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Viewing cable 09MONTEVIDEO592, URUGUAY: BORDABERRY: LOOKING FAR BEYOND OCTOBER 25

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09MONTEVIDEO592 2009-10-21 09:16 2011-08-26 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED Embassy Montevideo
VZCZCXYZ0001
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMN #0592/01 2940916
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 210916Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9411
INFO RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 2650
RUCNMER/MESUR COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS MONTEVIDEO 000592 
 
DEPT FOR WHA/BSC MARY DASCHBACH 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON UY
SUBJECT:  URUGUAY: BORDABERRY: LOOKING FAR BEYOND OCTOBER 25 
 
REF: MONTEVIDEO 314 
 
1. (U) This telegram is sensitive but unclassified, and not 
for Internet distribution. 
 
SUMMARY 
- - - - 
 
2. (U) With the electoral coverage mostly focused on 
frontrunners Luis Alberto Lacalle and Jose Mujica, the 
presidential electionQs third place contender, Colorado Party 
candidate Pedro Bordaberry, is taking the longer view.  Aware 
that a shot at the presidency is highly unlikely at this 
juncture, Bordaberry has instead made productive use of the 
electoral season to stand the Colorados back on their feet 
following their shattering electoral defeat in 2004.  In a 
well-organized, disciplined and focused campaign, Bordaberry 
has largely succeeded in presenting the Colorado as a 
renovated and politically engaged party equipped with a 
forward thinking program.  The party appears not only 
confident that it can reclaim many of the votes lost to the 
Frente Amplio (FA) coalition and National (Blanco) party in 
the last election, but is also hopeful that it will be able to 
reach out to younger voters.  With Mujica and Lacalle locked 
in a relatively tight and increasingly bitter race for the 
finish line, and with a second round likely, the political 
value of BordaberryQs relatively modest share of the vote 
continues to swell. Bordaberry is optimistic that careful 
management of this advantage will enable him to reposition the 
Colorados for a possible 2014 presidential bid.  END SUMMARY. 
 
REBUILDING THE PARTY 
-------------------- 
 
3. (SBU) As the two main presidential candidates stagger to a 
likely second round with their hands around each others 
throats, Colorado Pedro Bordaberry appears to be the only 
candidate actively gaining support.  While BordaberryQs recent 
rallying call that it would be Qgreat to win in the second 
half of the match with 47 minutes on the clockQ is not a 
serious expression of his chances (the Colorados currently 
command only 12 percent of the vote), it nevertheless 
indicates a sense of revival that appears to have life beyond 
political rhetoric.  Until recently however the notion of the 
Colorado recovery was very much open to question; once the 
countryQs dominant political force, the Colorados ran Uruguay 
for much of the 20th century but were all but obliterated in 
2004 when they returned just 10 percent of the vote.  The 
fallout was profound, much of the party machinery collapsed 
and the Colorados, already riven by lengthy and destructive 
power struggle between two aging party patriarchs, 73 year old 
Julio Mara Sanguinetti and 81 year old Jorge Batlle, 
continued to hemorrhage support.  Over the last two years 
however, Bordaberry and his QVamos UruguayQ (LetQs Go Uruguay) 
faction, have forged a Qnew centralismQ (reftel) which has 
arrested partyQs decline and appears to offer the real promise 
of long-term political rehabilitation. 
 
THE YOUNG MAN FOR THE JOB 
------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Bordaberry is very much the Colorados young lion. 
His confident, skilled and forward thinking leadership has 
enabled him to overcome the negative associations of his 
surname (his father's presidency led directly to Uruguay's 
1973-85 dictatorship) and begin the process of reuniting his 
party.  In contrast to the array of gaffs, embarrassments and 
bickering that have characterized much of his rivals 
campaigns, Bordaberry has headed an orderly, sober but 
imaginative operation that has seen him generate a gradual but 
steady amount of support.  There have been two main targets 
for BordaberryQs campaign.  First those voters, once loyal to 
the Colorado cause, who shifted to the FA or Blancos in the 
last election.  By presenting the Colorados as a politically 
viable entity again, Bordaberry plans to encourage them return 
to the fold, a hope made explicit by recent Colorado publicity 
centered on the notion of Qvotes coming home.Q  The second 
target audience is young voters.  A legacy of the ColoradoQs 
near collapse is that the partyQs demographic has aged while 
younger voters have been drawn to the FA and Blancos.  As an 
energetic 49 year-old, Bordaberry offers a sprightly contrast 
to the 74 year-old Mujica and the 68 year-old Lacalle.  Far 
from playing off the ColoradoQs heritage of almost constant 
political dominance, Bordaberry has instead presented himself 
as the new wave candidate, claiming that although this is the 
FrenteQs first term in office, their aging leadership 
represents not the beginning of a political project but the 
end of a political generation.  BordaberryQs bid for the youth 
was made explicit with smart selection of the wisely admired 
soccer star, Hugo de Leon as his running mate. 
 
 
A MAN WITH A PLAN 
----------------- 
 
5. (SBU) With sustained long-term political growth in mind, 
Bordaberry has angled his campaign to present himself as a 
serious policy-centered candidate. He has proudly underlined 
this ambition with a 250-page government program, prepared 
over two and a half years by numerous political experts.  It 
is not only the weight and depth of the tome that sets the 
program apart, but also the artful positioning of education 
right at the front of the agenda.  With the FA and Blancos 
currently locking horns over public security and social 
programs, this has allowed Bordaberry to stake out political 
territory that is not only under populated but also adroitly 
focused on long term development.  In harmony with this 
forward-thinking strategic approach, Bordaberry used a recent 
speech to turn around the common observation that Uruguay is a 
small entity surrounded on both sides by giants: 
acknowledging Brazil as a neighboring power-house, he 
described the relationship as one of opportunity allowing 
Uruguay to shape regional politics for its own benefit. 
 
 
ELECTION PROSPECTS 
----------------- 
 
6. (SBU) While the Colorado campaign is nominally being run 
under the auspices of a presidential bid, in reality 
BordaberryQs is focusing firmly on increasing the Colorado 
presence in Parliament.  Current polling figures suggest that 
whoever wins the election, voting will be tight enough to 
create a parliament in which no party has a clear majority, 
circumstances that would offer a party with even relatively 
modest presence a good deal of high-profile political leverage. 
Accordingly, recent Colorado publicity has sought to maximize 
his political capital by recalibrating the Colorado effort 
around the notion of Qputting a good team in parliament.Q This 
emphasizes the fact that although a vote for the Colorados 
will not put Bordaberry in the top job, it remains 
nevertheless a politically potent choice, capable of having a 
direct influence on government policy. 
 
7. (SBU) By capturing some of the undecided voters, Bordaberry 
and his team are shooting for at least 15-16 percent of the 
vote on October 25.  Irrespective of the final tally however, 
it seems likely that Bordaberry will reap an improvement on 
the Colorados meager 2004 electoral haul.  It is also likely 
that of the three Colorado lists in play for Senator and 
Deputy seats, his list will get the largest amount of support 
and Bordaberry will become senator.  Old guard Colorados 
Sanguinetti and Batlle have joined forces to field a list 
headed by their men Luis Amorin Batlle (a cousin) and Tabere 
Viera and are likely to attract a fair amount of votes.  The 
third list, headed by Alberto Iglesias may feature as an also 
ran.  Aside from generally increasing Colorado presence in 
parliament, a strong showing by BordaberryQs faction (he is 
counting on over 50 percent of the Colorado vote) would cement 
his position as party leader and finally relegate Batlle and 
Sanguinetti to the roles of respected, but retired party 
elders. 
 
THE SECOND ROUND AND BEYOND 
--------------------------- 
 
8. (SBU) It is generally assumed that in the case of a run-off 
election, any political advantage the Colorados can glean 
would accrue to the BlancosQ favor.  While this will probably 
prove to be the case, Bordaberry has nevertheless been working 
hard to present the Colorado party as a wholly independent 
entity.  He has maintained a more-or-less nonpartisan profile 
in public; complaining that LacalleQs and MujicaQs recent 
conduct has insulted the electorate and calling for an end to 
ideological conflict.  After the October 25 round Bordaberry 
has signaled that his overwhelming interest is in influencing 
policy, particularly in the areas of education, security and 
social development, areas in which he believes his program has 
well developed contributions to make.  Reaching a satisfactory 
agreement with Lacalle in these areas would likely allow 
Bordaberry to support Lacalle strongly in a run-off. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
9. (SBU).  Unlike his rivals in the campaign, Bordaberry has 
studiously avoided political missteps, and has managed to 
maintain a clean political image despite the burden of the 
Bordaberry name and efforts to drag him down.  A mixture of 
political skill and fortuitous circumstance has left 
Bordaberry in a potentially strong position which, if 
consolidated, could form a platform for future growth and (he 
hopes) see him emerge as a very real contender in 2014.  End 
Comment.