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E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/24/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-V): 
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, SEPTEMBER 21, 2009, 
MORNING SESSION 
 
REF: GENEVA 0774 (SFO-GVA-V-007) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-V-002. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  September 21, 2009 
                Time:  11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the first plenary meeting of the session, the 
Russian Delegation made verbal presentations on several 
portions of their draft treaty text which had been provided 
to the U.S. Embassy in Moscow the previous week (REF A). 
Russian Delegation members covered the central obligations, 
central limits, and locations of strategic offense arms 
(SOAs). 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation described the Russian view of 
the work schedule through the end of October; this session 
would end on October 2 and the next session would begin on 
October 19.  In the interim, the Delegations would return to 
capitals, but a small group from the U.S. Delegation would go 
to Moscow to continue our work, both before and during the 
ministerial in mid-October. 
 
-------------------- 
IMPORTANT CHANGES 
THAT AFFECT OUR WORK 
-------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Antonov summarized two developments he said would 
positively contribute to the START Follow-on discussions: 
the meeting of the two Presidents in New York on the margins 
of the United Nations Security Council meeting and the 
decision by President Obama on the configuration of U.S. 
missile defense.  On the latter, Antonov said Russian 
President Medvedev had reacted positively.  He said that 
Russia had asked the U.S. to send missile defense experts to 
Geneva to brief the Russian Delegation about the decision; 
A/S Gottemoeller demurred that she would convey the request 
to Washington but such a briefing would probably not be 
possible this week in Geneva. 
 
------------- 
WORK SCHEDULE 
------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) On the schedule of our work for the upcoming weeks, 
Antonov stated that the Russian Delegation's assumption was 
that the current session would last for two weeks, followed 
by a two-week break in capitals during which a small group 
from the U.S. Delegation would travel to Moscow just before 
the mid-October ministerial meeting.  Thereafter, Antonov 
said, the Delegations would return to Geneva on October 19 
for two more weeks of talks.  At the end of October, he 
explained, it would be possible to plan beyond November 1st, 
based on:  the progress of the negotiations thusfar, 
 
 
prospects for settling key issues, the need to return to 
capitals to study proposals, and the need to continue 
convening working groups in Geneva.  Gottemoeller reiterated 
that the U.S. saw the need to meet in continuous session in 
order to complete the treaty by December 5.  She asked 
Antonov to keep an open mind. 
 
-------------------------------- 
OVERVIEW OF RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Antonov gave an overview of the Russian approach to 
preparing its draft treaty text (REF A):  it was based on the 
existing START Treaty, but also incorporated the U.S. concept 
of a "hybrid" treaty.  Moscow had deleted everything that was 
not needed, assuming relations between the two countries had 
changed drastically.  He highlighted several aspects of the 
July 6, 2009 Presidential Joint Understanding incorporated 
into the treaty (legally-binding, reduction period, treaty 
duration, levels lower than Moscow Treaty) and listed the 
Russian-proposed central limits of 500 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs 
and heavy bombers; and 1675 warheads.  He pointed to elements 
of special importance, such as each side determining its own 
force structure, the relationship between strategic offensive 
and strategic defensive capabilities, the Russian-proposed 
ban on non-nuclear weapons on ICBMs or SLBMs, restrictions on 
basing SOAs outside of national territory, allowance for 
existing patterns of cooperation, and recognizing the 
contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 
 
¶8.  (S) Antonov noted Moscow wanted the START Follow-on 
agreement to be a positive example for other states, both 
nuclear and non-nuclear.  Because both of our countries were 
concerned about the proliferation of missile technology, the 
United States should understand the tough Russian position on 
non-nuclear ICBMs.  Moscow wanted to be able to explain to 
other countries with missile capabilities that they needed to 
show restraint.  The treaty should have a deterrent effect. 
Also, he emphasized, the U.S. and Russia should show 
leadership on the obligations under Article VI of the NPT. 
 
-------------------- 
MARCH THROUGH THE 
RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY 
-------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) General Orlov began a presentation on Articles I and 
II of the Russian draft.  He noted the sides' agreement on 
the concepts of confidence, predictability, and openness, and 
then spent several minutes repeating the Russian position 
about the interrelationship of strategic offensive and 
strategic defensive systems.  He added that even the new U.S. 
Triad, which includes missile defenses, demonstrates the link 
between offensive and defensive capabilities.  The Russian 
Delegation was sorry to see that the United States proposed 
only referencing the linkage in the preamble; Russia wanted 
the linkage to be in an operational paragraph of the new 
treaty (Article I, paragraph 2) to make it legally-binding, 
especially important with the "changed circumstances" of the 
new MD decision. 
 
¶10.  (S) Orlov further stated if one party built up its 
capability to intercept strategic missiles, the other side 
 
 
should have the right to increase its numbers of SOAs, both 
strategic delivery vehicles and warheads.  Such a scenario, 
he said, could be grounds to "denounce" the treaty. 
 
¶11.  (S) Orlov said the Russian position was unchangeable on 
banning the deployment of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear 
configuration.  He then read key sentences of the central 
limits of the Russian draft treaty (Article II, paragraph 1), 
clarifying on subparagraph (c) that the number included 
deployed and non-deployed launchers. 
 
     - (a) 500, for deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and 
deployed heavy bombers; 
 
     - (b) 1,675, for warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed 
SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers; 
 
     - (c) 600, ICBM and SLBM launchers. 
 
¶12.  (S) Orlov commented that the fact that one party had 
extensive upload capability would allow that party to 
secretly and quickly achieve a large-scale buildup of its 
forces.  This would impede real reductions and undermine the 
viability of the treaty.  Therefore, Russia had added a new 
provision on the total number of ICBM and SLBM launchers. 
The non-deployed number would exclude those launchers in 
long-term repair or maintenance, but include test launchers, 
and training launchers in the Russian aggregate limit of 600 
ICBM and SLBM launchers.  In response to a question, Orlov 
noted these were only examples of non-deployed launchers. 
 
¶13.  (S) General Petrov reviewed Article V of the Russian 
proposal on locations of SOAs.  The Russian text was based on 
lengthy experience under START, but had been simplified by 
moving the numerical aspects for types and their respective 
locations.  The technical characteristics of SOAs would also 
appear in the annex. 
 
     - Each Party shall locate strategic offensive arms 
subject to this treaty only at:  ICBM bases, submarine bases, 
air bases, storage facilities, conversion or elimination 
facilities, repair facilities, training facilities, and test 
ranges. 
 
     - Test launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located only 
at test ranges. 
 
     - Training launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs may be located 
only at ICBM bases and test ranges.  Mobile training 
launchers of ICBMs may, in addition, be located at storage 
facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at conversion or 
elimination facilities. 
 
¶14.  (S) Petrov pointed out the provision against basing SOA 
outside national territory in Article V, paragraph 4 to 
ensure that one Party could not achieve military advantage by 
bringing SOA closer to the other Party.  He then read two 
additional provisions on heavy bombers: 
 
     - In the event of temporary stationing of a heavy bomber 
outside national territory in accordance with subparagraph 
3(b) of Article VIII, notification shall be provided. 
 
 
     - Heavy bombers equipped or converted for non-nuclear 
armaments shall be based separately from heavy bombers 
equipped for nuclear armaments. 
 
------------------------ 
A FEW U.S. QUESTIONS ON 
THE RUSSIAN DRAFT TREATY 
------------------------ 
 
¶15.  (S) Gottemoeller asked Petrov about how ICBMs, SLBMs, 
and heavy bombers undergoing long-term maintenance would be 
treated in the memorandum of understanding.  Would they be 
removed from the database or remain listed.  Petrov responded 
that a notification would be provided and that details would 
be discussed in the working group.  (Begin comment:  He 
appeared unable to answer the question.  End comment.) 
 
¶16.  (S) Siemon asked whether the Russian draft treaty 
prohibited only nuclear-armed (that is, not non-nuclear) 
heavy bombers outside national territory.  Petrov clarified 
he meant those actually carrying nuclear weapons, not just 
nuclear-capable bombers.  Warner asked whether the 
notification requirement would also apply to heavy bombers 
that had been converted to non-nuclear status.  Petrov said 
it would apply because national technical means could not 
distinguish nuclear-capable from non-nuclear heavy bombers. 
Warner observed that once all the B-1Bs had been converted in 
about a year or two, this would no longer be an issue.  Orlov 
interjected to ask what guarantee there would be that 
converted heavy bombers would not be able to carry nuclear 
weapons.  Warner offered that this, too, would be discussed 
in the working group.  The Delegations agreed to continue the 
discussion at the afternoon meeting. 
 
¶17.  (U) Documents exchanged:  None. 
 
¶18.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
A/S Gottemoeller 
Amb Ries 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Evans 
Dr. Fraley 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
LTC Leyde 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Smith 
Mr. Taylor 
Mr. Trout 
Dr. Warner 
Mrs. Zdravecky 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Mr. Artemyev 
 
 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Izrazov 
Mr. Kamenskiy 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Leontiev 
Mr. Luchaninov 
Mr. Lysenko 
Mr. Malyugin 
Mr. Neshin 
Col Novikov 
Gen Orlov 
Gen Petrov 
Mr. Pischulov 
Gen Poznihir 
Mr. Semin 
Mr. Shevchenko 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Tarasov 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Gen Venevtsev 
Mr. Vorontsov 
Col Zaitsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
 
¶19.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
GRIFFITHS