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S E C R E T GENEVA 000807 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/30/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) PLENARY MEETING, SEPTEMBER 24, 2009 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-013. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 24, 2009 
                Time:  10:00 A.M. - 1:00 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the September 24 plenary meeting, chaired by U.S 
Head of Delegation (HOD) A/S Gottemoeller and Russian HOD 
Ambassador Antonov, the sides presented updates on the 
positive progress of the respective working groups.  Working 
group chairs, as well as HODs, were optimistic that progress 
would be made through the difficult issues remaining and that 
common ground would be found. 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. side clarified its approach to the draft 
treaty in response to Russian assertions that the U.S. draft 
contained "excessive" and "rigorous" verification measures. 
Gottemoeller stressed that no measures in the U.S.-proposed 
draft go beyond those provisions that were contained in 
START.  She stated that based on experience with START, the 
United States believed that carefully defined procedures 
offered the best chance of success in implementing the new 
treaty.  Furthermore, a degree of technical detail consistent 
with previously agreed-upon text was essential to produce a 
verifiable treaty. 
 
¶5.  (S) The U.S. side presented its approach in drafting the 
proposed Elimination and Telemetry Protocols.  The 
Elimination Protocol presentation was well-received by the 
Russian side.  Following the presentation of the approach to 
the Telemetry Protocol, the Russian Delegation provided no 
response. 
 
--------------------- 
A PHILOSOPHICAL 
QUESTION FROM ANTONOV 
--------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Antonov opened the plenary meeting on September 24, 
2009, and asked a philosophical question on the overall U.S. 
approach.  It was clear to the Russian Ddelegation that the 
new U.S. Administration had proposed more rigorous 
verification measures than the previous Administration. 
Specifically, treaty material proposed by the Bush 
Administration had emphasized openness and transparency, 
while the current U.S.-proposed draft employed vigorous and 
"excessive" verification measures.  He emphasized that the 
Cold War was over, both the United States and Russia had 
existing patterns of cooperation from the START Treaty, and 
the U.S.-Russian relationship was developing.  Finally, he 
observed that these aspects of the U.S.-proposed draft did 
not seem consistent with the spirit of recent remarks by the 
U.S. and Russian Presidents. 
 
¶7.  (S) Gottemoeller replied that the basis of all U.S. work 
was the original START Treaty, and that no measures in the 
U.S.-proposed drafts went beyond the precedents found in 
 
START.  She agreed with sentiments expressed by the Russian 
side that START implementation had been a beneficial, 
positive experience for each side, but that the difficulties 
in implementing START yielded lessons relevant to the current 
negotiations.  Where there had been carefully defined 
procedures, the United States and Russia have had the most 
success; impromptu procedures could lead to difficulties. 
 
------------------------- 
HAIL PRESIDENTIAL REMARKS 
------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Both Antonov and Gottemoeller traded general remarks 
regarding the improved state of the current U.S.-Russian 
relationship, and each cited recent comments by the American 
and Russian Presidents in New York.  Antonov mentioned two of 
the more difficult issues Russia believed were related to the 
START Treaty, the relationship between strategic offensive 
and defensive arms and the need to address the use of 
strategic offensive arms in a non-nuclear configuration. 
Gottemoeller acknowledged the challenge of these particular 
issues, and suggested that the Treaty Text Working Group 
chairs meet individually to discuss these items further.  She 
commented that there is pressure from Washington to reach an 
agreement on the new treaty, and both HODs expressed 
confidence that such an agreement would be reached by the end 
of the year. 
 
------------------ 
A SOLID START BY 
THE WORKING GROUPS 
------------------ 
 
¶9.  (S) The working group Chairs from both sides summarized 
progress made to date.  All chairs joined their Russian 
counterparts in praising the constructive, business-like and 
positive atmosphere observed in the working group meetings, 
and hailed the clarity of presentations made by the other 
side. 
 
¶10.  (S) Mr. Koshelev noted that the Treaty Text Working 
Group had had no differences in eight paragraphs of the 
Preamble, but had not yet come to the "most tasty" 
paragraphs, where there would definitely be brackets.  He 
opined that the final provisions of the treaty would be 
agreed quickly.  His co-chair, Ambassador Ries, highlighted 
the positive atmosphere, and acknowledged the hard and 
productive work done by each side.  Ries agreed that 
difficult issues lay ahead, but expressed confidence that 
agreement would be reached. 
 
¶11.  (S) Dr. Warner and Colonel Ilin, the Inspection Working 
Group Chairs, both echoed the positive statements made by 
their peers while acknowledging the significant gap between 
the level of detail provided by the United States and the 
level of detail provided in the Russian-proposed drafts. 
Ilin noted that the two sides would have to decide on how to 
reflect the different levels of detail in the treaty.  In 
addition, Ilin called attention to the differences between 
the sides in the areas of mobile ICBMs and provisions for 
continuous monitoring. 
 
¶12.  (S) Colonel Ryzhkov noted that the Elimination Protocol 
Working Group had only met once so far, but he looked forward 
 
to the upcoming U.S. presentation and would work to bring 
both positions together.  Mr. Elliott of the Elimination 
Protocol Working Group thanked Ryzhkov for his coherent and 
professional presentation to the U.S. side and his cordial 
manner in session.  Elliott observed that the U.S.-proposed 
text was generally closer to the words in the existing START 
Treaty than the Russian approach.  However, he had noted 
several elements in the Russian text that indicated their 
position was close to that of the United States, and he was 
hopeful that each side would reach common ground. 
 
¶13.  (S) Mr. Siemon thanked the Russian side for its 
enlightening presentation regarding the Russian approach to 
notifications, and highlighted several major areas of 
agreement between the two sides.  He commented that he looked 
forward to a productive discussion with the Russian side in 
this area. 
 
¶14.  (S) Mr. Trout, Chair of the Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) Working Group, praised the productive nature of early 
meetings with the opposite side and stated that the exchange 
of questions to date had been very fruitful.  General Orlov 
opined that the MOU Working Group is the main one, because it 
is discussing counting rules for the new treaty.  He also 
praised the good atmosphere. 
 
¶15.  (S) Antonov summarized the reports by the working group 
chairs, emphasizing the friendly relations and mutual respect 
between Delegation members despite the difficulties that 
confronted them.  He expressed reservations regarding the 
level of technical detail in the U.S.-proposed Inspection 
Protocol, stating that lawyers for the Russian State Duma 
would not be able to understand it.  This, in turn, would 
make ratification by the Russian side difficult.  He allowed 
that while issues of Russian lawyers were not a U.S. problem, 
he hoped the U.S. Delegation could see things from his point 
of view.  He opined that Russia had initially believed 
everything in the U.S. proposal had been drawn from the 
original START Treaty, but it turned out that many points 
were new and had been incorporated from Joint Compliance and 
Inspection Commission (JCIC) agreements.  This made 
translation and understanding more difficult for the Russian 
linguists.  He closed by thanking the U.S. interpreters for 
their help and expressed a desire that cooperation between 
the interpreters increase. 
 
¶16.  (S) Gottemoeller responded that U.S.-proposed technical 
language using JCIC agreements were historical precedent and 
did not represent significant differences, but simply 
provided more detail.  Since lawyers understood precedent, 
she was confident that the U.S. proposal would not pose a 
problem.  Gottemoeller also reminded all present that 
ratification in the Senate was never far from her mind. 
 
-------------------- 
U.S. APPROACH TO THE 
ELIMINATION PROTOCOL 
-------------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) Mr. Elliott presented the following concepts 
fundamental to the U.S.-proposed Elimination Protocol. 
 
Begin points: 
 
     The Russian-proposed Article VII in its Annex Section 
pertaining to conversion and elimination provides a framework 
much like that of the U.S. proposal. 
 
     - Strategic offensive arms shall be subject to the 
limitations provided for in the treaty until they have been 
eliminated, removed from accountability, or placed on static 
display. 
 
     - The Russian proposal, similar to the U.S. proposal, 
provides language specifying conversion procedures that 
ensure that strategic offensive arms are rendered inoperable, 
precluding their use for their original purpose. 
 
     - Finally, the Russians propose that verification of 
elimination or conversion procedures shall be carried out by 
national technical means, notifications and visits, which is 
again similar to the U.S. proposal. 
 
     Elliott explained that the U.S. concept for the 
Elimination Protocol draws on previous language from the 
START Treaty as much as possible.  START's Conversion or 
Elimination Protocol has served as a solid foundation to 
remove items from each Partie's force structure.  Using 
similar language and procedures from the Protocol, adapted 
and simplified, where possible, reinforces the U.S.-Russian 
relationship based on shared knowledge, understanding and 
expectations. 
 
     Since the last session of negotiations, the United 
States has amended its views on conversion or elimination. 
The United States has proposed to retain the concept of 
elimination in the Treaty as described below. 
 
     - The U.S. believes that "elimination" is a process by 
which a Party alters an accountable item such that it is no 
longer subject to the limitations of the treaty - numerical 
limits and the broader treaty limits. 
 
     - Under START, conversion procedures applied primarily 
to heavy bombers.  There was no provision for a conversion 
procedure to remove a heavy bomber from being subject to 
START's limitations. 
 
     - The U.S. proposes the term "elimination" apply to a 
procedure to physically alter an item and thereafter remove 
that item from accountability under the treaty. 
 
     - Also, the United States recognizes that methods short 
of physical destruction are equally advantageous to each 
Party:  1) as a means of removing an item from accountability 
under the treaty; 2) to retain use of the item for purposes 
not inconsistent with the treaty; and 3) to save costs. 
 
     - In this connection, the United States proposes a range 
of procedures to eliminate an item, any of which may be used 
by a Party for elimination. 
 
     - Additionally, the United States acknowledges that in 
the future a Party may develop a unique procedure that was 
previously not considered during negotiations that may 
leverage advanced technologies or save time and money.  In 
this instance, the United States proposes an option to use 
these procedures provided there is a sufficient level of 
 
transparency during the process. 
 
     Elliott discussed several items the U.S. proposes to 
delete from the existing START Conversion or Elimination 
Protocol: 
 
     - Procedures for Elimination of Silo Training Launchers 
and Silo Test Launchers:  These types of launchers are not 
deployed launchers and are not accountable under the new 
treaty and therefore do not require elimination procedures. 
 
     - Procedures for Elimination of Soft-Site Launchers: 
These types of launchers are also not deployed launchers and 
are not accountable under the treaty.  Therefore, they do not 
require elimination procedures. 
 
     Elliott also addressed the retention of the following 
elimination procedures in the new Protocol.  These align with 
the proposals Russia offered in Article VII: 
 
     - Procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for Mobile 
Launchers of ICBMs and their Launch Canisters, Silo Launchers 
of ICBMs, Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Training 
launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile ICBMs. 
 
     - Procedures for the elimination of SLBM launchers and 
heavy bombers in addition to procedures for removal from 
accountability, due to flight tests or static tests. 
 
End points. 
 
¶18.  (S) Elliott closed by stating we have a rare opportunity 
to apply the lessons learned from START to an entirely new 
treaty, one that offers increased transparency and openness, 
reinforcing our mutual understanding that the Cold War was 
truly behind us.  These opportunities include the viewing of 
exhibitions, notifications of actions we intended to take 
(and have taken), and the use of national technical means of 
verification. 
 
¶19.  (S) Ryzhkov thanked Elliott for his presentation, and 
asked whether the existing START procedures retained under 
the U.S. proposal were included fully, or if the U.S. 
proposal included new ideas.  Elliott responded that the U.S. 
proposal included some old procedures, added some new 
procedures, and had one that permitted flexibility for future 
development similar to the Russian proposal. 
 
¶20.  (S) Colonel Novikov asked Elliott whether the United 
States intended to change existing conversion procedures. 
Elliott answered that the United States hoped to retain 
flexibility by using the term "elimination" but retaining the 
concept of "conversion."  For example, one method of 
disposing of a mobile launcher would be to cut the launcher 
into pieces.  Another method would be to alter the launcher 
physically so that it could be used in a manner not 
inconsistent with the treaty. 
 
-------------------------- 
U.S. APPROACH TO TELEMETRY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (S) Mr. Siemon presented the following concepts 
supporting the U.S. Telemetry Protocol and Treaty Article: 
 
 
Begin points: 
 
     The primary difference in the U.S.-proposed Treaty 
Article on Telemetry and the associated Telemetry Protocol 
and Annexes concerns limitations on encryption and 
encapsulation.  The U.S. proposes reducing the total number 
of flight tests for which a Party may encrypt or encapsulate 
data while increasing a Party's flexibility regarding 
encryption.  Specific changes associated with encryption and 
encapsulation follow: 
 
     - Under Treaty Article X, the United States proposed 
that encryption and encapsulation be permitted for 7 rather 
than 11 flight tests each year. 
 
     - In the associated Section III, Paragraph 2(b) of the 
Telemetry Protocol, the United States proposed that: 
"Encryption shall be used only during flight tests of ICBMs 
or SLBMs of existing types that were deployed as of Treaty 
signature but none of which are deployed at the time of the 
flight test, as well as during no more than a total of two 
flight tests each year for ICBMs of existing types that are 
deployed and two flight tests each year for SLBMs of existing 
types that are deployed by each Party." 
 
     In other respects, the U.S.-proposed Telemetry Protocol 
and associated Annexes remain the same as under START with 
the following changes: 
 
     - References from "tapes" to "recording media" have been 
changed to more closely reflect current practices. 
 
     - In Section I, Paragraph 1(c)(i), the United States 
added "as appropriate" after the reference to recording speed 
in meters and inches per second of tapes. 
 
     - Only demonstrations of playback equipment that is 
different than the equipment demonstrated under START are 
required. 
 
     - In Section 3, Paragraph 2(a) of the Protocol, the 
United States amended language to reflect increased 
flexibility with regard to encryption, including the 
provision that notification of any encrypted flight test will 
be provided in advance versus the single notification for the 
one type as provided under START. 
 
     The Annexes have the following changes: 
 
     - Throughout Annex 1, installation activities and 
equipment exchanges need not be performed if they were 
already performed for equipment provided under START. 
 
     - In Annex 1, Section III, equipment lists have been 
updated to reflect the equipment that is required and is 
currently in use. 
 
     - In Annex 2, reference to "attributed warheads" was 
deleted since the concept no longer applies. 
 
     - Annex 5 was deleted. 
 
     - Paragraph references throughout also have been updated. 
 
 
End points. 
 
¶22.  (S) There were no questions from the Russian side. 
Gottemoeller commented that the U.S. approach to telemetry 
illustrated the general approach that the U.S. side had taken 
to drawing on language from the START Treaty.  New language 
was developed only if equipment or items were different than 
they were under START; measures were retained only if they 
were actually useful under START; and if an item, weapon, or 
system has been replaced or retired, the associated 
provisions were deleted, as had been the case with 
rail-mobile missiles. 
 
¶23.  (U) Document exchanged.  None. 
 
¶24.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
LCDR Brons 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Colby 
Lt Col Comeau 
Mr. Dean 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Dr. Fraley 
Mr. Johnston 
Ms. Pura 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Col Ilin 
Ms. Ivanova 
Col Izrazov 
Ms. Kotkova 
Adm (Ret) Kuznetsov 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Col Novikov 
Gen Orlov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Gen Poznihir 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Gen Venevtsev 
Col Zaitsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶25.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS