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S E C R E T GENEVA 000804 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/29/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) FIRST MEETING OF THE INSPECTION PROTOCOL WORKING GROUP, 
SEPTEMBER 22, 2009 
 
REF: A. GENEVA 0803 (SFO-GVA-V-019) 
     ¶B. STATE 91093-91284-91291-91106-91134-91143-91151 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-006. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 22, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 - 5:10 P.M. 
                Place: Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The first meeting of the Inspection Protocol Working 
Group focused on reviewing the recently-received Russian 
draft on Section V to the Treaty Annex regarding Inspections, 
Visits and Exhibitions (REF A).  The Russian Delegation 
presented similarities to and differences from the START 
Treaty and the U.S.-proposed draft of the Inspection Protocol 
(REF B). 
 
¶4.  (S) The U.S. Delegation stressed the importance of having 
a verification regime with enough precision and fidelity to 
ensure treaty ratification in the United States Senate.  The 
U.S. Delegation also expressed concern over the Russian 
Federation's approach to counting warheads on heavy bombers, 
as well as its desire to delay agreement on many specific 
inspection procedures until after ratification when they are 
slated to be worked out within the Bilateral Consultative 
Commission (BCC) prior to the initiation of the various 
inspection activities. 
 
------------------------ 
IF YOU WANT IT RATIFIED, 
IT BETTER BE VERIFIABLE 
------------------------ 
 
¶5.  (S) Colonel Ilin opened the meeting by acknowledging that 
the United States had only received the Russian draft of the 
Annex that morning.  Warner stressed how crucial the role of 
verification was to the treaty and emphasized the level of 
scrutiny that the United States Senate would put on the 
Inspection Protocol coming out of the working group. 
 
¶6.  (S) General Orlov asked whether the Senate's interest was 
motivated by the concept of "trust but verify" or by 
budgetary concerns.  Warner explained that Senator Nunn had 
recently reminded several senior U.S. Administration 
officials of how important verifiability was to Members of 
the Senate in establishing the credibility of any arms 
control treaty.  Warner predicted that the strength of the 
verification measures for this treaty could be a key factor 
in winning the two-thirds majority required for United States 
Senate ratification. 
 
------------------------------ 
SYNOPSIS OF SECTION V TO TO 
THE DRAFT RUSSIAN TREATY ANNEX 
------------------------------ 
 
 
 
¶7.  (S) Ilin proposed an exchange of views on the Russian- 
and U.S.-proposed drafts of the Inspection Protocol.  His 
goal was to gain an understanding of the inspection 
provisions proposed by each side by summarizing the key 
similarities and differences between their respective 
versions.  He wanted to first identify the common approaches 
and then locate the differences, while agreeing to move 
forward despite them.  Next, he proposed both sides work 
together to develop proposed solutions for those differences. 
 Ilin acknowledged that some differences would stem from 
major unresolved issues in the treaty and noted that these 
would ultimately be settled by the Heads of delegation. 
Warner stated that the United States was interested in such a 
comparison of both the treaty and protocol texts as they 
apply to the various inspection activities.  Reminding Ilin 
that the United States had only received the Russian-proposed 
annex, which contained a number of sections, that morning, 
Warner expressed an interest in hearing Russia's view of the 
similarities between the two countries' approaches to 
inspections and thus verification. 
 
¶8.  (S) Ilin provided an overview of Section V of the 
Russian-proposed draft treaty annex, entitled "Inspections, 
Visits and Exhibitions," which equates to the U.S. Inspection 
Protocol.  He noted that, in preparing their text, the 
Russian side attempted to reduce the number of inspection 
activities and procedures by leveraging the experience gained 
during implementation of the START Treaty.  They also sought 
to make the inspection mechanism less cumbersome and more 
cost-effective.  He stressed the importance of establishing 
clearly understandable rules.  Ilin briefly summarized the 
ten parts of Section V, noting that they had generally 
followed the path laid out in START and, in many cases, had 
come up with provisions that corresponded to sections in the 
U.S.-proposed draft Inspection Protocol.  The parts of the 
Russian draft are: 
 
      ¶I.  General Obligations; 
 
     II.  Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of 
          Inspectors and Aircrew Members; 
 
    III.  Arrangements for Air Transportation; 
 
     IV.  Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point 
          of Entry; 
 
      ¶V.  General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections, 
          Visits and Exhibitions; 
 
     VI.  Inspections; 
 
    VII.  Visits to Declared Facilities and Visits to New 
          Facilities; 
 
   VIII.  Technical Characteristics and Distinguishability 
          Exhibitions; 
 
     IX.  Cancellation of Inspections, Visits or Exhibitions; 
          and 
 
      ¶X.  Inspection, Visit or Exhibition Reports 
 
 
¶9.  (S) Ilin briefly described the types of sites and items 
that would be subject to inspections and visits. 
Inspections, he noted, are focused on deployed ICBMs, SLBMS 
and heavy bombers, deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers, and on 
the warheads deployed on these missiles and bombers.  In 
contrast, visits are focused on non-deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and 
heavy bombers as well as non-deployed ICBM and SLBM 
launchers.  Ilin stated that, by limiting inspections and 
visits to no more than five per year for each type, the sides 
would save money while ensuring confidence and transparency 
between Parties.  He confirmed that many of the specific 
procedures to be used to conduct inspections, visits and 
exhibitions would have to be agreed upon in the BCC prior to 
the initiation of these activities. 
 
¶10.  (S) Predicting that few disagreements would arise 
between the Parties regarding most of these parts, Ilin noted 
key additions and deletions from the original START 
provisions.  Highlighting the removal of all ground 
transportation provisions related to continuous portal 
monitoring, he reminded the U.S. side that the Russian 
position on discontinuing portal monitoring at Votkinsk had 
been made very clear.  He indicated that the Russian-proposed 
draft provided 18 hours for delivering an inspection group to 
an inspection or visit site.  He also pointed out that, while 
visits could last up to 36 hours, inspections were not 
limited in duration as long as the time to complete the 
procedures was reasonable. 
 
------------------ 
THE BOMBER PARADOX 
------------------ 
 
¶11.  (S) Colonel Zaitsev noted that the Duma remained 
skeptical of how warheads are being counted under the Moscow 
Treaty and said that many Russian experts believed that the 
new treaty should retain the START attribution-based counting 
rules.  Nevertheless, he indicated that the Russian side had 
attempted to construct rules for counting deployed warheads 
according to the U.S. approach and found that the task was 
very difficult. 
 
¶12.  (S) Warner described the paradox in Russia's approach to 
counting warheads associated with heavy bombers, which is 
their proposal that bomber armaments, bombs or long-range 
nuclear-armed ALCMs, count only when they are actually loaded 
on a heavy bomber.  He acknowledged that devising a method of 
verifying warhead numbers in general was very difficult and 
stated that doing so for heavy bombers was one of the most 
challenging problems confronting the Inspection Protocol 
Working Group.  Indicating that the Russian method of only 
counting those nuclear weapons actually loaded on bombers on 
a day-to-day basis did not reflect current practices of the 
United States or Russia, Warner expressed doubt that such a 
method would be acceptable to the United States Senate.  He 
indicated that some would question the need for the bombers 
in the first place if both sides simply declared that there 
were no nuclear warheads associated with them.  He reminded 
Ilin that the United States had proposed a method for 
inspecting the weapons storage areas associated with heavy 
bomber air bases and reaffirmed that the bomber problem was a 
crucial point of treaty warhead accounting and verification 
that needed work. 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
SPEAKING OF PARADOXES 
--------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Ilin stated that the sides would encounter other 
paradoxes, such as the U.S. intent to equip existing ICBMs 
and SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads and to develop new 
ballistic missiles and heavy bombers solely for non-nuclear 
use.  He opined that the United States' desired to have such 
delivery vehicles fall outside the scope of the new treaty. 
 
¶14.  (S) Warner provided a brief summary of inspections 
proposed in each side's drafts and noted that it was 
challenging to come up with a one-to-one comparison.  He 
asked what Russia meant by a non-deployed silo launcher. 
Ilin stated that test launchers and training launchers for 
silo-based ICBMs are examples of non-deployed silo launchers. 
 
---------------------- 
STAY BETWEEN THE LINES 
---------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S) Warner noted the dependence of the Inspection 
Protocol Working Group upon certain provisions in the treaty, 
particularly Article XI.  Recognizing that the review and 
redrafting of all treaty articles falls under the Treaty Text 
Working Group, he nevertheless suggested that the Inspection 
Protocol Working Group make a comparison of the sides' 
approaches to Article XI as a starting point for building 
their understanding of how inspection activities would work. 
Ilin stated that it would not be productive to discuss 
Article XI since the responsibility for development of treaty 
articles belongs to the other working group. 
 
----------------------- 
LET THE BCC WORRY ABOUT 
THE DETAILS 
----------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Expressing concern over the Russian-proposed draft's 
repeated call to having specific inspection-related 
procedures worked out in the BCC, Warner asserted that both 
sides should take advantage of their Delegations' expertise 
as well as their familiarity with the implementation of 
existing START provisions.  Believing that both sides should 
draft the needed procedures wherever possible, he again 
emphasized the importance of building verification procedures 
that would support ratification and not just rely upon the 
BCC to do so after the treaty was signed.  Ilin argued that 
Russian reliance on the BCC was based on the time constraints 
set by the two Presidents for completing the new treaty and 
the confidence the Russian side has in the future BCC.  He 
indicated that there was no reason for concern, since the 
Russian version of the treaty requires that all the needed 
procedures be agreed upon in the BCC before inspections and 
visits began.  By avoiding addressing the many procedures 
that will be needed, Ilin continued, the treaty would be 
reduced in size thus saving considerable negotiating time. 
 
--------------------- 
PICK A NUMBER BETWEEN 
FIVE AND TWELVE 
 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶17.  (S) Ilin and Warner discussed their respective 
rationales for each side's proposed annual number of 
inspections.  Ilin stated that Russia's proposal for five 
inspections per year was derived from the U.S.-proposed draft 
treaty of October 2008.  Warner reminded Ilin that the draft 
text came from a previous administration and did not 
represent the current administration's approach to a 
follow-on treaty.  As a former base commander, Orlov opined 
that inspections were onerous on facilities and stated that 
limiting their number had been one of Russia's primary goals. 
 Warner echoed Orlov's sentiment concerning the impact of 
inspections on those facilities, having recently visited 
several U.S. bases and discussed these matters with local 
base personnel.  Nevertheless, the U.S. side believes a 
larger number of inspections of the various types are needed 
each year, although he noted that the U.S.-proposed protocol 
had reduced the maximum number of data update inspections 
from 15 to 12 per year.  Warner argued that the U.S. side 
believes that at least 12 inspections are needed annually to 
provide a sufficient sample of the number of sites subject to 
inspection. 
 
¶18.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶19. (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Bosco 
Mr. DeNinno 
Mr. Fortier 
Maj Johnson 
Ms. Pura 
Ms. Purcell 
Mr. Rust 
Mr. Smith 
Ms. St. Julien 
Ms. Gesse (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Col Ilin 
Mr. Leontiev 
Gen Orlov 
Col S. Petrov 
Mr. A. Petrov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Gen Poznihir 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaitsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶20.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS