votkinsk, she had already talked 
with Taylor and Brown about final conforming of the 
respective texts on that matter.  Concerning the 
notifications text, she reported that she had heard from 
(U.S. delegation member and Notification WG chairman) Siemon 
that it will still take some input from the U.S. members of 
the Inspection Protocol and the Elimination Protocol working 
groups before that text could be finalized. 
 
--------------------------------------- 
U.S. OBJECTIVES FOR THE MOSCOW MEETINGS 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Concerning additional objectives for the Moscow 
meetings, Gottemoeller said that she wanted to go through the 
treaty text and raise some questions, adding that the Russian 
 
side might have some questions as well to pose to the U.S. 
side.  As to the work of the military experts on both sides, 
she noted that Dr. Warner would be ready to make a 
presentation regarding counting rules issues, and it would be 
good if the military experts could meet separately to do some 
work on these matters, either on Tuesday morning or in the 
afternoon during the plenary session, after the meeting 
between the foreign ministers was over. 
 
¶11.  (S)  Antonov responded that for twenty years he had been 
chastised for not having any young diplomats working in the 
arms control field and joked that he had now brought them in 
to show them how not to work.  He then went through a 
proposed agenda for the three days in Moscow: a meeting on 
October 12 from 1000 to 1200; a meeting on October 13 from 
1600 to 1800; and a meeting on October 14 from 1000 to 1300, 
followed by a buffet lunch for the two delegations and for 
U.S. Embassy officials, until 1430.  Returning to 
Gottemoeller's suggestion about having the military experts 
meet separately, Antonov acknowledged that, of course, the 
experts could speak without the participation of the heads of 
delegation, but he noted that there was a great interest in 
his delegation to take part in the discussion of counting 
rules, so he proposed that it be done during the October 13 
plenary meeting, although it would probably be in his 
absence.  At the October 14 meeting, his intent was to speak 
about the results achieved in the course of the two days and 
to discuss how to structure their joint work for the next 
round in Geneva. 
 
¶12.  (S)  Antonov asked whether it was possible to have 
Taylor and Brown address the Votkinsk issue at this point; 
Gottemoeller demurred, saying that it could be done on the 
following day.  Antonov then agreed to start with a review of 
the treaty text, to allow the U.S. side to raise questions, 
or to start with the Joint Statement, leaving the choice to 
Gottemoeller, 
 
--------------------------------- 
DISCUSSION OF RUSSIAN "OMISSIONS" 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Gottemoeller chose the option of going through the 
SFO Treaty text, emphasizing that she would be interested in 
any questions the Russian side might have as well.  She 
explained that there were two types of questions that she 
would raise: the first were more or less of a general, 
philosophical nature, while the second involved very specific 
comments, particularly about Article V.  Beginning with 
Article II, Gottemoeller raised the issue of the Russian 
approach to counting the various items to be limited under 
the treaty.  She noted that the two presidents had agreed to 
two aggregate limits: a limit on deployed nuclear warheads 
and a limit on deployed strategic delivery vehicles. The 
Russians had recently introduced a third limit, on ICBM and 
SLBM launchers, both deployed and non-deployed. She said that 
she wanted to understand the rationale for this, and why the 
Russian side went beyond what the presidents had agreed to in 
the Joint Understanding issued at the July Summit in Moscow, 
when there did not appear to be a need to do so. 
 
¶14.  (S)  Antonov responded that this question dealt with the 
"homework" that had been undertaken by the Russian side, and 
that a presentation will be made on this subject later in the 
week: the U.S. side had asked that the Russian military 
experts make a presentation, and the experts were prepared to 
do so on October 13.  Turning to the point about 
"philosophical" questions, he confirmed that what the 
presidents had decided had to be implemented by the 
delegations and that those decisions cannot be adjusted in 
 
any way.  He observed, however, that this question could also 
be approached in a different way, which would be to say that 
the delegations may develop those decisions in a creative 
manner.  He asserted that this was what the U.S. side had 
done with respect to some of the Russian ideas. If the 
presidents had said something in very concrete language, then 
that has to be reflected specifically in the text, but that 
does not mean that the two delegations have to be limited by 
just what has been said by the presidents. If something that 
was important for effective implementation is found, then it 
should be proposed to the leaders. 
 
¶15.  (S)  Antonov asserted that this principle was the basis 
of the elaboration of the July 6 Joint Understanding: if 
something was not included in that document, it did not mean 
that it cannot be added later.  He noted that the principal 
difference between the two sides prior to agreement on the 
Joint Understanding concerned counting rules, and that 
difference still remained.  He claimed that the Russian side 
had taken a step towards the U.S. position in this regard by 
focusing on deployed warheads rather than attribution of 
warhead loadings, acknowledging that there were, in fact, 
different schools of thought within the Russian delegation as 
to whether this had been the right step to take, but it had 
been taken, and it would not be walked back.  Antonov 
stressed that the Russian side would continue to move forward 
and wanted to develop that idea and go further than START: 
this was the reason for the additional limit on ICBM and SLBM 
launchers.  He acknowledged that there were, of course, other 
reasons why this limit had been proposed and affirmed that 
the October 13 presentation would be more specific.  But the 
objective had been to deal with this matter in order to be 
able to move forward more quickly. 
 
¶16.  (S)  Gottemoeller confirmed that the U.S. delegation was 
looking forward to the Russian presentation on Tuesday and to 
having the chance to elaborate U.S. views.  She noted that 
she had two sub questions that could help steer that 
discussion: 
 
- Could the Russian side clarify the relationship between the 
launcher limit in Article II and the provisions in paragraph 
3 of Article III: the idea that launchers can move easily 
between being "deployed" and being "non-deployed."   Would it 
not be easier to use the U.S.-proposed concept of "ICBMs and 
SLBMs with their associated launchers," commenting that the 
U.S. side foresaw the complicated situation of the 
requirement to notify changes between "deployed" and 
"non-deployed": it would be more complicated than it needed 
to be.  She proposed that the Russian side consider using the 
START concept of a launcher being "considered to contain" a 
missile when that missile was temporarily removed, even when 
that system is in effect not operational for a short period. 
 
- The second sub question was a bit more straightforward: in 
the Russian concept, is the relationship between the number 
of delivery vehicles and the number of launchers constant? 
In the current Russian proposal, the limit of delivery 
vehicles is 500, while the number of launchers is 600. Will 
the limit of ICBM and SLBM launchers always be 100 more than 
the limit on strategic delivery vehicles? 
 
¶17.  (S)  Antonov responded that he understood Gottemoeller's 
question, remarking that she was talking about the limit of 
500 on deployed delivery vehicles and on the limit of 600 for 
both deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. 
Turning to Orlov, he stated that this issue will be 
addressed, and expressed his thanks to Gottemoeller for 
raising this specific question, commenting that this would 
permit the MOD to prepare its answer for the coming meeting. 
 
Orlov nodded in agreement. 
 
¶18.  (S)  Gottemoeller then turned to Article IV, noting that 
this article dealt mostly with issues related to non-deployed 
mobile ICBMs, and acknowledging that the differences between 
the two sides were well understood.  She added that the 
previous round in Geneva had been very useful for allowing 
the U.S. side to understand the Russian position, and stated 
that the U.S. side was now studying that issue to be able to 
address it in Geneva.  She noted, however, that Article IV 
had some additional provisions, such as those limiting the 
number of test heavy bombers and non-deployed ICBMs and 
SLBMs, and asked for the Russian rationale in omitting them. 
Orlov expressed some puzzlement as to the question, but 
Antonov interjected that Gottemoeller's questions were sound 
and required serious analysis, remarking that it would be 
best if all of these questions could be provided in writing, 
and adding that these questions were too serious to be 
responded to immediately.  Antonov promised that answers to 
these questions would be worked on by the Russian side and 
that a response would be provided, perhaps at the next 
meeting.  He commented in that connection that several 
members of the Russian delegation were not present at this 
meeting because they were still working on these issues for 
the subsequent meeting. He mentioned that some of 
Gottemoeller's questions would be answered by the Russian 
presentation and that others could be discussed during the 
next round in Geneva. 
 
¶19.  (S) Gottemoeller explained that the U.S. side had made a 
very careful review of U.S.-proposed texts noting provisions 
that had been omitted in the Russian text, remarking that it 
might be good to look at the main differences in order to 
understand the rationales for their omission.  She stated 
that this was the idea behind the U.S. list, and said that 
she would pass over this list, in unofficial Russian, on the 
following day. 
 
¶20.  (S)  Antonov responded that he agreed completely with 
Gottemoeller's approach, observing that it would help the 
Russian side understand where the U.S side had problems with 
the Russian approach. He acknowledged that his delegation had 
been unable to conduct a similar analysis over the past week, 
and he expressed his view that once he received this list, it 
should be possible to make progress quickly in removing 
differences between the two sides. As an aside, he 
acknowledged that the most productive times are when the 
delegations meet outside of capitals, when the experts can 
work most creatively and can focus on their work.  He stated 
that this type of work will be done, but that it is best done 
in Geneva.  At this point, he turned to his own delegation 
and announced that they will have the second half of the 
upcoming Sunday (October 18), to do precisely this in 
preparation for the upcoming Geneva round.  Gottemoeller 
responded that she was sympathetic, having just had a very 
busy week in Washington, where there were many issues to deal 
with, not all of which were related to these negotiations. 
She noted that the list she would be providing to Antonov had 
been developed by some of her delegation who had remained in 
Geneva to do just this sort of detailed work. 
 
¶21.  (S)  Continuing with the "philosophical" questions, 
Gottemoeller mentioned that the U.S. draft of Article V 
contained many prohibitions taken from START, including the 
ban on rapid reload systems, on production, testing and 
deployment of ballistic missiles over 600 km range and their 
launchers on waterborne vehicles other than submarines, and 
on emplacement of missiles and their  launchers on the ocean 
floor, seabed, or beds of internal waters.  She noted that 
the U.S. had detailed points on why these provisions should 
 
be retained, and, commenting that she could begin that 
discussion later during this meeting, she stressed that she 
wanted to raise the larger philosophical question that she 
had also made during the previous round in Geneva.  She 
remarked that several of these prohibitions were first agreed 
upon in the SALT II Treaty and were part of the two 
countries' mutual legacy of arms control, and explained that 
the omission of such provisions could raise questions in the 
public and among arms control experts as to whether this new 
treaty regime was, in fact, effective.  She acknowledged that 
there might be some alternative ways of referring to such 
obligations within the text of the new treaty, but that in 
any event, neither side wanted to be seen as sliding 
backwards.  Gottemoeller stated that this was the reason she 
had raised this general question and why she had wanted to 
hear the Russian views, reiterating that she was prepared to 
work with the Russian side to simplify this article.  Antonov 
asked whether she could present the U.S. vision of this 
article, in order to help in its simplification. 
Gottemoeller noted that the U.S. side had found that the 
prohibitions contained in paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 
of Article V in the U.S. text had been omitted in the Russian 
text, and the U.S. side was prepared to discuss this in more 
detail, with specific points.  Gottemoeller stated that she 
intended to conclude her "philosophical" points first and 
then return to specifics at a later time. 
 
----------------- 
Articles IX - XII 
----------------- 
 
¶22.  (S)  Gottemoeller turned to Articles IX through XII, 
noting Russian omissions in Article IX (ban on concealment 
measures), X (provisions of telemetry), XI (continuous 
monitoring and elimination inspections), and XII (cooperative 
measures with regard to mobile launchers and heavy bombers). 
She said that the Russian positions on telemetry and on 
continuous monitoring were clear, and that, in some cases, 
the Russian text had moved some provisions from one part of 
the treaty to another, as was the case for elimination 
inspections.  In some cases, however, the provision had been 
omitted entirely, and this was the case, in particular, for 
the ban on telemetry encryption, which had been included 
since the SALT II Treaty, where it was included in the 
context of non-interference with NTM.  She noted that this 
was another area where the two sides could be viewed as 
backsliding.  On Article XII, the Russian position with 
respect to cooperative measures for mobile launchers was 
predictable, but what was not clear was the omission of 
cooperative measures for heavy bombers. Further, it was not 
clear why the prohibition on concealment measures during 
testing, which was contained in U.S.-proposed Article IX, 
paragraph 3, was omitted, since this also seemed to be 
beneficial to the Russian side.   Gottemoeller stated that 
this was an example of effective reciprocity: the obligations 
were reciprocal and benefited the U.S. and Russia alike, just 
as restrictions would constrain both sides in the same way. 
With these comments, Gottemoeller concluded her 
"philosophical" discussion. 
 
¶23.  (S) Antonov responded that, of course, the Russian side 
would study her comments carefully, and he admitted that such 
comments do lead one to closely examine the differences in 
their respective approaches.  He explained that, in the 
development of the Russian approach, the attempt had been 
made to create a vision that responded to Russian national 
interests.  He remarked that once he had the opportunity to 
fully explain the Russian approach to her, including the 
assumption that the text should be drastically simplified, he 
was convinced that the U.S. side would support such a 
 
simplification in terms of its impact on verification.  The 
Russian side was also convinced that the U.S. supported a 
simplification of the financial aspects of verification. Now 
it appeared that this assumption represented an incorrect 
assessment of the current U.S. Administration's position on 
disarmament.  Antonov admitted that, for him, it had been 
unexpected that the current U.S. Administration wanted to 
retain much of the language and concepts found in START, even 
under conditions in which both countries had stated that 
their relationship had dramatically improved.  Thus, the 
Russian side was now very seriously reviewing the U.S. 
position and revising its views on the U.S. position, while 
looking to see where U.S. concerns could be met. 
 
¶24.  (S)  Continuing, Antonov said that it was possible - it 
was a possibility that he could not discount - that the 
Russian attempt to simplify the SFO Treaty was perhaps 
excessive, and that perhaps the Russian proposal should be 
seen as just an initial vision of the treaty text.  He did 
not exclude the possibility that, in the course of 
negotiations, some provisions might be re-introduced, but 
that decision would be made only after detailed and careful 
discussion by experts. 
 
¶25.  (S)  Finally, on the issue of telemetry, he noted that 
while he was working in his office on Sunday he had read the 
U.S. proposal and had also read the views of the Russian MOD 
military experts.  It turned out that the two sides were 
talking as though coming from two completely different 
dimensions.  He noted that Russian  had been frank about how 
telemetry could be used to the detriment of the Russian 
Federation, and still the Russian side had not received U.S. 
argumentation in support of maintaining telemetry provisions, 
only that the U.S. was in favor of telemetry - no responses 
to the Russian concerns that had been raised in the previous 
round had yet been received.  Antonov stated that oftentimes 
he hears the comment that the U.S. side has directly 
responded to Russian concerns, and maybe that was the U.S. 
psychology, likening it to a situation in which one side 
asks, "Why are tulips so beautiful," and the other side 
responds, "Because it's lonely and difficult to live in the 
woods." 
 
¶26.  (S)  Concerning the question of reciprocity, Antonov 
noted that he had read some papers concerning mobile 
launchers of ICBMs that dealt with the data base, and he 
admitted that he had been prepared to accept their inclusion, 
but when he looked at verification provisions, he asked 
himself, how can the U.S. side suggest that this is 
reciprocal, when only one side has such systems?   He noted 
that this was a philosophical approach as well: there should 
be the same rights and obligations for both sides.  Thus, in 
reading the papers on mobiles, he now understood why the U.S. 
was opposed to the principle of "equal security," because, in 
the U.S. view, there would not be equal security.  Stopping 
himself, and saying that this was just philosophical, and 
perhaps he was wrong, he stressed that the sides needed to 
find a way to solve their differences. He proposed that he 
and Gottemoeller needed to meet one-on-one, at the beginning 
of the upcoming round, to agree on what they wanted to 
accomplish.  And perhaps they should be pragmatic and even a 
little bit cynical, because both needed to understand what 
each wanted to get from the other on concrete issues.  He 
stressed that the work on these issues would be done in the 
working groups and that the Russian side was prepared to do 
this work once it received these U.S. documents, in any 
format, in the plenary or otherwise. 
 
¶27.  (S)  Gottemoeller responded that she would not sign on 
to cynicism, and noted, referring to Antonov's allusion to 
 
"the difficulty of living in the woods," that it is hard to 
find mobile launchers in the forest, and that the U.S. 
concern about mobiles had to do with a covert deployment of 
such missiles as a form of breakout potential - it was the 
larger question of strategic stability.  She acknowledged 
that she understood the Russian position and that this issue 
was being worked in Washington. She said that she was looking 
forward to presenting the results of this work during the 
following week, in Geneva, noting that just as the Russian 
Federation takes into account its national interests, of 
course the U.S. would take into account its own interests. 
Antonov joked that this sounded like "equal security." 
 
¶28.  (S) Gottemoeller noted that it was true that the 
previous U.S. administration had taken a simplified approach 
to the negotiation of the Moscow Treaty, but that treaty 
benefited from the fact that START was still in force. 
However, with the impending expiration of START, there was 
the question of what verification aspects of START should be 
retained.  Thus, the two sides were in complete agreement on 
the need to simplify, to streamline, and to make the 
verification measures more effective, just as the presidents 
agreed in July, but a balance had to be struck between 
oversimplification and too much reliance on START-like 
provisions.  Therefore, there was still much work yet to do 
for the two delegations. 
 
¶29.  (S) Gottemoeller extended congratulations to the work 
done by the working groups and noted that the success of 
completing the treaty by December 5 depended to a great 
extent on them.  However, the two heads of delegation needed 
to "drive the train."  Antonov responded that the two sides 
had different ways of thinking, even when talking about the 
Moscow Treaty and START. He agreed that START provisions were 
available for the Moscow Treaty, but that what had been 
forgotten was that the ABM Treaty was in force at that time. 
Thus, the situation was completely different now in terms of 
strategic stability. If, on the other hand, there were to be 
a combination of the Moscow Treaty, the ABM Treaty, and 
START, that would be best.  Concluding his thought, Antonov 
said that the two sides will try to find mutually acceptable 
solutions, even though one element that previously 
contributed to strategic stability, the ABM Treaty, had been 
rejected by the U.S. side. 
 
¶30.  (S)  Gottemoeller and Antonov concluded by discussing 
plans to hold a one-on-one meeting about the reports to the 
foreign ministers and deputy foreign ministers, the agenda 
for the Tuesday and Wednesday meetings, and the 
Taylor-Koshelev meeting on JCIC documents relating to the 
completion of continuous monitoring activities at the 
monitored facility at Votkinsk. 
 
 
¶31.  (U) Documents exchanged: None. 
 
¶32.  (U) Participants 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
AMB Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Elliott 
Ms. Friedt 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Mr. Katsakis 
 
Mr. Sobchenko(Int) 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Ms. Furzhenkova 
Mr. Ivanov 
Ms. Ivanova 
Col Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Kuznetsov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Col Novikov 
Gen Orlov 
Mr. Pishchulov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Streltsov 
Mr. Trifonov 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Mr. Yermakov 
Ms. Zharkikh 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶33.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
Beyrle