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S E C R E T GENEVA 000843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) CLOSING PLENARY, OCTOBER 1, 2009 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-036. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  October 1, 2009 
                Time:  10:00 A.M. - 1:15 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) U.S. and Russian delegations met at the Russian 
Mission to conclude the fifth session of START Follow-on 
negotiations in Geneva.  Working group chairmen from each 
side reported on their activities, and the heads of 
delegations reviewed accomplishments and the critical issues 
that still required resolution.  They also previewed plans 
and objectives for meetings in Moscow during the week of 
October 12.  The working group reports made it clear that key 
accomplishments for this session were the establishment of 
very positive working relationships between each of the 
working group chairmen, and the development of a pattern of 
work.  It was evident the sides had developed a high level of 
mutual respect, which should facilitate resumption and 
acceleration of work at the next session.  Also clear, 
however, was that the working groups had reached the point 
where the sides needed to resolve key differences in 
principle between U.S. and Russian positions to enable 
substantive progress.  The working group reports identified 
accomplishments across all groups on structural and certain 
conceptual issues, but the impact of the critical differences 
across the range of issues was very evident. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) Ambassador Ries provided a summary of the Treaty Text 
and Definitions Working Group (TTDWG).  The TTDWG had focused 
on the treaty's preamble, final articles, and the article and 
protocol on the work of the Bilateral Consultative Commission 
(BCC), as these provisions provided the framework for the 
substance of the treaty.  The TTDWG had made good progress on 
the preamble, though bracketed text remained associated with 
the offense-defense relationship, missiles deployed with 
non-nuclear warheads, and the principle of equal security. 
For the final articles, the U.S. delegation emphasized the 
importance of jointly considering treaty extension, but there 
remained bracketed text on this concept, as well as on the 
notification time for withdrawal.  The U.S. delegation had 
presented the U.S.-proposed text for the BCC article and 
associated protocol.  One of the key issues that remained 
concerned the U.S. proposal for provisional application to 
allow the BCC to operate upon treaty signature.  Ries 
requested Russia consider this during the intersession. 
 
¶5.  (S) Mr. Koshelev agreed with the summary presented.  He 
added that the dialogue and working relationship within the 
group was very positive.  There were some issues of principle 
remaining in the preamble, but he felt that formulations that 
would satisfy each Party were possible.  On the final 
articles and the BCC, the Russian approach was to utilize the 
 
most successful elements of these portions from the START 
Treaty, while streamlining the text.  The United States had 
instead retained as much as possible from START.  The sides 
needed to find a resolution to these competing approaches as 
well to the issues of principle to facilitate work on the 
remaining articles, and the work within the other groups. 
 
¶6.  (S) Adding to the summary, Ambassador Antonov said the 
TTDWG needed more participation by military and technical 
experts to address key issues.  Otherwise it would be held 
hostage to the other working groups.  The working groups and 
experts would need to provide input on the relevant portions 
of the treaty text, and then the TTDWG would need to merge 
the text.  Counting rules, for example, should not be 
resolved by the TTDWG alone.  A/S Gottemoeller agreed to 
discuss this further during the week of October 12 in Moscow, 
and raised the possibility of establishing special ad hoc 
working groups for these types of issues. 
 
--------------------------------- 
INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶7. (S) Col Ilin provided his assessment of the Inspection 
Protocol Working Group (IPWG).  He characterized the work as 
highly professional and constructive.  The IPWG had agreed in 
concept to two sections of the Inspection Protocol, as well 
as the overall approach to work within the IPWG.  The 
delegations agreed to take as homework the preparation of 
their own versions of Joint Draft Text (JDT), reconsidering 
their own positions and those of the other side.  A key 
accomplishment was agreement on a three-tier approach to the 
treaty.  The first tier would include the treaty text and 
procedures.  The second would be for the protocol and 
annexes.  The third would equate to a practical manual for 
inspectors that would be adopted at a lower level.  The 
remaining problems for the group were tied to the key 
outstanding issues between the United States and Russia.  As 
an example, it would be impossible to resolve the types and 
numbers of inspections until the sides resolved counting 
rules for the new treaty. 
 
¶8.  (S) Dr. Warner agreed with Ilin's assessment.  The 
working group had established a pattern of work and was 
gaining momentum.  He noted specifically the progress made on 
characterizing the types of inspections under the new treaty: 
 inspections for deployed strategic offensive arms and 
warheads; and inspection-visits for non-deployed strategic 
offensive arms and exhibitions, including confirming 
conversion or elimination procedures.  Remaining differences 
included agreement on the annual numbers of inspections and 
facilities to be inspected, and agreement, even at the 
conceptual level, for nuclear warhead inspections, especially 
for nuclear armaments for heavy bombers. 
 
¶9.  (S) Gottemoeller complimented Warner and Ilin on 
pioneering the three-tier approach.  The U.S. delegation 
believed a streamlined treaty based on a three-tier structure 
was a good idea, with the understanding that the treaty text 
and protocols, which would contain the obligations and rights 
of the Parties, must appear in the first and second tier, and 
that the third tier would consist of lower-level detailed 
procedures.  The three tiers would form a legally-binding 
package and all three would be ratified by the U.S. Senate. 
 
 
¶10.  (S) Antonov clarified the Russian concept for the three 
tiers.  Specifically, the first and second tiers would 
require ratification.  The third would not.  It would be 
lower in status, perhaps in the form of an Executive 
Agreement.  While recognizing that the U.S. delegation 
believed all three tiers should be ratified, only ratifying 
the first two provided room for maneuver.  This was an idea 
the sides should consider further.  On this point, 
Gottemoeller noted that the legislative bodies in each 
country would ratify in accordance with their own 
constitutional procedures. 
 
------------------------- 
ELIMINATION WORKING GROUP 
------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Mr. Elliott provided a summary of the Elimination 
Working Group (EWG).  The approach of the EWG had been very 
professional.  The group stood out in the sense that much of 
the work during the session focused on concepts, and the 
sides had made significant progress toward understanding the 
concepts laid out by the other.  As a result, each had been 
able to accept certain approaches of the other.  Due to the 
need to focus so much on concepts, however, there had been 
little progress toward developing JDT, though this could now 
begin.  There were also significant differences regarding the 
U.S. approach for eliminating mobile missiles.  The sides 
would need to spend the next 2 weeks considering larger 
issues in order to focus the work of the delegations during 
the next session in Geneva. 
 
¶12.  (S) Col Ryzhkov thanked Elliott for his assessment, and 
noted the U.S. members of the EWG were very professional and 
a pleasure to work with.  They had made important progress; 
for example, it was clear both sides agreed that procedures 
should be less expensive and there should be greater 
flexibility regarding options for elimination.  The sides 
also agreed on verification at the conceptual level: 
inspection should supplement national technical means of 
verification (NTM).  Differences were that the United States 
sought more inspections, while Russia sought fewer.  However, 
there were areas where work on text could begin, such as 
elimination procedures for silo launchers.  Gottemoeller 
added that flexibility regarding elimination procedures was 
an important concept, but it was also important that the 
sides be able to confirm new elimination procedures prior to 
eliminations. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING WORKING GROUP 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) MGen Orlov thanked the U.S. members of the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) Working Group for both 
listeningQd hearing what Russian members had said.  This 
helped create a constructive atmosphere for the work from the 
start.  He was impressed by the younger members of the group, 
who posed some of the most challenging questions.  The U.S. 
and Russian delegations agreed on several elements of the 
MOU.  However, U.S. and Russian differences on key issues for 
the new treaty impacted the ability of the MOU Working Group 
to resolve certain essential elements.  During the 
intersession, the Russian side would finish developing a JDT 
 
for the next session that would take the U.S. view into 
account to the maximum extent possible.  Final results for 
the MOU would depend on work in the other groups. 
 
¶14.  (S) Mr. Trout agreed, noting that the overall structure 
did not depend on resolving issues within other groups.  The 
U.S. delegation had accepted the Russian-proposed structure 
for the MOU, including Russia's-proposed sections and 
annexes, though it proposed splitting out sections for ICBMs, 
SLBMs and heavy bombers.  Russia did not initially include 
data on space launch and elimination facilities, but would 
consider this further during the intersession.  Key 
outstanding issues affecting the MOU included central limits, 
mobile missiles, and the approaches of the sides for counting 
heavy bomber nuclear armaments, which under the Russian 
approach would only include nuclear ALCMs or gravity bombs 
when loaded on heavy bombers. 
 
--------------------- 
SUMMARY OFQEY ISSUES 
--------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) Summarizing the session, Gottemoeller said her goals 
had been met.  The delegations agreed to an overall structure 
for the treaty (the three-tier structure), established an 
active working group schedule, and completed a JDT for the 
treaty articles and begun the process of agreeing to text. 
The pace for the next session would need to accelerate, 
however.  For meetings in Moscow the week of October 12, her 
goals included reviewing the treaty articles to ensure all 
significant issues had been identified.  With the issues of 
principle clearly reflected in the JDT, the sides could study 
them in context.  Gottemoeller provided the Russian 
delegation with a U.S.-proposed merged text of the treaty 
articles.  Text will be reported septel. 
 
¶16.  (S) Antonov agreed the sides had a much better 
understanding of each other, and the sides had begun to take 
each other's views into account.  They had conducted the work 
during the session in a friendly, business-like manner.  He 
considered this session training for the real work ahead, 
however.  He then identified ten problematic issues for 
resolution, which he provided in written form. 
 
Begin text of official translation of the Russian paper: 
 
                              Official Translation 
 
                              Handed over by the 
                              Russian Side on 
                              October 1, 2009 
 
Problematic Issues 
 
¶1.  Reaching agreement on numerical limits on deployed 
delivery vehicles for SOAs. 
 
 
¶2.  Reaching agreement on numerical limits on deployed and 
non-deployed launchers of ICBMs and launchers of SLBMs. 
 
¶3.  Removing Peacekeeper and Minuteman II ICBMs and their 
launchers from accountability under the new treaty, and 
removing converted submarines and heavy bombers from the 
 
verification regime. 
 
¶4.  Inseparable interrelationship between SOAs and MD. 
 
¶5.  Non-nuclear configuration of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
¶6.  Retaining the continuous monitoring regime at the 
production facility for mobile ICBMs. 
 
¶7.  Special limitations and verification measures for mobile 
ICBMs, which are not envisaged for other kinds of mobile SOAs. 
 
¶8.  Retaining in the new treaty the provisions on exchanging 
telemetric information. 
 
¶9.  Tightening up verification measures for SOAs (increasing 
the number of inspections, while reducing the number of 
facilities to be inspected). 
 
¶10.  Removing "new kinds of SOAs" tested for non-nuclear 
purposes from coverage under the future agreement. 
 
End text. 
 
¶17.  (S) Gottemoeller noted that she also had a list of ten 
items requiring resolution, though two from Antonov's list 
were not included:  telemetry and continuous monitoring, as 
the United States had already advanced these issues in the 
previous round and they were a mature part of the U.S. 
position.  Her list was: 
 
      - The Russian-proposed third aggregate ceiling for 
deployed and non-deployed launchers. 
 
      - Russia's proposal to only count nuclear ALCMs and 
bombs that are loaded on heavy bombers. 
 
      - The concept of fewer inspections, and the distinction 
between inspections and inspection-visits. 
 
      - Russia's concept that under the treaty there should 
be no difference between road-mobile missiles and any other 
"mobile" system, such as submarine-launched ballistic 
missiles. 
 
      - The U.S. proposal not to count new types of missiles 
developed solely for non-nuclear warheads, and not to count 
non-nuclear warheads on existing systems. 
 
      - Russian objections to the U.S. approach for counting 
heavy bomber armaments in heavy bomber weapon storage areas. 
 
      - U.S. and Russian differences on incorporating 
provisions on strategic defensive arms. 
 
      - For the MOU, whether technical characteristics such 
as maximum numbers of reentry vehicles flight tested should 
be included for missiles as a transparency measure. 
 
      - The Russian proposal to merge space launch and test 
facilities within the MOU, and the implications of this. 
 
      - Russia's concerns regarding "phantom" launchers, 
including the Peacekeeper missile silos attributed under 
 
START that would not be captured under the new treaty. 
 
---------------- 
PLANS FOR MOSCOW 
---------------- 
 
¶18.  (S) Antonov asked Gottemoeller to describe her 
objectives and plans for the proposed meetings in Moscow 
during the week of October 12.  Supporting the U.S.-proposed 
meetings would be difficult due to the planned meetings that 
week between Secretary Clinton and Minister Lavrov, and Under 
Secretary Tauscher and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov. 
Further, finding meeting space and interpreters to support 
several different meetings of U.S. and Russian working group 
chairmen could be problematic.  From Russia's perspective, it 
would be most useful for the U.S. delegation in Moscow to 
present information on two issues.  He provided a paper 
detailing suggested U.S. briefing topics: 
 
Begin text: 
 
Suggested U.S. Briefing Topics of Interest to the RF 
 
      ¶1.    Approach to counting, in the new treaty, delivery 
vehicles and launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs currently 
attributed to the U.S. under the START Treaty. 
 
      ¶2.    The concept of new kind of non-nuclear SOAs and 
the U.S. approach to accounting for them in the new agreement. 
 
End text. 
 
¶19.  (S) Gottemoeller recognized the complexity of the 
multiple meetings in Moscow, but assured Antonov that the 
U.S. delegation would be flexible and prepared to meet during 
any available time.  The U.S. delegation would bring 
additional interpreters to support the meetings.  In addition 
to specific issues for discussion, she suggested the 
delegations discuss the idea of establishing focused working 
groups to address certain key issues, such as counting rules 
and monitoring of mobile missiles. 
 
¶20.  (S) Antonov indicated he was not excited about having 
the U.S. delegation in Moscow during the week of October 12, 
and pushed back some on the idea of establishing special 
working groups.  He was disappointed that the United States 
had not accepted Russia's proposal for meetings in Geneva 
related to missile defense, as the Russian experts were all 
there.  He and several of the other Russian representatives 
would be involved attending or supporting the Clinton-Lavrov 
and Tauscher-Ryabkov meetings, as missile defense issues 
would be a principal focus.  Further, he had not agreed that 
special working groups should be established; rather, his 
point on the matter was that he did not want to leave certain 
issues to the TTDWG to resolve, such as counting rules, and 
transparency for non-deployed ICBMs, including for mobile 
ICBMs.  These issues would require expertise from the other 
working groups. 
 
¶21.  (S) Gottemoeller clarified that the United States had 
preferred for missile defense discussions to take place in 
Moscow during the week of October 12 because that was when 
top U.S. experts such as General O'Reilly would be available 
to participate. 
 
 
 
¶22.  (U) Documents exchanged: 
 
- U.S.: 
 
      -- U.S.-Proposed Joint Draft Text for the Treaty 
Articles, dated October 1, 2009. 
 
¶23. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S.: 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Ms. Bobiak 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Dean 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Dr. Fraley 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Zdravecky 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
Russia: 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Col Ilin 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Kuznetsov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Mr. Neshin 
MGen Orlov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Rudenko 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Tarasov 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Mr. Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶24.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER