VZCZCXRO7837
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #2260/01 2851209
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121209Z OCT 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6086
RUEHPNH/NVC PORTSMOUTH 3587
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS 0013
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 1624

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 002260 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR CA/FPP AND NEA/ELA 
 
DEPT ALSO PASS TO KCC; POSTS FOR FRAUD PREVENTION MANAGERS; ATHENS 
FOR DHS/ICE AND DHS/CIS; ROME FOR DHS/ICE, DHS/CIS, AND DHS/CBP; 
NEA/ELA FOR M. GREGONIS; CA/FPP FOR S. SEXTON 
 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: KFRD CVIS CPAS CMGT ASEC JO
SUBJECT:  FRAUD SUMMARY - JORDAN 
 
REF: Amman 001508 
 
------------------ 
COUNTRY CONDITIONS 
------------------ 
 
¶1. (U) Jordan is a developing country with a GDP per capita of 
$5,100 and a population of over 6.3 million.  Over 78% of the people 
live in urban areas and one third of all Jordanians are younger than 
¶14. The service sector comprises over 66 percent of the economy, 
industry covers about 30 percent, and 2.4 percent is 
agriculture-based.  Although Jordan's official unemployment rate is 
nearing 13 percent, unofficial estimates put this figure 
substantially higher at 30 percent.  Scarce natural resources, 
poverty, inflation and unemployment are significant problems in 
Jordan, but over the past several years, the government has enacted 
broad economic reforms to improve the standard of living. 
 
¶2. (U) Jordan is host to a significant number of Iraqis who have 
fled Iraq over the last several years for security and economic 
reasons.  In May of 2008, the Government of Jordan imposed a visa 
regime for Iraqis which limited the number of Iraqis arriving in 
Jordan, although Iraqi business people and investors can now travel 
more easily to Jordan.  The continually-improving security situation 
in Iraq, coupled with the wider availability of consular services at 
the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad, has resulted in a slight decrease in 
Amman's Iraqi workload.  Over the past six months of this reporting 
period, April through September 2009, Iraqis still comprise 7 
percent of Amman's visa workload. 
 
¶3. (U) Jordanian-related civil document fraud is minimal as the 
documents contain many fraud-resistant features and adjudicators 
appreciate the reliability of both the civil-issuing authorities and 
integrity of the process.  Together, these factors permit an easy 
verification. 
 
¶4.  (U) Post continues to detect a significantly higher rate of 
document fraud for Iraqi cases.  Iraqi documents lack Jordan's high 
standards of quality control governing both issuance and 
verification.  This situation, coupled by issues relating to 
security and infrastructure, results in a higher incidence of fraud 
stemming from Iraqi documents rather than Jordanian.  Iraqi document 
fraud also involves widespread counterfeiting of primary 
identification documents, namely passports, national IDs, and other 
civil papers. 
 
--------- 
NIV FRAUD 
--------- 
 
¶5.  (U) During this reporting period of April 1 through September 
30, 2009, Amman adjudicated 14,672 nonimmigrant visas (NIV), five 
percent of which were Iraqi.  Of the 128 cases referred to the Fraud 
Prevention Unit, 43 contained at least one counterfeit, altered or 
fraudulently-obtained document.  Most Jordanian cases of document 
fraud are limited to poor-quality bank statements, employment 
letters and family registration books.  But post occasionally 
interviews sports teams or entertainment groups who attempt to 
include "stowaways" for immigration purposes only and who are not 
bona fide members of the group. 
 
¶6.  (U) The FPU confirmed fraud in approximately fifteen percent of 
the nonimmigrant Iraqi cases referred to the unit for review.  The 
fraud is a mixture of altered, counterfeit, and 
fraudulently-obtained documents. 
 
¶7. (U) The K1 fianc visa category, particularly among Iraqis, is 
problematic because of the low bar for adjudication.  Cultural norms 
permit couples to become engaged after the families meet a single 
time.  In addition, tradition favors the selection of a spouse from 
the extended family because a blood and property alliance already 
exists.  The K1 program provides an easy way for a family to sponsor 
a relative or neighbor to emigrate to the United States. 
 
¶8. (U) Post has received feedback through unofficial U.S. 
Citizenship and Immigration Service (USCIS) channels regarding the 
high number of Iraqi visitors who apply for asylum within one year 
of entering the United States.  Specific groups in question include 
K1s and F1s.  Post is currently evaluating last year's Iraqi B1/B2 
issuances to validate their travel and has taken immediate action to 
address adjudication standards. 
 
--------------- 
 
AMMAN 00002260  002 OF 005 
 
 
IV AND DV FRAUD 
--------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) Amman adjudicated 2419 Immigrant Visa (IV) applications 
during this reporting period, of which 176 cases, or 7 percent, were 
Iraqi.  FPU detected fraud in 60 IV cases, less than three percent 
of the total.  Most Jordanian IV fraud is either relationship fraud, 
i.e., a marriage for immigration purposes, or some type of document 
fraud.  The latter type often involves IR-1 and CR-1 cases where the 
Jordanian's alleged divorce from the first wife (which freed him up 
to adjust to LPR status by marrying an Amcit) is either not 
authentic or else not legally registered.  Post also sees a similar 
type of fraud involving IR-2 stepchildren, where the biological 
parents are either not legally divorced, or else the marriage 
permitting the step-parent relationship may have been entered into 
solely for immigration purposes.  Post notes that U.S. immigration 
laws that permit visitors to adjust to LPR status in the United 
States, in lieu of applying for immigrant visas overseas, 
contributes significantly to fraudulent immigrant visa cases. 
 
¶10. (U) Post transmitted a spot-reporting cable in July (Reftel) 
regarding an internet-based financial scam where enterprising crooks 
duped a Jordanian accountant into paying over $1100 to secure a U.S. 
employment visa and job in New York.  Orchestrated entirely via 
internet and communicated by e-mail, the package included many 
features of the U.S. immigration visa process, including fees, 
forms, fingerprints, and even administrative processing.  The 
perpetrators request payment in three different currencies, 
suggesting a global cooperative effort was underway to mastermind 
such a scheme. Post referred the case to law enforcement officials 
at post and suggested to the victim that he apply for the Diversity 
Visa program in order to legally emigrate to the United States. 
 
¶11.  (U) Post has identified a series of K3 cases where the Iraqi 
beneficiaries presented fraudulent Greek Orthodox marriage 
certificates, officiated by a priest in Amman defrocked by the 
Patriarchate for allegedly accepting bribes to perform illicit 
ceremonies.  Although the marriage certificates clearly exhibit 
multiple fraud indicators, the FPU confirmed the authenticity of the 
Jordanian Foreign Ministry and Governorate wet seals.  Post has 
notified the host government of this fraud trend. 
 
¶12. (U) Post is increasingly concerned with the mounting 
sophistication of Iraqi document fraud.  FPU confirmed fraud in 
fifteen percent of the IV cases referred to the unit and they range 
from high-quality counterfeit ID cards, to citizenship certificates, 
school transcripts, and civil documents - all of Iraqi origin.  One 
recent example involves an Iraqi male K1 where the applicant first 
presented an ID card, produced using an outdated technology.  When 
post refused to accept the document, he submitted a second ID card, 
which adhered to current technological norms, but other 
irregularities revealed it was a forgery.  Post returned the 
petition to the National Visa Center and recommended revocation. 
 
¶13.  (U) Post notes cases where an Amcit IV petitioner may have 
obtained U.S. citizenship through a marriage undertaken ostensibly 
for immigration purposes.  The Department, in consultation with 
USCIS General Counsel, has advised post not to pursue any possible 
denaturalization cases unless the person naturalized recently, i.e., 
within the past year or two.  Post continues to bring cases to 
CA/FPP's attention where the petitioner appears to have obtained 
immigration benefits through fraudulent means, even though the 
matter may not rise to the level of USCIS General Counsel's 
acceptance of the case for possible denaturalization proceedings or 
review of the person's permanent resident status. 
 
 
¶14. (U) Regarding diversity visas, fraud among Jordanian applicants 
is low. As Embassy Baghdad now handles its own Immigrant Visas, 
Embassy Amman did not process any Iraqi DVs during this reporting 
period. 
 
---------------------- 
ACS AND PASSPORT FRAUD 
---------------------- 
 
¶15.  (U) Citizenship-based fraud in Amman appears to be very low and 
post has no cases to report this period. Because Jordan is a 
relatively easy country to access in the region, post accepts CRBA 
applications on behalf of other posts, to forward them to the 
correct post for adjudication.  As a result, post handles West Bank 
and Gaza civil documents as well as Syrian civil documents on a 
regular basis. 
 
AMMAN 00002260  003 OF 005 
 
 
 
-------------- 
ADOPTION FRAUD 
-------------- 
 
¶16.  (U) Jordan is a Muslim country where Sharia courts have 
jurisdiction over family law.  To legally adopt a child in Jordan, 
both parents must be practicing Muslims.  Post did not detect any 
fraud in the one adoption visa issued during the last six months. 
 
 
------------------ 
USE OF DNA TESTING 
------------------ 
 
¶17.  (U) Post did not process any immigrant visa case where 
applicants submitted DNA evidence during the past six months. 
 
---------------------------- 
ASYLUM AND DHS BENEFIT FRAUD 
---------------------------- 
 
¶18.  (U) USCIS opened a Field Office in Amman in 2008 and they can 
be reached directly at uscis.amman@dhs.gov.  USCIS (Fraud Detection 
and National Security) officials  frequently request assistance from 
their field office in Amman for help confirming civil status on a 
variety of cases.  During this reporting period, USCIS confirmed 
fraud in 7 of the 28 cases referred to Amman. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
ALIEN SMUGGLING, TRAFFICKING, ORGANIZED CRIME, 
TERRORIST TRAVEL 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶19.  (U) Jordan is a major transit point in the Middle East for 
passengers heading to Europe and North America.  Passengers from 
around the world can select from 15 weekly direct flights to the 
United States.  Royal Jordanian Airlines flies directly to Chicago, 
Detroit, and New York. Delta Airlines began non-stop service from 
Amman to New York in June 2008. 
 
¶20.  (U) Jordan is a major transit country for narcotics in the 
region. Heroin and amphetamine trafficking occurs overland from both 
Israel and Lebanon destined for the Gulf States.  Local officials 
estimate that only 15% of all narcotics trafficking is locally 
consumed.  Cocaine trafficking occurs primarily via air passengers 
arriving at Queen Alia International Airport.  GOJ officials report 
that the majority of narcotics couriers interdicted at the airport 
are internal body carriers from poor disenfranchised areas of South 
America. 
 
¶21. (U) Jordan recently passed an Anti-Human-Trafficking law that 
officially criminalizes the act in a manner similar to U.S. 
standards.  Security forces have received little training in 
combating this crime and current enforcement efforts are hampered by 
factional disagreements between the responsible agencies.  There is 
limited local reporting on Human Smuggling and Trafficking in 
Jordan, specifically as it relates to the United States. 
 
¶22. (U) Organized crime has begun to explore the feasibility of 
expanding their operations into Jordan, as evidenced by the arrest 
of 14 Romanian nationals in August 2009.  The persons in question 
were part of an automatic teller machine (ATM) fraud scheme that 
stole credit/debit card information from victims through the use of 
a card reader affixed to the ATM.  Jordanian officials deny the 
existence of organized crime, while also acknowledging that about 15 
identified groups perpetuate most human and contraband smuggling in 
Jordan. 
 
¶23.  (U)  Airline and immigration authorities at Amman's Queen Alia 
International Airport have intercepted altered, counterfeit and 
stolen blank passports from several European countries, as well as 
from Turkey, South Africa, Mexico, Chile, Venezuela, Lesotho, 
Singapore, Japan, South Korea, Malaysia, and India.  Officials 
regularly detect fraudulent European residency permits and Schengen 
visas.  Travelers presenting questionable documents hail from 
countries as diverse as Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Somalia, Syria, 
Egypt, Lebanon, Nigeria, Sri Lanka, China, Turkey, India, Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, and Peru. 
 
-------------------------------- 
DS CRIMINAL FRAUD INVESTIGATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
AMMAN 00002260  004 OF 005 
 
 
 
¶24.  (U) Post conducted no criminal fraud investigations during this 
reporting period.  Post has recently welcomed the arrival of an 
Assistant Regional Security Officer for Investigations (A/RSO-I). 
Consequently, the FPU is currently updating its procedures and work 
flow to reflect the new staffing pattern. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
HOST COUNTRY PASSPORT, IDENTITY DOCUMENTS, AND CIVIL REGISTRY 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶25.  (U) In July 2008, Jordan introduced a new K-series passport, 
similar to the J-series launched in May 2007. Previous passport 
versions remain valid until they expire.  The 2008 version is 
machine-readable with enhanced technical specifications, but lacks 
biometric features.  The new passport uses the same security film as 
the J-series, but with enhanced UV features.  The new document 
cannot be extended when it expires.  Although there are no reports 
of fraud involving counterfeit K-series passports, FPU has notified 
the Jordanian authorities regarding defects in the security film and 
photo security features.  They are addressing the issue. 
 
¶26.  (U) In order to obtain a passport, children under 16 need to 
present a birth certificate and family book whereas an adult's 
national ID card is sufficient evidence.  Passport validity remains 
5 years.  Adults pay USD28.50 and children are half price. 
Authorities can provide same-day issuance for in-country 
applications.  But outside of Jordan, the wait can exceed 45 days 
and cost twice the amount. 
 
¶27.  (U) Jordan's Civil Status and Passport Department issues birth 
certificates to Jordanians who are born abroad.  However, the family 
must first register the birth with the host country to obtain a 
foreign birth certificate.  This document is needed to obtain a 
Jordanian birth certificate.  All births within Jordan have to be 
reported within one month to the civil authorities.  If a Jordanian 
is born overseas, the birth has to be reported within 90 days.  A 
birth certificate costs $1.40 (one dinar). 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
COOPERATION WITH HOST GOVERNMENT AUTHORITIES 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶28.  (U) FPU maintains a strong relationship with Jordanian 
government and airport officials who routinely report fraud 
incidents and vulnerabilities to the embassy.  Similarly, Amman's 
Fraud Control Group, comprised of North American and European fraud 
prevention officials, shares information and trends formally on a 
monthly basis, but informally through regular phone calls and 
e-mails.  The group  focuses primarily on Iraqi-related fraud and 
also holds joint training and informational sessions on Iraqi 
adjudication and verification issues. 
 
--------------------------- 
AREAS OF PARTICULAR CONCERN 
--------------------------- 
 
¶29.  (U) Amman routinely screens all Iraqi civil documents (i.e., 
passport, national i.d. card, and certificate of citizenship) for 
almost all IV and NIV cases.  Post is concerned that Iraqi document 
fraud is becoming increasingly more sophisticated.  Since 2007, FPU 
has noted certain Iraqi ID cards that appear to have been produced 
fraudulently on a large scale and from a single source.  Posts may 
want to pay close attention to Iraqi ID cards. For more details, 
please e-mail Amman FPU. 
 
¶30. (U) On several occasions, post has received e-mails alerting the 
U.S. Government that Middle Easterners working for the USG in Iraq 
can easily purchase a full set of Iraqi civil documents in order to 
apply for SIV or other immigration benefits.  Among a myriad of 
other fraud detection techniques, FPU has alerted Post's 
locally-engaged staff to advise Consular Officers when any Iraqi 
applies who lacks an Iraqi accent.  During this reporting period, 
FPU conducted additional screening to one SIV applicant to ascertain 
his country of origin, which FPU confirmed as Iraqi. 
 
¶31.  (U) Amman informed DHS in 2008 that Iraqi citizens born abroad 
who acquire Iraqi citizenship at birth have valid Iraqi passports 
indicating their place of birth is Baghdad. (See CBP's Fraudulent 
Document Analysis Unit Bulletin of August 2008 for more 
information.)  The applicant presents a valid birth certificate 
showing birth outside of Iraq and a passport that reads Baghdad as 
the place of birth.  Consular officials adhere to the passport's 
 
AMMAN 00002260  005 OF 005 
 
 
POB, but annotate the visa to read:  "Actual POB: City, Country." 
 
--------------------- 
STAFFING AND TRAINING 
--------------------- 
 
¶32.  (U) The FPU is staffed by one Foreign Service Officer Fraud 
Prevention Manager, one Assistant Regional Security Officer for 
Investigations and one full-time LES Fraud Specialist.  FPU works 
closely with Post's Visa Security Unit (DHS/ICE).  Please contact 
AmmanFPU@state.gov for information or assistance. 
 
¶33.  (U) The LES Fraud Prevention Specialist has completed 
Department of State fraud prevention training in Washington and 
forensic document lab training sponsored by the Anti-Terrorism 
Assistance program.  He trains all incoming consular personnel and 
shares his expertise with Jordanian and other fraud prevention 
officials in Amman and the region.  In addition, he regularly 
provides training in examining Iraqi civil documents and overall 
fraud detection techniques to Baghdad consular personnel transiting 
through  Amman. 
 
¶34.  (U) Both the Fraud Prevention Manager and Assistant Regional 
Security Officer for Investigations have completed FSI's course for 
Fraud Prevention Managers and the Advanced Namechecking Course. 
 
 
 
BEECROFT