VZCZCXYZ0003
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHGB #2384/01 2470838
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 040838Z SEP 09
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4582
INFO RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC

UNCLAS BAGHDAD 002384 
 
JUSTICE PASS TO ODAG - JJONES, OPDAT, IITAP 
STATE PASS TO INL, NEA-I 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
E.O. 12958:  N/A 
 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PNAT PINS PHUM IZ
 
SUBJECT:  Are the Iraqi Prisons Working Yet? -- An Assessment of 
Ministry of Justice/Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) Operations 
 
(SBU) SUMMARY: While the Iraqi Corrections Service (ICS) has made 
tremendous strides over the past six years, moving from 
non-existence to a very solid foundation for further development, 
there are still significant obstacles ahead for the creation of a 
sustainable and effective corrections system. Working within the 
Embassy's Rule of Law Coordinator's Office, the International 
Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (DOJ/ICITAP) will 
continue to play an essential role in advising the Ministry of 
Justice (MOJ) on organizational and physical capacity building as 
well as continuing to institutionalize the precepts of international 
human rights standards. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
Empty Prisons, Corrections Chaos: Historic Background 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶1. (SBU) In October 2002, Saddam granted unprecedented amnesty to 
virtually all prisoners in Iraq releasing to the street as   many as 
100,000 convicted criminals. He publically stated this release was a 
'thank you' to his countrymen for endorsing him as President in a 
national referendum.  With the collapse of the corrections system 
and the subsequent Coalition advance, nearly all documents on the 
organizational structure and operation of the correctional 
facilities were lost or destroyed.  Many officials with direct 
knowledge of facility operations disappeared, and Iraqi families had 
moved into abandoned prison and detention facilities as squatters. 
By the spring of 2003, most prison assets-once a key element of 
Saddam's security apparatus-- were either stolen or destroyed. 
 
¶2. (SBU) In May 2003, a multi-national team of corrections 
professionals comprised of three INL-funded ICITAP selected former 
U.S. state corrections directors and three experts from Great 
Britain and Canada, deployed to Iraq and produced a comprehensive 
report on the state of the Iraqi corrections system. Issued on June 
15, 2003, the report found that the Saddam regime maintained prisons 
in harsh and inhumane conditions ignoring international human rights 
standards while offering no professional training for officers and 
staff. These recommendations became the basis for the development of 
a strategic plan to establish a new Iraq Corrections Service (ICS). 
 
¶3. (SBU) Further, the report noted that rampant corruption 
victimized inmates, inmate's families, and often, lower-level staff. 
 With  15 specific recommendations for the establishment of a 
professional, secure, and humane correctional system to support the 
Iraqi criminal justice system, the DOJ/International Criminal 
Investigative Training Assistance Program, or ICITAP, was deployed 
to develop a corrections system using international standards and 
best correctional practices conforming with Iraqi Law and Coalition 
Provisional Authority orders. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Funded by the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs (INL), the corrections program at one time 
maintained 80 contract correctional advisors.  (Comment:  There are 
now 40 ICITAP advisors which will reduce to 37 by February 2010 with 
further reductions throughout 2010 due to funding reductions for the 
program. Additionally, the Department of Defense currently has an 
inter-agency agreement with ICITAP for the employment of four 
Corrections Advisors for their Security Detention program.  End 
Comment.) 
 
¶5.  (SBU) Over the last 6 years, the ICS, under the MOJ, has 
successfully expanded to include 12 prisons and 6 detention 
Qsuccessfully expanded to include 12 prisons and 6 detention 
facilities. Over 14,000 Iraqi Correctional Officers (ICOs) have been 
trained.  A national headquarters was established as well as a 
National Training Academy exclusively for ICO training.  To combat 
abuse and corruption, an internal affairs section was formed to 
investigate any and all allegations of abuse, corruption and fraud. 
 
 
¶6.  (SBU)  Since their initial assessment of the Iraq prisons in 
2003, ICITAP's mission has been to assist the GOI in the 
establishment and development of safe and secure correctional 
facilities for the humane care, custody, and treatment of persons 
incarcerated in the Iraqi Corrections Sevice as a means of enhancing 
the public safety for the citizens of Iraq under the rule of law. 
 
¶7.  (SBU)  ICITAP has functioned largely in a 
training/consulting/advising capacity at all levels of the MOJ 
assisting in the development of an ICS organizational structure; 
establishing standardardized policies, procedures and practices; 
assisting in the formulation of a professional organizational 
culture; assisting in the improvement of current facilities as well 
as the design and construction of new USG funded facilities. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Throughout the recent history of the ICS, there have been 
 
significant senior management challenges.  The first Director 
General (DG) of the ICS was removed in a management coup by his 
Deputy, who then served approximately four years before being 
arrested.  He had become significantly influenced by the Jayash 
al-Mahdi (JAM) militia and ultimately controlled by their demands. 
This control turned to complicity and culminated in the arrest of 
both him and his Deputy in May 2008.  These arrests marked the end 
of a period of increasing corruption. An acting DG was appointed, 
but was replaced within 45 days by another acting DG, Sharef 
Abdul-Mutalb Jasim al-Murtadha (recently named the official DG). 
This appointment was made by acting Minister of Justice, Dr. Safa 
al-Safi.  Sharef has no corrections background or experience. 
(Comment:  Al-Safi was not experienced in correction operations, was 
a noted sectarian, and did not work cooperatively with coalition 
forces and support personnel.  His ineffective leadership crippled 
the growth of the ICS.  Specifically, he refused to hire and train 
an adequate number of ICOs to fill vacancies in northern 
prison/detention facilities while over-hiring ICOs in the south, 
where his allegiance rested. End Comment.) 
¶9. (SBU) The current Minister of Justice, Dara Nour al-Deen Baha' 
al-Deen, (confirmed on February 19, 2009) demonstrates a firm 
dedication to ensuring the ICS applies and enforces the rule of law 
in the prison system.  The MOJ is a former Iraqi judge who, in 2002, 
was imprisoned in Abu Ghraib for issuing a judicial opinion contrary 
to Saddam's direction.  Since assuming duties as the MOJ, he has met 
frequently with the US Embassy RoL personnel, and has specifically 
requested briefings and corrections recommendations from ICITAP 
advisors.  This cooperative working relationship has already 
produced a number of positive changes in ICS operations. On August 
9, 2009 a Diplomatic Note from the Iraqi Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
expressed the need for continuation of services provided by ICITAP 
to the Ministry of Justice/Iraqi Corrections Service, stating that 
the "consultants work in managing prisons and have extensive 
experiences that are needed at the present time by prisons 
administrations in Iraq." 
¶10.  (SBU) The MOJ has placed a priority on hiring adequate numbers 
of ICOs, and he recently joined in the ground-breaking ceremony for 
the GOI national training academy for ICS personnel.  On his own 
initiative, the MOJ compelled the MOI to abide by Iraqi law and 
judicial rulings by either issuing new arrest warrants on detainees 
or approving their release from MOJ custody.  Although far from 
complete, this MOJ initiative is a significant application of the 
rule of law in detention operations. This dedication to justice and 
the rule of law was not demonstrated by the previous minister. 
Unfortunately, unless nominated and re-confirmed by the GOI, the 
MOJ's tenure is scheduled to end upon the election of a new 
government. 
¶11. (SBU) Over the past 5 years, Deputy Minister of Justice (DMOJ) 
Posho Ibrahim Ali Dizaye has weathered the storms of rotating 
ministers, arrests of senior staff, and militia influence. DMOJ 
Posho has always been a cooperative friend to ICITAP corrections 
advisors and coalition forces.  Nearing retirement age, he has made 
fewer strategic decisions over the last few months and defers most 
major decisions to the Minister or DG. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Repopulating the System:   Current Status and Challenges of the ICS 
QRepopulating the System:   Current Status and Challenges of the ICS 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) In sharp contrast with the past, prisons and detention 
facilities in the ICS are generally well-run.  Prisoners receive 
humane and respectful treatment (although the physical condition of 
many of the facilities is below international standards).  The MOJ 
ICS directly attributes this change to the ICITAP Corrections 
Program and its advisors, who are directly responsible for 
implementing prison reform in Iraq. Additionally, the new MOJ 
recognizes the importance of the detention transition and supports 
an aggressive, proactive ICS approach which increases the demand for 
advisory input at critical levels.  ICITAP advisors continue to 
provide security and organizational advice and information to the 
MOJ and his corrections staff regarding activation schedules, 
staffing analyses of various prisons, policy and procedures, 
prisoner population, and classification. 
¶13. (SBU) There are currently 19,530 total prisoners in the MOJ ICS; 
18,918 are adult male prisoners.  The remainders are female and a 
small portion are juveniles.  The MOJ ICS operates 11 prisons (not 
including the soon-to-be activated USG built Chamchamal Prison), and 
6 detention facilities.  There are 14,405 ICOs currently on the 
books with a need for approximately 4,100 more for the activation of 
three facilities and two additional renovation projects (Basra 
Central Prison; Chamchamal Prison; Taji Prison; Ft. Suse;, and 
Nasiriyah).  There are only 1,800 authorized ICO positions 
remaining, leaving a shortfall of 2,300 positions needed from the 
Ministry of Finance. 
 
¶14. (SBU) In practice, the correctional system in Iraq consists of 
 
the ICS national system and an independently operated system in the 
country's northern Kurdish Region.  The Iraqi national system, 
headquartered in Baghdad, consists of adult male and females 
facilities under the authority of the ICS.  Separate facilities are 
maintained for juveniles under the authority of the Ministry of 
Labor and Social Affairs (MoLSA).  Today in the Kurdish Region, 
correctional facilities for males, females, and juveniles are 
operated by MoLSA.  Jails are under the administrative and 
operational control of the Kurdish Ministry of Interior and the 
Kurdish Security Forces (Asaish). These interactions make the 
mission more difficult because of the number of independent agencies 
and ministries, as well as individual personalities, advisors work 
with in developing their detention operations. 
¶15. (SBU) Although substantial gains have been achieved over the 
last five years, there are critical benchmarks ahead for detention 
transition:  Coalition forces have set a target date to divest 
itself of security detainees by the beginning of 2010.  This 
includes completing the Taji Theater Internment Facility (TIF) and 
staffing trained ICOs.  Taji will house up to 5,600 prisoners, and 
will be turned over to the GOI in early 2010.  There are currently 
fewer than 10,000 coalition force detainees who are scheduled for 
release or transfer to the GOI.  Weekly transfers from Cropper to 
Rusafa of both convicted and detainees with detention orders and/or 
arrest warrants began in May 2009.  Rusafa Prison Complex, the ICS' 
largest intake detention facility, will receive custody and control 
of these coalition detainees pending resolution of their cases in 
Iraqi courts. 
¶16. (SBU) Task Force 134, Detention Operations, is constructing a 
Corrections Training Center at FOB Future for eventual turn-over to 
the MOJ ICS in March 2010.  This center will become the National 
Training Academy for pre-service ICO training, mid-upper level 
management and leadership training, and ICS specialty training.  The 
MOJ has committed to staffing this facility and taking operational 
control, and the National Headquarters of the ICS may also relocate 
to this site. 
¶17. (SBU) Comment:  This relocation will have a significant effect 
on the ICS.  The DG currently is involved in routine prison 
operations at Rusafa because of his proximity to the detainees.  He 
typically acts as a compound warden rather than a DG responsible for 
all prisons nationally.  Once relocated to the National Training 
Academy, he can more readily focus on national issues, staffing, 
budget formulation, judicial throughput, and strategic planning. 
This is a highly important move which will benefit ICS 
organizational leadership capacity.  End comment. 
¶18. (SBU) Additionally, there is momentum and pressure now to 
implement Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)directive 10 which 
places full authority and control over all detention and prison 
facilities with the MOJ.  On June 25, 2009, the Prime Minister 
ordered the Ministry of Defense to transfer all of its detainees 
(approximately 2500) to the Ministry of Justice.   CPA 10 may 
incrementally take hold in the Baghdad Operations Command (BOC) 
where there are two large, and persistently overcrowded, detention 
facilities.  There are MOI and MOD facilities within Iraq that hold 
detainees without legal authority and under abusive and inhumane 
conditions.  Placing authority and control under the MOJ, will, with 
Qconditions.  Placing authority and control under the MOJ, will, with 
appropriate resourcing, reduce abuse and contribute to reliable and 
predictable case processing from arrest to post-trial incarceration. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Comment:  This will contribute to efficient detainee 
population management and help reduce internal corruption and 
inconsistent application of the rule of law. The major obstacle to 
implementing CPA 10 is the lack of inter-ministerial cooperation 
that is required to reallocate appropriate resources (funding, 
personnel, and facilities) to the MOJ.  The successful 
implementation of CPA 10 will require a consistent application of 
Iraq Executive Order 207 (detention and case processing procedures) 
and personal emphasis at the Prime Minister/COR level. End comment. 
¶20. (SBU) Newly constructed USG funded prisons and those still under 
construction are not yet staffed or activated.  Chamchamal Prison is 
a 3,000 bed facility officially turned over to the MOJ on March 
¶2009.  Due to decisions made by the prior MOJ, and the delay in 
passing the 2009 budget, this facility is slow to activate.  There 
are enormous requirements for the activation of a 3,000 bed 
facility.  Many of these requirements are physical resources 
demanding human resource needs to set-up and organizationally 
activate the prison. 
¶21. (SBU) Further, there is a 1,189 bed construction project 
on-going in Ft. Suse bringing that facility from 1,500 to 2,689 
post-trial beds.  Nasiriyah Prison is scheduled to double in size 
adding another 800 beds by December 2009.  Finally, Basra Central 
Prison is scheduled for completion also by December 2009 adding 
another 1,200 beds to the ICS inventory.   Once all USG prison 
construction efforts are completed, the ICS will have an additional 
3,189 beds available for use in addition to Chamchamal (3,000 beds). 
 The MOJ, without coalition or USG support, brought 2,600 post-trial 
beds on-line by renovating and re-opening Baghdad Central Prison 
 
(formerly Abu Ghraib). 
¶22. (SBU) All the foregoing issues require significant oversight and 
assistance to ensure a safe and orderly transition of detainees to 
the GOI as expediently and professionally as possible.  The 
oversight, exclusively provided by ICITAP corrections advisors, will 
ensure supervision and support of detainee population management at 
ICS facilities and the application of humane treatment and respect 
for detainees. The ICITAP corrections advisory program is funded by 
INL through December 31, 2009 on the current interagency agreement 
(IAA).  A new IAA is expected to carry the mission through the end 
of May 2010 at lower than requested staffing, and funding beyond 
this date has not been identified.  The program is expected to 
require 40 advisors from now through January 2010, 37 through May 
2010, and a gradual reduction to 11 advisors through March 2011. 
All staffing projections are based on the challenges identified 
below and do not account for any significant changes impacting the 
ICS over the next year. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Prospects for the Future - ICS Ability to meet Challenges 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶23. (SBU) Executive leadership in the ICS is notably lacking.  The 
most consistent stable and cooperative force in the ICS has been the 
Deputy Minister of Justice, Posho Ibrahim Ali Dazaye.  DMOJ Posho is 
nearing retirement age, and does not effectively make substantial 
decisions.  The lack of experienced correctional senior level 
management is a handicap which limits a strategic direction for the 
ICS.  Unless re-nominated and confirmed by the Council of 
Representatives, the Minister of Justice will step-down from his 
position when national elections occur in January 2010. 
 
¶24. (SBU) At the working level, although there is increasing 
evidence that the ICS handles most emergency situations well, their 
management of life- threatening situations still places detainees 
and staff in jeopardy.  For example, recently when a fight between 
detainees broke out in Rusafa, the ICOs responded and separated the 
detainees but failed to restrain them upon removal from the cell, 
allowing one of the detainees to run and retrieve a piece of metal. 
He returned swinging the 'club' at both the ICOs and the other 
detainee. 
 
¶25. (SBU) With no template in place to ensure a seamless transition 
under CPA 10, success relies on inter-ministerial cooperation that 
reallocates and shares GoI resources to successfully transition 
detention facilities to the MOJ.  Security and prisoner 
accountability during this transition is critical.  Budgetary 
constraints that limit ICO hiring/training, and the lack of 
qualified supervisors to run the facilities remain a significant 
concern in this transition. Strategically planning for the 
transition of each facility must occur to ensure public safety and 
maintaining human rights standards. 
 
¶26. (SBU) The 2009 MOJ budget is woefully inadequate.  Although 
initially allocated with a sizable increase from 2008, the fall in 
oil prices resulted in a 39.7% reduction, making the 2009 MOJ budget 
less than last year's appropriation ($188M for 2008/$154 M for 
2009).  This reduction severely complicates the MOJ's ability to 
implement timely prison activation requirements. 
 
¶27. (SBU) The additional transfers of detainees from coalition 
custody in the next eight months will burden an already taxed system 
of chronic pretrial detainee overcrowding, detainee population 
Qof chronic pretrial detainee overcrowding, detainee population 
management, and the ability to ensure provisional care to detainees. 
 There is current overcrowding in existing pre-trial MOI facilities 
in the Baghdad area, many are waiting for bed space at Rusafa. 
 
¶28. (SBU) Case processing is not improving fast enough to keep pace 
with GOI detainee intakes and the transfer of detainees from 
coalition forces in the coming months.  This is causing many 
detainees to languish in detention for months or years.  The GOI 
detention system will, under this scenario, become more of a 
warehouse than a detainee processing center for the courts.  To 
address this problem, significant resources must be allocated for 
medical care and for programs that will offer adult basic education, 
vocational training, and recreation opportunities for all 
prisoners. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶29. (SBU) Comment:  When considering the positive impact ICITAP 
corrections advisors have made upon the ICS, the question remains 
whether the gains are sustainable in view of the additional 
challenges ahead. Upcoming national elections, 
 
inter-ministerial implementation of CPA 10, transfer of coalition 
detainees to the GOI, slow judicial processing of detainees, 
continuing GOI budget problems, lingering influence of the previous 
acting minister, an inexperienced DG of Corrections, the drawdown of 
coalition forces and ICITAP corrections advisors, and the enormous 
task of transitioning the 5,600 bed Taji Prison and 3,000 bed 
Cropper from coalition forces, present significant challenges for 
the ICS.The GOI needs to maintain the political will to ensure a 
humane, functioning corrections system that would befit it as an 
emerging democracy. 
The USG should continue to maintain managerial and organizational 
support for the Iraqi Correctional Service during these challenging 
events and engage other international partners for their assistance 
to ensure success for the future.  These actions will provide 
assurance that international human rights are upheld and the rule of 
law will continue to be an integral part of the Iraqi Correctional 
System. 
 
HILL 
1