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S E C R E T GENEVA 000819 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/01/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) PLENARY MEETING, SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007) 
     ¶B. GENEVA 0815 (SFO-GVA-V-023) 
     ¶C. GENEVA 0813 (SFO-GVA-V-020) 
     ¶D. GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024) 
     ¶E. GENEVA 0816 (SFO-GVA-V-021) 
     ¶F. GENEVA 0810 (SFO-GVA-V-019) 
     ¶G. GENEVA 0818 (SFO-GVA-V-022) 
     ¶H. STATE 088263 (SFO-DIP-09-002) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-004. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 22, 2009 
                Time:  10:00 A.M. - 12:30 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the September 22 plenary meeting chaired by U.S. 
Head of Delegation (HOD) A/S Gottemoeller and Russian HOD 
Ambassador Antonov, the U.S. Delegation posed some 
big-picture questions about the Russian-proposed treaty text 
which had been provided to officials at the United States 
Embassy in Moscow the previous week (REF A).  The U.S. 
Delegation pointed out the difficulties Russia's proposed 
text would cause in the areas of counting heavy bomber 
warheads and effective verification.  Antonov emphasized that 
Russia was seeking a new approach different from START, which 
he termed a treaty of the Cold War. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation provided a proposed omnibus 
annex to the treaty, that the U.S. side noted would flesh out 
our understanding of Russia's treaty concepts.  The Russians 
clarified several points:  they did not envisage subjecting 
facilities that they are using in Kazakhstan to treaty 
restrictions; they would not permit a right of sequential 
inspections or visits; and they did not support visiting 
eliminated facilities. 
 
--------------------- 
RUSSIA PROVIDES ITS 
PROPOSED TREATY ANNEX 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Antonov presented Russia's proposed Annex to the 
Treaty Between the United States and Russian Federation on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of 
Strategic Offensive Arms, a 34-page document in the original 
Russian that included six sections on definitions (REF B), 
the data base (REF C), conversion and elimination procedures 
(REF D), notifications (REF E), 
inspections/visits/exhibitions (REF F), and the Bilateral 
Consultative Commission (BCC) (REF G).  The Russian 
Delegation considered that this format (treaty text plus 
single annex) would be easier for its legislature to ratify. 
They could consider other options, however, and would listen 
to U.S. views.  Antonov commented,  jokingly, that just as 
the United States had devoted half its text to mobile 
missiles, Russia had devoted half of its text to ballistic 
missile defenses.  Antonov noted that this was the final 
 
document of Russia's treaty proposals.  Russia was ready to 
work cooperatively on the annex so that it would address both 
sides' concerns.  New ideas could also be incorporated in the 
course of negotiations. 
 
¶6.  (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for the document and 
noted that the U.S. negotiators needed the draft annex in 
order to complete their understanding of Russia's proposed 
treaty text.  The focus of this meeting would be initial U.S. 
questions on the rationales behQ Russia's treaty proposals. 
 
¶7.  (S) In response to Antonov's joke, Gottemoeller reassured 
the Russian side about the potential for U.S. development of 
a global missile defense (MD) capability.  She reiterated 
relevant points made by the President in his April 1 meeting 
with Russian President Medvedev in London and his April 5 
speech in Prague.  The planned European MD deployments would 
be focused on the Iranian threat.  If the Iranian missile and 
weapons of mass destruction threats went away, so too would 
the need for future MD deployments in Europe. 
 
¶8.  (S) Antonov replied that he was familiar with these 
Presidential statements.  His Delegation had not said they 
were concerned about global MD systems following the 
September 16 U.S. announcement of new MD plans.  That concern 
had existed for years.  The Delegation was simply inviting 
Washington MD experts to come to Geneva and have a serious 
discussion with Russian experts, outside the framework of the 
START Follow-on Negotiations.  Russia had many questions and 
wanted to understand the new U.S. policy better. 
 
--------------------- 
TREATY PHILOSOPHY 101 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Gottemoeller's first questions addressed some of the 
basic concepts of Russia's proposed treaty.  She asked 
whether Russia's omission of many of the prohibitions 
contained in START Article V, Paragraph 18, was based on an 
assumption that such prohibitions were covered under other 
international agreements that remained in force.  For 
example, the 1971 Seabed Arms Control Treaty contained a 
prohibition on emplacing nuclear weapons launchers on the 
seabed and the ocean floor, similar to a ban contained in 
Subparagraph 18(b) of Article V of START.  On the other hand, 
if other countries perceived that the U.S. and Russia were 
dropping long-standing constraints on their strategic arms, 
it would seem as if our countries were backtracking on arms 
control. 
 
¶10.  (S) Antonov professed to be unfamiliar with the specific 
provisions of each article in the Russian draft, but assured 
Gottemoeller that Russia's philosophy was always to further 
the goals of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).  It 
was clearly necessary to convince opponents and skeptics of 
the new treaty that the United States and Russia were not 
undermining any previous agreements on nuclear disarmament 
and nonproliferation.  Russia had only deleted START 
provisions that hampered operations.  He conceded it was 
possible that Russia had removed too much.  The working 
groups could discuss such questions.  (Begin comment:  During 
a break, Antonov remarked that he had felt cornered by the 
question, since the military had cut a lot of material out 
that he had not paid attention to.  End comment.) 
 
 
¶11.  (S) Gottemoeller noted that the United States wanted the 
new treaty to preserve predictability as well as flexibility. 
 The U.S. side also wanted simplification.  It was important 
to ensure that there were no contradictions among those three 
aspects of the treaty.  Antonov agreed. 
 
-------------------- 
MORE QUESTIONS ON 
RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY 
-------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Fraley asked why Russia had added a provision on 
measures aimed at strengthening trust, openness, and 
predictability to the other obligations in Paragraph 1 of 
Article I.  The United States had proposed simply to use the 
original START formulation for this paragraph (REF H). 
Antonov answered that Russia's proposed treaty was designed 
to be new and to differ from START, which had been negotiated 
under very different circumstances from the present.  Russia 
had recently, and with great difficulty, accepted that the 
new treaty should be a "hybrid."  While START should be the 
foundation for the new treaty, Russia did not believe it was 
simply a matter of taking START and crossing some text out. 
Russia believed the new treaty should show the world the new 
character of U.S.-Russian relations, and had highlighted this 
in Article I.  As for specific measures, the experts could 
consider in the working groups what measures would be 
possible.  Zaytsev added that, in this treaty, Russia was not 
just reducing numbers, but also wanted to include 
confidence-building measures, such as notifications. 
 
¶13.  (S) Warner asked for additional clarification of how 
heavy bomber armaments would count under Russia's approach. 
The Parties had committed to reduce strategic offensive arms 
(SOAs), including those for heavy bombers.  According to 
Russia's proposed Article III, heavy bomber nuclear armaments 
would only count when they were actually deployed on a heavy 
bomber.  The fact was that neither Party keeps nuclear 
armaments loaded on heavy bombers.  Therefore, we would both 
appear to have zero heavy bomber nuclear armaments.  The 
Russian Delegation acknowledged that this was correct. 
Zaytsev said the problem had existed under START and still 
existed for the new treaty -- heavy bomber warheads could not 
be verified.  It was too difficult to count warheads in 
storage.  Russia's logic was to account for heavy bomber 
warheads in the same way as ICBM and SLBM warheads; i.e., 
only warheads deployed on heavy bombers would count.  The 
U.S.-proposed approach created problems in terms of what 
portion would count and what would not, and which storage 
facilities would be subject to the treaty. 
 
¶14.  (S) Warner acknowledged that defining heavy bomber 
warheads was difficult, but heavy bombers were different from 
ICBMs and SLBMs and did not lend themselves to being counted 
in the same way.  The U.S. side would discuss its proposed 
approach in more detail in the working groups.  Russia's 
proposal would reduce nuclear arms by definition instead of 
in reality.  Our countries would look foolish if we declared 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments on both sides 
but said they had no weapons.  The United States certainly 
did not want to load nuclear armaments on its heavy bombers 
and put them on alert, as was done during the Cold War. 
 
¶15.  (S) Antonov said Warner's comments about heavy bombers 
not being counted with warheads reminded him of Russia's 
long-standing concerns about ICBM and SLBM front sections 
that did not carry as many warheads as their maximum 
capacity.  Russia wanted to limit upload capability.  The 
case with heavy bombers would be similar:  no warheads were 
currently loaded, but they existed somewhere and would be 
ready to load onto heavy bombers.  Russia was not trying to 
find out U.S. secrets, and was not interested in warheads 
located in storage facilities.  Warheads could not fly on 
their own.  The focus was on delivery vehicles, which Russia 
wanted to reduce permanently. 
 
-------------------- 
LAUNCHERS AND LIMITS 
-------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Trout questioned Russia's Article III, Subparagraph 
4.(e)(ii) provision, which states a mobile launcher is 
removed from accountability by returning to the production 
facility.  Under the START Treaty, such movement did not 
change the accountability of a mobile launcher.  Antonov was 
unable to address Trout's question.  Orlov proposed 
discussing the question in the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) Working Group, adding that, if a mobile launcher 
returned to a production facility, it would not be deployed. 
Orlov promised he would also have questions for the U.S. side 
at the working group meeting. 
 
¶17.  (S) Fraley asked the Russian side to clarify the 
difference between the proposed accountability rules in 
Russia's Article IV, Paragraph 2 and Article III, Paragraph 
¶4.  What kinds of limits were being referred to in each case? 
 After much discussion among the Russian Delegation, Antonov 
said Article IV, Paragraph 2 defined when items became 
subject to the treaty in general.  It was not about numbers. 
 
¶18.  (S) Purcell asked about Russia's Article V, Paragraph 2 
proposed restrictions on test launchers.  Since, in Article 
II. Russia proposed a single limit on both deployed and 
non-deployed launchers, why did Russia see a need to 
distinguish test launchers from deployed launchers?  The 
U.S.-proposed treaty text included limits on test launchers 
because the U.S. view was that such launchers would not count 
under the central limits.  Zaytsev attempted an answer, 
saying that Russia had not proposed specific limits on test 
launchers since they would fall under the proposed aggregate 
launcher limit.  Their location would determine whether the 
launchers were test or training launchers.  Test launchers 
would be located at test ranges and would be considered 
non-deployed.  At the end of the meeting, Zaytsev added 
privately that such non-deployed launchers would not differ 
from deployed launchers.  Purcell noted that was why she had 
asked the question. 
 
----------------------------- 
MANY QUESTIONS, FEWER ANSWERS 
----------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) DeNinno noted that Russia's Article VII, Paragraph 3 
provided for use of ICBMs and SLBMs as space launch vehicles, 
but Russia's treaty did not mention space launch facilities. 
What was Russia's view regarding space launch facilities 
under the new treaty?  What was the status of the Leninsk 
 
Space Launch Facility in Kazakhstan?  Finally, would ICBMs, 
SLBMs, and their first stages used for space launch be 
accountable in the new treaty in the same way as under START? 
 
¶20.  (S) Smirnov stated that Leninsk was located in 
Kazakhstan, and the United States and Russia had agreed that 
this treaty would not include third parties.  Russia viewed 
Paragraph 3 of Article VII as identifying one way in which 
the Parties could eliminate missiles.  Each missile would be 
subject to the treaty until launched -- the same general 
counting rule as under START.  Petrov added that launchers at 
Leninsk would remain accountable until eliminated. 
 
¶21.  (S) Warner commented that the U.S. side was trying to 
correlate Russia's concept of inspections and visits with the 
START inspection regime.  Inspections and visits seemed to be 
similar to START reentry vehicle inspections and data update 
inspections.  The biggest difference was the change in the 
annual quota.  Russia wanted no more than five inspections 
and five visits, while the United States was proposing 12 
data update inspections and 10 warhead inspections.  Since 
there were many more Russian ICBM bases than U.S. ICBM bases, 
the United States considered Russia's annual quota too low. 
Gottemoeller asked whether a single inspection team could 
conduct a visit to a base and then a sequential inspection at 
the same base.  Petrov responded that Russia's concept did 
not provide for a single team to conduct more than one 
inspection, visit, or exhibiion.  The Russians were willing, 
however, to disuss this issue  further in the working group 
andto consider numbers and types of facilities. 
 
¶22. (S) Warner asked whether Russia's concept include 
anything like the U.S.-proposed formerly declard facility 
(FDF) inspections.  Petrov answered, gain, saying that 
Russia was not providing for tat kind of inspection. 
Eliminated facilities coul be monitored with national 
technical means (NTM.  Warner remared that NTM was indeed 
the primay means of monitoring former facilities, but if 
uestions arose on that basis, the United States wold want 
the opportunity to follow up with an inspction.  The United 
States was dropping facility close-out inspections, bu 
wanted to retain FDF inspections.  Petrov counteed that, in 
the entire START experience, there hd never been any 
ambiguities regarding activitie at former facilities. 
Russia proposed that, if uestions arose, it would be 
possible to discuss hem in the BCC. 
 
¶23.  (S) Gottemoeller summed up hat both sides had agreed to 
simplify treaty procedures and reduce costs, and also to make 
verification more effective.  The Delegations would continue 
to develop concepts of predictability under more efficient 
conditions.  All of the measures must be sound.  Antonov said 
the exchange of questions was very useful, making the Russian 
side think more about its rationales.  He hoped that the 
working group meetings that were about to commence would be 
friendly and constructive, with no fighting.  Acceptable 
compromises must be found. 
 
¶24.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
 
   -- Russian-proposed Annex to the Treaty, dated September 
22, 2009. 
 
 
¶25.  (U) Participants. 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Dwyer 
Mr. Elliott 
Dr. Fraley 
Col Hartford 
Maj Johnson 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Purcell 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Artemyev 
Ms. Ivanova 
Col Izrazov 
Col Kamenskiy 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Lysenko 
Mr. Malyugin 
Col Novikov 
Gen Orlov 
Col Petrov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Gen Poznihir 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Gen Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Evarovskaya (Int) 
 
¶26.  (U) Gottemoeller sends, 
GRIFFITHS