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Viewing cable 09SAOPAULO549, BRAZIL: PUBLIC BANKS' RISING INFLUENCE BRINGS INCREASED

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09SAOPAULO549 2009-09-15 13:00 2011-07-11 00:00 UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Consulate Sao Paulo
VZCZCXRO5922
RR RUEHRG
DE RUEHSO #0549/01 2581300
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 151300Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL SAO PAULO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9616
INFO RUEHBR/AMEMBASSY BRASILIA 0753
RUEHRG/AMCONSUL RECIFE 4424
RUEHRI/AMCONSUL RIO DE JANEIRO 9250
RUEHBU/AMEMBASSY BUENOS AIRES 3645
RUEHAC/AMEMBASSY ASUNCION 0030
RUEHMN/AMEMBASSY MONTEVIDEO 2963
RUEHSG/AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO 0030
RUEHLP/AMEMBASSY LA PAZ 4143
RUCPDOC/USDOC WASHDC 3287
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHDC
UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SAO PAULO 000549 
 
SIPDIS 
SENSITIVE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: ECON EFIN ETRD EINV BR
SUBJECT: BRAZIL: PUBLIC BANKS' RISING INFLUENCE BRINGS INCREASED 
RISKS TO FINANCIAL SECTOR 
 
REF: (A) SAO PAULO 531; (B)SAO PAULO 320; (C) BRASILIA 950 
 
SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED--PLEASE PROTECT ACCORDINGLY 
 
1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Public bank growth in Brazil has played a positive 
counter-cyclical role against the impact of the global financial 
crisis, but has also raised concerns. In the near-term, continued 
growth in public bank lending could accelerate inflation.  Over the 
longer term, public banks may begin to crowd out private lending. 
As Brazil's lending market matures, crowding out effects could 
intensify and impose larger efficiency costs on Brazil's financial 
system. Despite these risks, attempts to downsize the public banking 
sector, given the recognition it has received for bolstering the 
Brazilian economy through the crisis, will be politically difficult. 
 END SUMMARY. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Lower Rates & Increased Lending Bolster Economy 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
2. (SBU) Large public banks such as Brazil's Development Bank 
(BNDES), Banco do Brasil, and Caixa Economica have helped stabilize 
Brazil's economy in recent months by boosting credit flows and 
serving as a quasi-lender of last resort for the hardest-hit 
industries.  The substantial increase in public bank lending is a 
result of significant pressure applied by President Lula at the 
outset of the global financial crisis in late 2008.  BNDES lending 
rose sharply for capital goods purchases, SMEs, and trade finance, 
while Banco do Brasil boosted agricultural lending and Caixa 
Economica supported Brazil's housing sector.  The GoB also 
instructed public banks to reduce loan rates.  Rates on working 
capital loans, among the most important loan categories, for example 
are 5 to 10 percentage points below private bank rates. Banco do 
Brazil for example charges about 17 percent compared to Bradesco's 
23 percent, according to the Central Bank. 
 
3. (SBU) Increased lending by Brazil's public banks provided a key 
source of monetary stimulus, arguably even more important than the 
Central Bank's reductions in its benchmark Selic rate since bank 
lending injected credit directly into the economy rather than 
indirectly via price signals.  Over the past year, total credit 
expanded nearly 20 percent while BNDES lending alone rose almost 40 
percent. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
Advantages Over Private Banks Fuel Growth 
----------------------------------------- 
 
4. (SBU) Public banks' in Brazil enjoy several market advantages 
over private banks.  First, a significant portion of the public 
banks' funding comes from payroll taxation (FAT), which provides a 
low cost and captive source of funds.  While estimates vary, the 
cost advantage that FAT funding provides is substantial.  Private 
bankers have told Treasury's financial attache that they simply 
cannot compete for longer-run funding against the large public 
banks.  Public banks also have access to additional funding directly 
from Brazil's Finance Ministry.  Last December, for example, BNDES 
obtained a $55 billion loan at a time when private inter-bank 
markets were completely frozen.  The funding source provides public 
banks stronger implicit deposit guarantees than private banks. 
Finally, some of the liability advantages that public banks have 
allow them to take greater risk with their loan portfolios and other 
assets.  For example, Banco do Brasil and Caixa Economica lend 
disproportionately to Brazil's highest-risk sectors and BNDES is 
Brazil's second-largest holder of equities -- a large degree of 
asset risk that private banks are less able to absorb. 
 
------------------------- 
Rising Inflationary Risks 
------------------------- 
 
5. (SBU) As the economy recovers, continued growth in public bank 
credit could generate short-term inflationary problems, as private 
credit is likely to rebound.  In a worst-case scenario, 2010 
inflation could approach the central bank's 6.5 percent upper 
boundary target, a large but not catastrophic jump from the current 
4.5 percent level.  Adding to potential inflation risk, leadership 
succession at Brazil's Central Bank remains uncertain following 
Central Bank president Henrique Meirelles' expected resignation in 
 
SAO PAULO 00000549  002 OF 002 
 
 
the near future.  Additionally, according to a contact from a major 
private bank, Mario Mesquita and Mario Toros, respected members of 
the Bank's interest rate committee (COPOM) are likely to step down 
later this year, although neither has publicly admitted this 
information.  Fiscal policy is likely to remain expansionary over 
the next year as President Lula seeks to support his Chief of Staff, 
Dilma Rousseff's, presidential bid. 
 
---------------------------- 
Crowding Out Private Lending 
---------------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) Since Brazil's current credit ratio is only 50 percent of 
GDP, all banks, including private banks, are likely to continue 
growing their loan books rapidly and remain highly profitable over 
the near-term.  Sustained increases in public bank lending over the 
long-term could, however, eventually crowd out private lenders and 
become a structural drag on future bank competition.  As crowding 
out effects rise, the subsidy and guarantee advantages that public 
banks receive could increase distortions and impose larger 
efficiency costs on Brazil's financial system and private sector 
customers. 
 
------- 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
7. (SBU) As Brazil's economy recovers, lending will continue to 
grow.  Public banks are eager to expand and many borrowers support 
public bank lending because the rates they pay are effectively 
subsidized by Brazilian taxpayers.  Many Brazilians, including 
President Lula, credit Brazil's stable, if inefficient, banking 
system for helping Brazil successfully withstand the global 
downturn.  President Lula has actually suggested publicly that a key 
weakness in the U.S. financial system is its absence of large public 
banks.  This popularity makes any reform of the public banking 
sector politically difficult.  Nevertheless, the growth of public 
bank lending does pose limited, but important, costs on the country 
that will rise in coming years as Brazil's loan market saturates. 
At that point restraining Brazil's public banks may be even more 
difficult. End Comment. 
 
8. (U) This cable has been coordinated with Sao Paulo Treasury 
Attache.