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S E C R E T GENEVA 000812 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION AND NOTIFICATIONS WORKING 
GROUP MEETING, SEPTEMBER 23, 2009 
 
REF: GENEVA 0811 (SFO-GVA-V-024) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-008. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 23, 2009 
                Time:  10:30 A.M. - 12:45 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The first meeting of the Conversion or Elimination 
(CorE) and Notifications Working Group (WG) was held at the 
Russian Mission on September 23, 2009.  The Russian WG chair 
explained the Russian approach used to draft the CorE section 
of Russia's proposed annex, and made a verbal presentation on 
key elements of the section (REF A).  The Russian Head of 
Delegation, Ambassador Antonov, came into the meeting shortly 
after it started.  He did not actively participate, but spoke 
with several members of the Russian Delegation during breaks. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation explained its CorE proposal 
relied heavily on national technical means for verification, 
using "visits" should a Party wish to send an inspection team 
to confirm elimination or conversion.  The Russian WG chair 
stressed that eliminations and conversions must be 
irreversible.  Russian CorE proposals would allow each Party 
to independently determine its procedures for eliminations, 
but included some mandatory steps, such as removal or 
destruction of SLBM hatches.  Conversion procedures would 
also be determined independently, but would only be used for 
conversion to another type or category of accountable item. 
 
¶5.  (S) The Russians briefly explained their concept for 
notifications and proposed to delete notifications for 
rail-mobile missiles, cooperative measures, portal 
monitoring, post-exercise dispersal inspections, ballistic 
missile throw-weights, and would not include telemetric 
frequencies in flight-test notifications. 
 
----------------------- 
START C OR E PROCEDURES 
UNFAIR TO RUSSIA 
----------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) After welcoming the U.S. Delegates to the first 
meeting of the CorE and Notifications WG, Colonel Ryzhkov 
explained that the Russian Federation's CorE proposals were 
based on a study that concluded certain START CorE procedures 
were either not cost-effective or were unfair to Russia. 
Furthermore, extensive and detailed START CorE procedures 
made long-term confrontation over compliance issues virtually 
unavoidable. 
 
¶7.  (S) As examples, Ryzhkov highlighted the issue between 
the United States and Russia that arose over the 
self-contained dispensing mechanisms (SCDMs) during the 
elimination of 109 SS-25 ICBMs, and the issue between the 
United States and Ukraine over elimination procedures for 
 
 
SS-24 solid-propellant motors.  In the case of the SS-25 
eliminations, he stated it was evident to the United States 
that the missiles themselves were gone and the SCDMs were no 
threat.  As for the Ukrainian motors, Ryzhkov claimed that 
any engineer would agree that drilling holes in the rocket 
motors rendered them unusable as stages for ICBMs.  Other 
examples of confrontation also existed, such as with 
Peacekeeper eliminations. 
 
------------------------ 
THE CHOICE IS YOURS, 
BUT MAKE IT IRREVERSIBLE 
------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (S) According to Ryzhkov, Russia's proposal would allow 
each Party to determine its own CorE procedures that would be 
less expensive and easier to implement, yet would still 
adhere to the "unshakable" principle of irreversibility; that 
is, procedures that rendered the item incapable of being used 
for its original purpose.  Ryzhkov claimed that despite each 
side determining its own procedures, the degree of 
transparency would not be reduced, and Russia would retain 
the notification regime for eliminations almost unchanged. 
 
¶9.  (S) While each Party was free to define its own 
procedures, Ryzhkov noted that the Russian proposal 
incorporated some key elimination procedures that would still 
be mandatory.  For example, it would still be necessary to 
remove or destroy the hatches during SLBM launcher 
eliminations and to remove or destroy basic structural 
elements of a heavy bomber (HB) for eliminations.  In 
addition, Russia had tried to standardize the procedures for 
similar categories of items, such as all solid-propellant 
ICBMs. 
 
¶10.  (S) Regarding conversions, Ryzhkov explained that each 
side could also define its own procedures that would result 
in external or functional differences.  These distinguishing 
features and differences could then be exhibited to the other 
side to confirm conversion.  He reminded the WG that the 
complex START procedures used to confirm the conversion of 
U.S. heavy bombers to non-nuclear configurations and for the 
conversion of an SS-27 mobile launcher to launch the 
prototype RS-24 ICBM had resulted in serious issues for the 
Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC).  Ryzhkov 
stated that if we began negotiations by focusing on detailed 
procedures, we would fail to reach our goal to complete a new 
treaty. 
 
---------------- 
NTM WILL SUFFICE 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that Russia did not understand why it 
was necessary for the United States to observe the entire 
elimination process when national technical means (NTM) could 
be used to verify the elimination of liquid and 
solid-propellant ICBMs and SLBMs, as well as silo, mobile, 
and SLBM launchers, and facilities.  To enhance the 
effectiveness of NTM, Ryzhkov said Russia would provide a 
notification to the United States of the completion of 
elimination procedures for HBs, launchers, and 
solid-propellant missiles, and then display the eliminated 
 
 
item in the open for 30 days thereafter.  The item would be 
removed from accountability after receipt of the 
notification, according to Ryzhkov.  As an additional 
measure, Ryzhkov said each Party could confirm the 
elimination during visits to facilities where the 
eliminations had taken place. 
 
--------------------- 
RUSSIAN C OR E 
PROPOSAL BLOW-BY-BLOW 
--------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Ryzhkov provided a short summary of each of the 
Russian-proposed CorE sections, highlighted key elements, and 
noted that the Russian approach allowed for elimination or 
conversation at minimal cost, with minimal difficulty, and 
removed the potential for confrontation.  Colonel Zaytsev 
added that the Russian approach was an attempt to make CorE 
procedures easier to implement in light of the disputed U.S. 
conversion of the B-1B HB in which both Parties still 
believed their Treaty interpretation was correct. 
 
    -- Subsection I:  CorE procedures for any ICBM launcher, 
whether silo or mobile, would be determined by each side, 
subject to verification by NTM and, if desired, an inspection 
team could conduct a visit to confirm that the elimination 
procedures were carried out in such a manner that rendered 
the launcher incapable of launching an ICBM, or that the 
conversion procedures were completed in such a manner that 
the launcher could no longer contain an ICBM of the previous 
type.  Ryzhkov noted that the end result of CorE procedures 
for silo or mobile launchers would be the same. 
 
    -- Subsection II:  CorE procedures for SLBM launchers 
would be the same in principle as for ICBM launchers with the 
added requirement to remove or destroy the launch tube 
hatches for eliminations. 
 
    -- Subsection III:  For CorE procedures for HB, Ryzhkov 
reiterated his earlier point that elimination procedures had 
to provide for removal or destruction of basic structural 
elements of the bomber. 
 
    -- Subsection IV:  Ryzhkov noted that for elimination of 
ICBMs and SLBMs, Russia did not see any difference between 
the processes for Russian solid-propellant ICBMs and those 
for the U.S. Minuteman III (MM-III) ICBM.  He stated that 
Russia intended to use "unified" procedures to eliminate the 
same categories of missiles, whether mobile or silo-based, 
and that the START experience of elimination of liquid 
propellant missiles demonstrated how each side could 
independently choose its own procedures. 
 
    -- Subsection V:  Regarding declared facilities, Ryzhkov 
said they would be considered eliminated once all strategic 
offensive arms (SOAs) at the facility had been removed or 
eliminated and a notification of that fact had been provided. 
 
----------------------------- 
DIFFERING CONCEPTS FOR C OR E 
----------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Ryzhkov negatively compared START with how facts 
 
 
were confirmed in other treaties and stated that Russia 
conducted over 70 inspections annually for the Vienna 
Document without any comment.  The text of the Vienna 
Document was simple, with no detailed, agreed-upon procedures 
-- hence, there were almost no problems.  Ryzhkov admitted 
that SOA treaties were more complex and difficult, but START 
had been negotiated during the Cold War and the mission now 
was to make the new treaty easier to implement. 
 
¶14.  (S) Zaytsev interjected to point out the START "paradox" 
of the four U.S. ballistic missile submarines converted to 
cruise missile carriers.  According to the Treaty, these 
boats were still considered to be Trident I ballistic missile 
submarines  despite the fact that the United States no longer 
had such a missile in service. 
 
¶15.  (S) Elliott explained that this was due in part to 
START's higher limits, under which the United States had no 
need to completely remove these launchers from 
accountability, therefore, the debate was not enjoined. 
Elliott then requested clarification on the Russian position 
on removal of hatches from launch tubes, asking whether the 
intent was to make the submarine no longer useful as a 
submarine, or to make the launcher incapable of launching a 
missile of the type for which it is declared. 
 
¶16.  (S) Ryzhkov repeated that each side could determine its 
own elimination procedures.  However, where necessary, there 
would need to be some specific procedures added.  Ryzhkov 
noted that confirmation of elimination procedures using NTM 
for SLBM launchers was more difficult than for silo 
launchers.  Therefore, the Russian proposal included removal 
or destruction of the hatches as one of the key elements, but 
Ryzhkov reiterated that each side could determine procedures 
for itself. 
 
¶17.  (S) Siemon asked about the Russian view of the 
relationship between demonstrations and eliminations and 
whether the Russians always planned to provide a 
demonstration prior to eliminations.  Ryzhkov replied that 
demonstrations would only be conducted for conversions and 
would not be used to show the conversion procedures, only the 
final result of the conversion. 
 
¶18.  (S) Elliott indicated he heard a difference between the 
START Treaty and the Russian START Follow-on approach, and 
asked whether Russia viewed the conversion of submarine 
launchers from nuclear to non-nuclear in the same way as 
conversion of a nuclear HB to a non-nuclear HB.  Ryzhkov said 
no, START allowed only for conversion of ballistic missile 
launchers from one type to another, as well as conversion of 
HB.  Ryzhkov stated that if the United States was asking 
whether it was possible to convert nuclear ballistic missiles 
to non-nuclear, the Russian position was that this was not 
allowed. 
 
¶19.  (S) Elliott asked whether Russia would view a proposal 
to convert a U.S. Trident II submarine in the same manner as 
they would view conversion of Trident I submarines into 
non-nuclear cruise missile carriers.  In response, Ryzhkov 
referred to Zaytsev's earlier example of the Trident I 
conversion to point out that Russia did not consider this 
conversion to be in compliance with applicable START 
 
 
procedures.  Ryzhkov said that, in the Russian approach to 
START Follow-on, it was essential to convince the other side 
that the item could not be used for its original purpose, but 
that detailed procedures or excessive requirements were not 
necessary. 
 
¶20.  (S) Siemon asked whether, under Russia's concept, the 
Parties would provide descriptions of the elimination 
procedures they had decided for themselves.  Ryzhkov answered 
that information on the elimination procedures would be 
provided in the elimination notifications, just as was being 
done already for liquid-fueled ICBMs under START.  The 
notification regime would be changed very little, and 
notifications would indicate what each Party was doing. 
 
¶21.  (S) Elliott raised a theoretical issue on facility 
elimination, asking whether the conversion of all U.S. B-1 
bombers at a base to non-nuclear also meant that the base 
itself would be considered eliminated, as there were no more 
nuclear weapons at the base.  Before Ryzhkov could respond, 
both Colonel Novikov and Mr. Smirnov engaged him in a short 
and intense side-bar conversation.  Just as Ryzhkov was 
beginning to answer, Smirnov cut him off, saying in Russian 
"No, the bases stay."  (Begin comment:  This statement by 
Smirnov was not translated by the Russian interpreter.  End 
comment.)  Ryzhkov then asked for a short break to discuss 
the matter with his group.  The Russians made no further 
comments to Elliott's question other than to suggest that the 
question might be resolved when discussing notifications. 
 
¶22.  (S) Comeau questioned Ryzhkov about an earlier statement 
made on the similarities between the elimination procedures 
for the Russian SS-25 and the U.S. MM-III ICBM.  Ryzhkov 
replied he had made the statement only to illustrate that 
methods used for the elimination of any solid-propellant 
missile could be alike.  For the removal of the fuel, Ryzhkov 
noted that it could either be burned or one could drill holes 
in the rocket motors. 
 
¶23.  (S) Comeau then asked about elimination of the launch 
canisters, since this was a fundamental difference between 
U.S. and Russian missiles.  Ryzhkov dismissed the issue, 
claiming that the launch canister had nothing to do with the 
functioning of the missile.  The approach to elimination of 
missiles was what mattered, and if the Parties got bogged 
down in specific procedures for every item, they would be in 
Geneva until next winter. 
 
---------------------------- 
SHORT NOTES ON NOTIFICATIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶24.  (S) Ryzhkov stated that the system of notifications was 
one of the basic elements of verification and it would be 
foolish to reject positive mechanisms from START.  However, 
the notification regime required some adaptation or 
improvement due to changes in counting rules, inspection 
procedures, as well as CorE procedures. 
 
¶25.  (S) Ryzhkov proposed to retain data exchanges, which 
would also incorporate additional notifications on the 
aggregate numbers of warheads per base, as well as the number 
of ICBMs, SLBMs, and HBs per base.  The timing of data 
 
 
exchanges could be the same as under START, with the first 
exchange to occur no later than 30 days after entry into 
force and every six months thereafter.  He also proposed to 
unify all notifications on changes to the status of SOA in 
each category and transmit the changes no later than five 
days after the change.  Russia would also retain 
notifications on flight-tests for SLBMs and ICBMs.  Russia 
would delete the remainder of the START Notification Protocol 
Section I notifications, such as those on former and retired 
types. 
 
¶26.  (S) Russia proposed to retain notifications on HB 
movements between facilities, and for HB between any 
location.  Ryzhkov noted that both Parties had a verification 
problem under START with HB visits to non-declared facilities 
and that U.S. movement of HB outside national territory 
needed to be fixed.  To resolve the issue, Ryzhkov proposed 
that both sides provide notifications for the movement of an 
HB to any location no later than 24 hours prior to the 
arrival for visits lasting more than 24 hours.  This would be 
easier for operational personnel to report than the 8-hour 
timeline required under START provisions, would enhance 
transparency, and allow for better tracking of the other's HB 
assets, in Ryzhkov's opinion. 
 
¶27.  (S) The Russians proposed to delete notifications 
pertaining specifically to mobile missiles--those for 
rail-mobile missiles, cooperative measures, portal 
monitoring, and post-dispersal exercises.  Russia would 
retain notifications on flight-tests for SLBMs and ICBMs. 
However, Russia proposed to delete notifications for 
throw-weight, as this parameter was not subject to 
verification by the United States or Russia; notifications on 
the reduction of the number of warheads for ICBMs and SLBMs; 
and would not provide telemetric frequencies for 
notifications of ballistic missile test launches.  Ryzhkov 
stated that Russia had no intention to provide telemetric 
information via the notification protocol or otherwise. 
 
¶28.  (S) The Russians also proposed to add a few new sections 
to the notifications:  one pertaining to removal from 
accountability; one for additional information; and one on 
inspections, visits, and exhibitions, all with the purpose of 
unifying these notifications in one section. 
 
¶29.  (S) Ryzhkov concluded his remarks by stating that many 
of the notifications had been overcome by events, as U.S. and 
Russian military cooperation had increased during the past 20 
years.   The Russians had removed and combined notification 
elements that reflected our current relationship. 
 
¶30.  (S) Siemon advised Ryzhkov that the United States was 
still working on its proposed Notification Protocol, but 
warned that it would not be as brief as the Russian proposal 
and would contain some issues the Russians would not like, 
such as notifications on portal monitoring, cooperative 
measures, and telemetry.  Siemon explained that this was not 
an expression of dissatisfaction with the Russian proposals, 
simply a reflection of the U.S. approach to treaty provisions 
we wanted to retain.  Siemon noted that the CorE WG would 
take its lead from the plenary and adjust as decisions are 
made.  Ryzhkov agreed with the imperative to resolve several 
conceptual issues before some subsections of the annex could 
 
 
be agreed, but asserted that the working groups could make 
progress on many issues in the meantime.  Siemon commented 
that the United States shared Russia''s goal of reducing the 
volume of the new treaty.  Ryzhkov laughed and said that was 
not noticeable to the Russians. 
 
¶31.  (U) Documents exchanged,  None. 
 
¶32.  (U) Participants 
 
U.S. 
 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Siemon 
LCDR Brons 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Dwyer 
Dr. Fraley 
Mr. Hanchett 
LTC Leyde 
Mr. McConnell 
Ms. Purcell 
Mr. Strauss 
Ms. Gross(Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ryzhkov 
Amb Antonov 
Col Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Leontiev 
Col Novikov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶33.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS