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Viewing cable 09DAKAR1261, Casamance rebels kill Seven Senegalese soldiers

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09DAKAR1261 2009-10-06 11:02 2011-08-24 16:30 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Embassy Dakar
VZCZCXYZ1678
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHDK #1261 2791102
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 061102Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY DAKAR
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3160
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
UNCLAS DAKAR 001261 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
DEPT FOR AF/W, AF/RSA, DRL AND INR/AA 
PARIS FOR AFRICA WATCHER 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PINS KDEM ECON SG
SUBJECT: Casamance rebels kill Seven Senegalese soldiers 
 
1. (SBU) Summary: 2009 has had an uptick of violent assaults by 
gunmen allegedly belonging to MFDC (Movement of Democratic Forces of 
Casamance) resulting in numerous civilian deaths.  However, a more 
worrying development is the resumption of attacks against the 
Senegalese army.  On October 2, MFDC rebels ambushed an army vehicle 
on a muddy road in the Kolda region.  They killed six soldiers and 
wounded four; a day later one of the wounded died.  It is feared 
that if these attacks continue that the army will respond in kind 
thus increasing the intensity of the conflict.  End Summary. 
 
Escalation of violence 
---------------------- 
 
2. (SBU) On the afternoon of October 2, a Senegalese army vehicle 
was ambushed in the village of Sare Boya, in the Kolda region, two 
miles away from the Bissau-Guinean border.  When the vehicle was 
bogged down in a muddy pool, soldiers got out to help extract it 
from the mud.  It was at that moment that gunmen believed to be 
members of MFDC ambushed the unit with guns and RPG-7s.  Six 
soldiers died at the scene and four were wounded.  A day later, one 
of the wounded soldiers passed away.  One of the dead is reported to 
be an army captain.  The Senegalese army has not sustained such 
heavy casualties since the 1990s.  With President Abdoulaye Wade's 
election in 2000, the GOS has been generally successful in 
restraining the army's use of force in Casamance.  A civil society 
leader who follows the conflict closely told Embassy that the attack 
was conducted by men affiliated with Edouard Diedhiou, Commander of 
the Fouladou rebel base in the Region of Kolda.  This group is 
believed to be close to dissidents of the Kassolol branch of the 
MFDC that attacked the Senegalese army last month and killed one 
soldier on the outskirts of Ziguinchor. 
 
A deadly message 
---------------- 
 
3. (SBU) This attack comes on the heels of a meeting that President 
Wade held with Casamance leaders (The "Cadre Casamancais") to get 
their views on how to resolve the conflict.  A journalist, who is a 
native of the Casamance, told the Embassy that MFDC hardliners 
reacted violently as they felt that they had not mandated these 
leaders to speak on their behalf.  He added that rebels in the 
Maquis have told him that they do not trust the numerous 
self-appointed intermediaries that Wade meets and that they are 
faced with the problem of how to engage the GOS and to identify 
credible interlocutors within the government. 
 
Senegalese soldiers must leave Casamance 
---------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) A recurrent MFDC demand has been that Senegalese soldiers 
return to their positions of 1982, before the conflict started, when 
they were confined to their barracks in the regions of Ziguinchor, 
Bignona, and Kolda.  The MFDC has aggressively opposed the recent 
deployment of many small combat units by the Senegalese army in an 
attempt to deter the hijacking of passenger vehicles by rebels.  An 
Embassy source noted that the increase in patrols conducted by 
Senegalese soldiers is likely to result in more clashes with the 
MFDC.  He added that another reason why MFDC rebels are frustrated 
and demand the departure of the soldiers is their view that "all 
Senegalese soldiers do here is impregnate our women." 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
5. (SBU) As the government keeps the Casamance conflict on the back 
burner, so will the frustration and concomitant violence increase. 
In the meantime the MFDC is believed to have used the prolonged 
ceasefire to acquire weapons and, although their force and logistics 
remain primitive, it would be very difficult for the GOS to fund a 
large scale counterinsurgency in the region.  Negotiations seems to 
be the only viable solution but as long as the government remains 
hesitant and seeks peace without political concessions, granting the 
region more say in its governance, then all efforts will be for 
naught. 
 
SMITH