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S E C R E T GENEVA 000841 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/21/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) FOURTH TREATY TEXT AND DEFINITIONS WORKING GROUP, 
SEPTEMBER 28, 2009, P.M. SESSION 
 
REF: JOINT UNDERSTANDING APRIL 6 2009 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-026. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 28, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 p.m. - 6:00 p.m. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the fourth Treaty Text and Definitions Working 
Group (TTDWG) meeting of the session, the Parties continued 
discussion of the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for 
the treaty Preamble.  Agreement was reached on the title, 
opening and closing statements and six paragraphs.  Brackets 
remained on nine paragraphs.  Delegation has prepared a 
complete U.S.-proposed merged text for the draft 
START-Follow-on Treaty, which includes the results of the 
final discussion on the Preamble.  That U.S.-proposed text 
will be sent septel. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian side engaged the U.S. side in discussions 
on the interrelationship of strategic offensive arms and 
missile defense systems and on the connection of the 
Ukrainian contribution to START and its accession to the 
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).   At the end of the meeting it 
was agreed that the heads of the delegations would attempt to 
develop agreed language on these issues. 
 
------------------------------- 
WHERE WE STAND - THE EASY STUFF 
------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) At the fourth meeting of the TTDWG, the Parties began 
the meeting by agreeing on the Russian-proposed formulation 
of the treaty title and also the phrase "Have agreed as 
follows," which appeared at the end of the Preamble.  Mr. 
Koshelev summarized the current state of play for the 
remainder of the Preamble noting the agreed upon text and the 
text that remained bracketed.  The sides agreed to leave the 
paragraph on the "devastating consequences of nuclear war" 
bracketed since agreement could not be reached on removing 
the reference to nuclear war. 
 
------------------------------ 
EQUAL SECURITY FOR THE PARTIES 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S) Moving on to the discussion of the paragraph which 
began with "Guided by the principle...," Ambassador Ries 
observed the importance of retaining the second part of the 
paragraph since it had implications all along the range of 
the U.S.-Russian relationship.  She asked Koshelev whether 
the Russian side preferred "all Parties" or "both Parties" 
when formulating the text of the first sentence.  Koshelev 
stated the Russian side could agree with either formulation, 
however, if agreement could be reached on including "equal 
security," discussion of the paragraph could be concluded. 
 
 
The first part of the sentence in the JDT was changed to 
"Guided by the principle of equal security for both Parties," 
and that part of the sentence would remain bracketed as 
Russian text. 
 
---------------------- 
VERIFICATION MECHANISM 
---------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) In reference to the paragraph which began with 
"Desiring to create a mechanism...," Ries stated that 
verification was an important and essential part of this 
treaty and as such needed to be mentioned in the Preamble in 
order to strengthen its place within the treaty. 
Additionally, a robust verification regime required 
mentioning in the Preamble.  Ries asked Koshelev whether the 
Russian concern was simply a matter of wording or was the 
concern conceptual.  Koshelev stated that the text of this 
paragraph had originally been proposed by Russia in response 
to treaty text proposed by the last U.S. Administration. 
That treaty text had not put forth a verification mechanism 
but rather was built on confidence building measures and 
transparency.  Since the U.S.-proposal had now changed the 
Russian delegation saw no need to specify this concept in the 
Preamble.  It was sufficient that the verification mechanism 
was developed inside the treaty and Koshelev did not see the 
Russian position on this changing.  Further discussion on 
this Preamble paragraph could be conducted once the 
appropriate working groups made their decisions on 
verification mechanisms.  It was decided that this paragraph 
would remain bracketed, now as U.S. text. 
 
---------------------------------- 
MISSILE DEFENSE, A RUSSIAN REDLINE 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) An extremely energetic discussion on missile defense 
began with Ries' statement that the U.S.-proposed formulation 
for the paragraph on the interrelationship between strategic 
offensive and defensive arms was consistent with the Joint 
Understanding from the Moscow Summit (Reftel).  In fact, with 
the exception of "Recognizing," the U.S.-proposed formulation 
used the same text from the Joint Understanding.  Koshelev 
understood that the Joint Understanding included the 
requirement for a "Provision" because the two Presidents left 
it up to the negotiators to decide on the proper formulation 
to describe the interrelationship between strategic offensive 
and strategic defensive arms and for the Russian side this 
meant finding the correct wording for "strategic defensive 
arms."  Defensive arms had a very broad meaning of which a 
missile defense system and its components was a part.  Given 
this, the Russian side proceeded from the idea the Presidents 
required the negotiators to develop wording describing the 
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and the 
deployment of a missile defense system.  Use of the phrase 
"defensive arms" did not meet the Russian understanding of 
the Joint Understanding and U.S. insistence on its use 
crossed a Russian redline.  The Russian side could not sign a 
treaty without the stated interrelationship between strategic 
offensive arms and deployment of missile defense systems. 
 
¶9.  (S) Ries put forth that by placing "Recognizing" ahead of 
interrelationship text as the U.S. side had proposed, the 
 
 
Presidential instructions were being met.  When asked by 
Koshelev, Mr. Taylor stated that "Recognized" was a stronger 
word in the English formulation than use of the phrase 
"Taking note of" in the Russian formulation.  Koshelev 
accepted "Recognizing," since, as Taylor suggested, it showed 
a strong history of the issue.  As for the interrelationship 
language, Ries stated it was worth noting the United States 
and Russia were planning and had begun some cooperation on 
defenses to common threats.  Earlier in the discussion, 
Koshelev had stated that he had a formulation that was going 
to be provided to Ambassador Antonov.  When asked, Koshelev 
provided the following formulation:  "Recognizing the 
inseparable interrelationship between the reduction of 
strategic offensive arms and the deployment and build-up of 
missile defense systems and their components."  Admiral (Ret) 
Kuznetsov and General Venevtsev attempted to sidetrack the 
discussions by engaging the U.S. side on U.S./Russian 
mil-to-mil cooperation in the area of non-strategic defensive 
arms and pressing for a definition of strategic defensive 
arms, which added little to the cross table discussion. 
 
----------------- 
INDISSOLUBLE GONE 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Koshelev cleared up confusion on the use of the word 
"indissoluble" within the paragraph.  The Russian side 
corrected the English translation by stating it had used the 
word "inseparable" which meant unbreakable like a rock, which 
was not as strong as "indissoluble."  Since the first part of 
the paragraph would remain bracketed as a Russian proposal, 
the sides agreed to show Russia's preferred word. 
 
---------------------------------------- 
FROM ONE ENERGETIC DISCUSSION TO ANOTHER 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) In the Russian-proposed formulation of the paragraph 
which began with "Highly appreciating the contribution 
of...," Ries recommended replacing "Highly" with "Deeply" and 
adding "under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons of July 1, 1968" to the end of the paragraph.  This 
suggestion touched off the second extremely energetic 
discussion of the meeting.  Koshelev stated that proposed 
text needed to avoid any connection of Ukraine's contribution 
to START with Ukraine's' accession to the NPT, which was a 
requirement of becoming a Party to START.  In Russia's view, 
Ukraine had acceded to the NPT only after receiving security 
assurances from the United States and Russia.  Russia was 
convinced that Ukraine believed that these security 
assurances would no longer be in effect once START expired. 
As such, any stated connection between START and Ukraine's' 
accession to the NPT in the text of the new treaty might lead 
Ukraine to assert there was a legal right to ask for 
additional security assurances beyond those within the NPT. 
Koshelev expressed his concern that highlighting this 
connection could lead Ukraine to use its NPT membership as 
leverage to demand new security assurances.  Koshelev stated 
that except for the phrase directly referring to the NPT, the 
Russian side had no problems with the U.S.-proposed text. 
The proposed text was needed to praise Ukraine on its 
contribution to nuclear disarmament, not on its contribution 
to non-nuclear proliferation; and specifically to its 
 
 
adherence to the NPT. 
 
-------------- 
EQUAL SECURITY 
-------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) On a less energetic note, the sides agreed to delete 
the first sentence in the paragraph on equal security since 
the phrase "equal security" had already been added to a prior 
paragraph.  Koshelev stated that he believed the Russian side 
would be agreeable to "for all Parties" but this had to be 
decided by Antonov.  Ries mentioned that the second thought 
in the paragraph beginning with "believing that global 
challenges and threats..." was a useful concept.  Koshelev 
agreed and the sides retained the remaining text but left it 
bracketed for further consideration. 
 
-------------------- 
MINDFUL SIGNIFICANCE 
-------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Koshelev questioned the reason for using 
"significance" in the paragraph regarding strategic ballistic 
missiles in a non-nuclear configuration.  The Russian side 
believed the word did not relay the negative impact of 
non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs on strategic stability.  Ries 
replied that in the U.S. view "significance" did not relay a 
positive or negative impact; it just recognized the effect of 
a non-nuclear strategic ballistic missile.  Koshelev could 
not agree with this assessment since further in the treaty, 
Russia proposed a ban on non-nuclear ICBMs and SLBMs and the 
U.S. proposed not to include them in the limit on strategic 
delivery vehicles.  These provisions pointed to the negative 
impact of these systems.  For the Russian side this was the 
second most important issue behind missile defense.  Without 
an understanding of the importance of non-nuclear arms, 
treaty signature was impossible. 
 
¶14.  (S) Koshelev attempted a re-attack by suggesting the 
formulation, "Agreeing that ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear 
configuration have an impact on strategic stability," to 
which Ries replied that this formulation continued to show 
that there was agreement that an impact existed.  The two 
sides agreed that the brackets would remain and left the 
formulation of the paragraph to the Heads of the Delegations. 
 
----------------------------- 
FINALLY, THE FINAL PROVISIONS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) Koshelev believed the differences in the U.S.- and 
Russian-proposed texts in paragraph 1 of Russian-proposed 
Treaty Article XV/U.S.-proposed Treaty Article XIV on 
entry-into-force were mainly editorial.  Unfortunately he 
handed the discussion of the formulation over to his lawyer 
and the word war began.  Ms. Kotkova stated she understood 
this formulation existed in QART, but recognized each side 
had its own procedures for ratifying a treaty.  The Russian 
side saw only one reason that the U.S.-proposed text included 
language on constitutional procedures and that reason was to 
please the U.S. Senate.  Mr. Dean replied that he was happy 
to hear that both sides were not suggesting 
non-constitutional language to ratify the treaty.  He noted 
 
 
the language was included in the START and Moscow Treaties 
and was standard ratification language.  It was unambiguous 
and did no harm as part of the treaty.  The U.S. Senate 
expected to see this language in the treaty and removal could 
raise questions in the Senate.  The Senate could view 
deletion as the Parties ignoring its constitutional role in 
the treaty process and jeopardize U.S. ratification. 
 
¶16.  (S) Kotova asked whether the United States had 
procedures other than constitutional procedures to ratify an 
international agreement.  Dean responded in the negative and 
a hushed "Touche" was heard coming from the other side of the 
table. 
 
¶17.  (S) Ries stated that this language usually was seen in 
the formulation of treaty text and leaving it out may impute 
questions.  Koshelev stated he did not believe that removing 
the text would jeopardize the treaty and that the Russian 
side saw the new treaty as an opportunity to simplify 
procedures.  The sides agreed to keep the formulation in the 
JDT and leave it for further discussion.  Koshelev also 
suggested leaving the text on treaty structure bracketed 
until this had been decided on in the working groups. 
 
------------------------ 
A ROSE BY ANY OTHER NAME 
------------------------ 
 
¶18.  (S) Kotkova recognized that each side had its own way of 
referring to the Moscow Treaty in paragraph 2.  Whereas the 
U.S. side referred to it as the Moscow Treaty, the Russian 
side used a shorter version of the official name of the 
treaty; the Treaty Between the Russian Federation and the 
United States of America on Strategic Offensive Reductions of 
May 24, 2002.  She recommended that since the long title was 
used in the Preamble, it should be used again here for 
consistency.  Ries asked whether there were any negative 
connotations to referring to the treaty as the Moscow Treaty, 
to which Kotkova responded that Russia officially called the 
treaty Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT).  Ries 
believed resolution could wait until the issue was resolved 
in the Preamble. 
 
¶19.  (U) Documents exchanged: 
 
U.S.: 
 
      -- U.S.-proposed JDT of Final Provisions, dated 
September 28, 2009 (in English and unofficial Russian) 
 
¶29.  (S) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Connell 
Mr. Dean 
Mr. Evans 
Dr. Fraley 
Mr. Hanchett 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
 
 
Mr. Taylor 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Col Kamenskiy 
Ms. Kotkova 
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Malyugin 
Gen Venevtsev 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶30.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
RICHTER