VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGV #0829/01 2751414
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 021414Z OCT 09
FM USMISSION GENEVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9473
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/VCJCS WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO IMMEDIATE 4872
RHMFISS/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE IMMEDIATE
RUENAAA/CNO WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
RHMFISS/DIRSSP WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE
INFO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ASTANA PRIORITY 2057
RUEHKV/AMEMBASSY KYIV PRIORITY 1056
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 6255

S E C R E T GENEVA 000829 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR T, VC AND EUR/PRA 
DOE FOR NNSA/NA-24 
CIA FOR WINPAC 
JCS FOR J5/DDGSA 
SECDEF FOR OSD(P)/STRATCAP 
NAVY FOR CNO-N5JA AND DIRSSP 
AIRFORCE FOR HQ USAF/ASX AND ASXP 
DTRA FOR OP-OS OP-OSA AND DIRECTOR 
NSC FOR LOOK 
DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
THIRD TREATY TEXT WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-016. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 25, 2009 
                Time:  3:15 - 5:45 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the third Treaty Text and Definitions Working 
Group meeting of the session, the Parties continued their 
discussion on the U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text (JDT) for 
the treaty Preamble. 
 
¶4.  (S) Agreement was reached on combining two paragraphs of 
the Preamble and how to address the Moscow Treaty.  However, 
the Russian Delegation disagreed with U.S. counterproposals 
regarding "undiminished security" and, likewise, agreement 
was not reached on Russian proposals for the paragraphs 
addressing:  1) the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and 
Ukraine to the successful implementation of the START Treaty, 
2) the consequences of nuclear war, and 3) offensive and 
defensive arms. 
 
-------- 
PROGRESS 
-------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Ambassador Ries began by proposing editorial changes 
which addressed the step-by-step process of reducing and 
limiting nuclear arms.  Ries noted that the changes were 
minor refinements designed to improve the text in English. 
Mr. Koshelev agreed, in principle, but wanted to study the 
changes to ensure that the phrasing worked in Russian as 
well.  Koshelev then revisited already-agreed-to text, noting 
that there was some redundancy in two paragraphs and 
suggested combining them.  After some discussion, both sides 
agreed to a single paragraph: "Continuing along the path of 
forging a new strategic relationship based on mutual trust, 
openness, predictability and cooperation, and desiring to 
bring their respective nuclear postures into alignment with 
this new relationship." 
 
---------------------------- 
UKRAINE, BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN 
---------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Koshelev proposed revising the text discussing the 
contributions of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan.  The 
purpose of the rewrite was to improve the wording by 
recognizing the contributions of these three nations without 
"adding significance."  The key change in Koshelev's proposal 
was the deletion of the reference to the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). 
 
¶7.  (S) Koshelev explained that Ukraine believed the Budapest 
Memorandum security assurances, provided as part of Ukraine's 
accession to the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state, would 
expire when START did.  Koshelev noted that even though the 
United States and the Russian Federation did not agree with 
 
this interpretation, the Russian Delegation wanted any 
reference to the NPT removed to preclude Ukraine from making 
that linkage.  Ries concurred that both the United States and 
the Russian Federation disagreed with the Ukrainian 
interpretation, but requested further explanation as to why 
dropping the NPT reference helped. 
 
¶8.  (S) Koshelev responded that when Ukraine agreed to give 
up nuclear weapons, it was provided security assurances 
which, for Ukraine, was the first step.  The second step in 
Ukraine's view was entering the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon 
state.  Therefore, Ukraine viewed the Budapest Memorandum 
security assurances as a pre-condition for entering the NPT. 
These security assurances were much more important to Ukraine 
than those provided by the NPT.  Ms. Kotkova further stated 
that by including the NPT within this paragraph, Ukraine was 
provided the link to demand additional guarantees to remain 
an NPT member. 
 
¶9.  (S) Ries replied that the United States had not included 
the NPT reference in its September 22, 2009 draft of the JDT, 
but had proposed the language at the September 23, 2009 
Treaty Text Working Group meeting.  However, its inclusion 
emphasized the importance of Ukraine's entry into the NPT. 
Koshelev stated that he was not denying the significance of 
this event, but stressed that Ukraine had only joined the NPT 
for the special security assurances which they wrongly 
believed would expire at the end of START.  Many high-ranking 
Ukrainian Government officials considered entry into the NPT 
a mistake and Koshelev reminded the U.S. Delegation that the 
Ukrainians had stated in the Joint Compliance and Inspection 
Commission (JCIC) that they might reconsider their 
non-nuclear weapon status.  Koshelev noted that all NPT 
members received equal treatment, but Ukraine wanted more; in 
effect,  Ukraine advocated the creation of a new category of 
non-nuclear weapon states. 
 
¶10.  (S) In summary, the Russian Delegation believed Ukraine 
had made a responsible decision to become a member of the NPT 
and to renounce nuclear weapons.  Therefore, the Russian 
Delegation had one request for this paragraph:  to drop the 
reference to the NPT.  Ries said she understood Russia's 
concern and she would consult with her NPT experts. 
 
----------------- 
THE MOSCOW TREATY 
----------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Moving on, Koshelev declared that the Russian 
Delegation had no objection to mentioning the Moscow Treaty, 
but they preferred to reduce the verbiage to simply noting 
its successful implementation.  Koshelev's rationale was that 
because the Moscow Treaty had no verification regime it had 
been subjected to criticism.  The Russian Federation had 
never publicly declared specific reductions of its nuclear 
arsenal.  However, Russia did inform the United States that 
it was already under the limits prescribed by the treaty. 
The Russian Delegation agreed that there should be some 
recognition of the Moscow Treaty because of the 
accomplishments that resulted from it, but they did not want 
it over-emphasized because the reductions could not be 
confirmed.  Ries accepted Koshelev's proposal. 
 
--------------------- 
 
UNDIMINISHED SECURITY 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Ries suggested moving the phrase referring to 
"undiminished security for the Parties" from the beginning of 
the eighth paragraph, which discussed the reduction of 
strategic offensive arms enhancing the security of both 
parties, to the end of paragraph three about 
non-proliferation.  The revised paragraph would read: 
"Expressing strong support for global efforts in 
non-proliferation and guided by the principles of 
undiminished security for all."  Koshelev objected and noted 
that he had been criticized because the phrase "undiminished 
security," which was earlier substituted for "equal 
security," was much weaker.  In the Russian view, the phrases 
"equal security" and "undiminished security for the Parties" 
referred only to the two Parties of this treaty.  By changing 
it to read "undiminished security for all" and then moving it 
to another paragraph, it lost that meaning entirely. 
 
¶13.  (S) Ries expressed surprise at Koshelev's reaction and 
noted that "undiminished security for all" was from the 
language used in United Nations Security Council Resolution 
1887 (September 24, 2009).  Ries advocated for following what 
the United States and Russian Federation had already agreed 
upon.  Koshelev retorted that the Russian side had proposed 
the principle of "undiminished security for the parties" for 
one purpose:  to find a different formulation for "equal 
security."  Therefore, if this wording for the paragraph on 
strategic offensive arms was not acceptable, then it was back 
to "equal security," and as such, starting over. 
 
¶14.  (S) Ries noted that the Preamble must set forth 
principles to which both sides can agree.  Recent 
deliberations on "equal security" had revealed disagreement 
between the two sides.  However, because some agreement did 
exist, the U.S. Delegation had hoped moving the "undiminished 
security" phrase to the paragraph discussing 
non-proliferation would achieve accord.  Koshelev replied 
that "undiminished security for all" was related to nuclear 
disarmament whereas "equal security for all" was the main 
goal of nuclear nonproliferation.  Koshelev introduced a 
third concept, "indivisible security."  Koshelev informed the 
U.S. Delegation that "undiminished security for all" was 
first mentioned in the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) 
Treaty, and later at the 2000 NPT RevCon.  However, the 
Russian position was that this phrase was not as good as 
"equal security."  Koshelev stressed that, for this treaty, 
"undiminished security" referred just to the United States 
and Russia; it did not include China, France or anyone else. 
Therefore, it was not acceptable to merge the two paragraphs 
as suggested.  Ries agreed to leave this issue for now. 
 
---------------------------- 
DON'T TALK ABOUT NUCLEAR WAR 
---------------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) The Russian Delegation expressed concern regarding 
the paragraph articulating the consequences of nuclear war. 
Koshelev recognized that it was in the START preamble but 
pointed out that it was not found in the Moscow Treaty. 
Koshelev contended that to insert it now into this treaty 
would be implying that something had changed since 2002. 
Koshelev emphasized that Russia agreed and supported the 
 
concept espoused by this paragraph, but questioned why it 
needed to be brought up again.  Ries agreed that nuclear war 
was unthinkable, but that this paragraph should be seen as 
something positive; the idea that nuclear war cannot be won 
and must never be fought was a very positive statement. 
 
¶16.  (S) Koshelev said his concern was that START was signed 
near the end of the Cold War in 1991 and, at that time, the 
statement was useful.  But it was not carried over into the 
Moscow Treaty and mentioning it again was sending the wrong 
signal.  He asked "what would a non-aligned nation think? 
Did something change that this needed to be emphasized 
again?"  Ries replied that having this statement did not mean 
the world had gotten more dangerous since 2002 and, 
therefore, it should not be interpreted that way.  Admiral 
Kuznetsov interjected and said that the relationship that 
existed between the two Parties when START was implemented 
was completely different from that which existed now.  So to 
discuss nuclear war was nonsense.  Koshelev restated that 
Russia had nothing against the concept, but questioned the 
necessity to send this message regarding the horrors of 
nuclear war.  Was it the right thing to do? 
 
¶17.  (S) Ries said she understood that the Russians wanted to 
get away from Cold War thinking and remarked that these 
discussions are beneficial.  However, this issue would not be 
resolved today. 
 
--------------- 
MISSILE DEFENSE 
--------------- 
 
¶18.  (S) Ries read the U.S. proposal in the twelfth 
paragraph, "Recognizing the interrelationship between 
strategic offensive and defensive arms" and added that it 
elegantly portrayed the offense-defense relationship. 
Koshelev replied by explaining that it was important for the 
Russians to have "the deployment of missile defense systems" 
in lieu of "defensive arms" because this was the first time 
such a treaty was concluded without the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) Treaty.  Koshelev asserted that a decrease in 
strategic offensive armaments was directly related to the 
deployment of missile defense systems and that this was 
effectively the same concept stated by the Presidents in the 
Joint Understanding of July 6, 2009.  However, the phrase 
"defensive arms" in the Joint Understanding was too 
imprecise.  The substitution of "deployment of missile 
defense systems" provided for better accuracy. 
 
¶19.  (S) Mr. Taylor said the United States proceeded from the 
premise that the Delegations had been instructed by our 
Presidents that the subject of the new agreement would be the 
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.  That 
said, the United States was also committed to including a 
provision on the interrelationship of strategic offensive and 
strategic defensive arms.  Taylor noted that the United 
States had historically recognized this relationship but that 
both sides would probably describe it differently based on 
each nation's own view of its national security. 
 
¶20.  (S) Taylor explained that the United States would not 
use the phrase "indissoluble interrelationship" when speaking 
about strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms 
because the United States did not see the two things as 
 
always linked. 
 
¶21.  (S) Taylor noted that the United States regarded this 
negotiation on the reduction of strategic offensive arms as 
proceeding independently of the discussions on missile 
defense systems, which were being conducted in another venue 
in keeping with a Russian suggestion about ways we might work 
together. 
 
¶22.  (S) Taylor said that, in strategic arms reduction talks, 
the Delegations were discussing U.S. and Russian offensive 
systems and bilateral strategic stability.  However, in 
separate dialogues concerning strategic defensive systems, we 
were conferring about third country threats and about how our 
two countries might work together to counter them. 
 
¶23.  (S) Taylor said that the United States and the Russian 
Federation had developed, and continued to forge, a strategic 
relationship based on mutual trust, openness, predictability 
and cooperation.  This could not have been more evident than 
during this very week as our two Presidents together 
demonstrated unprecedented leadership in New York and 
Pittsburgh.  Therefore, the United States believed that the 
paragraph, as drafted, was consistent with the spirit of our 
current relationship. 
 
¶24.  (S) It was for these reasons, and in the spirit of this 
new strategic relationship, that the U.S. Delegation urged 
the Russian Delegation to accept the U.S.-proposed 
formulation. 
 
¶25.  (S) Koshelev stated that he agreed with some of the 
positions addressed by Taylor, but asked why the United 
States needed strategic ballistic missile interceptors. 
Taylor replied that this question should be discussed in a 
different forum.  Koshelev complimented Taylor on his 
diplomacy and followed up with a history of missile defenses, 
starting with the 1972 ABM Treaty.  Koshelev noted that, 
since then, the positions of the two sides had reversed.  The 
purpose of strategic missile defense was to intercept 
ballistic missiles and, since only two other nations 
possessed them (the Russian Federation and China), the 
Russian position was that the United States needed missile 
defense to protect itself against Russian strategic offensive 
arms.  Koshelev argued that the build-up and deployment of 
missile defense systems by one Party affected the strategic 
deterrence of the other and, therefore, this relationship 
should be reflected.  Koshelev concluded by reiterating that 
because no ABM Treaty existed, this principle should be 
enshrined in the treaty. 
 
¶26.  (S) Ries agreed that circumstances had changed (between 
1972 and now), but also commented that they had progressed in 
a positive direction.  Ries brought the meeting to a close by 
noting that both sides are undertaking constructive 
cooperation and evaluating things that threaten and affect 
the national security of each nation. 
 
¶27.  (U) Documents exchanged: 
 
- U.S. 
 
    -- U.S.-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble, dated 
September 25, 2009 (English and unofficial Russian). 
 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian-proposed Joint Draft Text of the Preamble, 
dated September 25, 2009 (paragraph 14) (Unofficial English 
only). 
 
¶28.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Connell 
Mr. Evans 
Dr. Fraley 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Sims 
Mr. Taylor 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Mr. Koshelev 
Col Kamenskiy 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Col Novikov 
Adm.(Ret) Kuznetsov 
Gen Venevtsev 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶29.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS