VZCZCXRO9910
OO RUEHCHI
DE RUEHBK #2724/01 2991116
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 261116Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8732
INFO RUEHVN/AMEMBASSY VIENTIANE PRIORITY 5793
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI PRIORITY 7208
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 2167

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002724 
 
SIPDIS 
 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
DEPT FOR PRM/ANE AND PRM/A; EAP/MLS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/25/2019 
TAGS: PREF PHUM SMIG TH LA
SUBJECT: THAI ARMY: REMAINING LAO HMONG TO BE DEPORTED FROM 
PETCHABUN IN EARLY NOVEMBER 
 
REF: BANGKOK 2712 
 
Classified By: Charge d' Affaires, a.i.,  James F. Entwistle for Reason 
s  1.5 (b, d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) General Nipat 
Thonglek, head of the Thai delegation to the bilateral 
Thai-Lao  committee handling the Lao Hmong in Petchabun, 
unexpectedly told Charge on October 26th that all remaining 
4,221 Lao Hmong in the facility would be deported to Laos in 
early November. The deportation will include Lao Hmong 
identified in a January 2008 Royal Thai government (RTG) 
vetting process as "screened in" and previously privately 
described by RTG officials as not subject to return.  Nipat 
said an operational plan has been developed that "foresees 
using force" if necessary.  According to Nipat, the decision 
to resort to a large-scale forcible deportation was made by 
the National Security council (NSC) last week, and awaits a 
green-light from the Prime Minister Abhisit Vejajjiva, 
expected "in the next few days."  Gen. Nipat requested U.S. 
support for this "last stage" of the Lao Hmong return 
operation, which has seen 2,800 returned in small groups over 
the last 18 months. 
 
¶2.  (C)  According to Gen. Nipat, RTARF Chief of Defense 
Forces Songkitti Jaggabatara and the NSC Secretary General 
noted the recent destruction (by French officials) of a 
illegal migrant settlement in Calais, France, and became 
"very confident" that the forcible return of the remaining 
Lao Hmong was defensible. The early November timing of the 
deportation was requested by Lao army Brigadier General 
Bouaxieng Champaphanh, Nipat's counterpart, to avoid 
conflicting with the Southeast Asia Games, to be hosted by 
Laos in late November. Nipat claimed that the remaining Lao 
Hmong in Petchabun "refuse to return" and that therefore the 
"rule of law" will be used to solve the long-standing 
problem. The RTARF's operational plan envisions returning all 
the Petchabun Hmong within a 12-hour period. Initially, about 
50 key Hmong leaders--of whom 30 were characterized as 
particularly important- will be apprehended and forced on 
buses.  The RTARF expects that others in the camp will then 
acquiesce and return without force. Government of Laos (GOL) 
officials will be invited to observe the large-scale 
deportation. 
 
¶3.  (C)  In response to Charge's request, the RTARF agreed to 
provide a list of the "screened in" Hmong to assist in 
possible third country resettlement after their return to 
Laos. Gen. Nipat claimed that Lao BG Bouaxieng had agreed 
recently to allow the group to be resettled abroad after a 
30-day "processing period" in Laos. The RTARF delegation 
suggested that the U.S. quickly accept the group, and 
appeared surprised when the various refugee processing steps 
were described (again.) Nipat and his staff were unable to 
provide details regarding arrangements in Laos to identify, 
segregate and provide access for the U.S. Refugee Admissions 
Program to the "screened in" Hmong. RefCoord noted the 
practical obstacles in identifying and locating them once 
they had dispersed to their home villages, and suggested that 
OPE pre-screening (to include collecting biodata and contact 
information) prior to departure from Thailand would be the 
minimum required to pursue later processing in Laos. Gen. 
Nipat asserted that the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) had been approached by the RTG to "witness" 
the large-scale forcible return, and that IOM was considering 
participation. (Note: we believe that IOM is only considering 
assisting the current repatriation process in an attempt to 
improve transparency and voluntariness, and would not be 
willing to be involved in a clearly forced deportation. End 
Note.) 
 
¶4.  (C)  Comments. 
         -------- 
 
We have heard RTG announcements concerning the closing of the 
Petchabun camp several times in the past, and deadlines have 
passed without action. This occasion was different: a solemn 
RTARF delegation visited the Embassy to inform us directly, 
and to gauge our reaction. Still, it may be that a clearly 
uncomfortable Gen. Nipat previewed the mass deportation for 
us so that we could weigh-in with the Prime Minister's office 
in opposition.  That would allow the RTARF to avoid a 
difficult, messy operation for which they (and particularly 
Gen. Nipat) are certain to receive international criticism. 
Nipat could then inform his Lao military counterpart that the 
RTARF attempted to meet the December 30th closure date for 
Petchabun, but were prevented from doing so by the PM under 
 
BANGKOK 00002724  002 OF 002 
 
 
international pressure. In support of this theory, Gen. Nipat 
did not appear discomfited when we reminded him of PM 
Abhisit's July commitment to the Secretary that there would 
not be forcible returns of the Petchabun group, and he 
quickly inquired if the issue might be raised by POTUS in 
Singapore next month. (We told him it very well might.)  We 
also note that the operation outlined by Nipat borders on the 
impossible (4,000 Hmong loaded on buses and removed in twelve 
hours, particularly if there is resistance) and wonder if 
Nipat was laying out as dire a scenario as possible in the 
hopes that we might object strongly. 
 
¶5.  (C) We will "ground truth" Gen. Nipat's odd account with 
the MFA and IOM over the next few day and formulate action 
recommendations to perhaps include reminding PM Abhisit of 
his "no forced returns" promise to Secretary Clinton, and 
raising the matter with General Songkitti when he is in 
Washington at the end of this week.  It would also be very 
helpful to have Embassy Vientiane's read on all this. 
ENTWISTLE