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S E C R E T GENEVA 000826 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) SECOND MEETING OF THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING 
WORKING GROUP, SEPTEMBER 25, 2009 
 
REF: STATE 97473 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-015. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 25, 2009 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The second meeting of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) Working Group was held at the U.S. Mission on September 
25, 2009.  U.S. and Russian Delegations exchanged questions 
regarding their respective approaches to organizing and 
reporting categories of data in the MOU.  Questions were 
focused on understanding the objectives behind proposed 
categories of data and how each Party expected to use these 
categories for verification and transparency.  The Russian 
Delegation also sought to clarify which limitations the 
United States intended to put on non-deployed systems.  They 
also asked the U.S. side to examine the Russian proposal to 
introduce an aggregate limit of 600 on deployed and 
non-deployed ICBM/SLBM launchers in order to provide balance 
and to limit upload capability.  The Russian Delegation 
argued against unbalanced restrictions, particularly on 
road-mobile systems. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. side clarified the U.S. position not to base 
ICBM or SLBM launchers outside U.S. national territory.  The 
Delegation explained that the space launch facilities at Meck 
and Kodiak Islands would be used to launch space launch 
vehicles (SLVs) that incorporated the first stage of the 
Trident I SLBM and that the Trident I SLBM and Minuteman II 
ICBM would not be counted under the START Follow-on (SFO) 
Treaty.  Russia clarified that, under their proposal, data on 
existing types, variants, and versions of systems will 
continue to be reported with the exception of support 
equipment.  The U.S. side  also pressed Russia to rethink the 
Russian position not to list space launch facilities in 
Kazakhstan in the MOU.  The Russian Delegation admitted they 
may need to be more specific in defining at what point a 
missile removed from a launcher for maintenance would be 
counted as non-deployed. 
 
----------------------- 
THE THROW-WEIGHT DEBATE 
----------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) General Orlov began opening remarks and explained 
that the Russian Delegation had analyzed the U.S.-proposed 
MOU to compare commonalities in each Party's approach.  He 
said Russia needed clarification on a number of issues to 
thoroughly understand U.S. proposed categories of data. 
Orlov explained that Russia needed to understand the 
objective of the U.S. approach and definitions in order to 
find common ground and ultimately develop an MOU.  He said 
the Russians had prepared 12 questions for discussion. 
 
 
¶6.  (S) Orlov questioned U.S. intentions to report 
throw-weight in the MOU, inquiring why the United States 
planned to add a parameter on a subject not limited by the 
treaty while also stating that throw-weight provisions which 
pertained to heavy ICBMs would no longer apply.  Mr. Trout 
reminded the Russian Delegation that throw-weight remains a 
factor in determining new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in the 
U.S. proposal.  Trout explained that the U.S. definition of 
new type was taken from START and includes throw-weight, 
since it is a measure to determine a new type of missile in 
comparison to an existing type.  Orlov argued that the 
Russian treaty proposal does not include provisions on 
exchanging telemetry; therefore, there would be no 
verification of throw-weight data.  Trout acknowledged the 
point, but explained that the U.S proposal does include 
telemetry exchanges. 
 
¶7.  (S) General Poznihir stated that the Parties are 
discussing a treaty based on counting warheads deployed on 
delivery vehicles regardless of whether they are existing 
types or new types.  Therefore, the Russian opinion is that 
throw-weight does not play a role.  Trout responded that, in 
order to add transparency, we need to determine the maximum 
number of warheads on SLBMs and ICBMs.  Poznihir argued that 
the goal is to verify operationally-deployed warheads, not 
the maximum number on each missile.  Trout agreed that 
determining the number of operationally-deployed warheads is 
one factor of verification, but the United States had adopted 
certain START methodologies to maintain transparency as well. 
 Providing this data would aid each side in understanding the 
other Party's force, while allowing each Party to determine 
the composition of its own force.  The U.S proposal was not 
just to verify the number of deployed warheads, but also to 
provide an additional level of transparency.  Trout said the 
Russian focus was on verifying numbers of limited items but 
commented that the item and the number of items to be limited 
would be decided at senior levels. 
 
¶8.  (S) Orlov requested clarification to confirm that the 
U.S. purpose of listing throw-weight in the MOU was related 
to transparency.  Trout confirmed.  Orlov asked whether the 
addition of throw-weight was intended as a provision to 
monitor all missiles or just the development of new types. 
Trout confirmed that the goal was transparency and to provide 
a better understanding of new types. 
 
-------------------- 
AGGREGATE LIMITS AND 
UPLOAD CAPABILITY 
-------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Poznihir stated that the United States intended to 
conduct inspections on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs and 
SLBMs but did not provide definitions or an aggregate limit 
on those systems.  He asked which data the United States 
planned to use to verify numbers on non-deployed systems. 
Trout responded that the United States had definitions for 
non-deployed systems in the U.S. proposal.  Poznihir inquired 
as to whether the United States would be willing to dntroduce 
aggregate limits on deployed and non-deployed systems and add 
them to the aggregate numbers section of the MOU.  Trout 
responded that we have such limits for mobile non-deployed 
systems, but the United States would consider the suggestion. 
 
 
 Colonel Petrov explained that such data is required under 
START to verify the number of non-deployed systems associated 
with each facility.  Lieutenant Lobner explained that the 
United States proposed to include data on non-deployed 
systems in the aggregate section for each Party, similar to 
START. 
 
¶10.  (S) Colonel Pischulov asked for the U.S. opinion on the 
Russian-proposed concept of introducing an aggregate limit of 
600 on deployed and non-deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers. 
Trout responded that the United States had only recently 
received the Russian proposal and the United States still 
needed time for review, but it was studying the option in the 
context of the on-going Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). 
 
¶11.  (S) Pischulov stated that the proposed aggregate limit 
of 600 on ICBM and SLBM launchers would provide transparency 
and allow the sides to control upload potential.  When asked 
to explain, Poznihir stated that it would be unfair if one 
side has 600 launchers and the other 2000.  He opined that 
one side could have non-deployed missiles and warheads in 
storage that could be used to upload and, therefore, create 
unfair conditions.  Poznihir asked whether the United States 
envisioned limits on the number of non-deployed launchers. 
Trout responded that the United States'  concerns over upload 
capability were based on warheads and not delivery vehicles. 
Orlov responded that warheads cannot fly without a delivery 
vehicle.  He stated that there was a huge gap in the number 
of proposed numerical limits on delivery vehicles, citing the 
500-1100 proposed limits on delivery vehicles.  Orlov asked 
what could be done to narrow the gap.  Trout cited that the 
United States had spoken to the Russians about proposing 
lower limits on delivery vehicles to a range of 700-900 but 
Orlov said that Russia did not receive an official proposal 
in writing.  The reason, Trout responded, was that there were 
other conditions that had not been agreed to by Russia. 
Orlov agreed. 
 
¶12.  (S) Orlov asked how deployed versus non-deployed SLBMs 
would be reported.  Trout responded that they would be 
reported as they currently were under START.  Petrov asked 
whether the United States planned to indicate specifically 
which SLBMs were deployed and which were non-deployed in 
storage bunkers prior to each inspection.  Trout answered 
that the process for reporting during inspections is a 
question for the Inspection Protocol Working Group, but that 
information would be included in the MOU for each base 
similar to START. 
 
----------------------- 
MOBILE RESTRICTIONS -- 
AN HISTORICAL NARRATIVE 
----------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Orlov questioned U.S. rationale for continuing to 
insist on unique identifiers (UIDs) which were applied only 
to mobile ICBMs, and why the general U.S. focus was 
specifically on mobile ICBM forces.  Orlov asked for 
clarification as to why this was necessary.  Trout emphasized 
the historical background of mobile missiles explaining that, 
during original START negotiations, both sides agreed that 
the most difficult strategic offensive arms (SOAs) to monitor 
were  mobile missiles.  Therefore, additional procedures were 
 
 
agreed upon by both Parties to deal with these concerns. 
Trout explained that Russia agreed to these measures even 
after the United States cancelled its plans for developing 
and deploying mobile missiles.  Orlov replied that these 
restrictions only affected Russia.  Trout replied that Russia 
still has mobile missiles; therefore, the additional 
procedures were still required.  Trout concluded that the 
discussion was above the level of the MOU WG. 
 
¶14.  (S) Poznihir said that the Russian proposal is to limit 
SOAs and did not see a reason to accept restrictions that 
only affect Russia.  He stated that the covertness of 
submarines is more worrisome than that of mobile ICBMs.  He 
opined that UIDs could therefore be applied to SLBMS. 
Poznihir also suggested defining operational zones at sea for 
submarines with SLBMs.  Trout offered that a captain at sea 
might have a hard time dealing with restrictions on 
operational zones.  After Orlov pressed the U.S side for an 
answer, Trout responded by asking whether Russia was 
proposing UIDs for SLBMs.  Orlov said they would think about 
it. 
 
¶15.  (S) Orlov stated again that the U.S. proposal would only 
be applied to mobile ICBM systems.  Trout repeated that both 
countries had already agreed to additional measures under 
START, and asked what had changed.  Orlov answered that the 
people at the table have changed.  Mr. Luchaninov said that 
the original START negotiations were the first time these 
issues were discussed and 15 years have passed.  Russia has 
had time to correct its position and concluded that 
monitoring SLBMs is much more difficult than monitoring 
mobile ICBMs.  Luchaninov expressed surprise at what he 
called an unbalanced and inconsistent U.S. approach to 
controlling various types of strategic nuclear arms. 
 
¶16.  (S) Orlov said Russia needed to understand the U.S. goal 
behind maintaining the practice of reporting UIDs.  He said 
that Russia is absolutely opposed to unbalanced restrictions 
on mobile systems and added that Russia does not bother U.S. 
submarines.  Trout replied that the United States was not 
intending to control Russian mobiles or impose limitations on 
Russian road-mobile systems, but wanted to maintain 
transparency.  He stated that mobile launchers can be 
reloaded more quickly than silo launchers or submarines. 
Orlov responded jocularly that maybe the United States should 
develop mobiles and see for themselves.  Trout said the 
concern is related to having more missiles than launchers. 
As such, there needed to be an understanding regarding the 
total number of missiles in relation to launchers.  Orlov 
said that such information would be provided in the aggregate 
numbers section of the MOU.  Trout argued that UIDs are more 
helpful in tracking missiles after they leave the production 
facility.  Poznihir said that Votkinsk would not be part of 
SFO.  Orlov said that Russia had a secret:  portal monitoring 
activities would not be continued. 
 
¶17.  (S) After a short break, Luchaninov again asked for 
clarification of U.S.-proposed limitations on non-deployed 
SLBMs and ICBMs, specifically, locational restrictions in 
Article IV of the U.S.-proposed treaty.  Trout reminded the 
Russian Delegation that the sides had been discussing this 
issue since spring.  The issue concerned the ability of 
mobile forces to rapidly expand.  He stated that the U.S. 
 
 
side was proposing no limits except the 80 for non-deployed 
mobile ICBM launchers, 10 for test mobile ICBM launchers, and 
10 for mobile training launchers of ICBMs.  He stated that 
the U.S. side would examine the Russian proposal to limit 
both deployed and non-deployed launchers. 
 
--------------------- 
A GUIDE TO U.S. SPACE 
LAUNCH RESORTS 
--------------------- 
 
¶18.  (S) Mr. Shevchenko asked whether the United States would 
deploy ICBM/SLBM launchers or ICBMs/SLBMs themselves outside 
of national territory, including those used for space launch, 
and if there would be notifications for the associated 
activities.  Lobner explained that the United States had no 
plans to base U.S. SLBMs, ICBMs, or launchers for ICBMs or 
SLBMs outside the national territory.  Petrov asked whether 
the United States planned to send notifications regarding 
activities at Meck Island, noting that an SLV using the first 
stage of a Trident I SLBM had been used to launch a payload 
into space.  Lobner replied that SLVs that incorporated the 
first stage of Trident I missiles could be launched from 
Kodiak and Meck Islands, but added that, in the U.S. 
proposal, the Trident I SLBM is not accountable and would not 
be declared. 
 
¶19.  (S) Petrov asked whether the Trident I and Minuteman II 
storage facilities would be accountable under SFO.  Trout 
responded that they would not be accountable because they 
would not be declared as existing types of SLBMs/ICBMs in the 
U.S.-proposed treaty language.  Therefore, their storage 
facilities would not be listed in the MOU. 
 
---------------------------- 
LAST QUESTION, HEAVY BOMBERS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶20.  (S) Poznihir requested clarification of additional 
technical information in Annex F.  Trout clarified that 
additional information in Annex F was information transferred 
from JCIC Agreement 23.  Poznihir asked why additional 
technical information was being added for ICBMs and SLBMs but 
being deleted for heavy bombers.  Lobner explained that the 
technical data listed under START was needed for verifying 
heavy bomber maximum equipage and types.  Since the new 
treaty would only focus on distinguishing between different 
bomber types or variants of a type, but not between 
categories of bombers, such as those equipped for Long-Range 
Nuclear AlCMs or those equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other 
than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs, the additional data was no 
longer required. 
 
¶21.  (S) The Russians asked what types of ICBMs and SLBMs the 
U.S. proposed providing technical data.  Trout stated that 
data would be provided for types declared under the treaty 
and, therefore, in response to further Russian questioning, 
technical data would not be provided for Trident I and 
Minuteman II, nor would their facilities be subject to 
inspections. 
 
------------------- 
THE U.S. PUTS 
 
 
RUSSIA ON THE STAND 
------------------- 
 
¶22.  (S) Trout began the U.S. questions noting that, in 
Section III of the Russian proposed MOU, there was a category 
of Warheads on Deployed Heavy Bombers.  He noted that, under 
Russian-proposed counting rules, nuclear armaments on heavy 
bombers would only count when they are actually loaded on the 
bomber.  Trout asked when this number would be anything other 
than zero, given that both Parties do not fly their bombers 
with nuclear armaments.  Petrov responded that this category 
is based on a theoretical situation where a heavy bomber 
would be loaded with nuclear armaments on the airfield.  He 
clarified that in this situation a notification would be sent 
or the information would be reported during pre-inspection 
procedures.  Poznihir agreed that the number for heavy 
bombers would always be zero.  Trout replied that if we had 
anything other than zero, each Party would have other 
concerns than complying with treaty provisions.  Trout added 
that the United States had very significant concerns over 
this proposed counting method. 
 
¶23.  (S) Trout asked the Russian Delegation if Russia planned 
to list the RS-12M Variant 2 (SS-27) as an accountable item 
in the MOU since it was not listed in the Russian-proposed 
treaty.  Orlov confirmed that Russia was just checking if the 
United States was paying attention to detail.  When Trout 
asked about the RS-24, Orlov responded that, as of yet, there 
is no such thing. 
 
¶24.  (S) Mr. DeNinno asked which types of systems Russia 
intended to list in the MOU by type, variant, and version. 
He specifically asked whether Russia planned to provide 
information on fixed structures for mobile launchers.  Orlov 
stated that the Russian answer would be an incomplete one. 
Poznihir responded that all current START information would 
be reported including all types and variants, with the 
exception of throw-weight and warhead attribution, 
emphasizing that Russia would not try to hide.  Deployed and 
non-deployed ICBMs and launchers, including those designed 
for test and static displays, would also be included. 
DeNinno asked for confirmation that fixed structures would be 
listed.  Petrov responded that the Russian-proposed 
definition annex does not include the term for support 
equipment.  Fixed structures will therefore be considered 
normal structures and no technical data will be reported on 
them. 
 
¶25.  (S) DeNinno referenced Article V, Paragraph 3, of the 
Russian treaty text, where the Russian Federation proposed 
that "training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located 
only at ICBM bases and test ranges."  He asked whether the 
Russian Federation envisioned declaring the number and 
location of training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs or mobile 
training launchers of ICBMs in the MOU.  Poznihir responded 
that training launchers would be included in aggregate 
numbers and that Russia would provide aggregates numbers of 
deployed and non-deployed for each base. 
 
---------------- 
WAIT, KAZAKHSTAN 
IS NOT IN RUSSIA 
---------------- 
 
 
 
¶26.  (S) Lobner said that in Article VII, Paragraph 3, of the 
Russian-proposed treaty, the Russian Federation proposed that 
"each Party shall have the right to use ICBMs and SLBMs for 
placing a payload into space."  He asked whether the Russian 
Federation envisioned declaring space launch facilities.  He 
added that if such a facility is not declared, did Russia 
intend to locate an ICBM or SLBM at a facility not listed in 
the MOU.  He asked about the planned status of the Leninsk 
Space Launch Facility in Kazakhstan and if SLBMs, and their 
first stages used for space launch, would be accountable in 
the same way as under START.  Petrov responded that, under 
existing START practices, an existing ICBM or SLBM could be 
used to deliver payloads that are not weapons into space.  He 
said that Russia would provide the corresponding 
notifications if such launches occurred from test or space 
launch facilities. 
 
¶27.  (S) Lobner asked whether there would be a listing of 
these facilities in the MOU, specifically Leninsk. 
Shevchenko answered that SFO would not impose limits on 
existing patterns of cooperation with third parties, 
including activities at Baykonur (Leninsk), Kazakhstan. 
However, he continued, Russia had a presence at Leninsk and 
leased the facility from Kazakhstan.  Trout asked about the 
status of treaty-accountable items shipped to Leninsk. 
Petrov responded that it would be the same as U.S. Trident II 
SLBMs transferred to the United Kingdom (UK) for their use on 
their submarines. 
 
¶28.  (S) Petrov and Orlov clarified that Russian missiles 
would not be transferred to a third party since the missiles 
would always be under Russian control.  He repeated that 
Leninsk was being leased by Russia.  Trout asked again how 
this would be notified.  Petrov responded that the United 
States would be notified just as the United States notifies 
Russia of Trident II transfers to the UK.  Trout said there 
is a difference in these practices.  In the U.S. view, 
missiles that are transferred to the UK become the property 
of the UK, but the missiles Russia locates to Kazakhstan are 
still Russian missiles. 
 
¶29.  (S) Shevchenko said accountable items would not be based 
at those facilities, only temporarily located.  There is no 
prohibition against using the missiles for space launch and 
they would not be equipped with deployed warheads.  DeNinno 
asked the Russian Delegation whether they were speaking of 
activities at the Leninsk test range or the space launch 
facility because different provisions apply to those 
facilities.  Petrov clarified he was speaking of activities 
at the space launch facility.  Trout asked how activities 
would be notified concerning the test range.  Petrov said 
they would have to think about it.  Petrov said all 
appropriate notifications would be sent.  DeNinno explained 
that if Russia were to transfer a missile to another Russian 
facility, then the notification should include the name of 
the facility where it was located.  Facilities where items 
could be located are listed in the MOU so that the sides are 
able to monitor and track missile movements.  As such, space 
launch facilities still needed to be listed.  Orlov said they 
would need to think about listing it in the MOU. 
 
-------------------- 
 
 
WE NEED MORE DETAILS 
-------------------- 
 
¶30.  (S) Lobner noted that, in Annex C of the Russian MOU, 
the Russian Federation proposed that long-range nuclear ALCM 
technical data would be exchanged.  He asked whether the 
Russian Federation envisioned exchanging data regarding other 
types of nuclear armaments for heavy bombers, for example, 
nuclear bombs, and nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a 
range of less than 600 kilometers.  Petrov responded that 
Russia does not have that problem as all Russian heavy 
bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear air-launched 
cruise missiles (LRNA).  Therefore, the problem pertains only 
to U.S. systems.  Petrov said Russia understood that, without 
such information, inspections at certain facilities would be 
difficult. 
 
¶31.  (S) DeNinno asked whether Russia planned to list 
coordinates for individual silo launchers or re stricted 
areas for mobile launchers in the MOU, and added that this 
information was necessary to conduct nuclear warhead 
inspections.  Petrov confirmed this and said that coordinates 
for each silo would be listed in Section II of the Russian 
proposal.  He clarified that information on the aggregate 
number of warheads at the base and numbers of warheads 
deployed on each ICBM or SLBM would be reported at the base 
prior to the inspection. 
 
¶32.  (S) Mr. Sims asked whether Russia planned to list points 
of entry in the MOU.  Petrov confirmed that Russia planned to 
provide all information associated with points of entry as 
currently provided under START.  Flight routes would be 
provided in the Russian-proposed Annex D under additional 
data required. 
 
------------------- 
DEFINE DEPLOYED VS. 
NON-DEPLOYED 
------------------- 
 
¶33.  (S) Sims asked how a missile would be counted if all the 
warheads were removed but the missile remained in its 
launcher.  Poznihir responded that it would count as deployed. 
 
¶34.  (S) Mr. Rust asked how Russia would count a missile that 
was only temporarily removed from a launcher for maintenance. 
 Additionally, he asked if Russia would notify the United 
States if a launcher was removed for a short period.  Orlov 
said a missile removed from a launcher would count as 
non-deployed and that Russia would send a notification as a 
transparency measure.  He agreed, however, that the issue of 
time does raise some questions and that a reasonable time 
limit would need to be determined. 
 
¶35.  (S) Rust asked the Russian Delegation to clarify whether 
they envisioned sending a notification each time an ICBM or 
SLBM was removed from a launcher or the number of warheads on 
an ICBM or SLBM was altered.  Petrov stated that such a 
notification would have to be sent unless it was for a short 
period of time.  Rust asked the Russian Delegation to clarify 
what was meant by a short period of time.  Petrov stated that 
they would have to think about that concept and the 
corresponding notification requirement some more. 
 
 
 
¶36.  (S) Trout, in reference to Article III.4.(e).(ii) of the 
Russian-proposed treaty, asked why a mobile launcher that 
returned to a production facility would no longer count under 
the aggregate limit on deployed and non-deployed launchers. 
Orlov responded that if a mobile launcher returns to the 
production facility it meant there was a malfunction that 
rendered the launcher incapable of completing its mission. 
It was Russia's opinion that only operationally-capable 
launchers were located at ICBM bases or storage facilities. 
Once a mobile launcher left a production facility it would be 
accountable again.  Colonel Hartford reasoned that, according 
to Russia's logic, if a launcher was not capable of 
fulfilling its intended purpose, then it would not be 
considered deployed.  Orlov responded that mobile launchers 
would be considered deployed until the moment they reached 
the production facility.  While at a base, however, mobile 
launchers would be considered to be deployed, regardless of 
their capability to carry out their mission. 
 
¶37.  (S) Orlov and Trout then discussed the path forward and 
the schedule for the next week.  Trout noted that the United 
States would likely have a few more questions and that the 
two sides needed to begin work towards a Joint Draft Text. 
Orlov agreed and added that they needed to focus on Annexes A 
and B.  Trout replied that the United States was still 
finalizing those Annexes.  Orlov then recommended that the 
Parties focus on the organizational structure of the MOU, to 
which Trout agreed. 
 
¶38.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶39.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Trout 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. Colby 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Evans 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
LT Lobner 
Mr. Rust 
Mr. Sims 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Gen  Orlov 
Col Kamenskiy 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Gen Poznihir 
Col Petrov 
Col Pischulov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Ms. Yevarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶40.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS