Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 251287 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z
AEMR ASEC AMGT AE AS AMED AVIAN AU AF AORC AGENDA AO AR AM APER AFIN ATRN AJ ABUD ARABL AL AG AODE ALOW ADANA AADP AND APECO ACABQ ASEAN AA AFFAIRS AID AGR AY AGS AFSI AGOA AMB ARF ANET ASCH ACOA AFLU AFSN AMEX AFDB ABLD AESC AFGHANISTAN AINF AVIATION ARR ARSO ANDREW ASSEMBLY AIDS APRC ASSK ADCO ASIG AC AZ APEC AFINM ADB AP ACOTA ASEX ACKM ASUP ANTITERRORISM ADPM AINR ARABLEAGUE AGAO AORG AMTC AIN ACCOUNT ASECAFINGMGRIZOREPTU AIDAC AINT ARCH AMGTKSUP ALAMI AMCHAMS ALJAZEERA AVIANFLU AORD AOREC ALIREZA AOMS AMGMT ABDALLAH AORCAE AHMED ACCELERATED AUC ALZUGUREN ANGEL AORL ASECIR AMG AMBASSADOR AEMRASECCASCKFLOMARRPRELPINRAMGTJMXL ADM ASES ABMC AER AMER ASE AMGTHA ARNOLDFREDERICK AOPC ACS AFL AEGR ASED AFPREL AGRI AMCHAM ARNOLD AN ANATO AME APERTH ASECSI AT ACDA ASEDC AIT AMERICA AMLB AMGE ACTION AGMT AFINIZ ASECVE ADRC ABER AGIT APCS AEMED ARABBL ARC ASO AIAG ACEC ASR ASECM ARG AEC ABT ADIP ADCP ANARCHISTS AORCUN AOWC ASJA AALC AX AROC ARM AGENCIES ALBE AK AZE AOPR AREP AMIA ASCE ALANAZI ABDULRAHMEN ABDULHADI AINFCY ARMS ASECEFINKCRMKPAOPTERKHLSAEMRNS AGRICULTURE AFPK AOCR ALEXANDER ATRD ATFN ABLG AORCD AFGHAN ARAS AORCYM AVERY ALVAREZ ACBAQ ALOWAR ANTOINE ABLDG ALAB AMERICAS AFAF ASECAFIN ASEK ASCC AMCT AMGTATK AMT APDC AEMRS ASECE AFSA ATRA ARTICLE ARENA AISG AEMRBC AFR AEIR ASECAF AFARI AMPR ASPA ASOC ANTONIO AORCL ASECARP APRM AUSTRALIAGROUP ASEG AFOR AEAID AMEDI ASECTH ASIC AFDIN AGUIRRE AUNR ASFC AOIC ANTXON ASA ASECCASC ALI AORCEUNPREFPRELSMIGBN ASECKHLS ASSSEMBLY ASECVZ AI ASECPGOV ASIR ASCEC ASAC ARAB AIEA ADMIRAL AUSGR AQ AMTG ARRMZY ANC APR AMAT AIHRC AFU ADEL AECL ACAO AMEMR ADEP AV AW AOR ALL ALOUNI AORCUNGA ALNEA ASC AORCO ARMITAGE AGENGA AGRIC AEM ACOAAMGT AGUILAR AFPHUM AMEDCASCKFLO AFZAL AAA ATPDEA ASECPHUM ASECKFRDCVISKIRFPHUMSMIGEG
ETRD ETTC EU ECON EFIN EAGR EAID ELAB EINV ENIV ENRG EPET EZ ELTN ELECTIONS ECPS ET ER EG EUN EIND ECONOMICS EMIN ECIN EINT EWWT EAIR EN ENGR ES EI ETMIN EL EPA EARG EFIS ECONOMY EC EK ELAM ECONOMIC EAR ESDP ECCP ELN EUM EUMEM ECA EAP ELEC ECOWAS EFTA EXIM ETTD EDRC ECOSOC ECPSN ENVIRONMENT ECO EMAIL ECTRD EREL EDU ENERG ENERGY ENVR ETRAD EAC EXTERNAL EFIC ECIP ERTD EUC ENRGMO EINZ ESTH ECCT EAGER ECPN ELNT ERD EGEN ETRN EIVN ETDR EXEC EIAD EIAR EVN EPRT ETTF ENGY EAIDCIN EXPORT ETRC ESA EIB EAPC EPIT ESOCI ETRB EINDQTRD ENRC EGOV ECLAC EUR ELF ETEL ENRGUA EVIN EARI ESCAP EID ERIN ELAN ENVT EDEV EWWY EXBS ECOM EV ELNTECON ECE ETRDGK EPETEIND ESCI ETRDAORC EAIDETRD ETTR EMS EAGRECONEINVPGOVBN EBRD EUREM ERGR EAGRBN EAUD EFI ETRDEINVECINPGOVCS EPEC ETRO ENRGY EGAR ESSO EGAD ENV ENER EAIDXMXAXBXFFR ELA EET EINVETRD EETC EIDN ERGY ETRDPGOV EING EMINCG EINVECON EURM EEC EICN EINO EPSC ELAP ELABPGOVBN EE ESPS ETRA ECONETRDBESPAR ERICKSON EEOC EVENTS EPIN EB ECUN EPWR ENG EX EH EAIDAR EAIS ELBA EPETUN ETRDEIQ EENV ECPC ETRP ECONENRG EUEAID EWT EEB EAIDNI ESENV EADM ECN ENRGKNNP ETAD ETR ECONETRDEAGRJA ETRG ETER EDUC EITC EBUD EAIF EBEXP EAIDS EITI EGOVSY EFQ ECOQKPKO ETRGY ESF EUE EAIC EPGOV ENFR EAGRE ENRD EINTECPS EAVI ETC ETCC EIAID EAIDAF EAGREAIDPGOVPRELBN EAOD ETRDA EURN EASS EINVA EAIDRW EON ECOR EPREL EGPHUM ELTM ECOS EINN ENNP EUPGOV EAGRTR ECONCS ETIO ETRDGR EAIDB EISNAR EIFN ESPINOSA EAIDASEC ELIN EWTR EMED ETFN ETT EADI EPTER ELDIN EINVEFIN ESS ENRGIZ EQRD ESOC ETRDECD ECINECONCS EAIT ECONEAIR ECONEFIN EUNJ ENRGKNNPMNUCPARMPRELNPTIAEAJMXL ELAD EFIM ETIC EFND EFN ETLN ENGRD EWRG ETA EIN EAIRECONRP EXIMOPIC ERA ENRGJM ECONEGE ENVI ECHEVARRIA EMINETRD EAD ECONIZ EENG ELBR EWWC ELTD EAIDMG ETRK EIPR EISNLN ETEX EPTED EFINECONCS EPCS EAG ETRDKIPR ED EAIO ETRDEC ENRGPARMOTRASENVKGHGPGOVECONTSPLEAID ECONEINVEFINPGOVIZ ERNG EFINU EURFOR EWWI ELTNSNAR ETD EAIRASECCASCID EOXC ESTN EAIDAORC EAGRRP ETRDEMIN ELABPHUMSMIGKCRMBN ETRDEINVTINTCS EGHG EAIDPHUMPRELUG EAGRBTIOBEXPETRDBN EDA EPETPGOV ELAINE EUCOM EMW EFINECONEAIDUNGAGM ELB EINDETRD EMI ETRDECONWTOCS EINR ESTRADA EHUM EFNI ELABV ENR EMN EXO EWWTPRELPGOVMASSMARRBN EATO END EP EINVETC ECONEFINETRDPGOVEAGRPTERKTFNKCRMEAID ELTRN EIQ ETTW EAI ENGRG ETRED ENDURING ETTRD EAIDEGZ EOCN EINF EUPREL ENRL ECPO ENLT EEFIN EPPD ECOIN EUEAGR EISL EIDE ENRGSD EINVECONSENVCSJA EAIG ENTG EEPET EUNCH EPECO ETZ EPAT EPTE EAIRGM ETRDPREL EUNGRSISAFPKSYLESO ETTN EINVKSCA ESLCO EBMGT ENRGTRGYETRDBEXPBTIOSZ EFLU ELND EFINOECD EAIDHO EDUARDO ENEG ECONEINVETRDEFINELABETRDKTDBPGOVOPIC EFINTS ECONQH ENRGPREL EUNPHUM EINDIR EPE EMINECINECONSENVTBIONS EFINM ECRM EQ EWWTSP ECONPGOVBN
KFLO KPKO KDEM KFLU KTEX KMDR KPAO KCRM KIDE KN KNNP KG KMCA KZ KJUS KWBG KU KDMR KAWC KCOR KPAL KOMC KTDB KTIA KISL KHIV KHUM KTER KCFE KTFN KS KIRF KTIP KIRC KSCA KICA KIPR KPWR KWMN KE KGIC KGIT KSTC KACT KSEP KFRD KUNR KHLS KCRS KRVC KUWAIT KVPR KSRE KMPI KMRS KNRV KNEI KCIP KSEO KITA KDRG KV KSUM KCUL KPET KBCT KO KSEC KOLY KNAR KGHG KSAF KWNM KNUC KMNP KVIR KPOL KOCI KPIR KLIG KSAC KSTH KNPT KINL KPRP KRIM KICC KIFR KPRV KAWK KFIN KT KVRC KR KHDP KGOV KPOW KTBT KPMI KPOA KRIF KEDEM KFSC KY KGCC KATRINA KWAC KSPR KTBD KBIO KSCI KRCM KNNB KBNC KIMT KCSY KINR KRAD KMFO KCORR KW KDEMSOCI KNEP KFPC KEMPI KBTR KFRDCVISCMGTCASCKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KNPP KTTB KTFIN KBTS KCOM KFTN KMOC KOR KDP KPOP KGHA KSLG KMCR KJUST KUM KMSG KHPD KREC KIPRTRD KPREL KEN KCSA KCRIM KGLB KAKA KWWT KUNP KCRN KISLPINR KLFU KUNC KEDU KCMA KREF KPAS KRKO KNNC KLHS KWAK KOC KAPO KTDD KOGL KLAP KECF KCRCM KNDP KSEAO KCIS KISM KREL KISR KISC KKPO KWCR KPFO KUS KX KWCI KRFD KWPG KTRD KH KLSO KEVIN KEANE KACW KWRF KNAO KETTC KTAO KWIR KVCORR KDEMGT KPLS KICT KWGB KIDS KSCS KIRP KSTCPL KDEN KLAB KFLOA KIND KMIG KPPAO KPRO KLEG KGKG KCUM KTTP KWPA KIIP KPEO KICR KNNA KMGT KCROM KMCC KLPM KNNPGM KSIA KSI KWWW KOMS KESS KMCAJO KWN KTDM KDCM KCM KVPRKHLS KENV KCCP KGCN KCEM KEMR KWMNKDEM KNNPPARM KDRM KWIM KJRE KAID KWMM KPAONZ KUAE KTFR KIF KNAP KPSC KSOCI KCWI KAUST KPIN KCHG KLBO KIRCOEXC KI KIRCHOFF KSTT KNPR KDRL KCFC KLTN KPAOKMDRKE KPALAOIS KESO KKOR KSMT KFTFN KTFM KDEMK KPKP KOCM KNN KISLSCUL KFRDSOCIRO KINT KRG KWMNSMIG KSTCC KPAOY KFOR KWPR KSEPCVIS KGIV KSEI KIL KWMNPHUMPRELKPAOZW KQ KEMS KHSL KTNF KPDD KANSOU KKIV KFCE KTTC KGH KNNNP KK KSCT KWNN KAWX KOMCSG KEIM KTSD KFIU KDTB KFGM KACP KWWMN KWAWC KSPA KGICKS KNUP KNNO KISLAO KTPN KSTS KPRM KPALPREL KPO KTLA KCRP KNMP KAWCK KCERS KDUM KEDM KTIALG KWUN KPTS KPEM KMEPI KAWL KHMN KCRO KCMR KPTD KCROR KMPT KTRF KSKN KMAC KUK KIRL KEM KSOC KBTC KOM KINP KDEMAF KTNBT KISK KRM KWBW KBWG KNNPMNUC KNOP KSUP KCOG KNET KWBC KESP KMRD KEBG KFRDKIRFCVISCMGTKOCIASECPHUMSMIGEG KPWG KOMCCO KRGY KNNF KPROG KJAN KFRED KPOKO KM KWMNCS KMPF KJWC KJU KSMIG KALR KRAL KDGOV KPA KCRMJA KCRI KAYLA KPGOV KRD KNNPCH KFEM KPRD KFAM KALM KIPRETRDKCRM KMPP KADM KRFR KMWN KWRG KTIAPARM KTIAEUN KRDP KLIP KDDEM KTIAIC KWKN KPAD KDM KRCS KWBGSY KEAI KIVP KPAOPREL KUNH KTSC KIPT KNP KJUSTH KGOR KEPREL KHSA KGHGHIV KNNR KOMH KRCIM KWPB KWIC KINF KPER KILS KA KNRG KCSI KFRP KLFLO KFE KNPPIS KQM KQRDQ KERG KPAOPHUM KSUMPHUM KVBL KARIM KOSOVO KNSD KUIR KWHG KWBGXF KWMNU KPBT KKNP KERF KCRT KVIS KWRC KVIP KTFS KMARR KDGR KPAI KDE KTCRE KMPIO KUNRAORC KHOURY KAWS KPAK KOEM KCGC KID KVRP KCPS KIVR KBDS KWOMN KIIC KTFNJA KARZAI KMVP KHJUS KPKOUNSC KMAR KIBL KUNA KSA KIS KJUSAF KDEV KPMO KHIB KIRD KOUYATE KIPRZ KBEM KPAM KDET KPPD KOSCE KJUSKUNR KICCPUR KRMS KWMNPREL KWMJN KREISLER KWM KDHS KRV KPOV KWMNCI KMPL KFLD KWWN KCVM KIMMITT KCASC KOMO KNATO KDDG KHGH KRF KSCAECON KWMEN KRIC
PREL PINR PGOV PHUM PTER PE PREF PARM PBTS PINS PHSA PK PL PM PNAT PHAS PO PROP PGOVE PA PU POLITICAL PPTER POL PALESTINIAN PHUN PIN PAMQ PPA PSEC POLM PBIO PSOE PDEM PAK PF PKAO PGOVPRELMARRMOPS PMIL PV POLITICS PRELS POLICY PRELHA PIRN PINT PGOG PERSONS PRC PEACE PROCESS PRELPGOV PROV PFOV PKK PRE PT PIRF PSI PRL PRELAF PROG PARMP PERL PUNE PREFA PP PGOB PUM PROTECTION PARTIES PRIL PEL PAGE PS PGO PCUL PLUM PIF PGOVENRGCVISMASSEAIDOPRCEWWTBN PMUC PCOR PAS PB PKO PY PKST PTR PRM POUS PRELIZ PGIC PHUMS PAL PNUC PLO PMOPS PHM PGOVBL PBK PELOSI PTE PGOVAU PNR PINSO PRO PLAB PREM PNIR PSOCI PBS PD PHUML PERURENA PKPA PVOV PMAR PHUMCF PUHM PHUH PRELPGOVETTCIRAE PRT PROPERTY PEPFAR PREI POLUN PAR PINSF PREFL PH PREC PPD PING PQL PINSCE PGV PREO PRELUN POV PGOVPHUM PINRES PRES PGOC PINO POTUS PTERE PRELKPAO PRGOV PETR PGOVEAGRKMCAKNARBN PPKO PARLIAMENT PEPR PMIG PTBS PACE PETER PMDL PVIP PKPO POLMIL PTEL PJUS PHUMNI PRELKPAOIZ PGOVPREL POGV PEREZ POWELL PMASS PDOV PARN PG PPOL PGIV PAIGH PBOV PETROL PGPV PGOVL POSTS PSO PRELEU PRELECON PHUMPINS PGOVKCMABN PQM PRELSP PRGO PATTY PRELPGOVEAIDECONEINVBEXPSCULOIIPBTIO PGVO PROTESTS PRELPLS PKFK PGOVEAIDUKNOSWGMHUCANLLHFRSPITNZ PARAGRAPH PRELGOV POG PTRD PTERM PBTSAG PHUMKPAL PRELPK PTERPGOV PAO PRIVATIZATION PSCE PPAO PGOVPRELPHUMPREFSMIGELABEAIDKCRMKWMN PARALYMPIC PRUM PKPRP PETERS PAHO PARMS PGREL PINV POINS PHUMPREL POREL PRELNL PHUMPGOV PGOVQL PLAN PRELL PARP PROVE PSOC PDD PRELNP PRELBR PKMN PGKV PUAS PRELTBIOBA PBTSEWWT PTERIS PGOVU PRELGG PHUMPRELPGOV PFOR PEPGOV PRELUNSC PRAM PICES PTERIZ PREK PRELEAGR PRELEUN PHUME PHU PHUMKCRS PRESL PRTER PGOF PARK PGOVSOCI PTERPREL PGOVEAID PGOVPHUMKPAO PINSKISL PREZ PGOVAF PARMEUN PECON PINL POGOV PGOVLO PIERRE PRELPHUM PGOVPZ PGOVKCRM PBST PKPAO PHUMHUPPS PGOVPOL PASS PPGOV PROGV PAGR PHALANAGE PARTY PRELID PGOVID PHUMR PHSAQ PINRAMGT PSA PRELM PRELMU PIA PINRPE PBTSRU PARMIR PEDRO PNUK PVPR PINOCHET PAARM PRFE PRELEIN PINF PCI PSEPC PGOVSU PRLE PDIP PHEM PRELB PORG PGGOC POLG POPDC PGOVPM PWMN PDRG PHUMK PINB PRELAL PRER PFIN PNRG PRED POLI PHUMBO PHYTRP PROLIFERATION PHARM PUOS PRHUM PUNR PENA PGOVREL PETRAEUS PGOVKDEM PGOVENRG PHUS PRESIDENT PTERKU PRELKSUMXABN PGOVSI PHUMQHA PKISL PIR PGOVZI PHUMIZNL PKNP PRELEVU PMIN PHIM PHUMBA PUBLIC PHAM PRELKPKO PMR PARTM PPREL PN PROL PDA PGOVECON PKBL PKEAID PERM PRELEZ PRELC PER PHJM PGOVPRELPINRBN PRFL PLN PWBG PNG PHUMA PGOR PHUMPTER POLINT PPEF PKPAL PNNL PMARR PAC PTIA PKDEM PAUL PREG PTERR PTERPRELPARMPGOVPBTSETTCEAIRELTNTC PRELJA POLS PI PNS PAREL PENV PTEROREP PGOVM PINER PBGT PHSAUNSC PTERDJ PRELEAID PARMIN PKIR PLEC PCRM PNET PARR PRELETRD PRELBN PINRTH PREJ PEACEKEEPINGFORCES PEMEX PRELZ PFLP PBPTS PTGOV PREVAL PRELSW PAUM PRF PHUMKDEM PATRICK PGOVKMCAPHUMBN PRELA PNUM PGGV PGOVSMIGKCRMKWMNPHUMCVISKFRDCA PBT PIND PTEP PTERKS PGOVJM PGOT PRELMARR PGOVCU PREV PREFF PRWL PET PROB PRELPHUMP PHUMAF PVTS PRELAFDB PSNR PGOVECONPRELBU PGOVZL PREP PHUMPRELBN PHSAPREL PARCA PGREV PGOVDO PGON PCON PODC PRELOV PHSAK PSHA PGOVGM PRELP POSCE PGOVPTER PHUMRU PINRHU PARMR PGOVTI PPEL PMAT PAN PANAM PGOVBO PRELHRC

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09CHIANGMAI138, RED-SHIRTS, YELLOW-SHIRTS BEGIN DIALOGUE

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09CHIANGMAI138.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09CHIANGMAI138 2009-09-29 09:51 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Consulate Chiang Mai
VZCZCXRO6766
PP RUEHCN RUEHDT RUEHHM
DE RUEHCHI #0138/01 2720951
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P R 290951Z SEP 09
FM AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1160
INFO RUEHZS/ASSOCIATION OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN NATIONS
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHCHI/AMCONSUL CHIANG MAI 1244
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CHIANG MAI 000138 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR WALTON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  9/29/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM SOCI KDEM PROP TH
SUBJECT: RED-SHIRTS, YELLOW-SHIRTS BEGIN DIALOGUE 
 
REF: A. CHIANG MAI 132 (DOWNPLAY RECONCILIATION CALL) 
     B. CHIANG MAI 93 (U.S. ACADEMIC DISCUSSES) 
     C. 08 CHIANG MAI 178 (PRO AND ANTI-THAKSIN) 
     D. CHIANG MAI 59 (COMMUNITY RADIO STATIONS) 
     E. CHIANG MAI 32 (REDS SPOIL TWO) 
     F. CHIANG MAI 24 (BY-ELECTIONS, REDS AND MIGRANTS) 
     G. CHIANG MAI 18 (TOUGHER TIMES AHEAD) 
     H. CHIANG MAI 3 (RED-SHIRTS FLEX) 
     I. 08 CHIANG MAI 168 (POLITICAL TEMPERATURE) 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000138  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Alex Barrasso, Chief, Pol/Econ, CG Chiang Mai. 
REASON: 1.4 (d) 
-------------------------- 
 
Summary and Comment 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
1.  (C) Spurred on by a U.S. speaker program that focused on the 
role of opposition political parties and non-party actors (Ref 
B), members of red-shirt and yellow-shirt groups in Chiang Mai 
held an initial meeting on September 23 to iron out some 
differences and search for common ground.  Though they stressed 
the need to keep the dialogue low-profile for fear of a backlash 
from more extremist elements on both sides of the spectrum, 
participants agreed to meet again and to expand the circle to 
include private sector representatives and respected academics, 
with the goal of preventing local politics from further harming 
Chiang Mai's economy. 
 
 
 
2.  (C) Comment:  We are gratified that participants on both 
sides cited the Mission-sponsored speaker program (Ref B) as 
empowering them to realize that they should and could find 
common ground for Chiang Mai's benefit.  Though their meeting is 
a positive first step, much work remains to be done.  Extremist 
elements in both camps have personalized their political 
differences, and have personal interests that stand to be harmed 
if true political reconciliation takes hold.  We will 
nonetheless continue to impress upon actors on both sides that 
divergent views and the ability to express them, when done 
peacefully, is a large part of what makes democracies vibrant 
and flourishing, and to encourage their nascent reconciliatory 
efforts.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Getting Red-shirts and Yellow-shirts Together 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
 
 
3.  (C) Differences in the political views of anti-government 
red-shirts and anti-Thaksin yellow-shirts have played out on 
Thailand's streets several times in recent years, most notably 
during the anti-Thaksin People's Alliance for Democracy's (PAD) 
2008 seizure of Government House and Bangkok's airports, and the 
red-shirt riots in Bangkok and Pattaya earlier this year.  In 
Chiang Mai, tensions have run particularly high, with the most 
egregious violence taking place in November 2008, when a mob of 
red-shirts took the father of the local pro-PAD community radio 
station out of his car and subsequently killed him (see Refs E-I 
for more on the dynamics between the red-shirt and yellow-shirt 
groups in Chiang Mai).  It wasn't until June 2009 that actors on 
both sides in Chiang Mai had a serious political discussion with 
each other.  That exchange of views took place as part of a 
Mission-sponsored State Department Speaker Program featuring 
University of California-Davis professor  Larry Berman, who 
spoke at various locales in Thailand last June on the role of 
opposition parties and non-party actors in a democracy (Ref B). 
When Dr. Berman visited Chiang Mai, the Consulate brought 
together a group of red-shirt and yellow-shirt leaders who, 
after Berman's remarks, engaged with him in a discussion of the 
institutional parameters critical to a functioning democracy. 
The participants later praised Dr. Berman's program, noting it 
had convinced them that they could and should work together to 
find common ground on social, economic and political issues. 
 
 
 
-------------------------- 
 
Who Was At the Table? 
 
-------------------------- 
 
 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000138  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
4.  (C) This event was the catalyst for a September 23 meeting 
in Chiang Mai, at which representatives of the People's Alliance 
for Democracy (PAD) and Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) on 
the yellow-shirt side, and the Northern Grassroots Confederation 
(NGC) on the red-shirt side, met for two and a half hours to 
discuss their differences and search for common ground. 
According to a neutral participant who served as moderator for 
the meeting, the discussions were amicable, constructive and 
open-minded. 
 
 
 
5.  (C) Representing the yellow-shirts were CPD Acting 
Secretary-General Suriyan Tongnu-ied and PAD Chiang Mai 
Coordinator Phongphan Kongkham.  The red-shirt groups were 
represented by NGC Chairman Phromsak Saengpho, who also speaks 
for red-shirt community radio 89.5 FM, as well as Somchat 
Malaihuan (editor of "Red Front" magazine and spokesman for 
red-shirt radio 105.5 FM) and former Chiang Mai University 
professor Chiraporn Chankham.  The CPD's Suriyan claims to have 
close links to the PAD's Phiphop Thongchai (Ref C), while we see 
the NGC's Phromsak as very close to banned Thai Rak Thai 
politician Chaturon Chaisang.  Phromsak and his red-shirt group, 
though they do not advocate violence, believe that the elites 
and monarchy need to be overthrown, and subscribe to traditional 
Communist ideology. 
 
 
 
------------------- 
 
What Was On It? 
 
------------------- 
 
 
 
6.  (C) The NGC's Phromsak admitted that the national red-shirt 
movement was largely "disoriented, lacking an agenda, and 
fraught with violence."  The movement served politicians' 
interests, he added, not those of the people.  Achievement of 
its political goals via violence was not a victory for the Thai 
people, and was also not sustainable, he opined.  Phromsak 
characterized national red-shirt leaders Veera Musikapong, 
Jatuporn Prompan and Nattawut Saikua as representatives of the 
opposition Phuea Thai Party, not the people.  Phromsak made 
similarly derogatory statements about the leader of the local 
Rak Chiang Mai 51 (RCM51) red-shirt group - Phetcharawat 
Wattanapongsirikul - saying that he was more interested in 
money-making than benefiting the masses.  RCM51 relies only on 
money from Thaksin, Phromsak noted, adding that the politicians 
know how to take advantage of the people's loyalty to him. 
 
 
 
7.  (C) For his part, the yellow-shirt CPD's Suriyan focused his 
initial comments on what he called Thailand's evolving center of 
power .  The main issue at hand was the question of succession 
of "the most revered institution" (an overt reference to the 
King).  Focus on those individuals at the center of the 
succession issue threatened to sideline both the red-shirts and 
yellow-shirts, he opined.  The "blue-shirts" (associated with 
former Thaksin ally and current government coalition partner 
Newin Chidchob) were also a concern, Suriyan speculated, as they 
could target both the yellow and red-shirts in an effort to 
assert themselves as the predominant force in Thai politics. 
 
 
 
8.  (C) "Red Front" magazine's Somchat opined that the two sides 
shared common ground in that they both wanted "new" politics and 
to see the Thai State recreated, with the goal of realizing true 
democracy.  Somchat noted that one area both sides agreed on was 
that land-grabbing by foreign capitalists at the expense of 
farmers had to be stopped.  Somchat and yellow-shirt Suriyan 
also both agreed on the need to curtail the influence of 
politicians, and strengthen local people's participation in 
politics. 
 
 
 
9.  (C) Both groups agreed on two principles moving forward: 
they must be free to peacefully express their political views 
without fear of intimidation/harassment from the other; and they 
should seek common ground around which they could hold joint 
activities and bring outsiders into the fold.  Furthermore, they 
agreed that the successful organization of a particular activity 
by one group did not necessarily mean a defeat for the other. 
Rather, it highlighted the need to respect each other's rights 
 
CHIANG MAI 00000138  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
and freedoms. 
 
 
 
10. (C) Participants discussed two concrete areas in which they 
could immediately begin working together to reduce tension - the 
media and local economy.  With regard to the media, they agreed 
on the need to counter "misinformation" spread by the red-shirt 
RCM51 radio station and its pro-PAD counterpart (Refs C-D). 
Somchat and Phromsak noted that a total of five red-shirt 
stations could join this effort, hopefully marginalizing RCM51. 
More importantly, print publications associated with these five 
stations would also follow suit and try to counteract false 
propaganda.  Both sides agreed that the next step would be to 
counter misinformation in the general public, and that these 
measures would be more effective than strengthened law 
enforcement measures undertaken by Provincial authorities. 
 
 
 
11. (C) Regarding Chiang Mai's economy, participants agreed to 
explore holding a public forum to discuss problems facing the 
urban middle class, and to include private sector 
representatives in the discussion.  Their goal is to reestablish 
Chiang Mai's image as a thriving, peaceful area, rather than an 
"unruly" one.  They expressed interest in having representatives 
from hotel and tourism associations participate in the forum. 
 
 
 
--------------- 
 
What's Next? 
 
--------------- 
 
 
 
12. (C) Both sides agreed to meet again to discuss the proposed 
program of work in greater detail, and to expand the dialogue to 
include selected business community representatives.  Chiang 
Mai's Chamber of Commerce and Federation of Thai Industries were 
mentioned as possible partners.  (Per Ref A, these groups had 
joined local academics and hotel/tourism groups to issue a 
public statement calling for reconciliation between Chiang Mai's 
yellow-shirts and red-shirts).  Participants also stressed the 
need to keep the dialogue low-profile for now, fearing that 
publicizing it could lead to a backlash from more extremist 
elements on both sides. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
Provincial Government, Private Sector React 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
 
 
13.  (C) Chiang Mai's Vice Governor for Security Affairs told 
Pol/Econ Chief on September 25 that he expected things between 
red-shirts and yellow-shirts to calm down.  He sung the praises 
of strengthened law enforcement, noting that in the wake of the 
agreement he struck with community radio stations in May (Ref 
D), their rhetoric had toned down significantly.  On September 
24, the head of the local chapter of the Federation of Thai 
Industries told P/E Chief that he too expected both groups would 
step back from confrontation.  (Note:  it's unclear whether 
either contact was aware of the September 23 
red-shirt/yellow-shirt meeting). 
 
 
 
14. (U) This cable was coordinated with Embassy Bangkok. 
MORROW