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Viewing cable 09BANGKOK2041, PRM PDAS WITTEN OPENS DOOR ON LAO HMONG IN THAILAND

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09BANGKOK2041 2009-08-18 06:15 2011-08-30 01:44 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Bangkok
VZCZCXRO4878
PP RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHHM RUEHNH
DE RUEHBK #2041/01 2300615
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 180615Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7932
INFO RUCNASE/ASEAN MEMBER COLLECTIVE
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 2148
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002041 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR PRM/ANE AND PRM/A; EAP/MLS 
GENEVA FOR RMA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2019 
TAGS: PREF PHUM SMIG TH LA
SUBJECT: PRM PDAS WITTEN OPENS DOOR ON LAO HMONG IN THAILAND 
 
REF: A. VIENTIANE 0384 
     B. VIENTIANE 0387 
 
Classified By: DCM James F. Entwistle, reason: 1.4 (b and d). 
 
 1. (C)  Summary.  During a busy July 28-August 1 visit to 
Thailand, PRM PDAS Samuel Witten met with senior Royal Thai 
Government (RTG) civilian and military officials on the Lao 
Hmong issue, and toured the two sites in Thailand where a 
total of almost 5,000 Lao Hmong are being held.   Witten 
pushed for an immediate release of the 158 UNHCR-recognized 
refugees, held now for two-and-a-half years in a border 
immigration jail at Nong Khai, pending an agreed mechanism 
for third country resettlement.  In Petchabun, Witten met 
with local military commanders and spoke directly to Hmong 
leaders representing the remaining 4,700 residents, rebutting 
rumors that there is a planned large scale resettlement 
program to the United State. Witten encouraged greater 
transparency in the return process underway by allowing the 
International Organization for Migration (IOM) to play a 
role, and noted the availability of U.S. funding for such IOM 
activities. Additional information on the internal RTG 
screening in Petchabun was provided by RTG interlocutors, 
although we are seeking more information about the process. 
The visit complemented earlier advocacy efforts by Witten in 
Laos on resolving the impasse over the Hmong (Refs.) 
 
2.  (C) Comment:  PDAS Witten's visit, coming shortly after 
the Secretary's July 21st expression of concern over the Lao 
Hmong issue to Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, has 
clearly moved the RTG away from a feared move to quickly 
repatriate all of the remaining 4,700 Lao Hmong in 
Petchabun-a move that under present circumstances could only 
be done forcibly, and would certainly spark international 
criticism. The senior level of his interlocutors, and the 
serious attention paid to his views, suggests an overall 
easing of the atmosphere in Thailand on what at times has 
seemed to be an intractable issue.  An immediate result of 
the visit was the first invitation to the U.S. to discuss the 
Petchabun group in a tripartite meeting with the RTG and GOL 
on August 7. (Septel)  On August 10, the Royal Thai Armed 
Forces (RTARF) headquarters also requested continued 
humanitarian assistance for the Petchabun group until April 
2010, signaling an abandonment of earlier announced plans to 
begin forced repatriations. Our goal over the next months 
will be to encourage improvements in voluntariness of the 
return process currently underway, while continuing 
tripartite discussions of the protection needs of those with 
a legitimate fear of return to Laos. For the UNHCR-recognized 
refugees in Nong Khai, we will continue press for immediate 
release from jail. End Summary and Comment. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
UNHCR-recognized Refugees in Nong Khai Jail 
------------------------------------------- 
 
3.  (SBU)   On July 28th, PDAS Witten toured the Nong Khai 
Immigration Detention Center (IDC), along the Thai - Lao 
border, to observe first hand conditions for the 158 
UNHCR-recognized refugees. The internees have been confined 
since January 2007.  The large group, with includes almost 90 
children, sleeps in two dark, poorly ventilated cells, 
separated by gender.  For most of the day, however, they are 
permitted to stay in an outside pavilion with fresh air and 
partial sunlight, a facility completed with PRM funding in 
January 2009.  A nurse station, staffed by an IOM nurse, and 
an English class (taught by a PRM-funded trainer) for 
children was seen at the pavilion. Interaction with the 
detained Hmong was limited by immigration officers, but 
Witten did talk to one young man with a severe facial injury 
who said he was shot in 2003 by a Lao army soldier near his 
village.  The atmosphere seemed calm in the IDC, although the 
IOM nurse reported later that psychological stress remains a 
significant problem for the detainees due to crowding and 
uncertainty regarding their future. 
 
4.  (C)  In a subsequent Bangkok meeting with Thawin 
Ploensri, the new Secretary General of the National Security 
Council (the lead policy agency on the Hmong issue), Witten 
described the prolonged detention as "unacceptable" and 
advocated for the immediate release of the group pending an 
agreed upon mechanism for their resettlement in third 
countries.  (Note: the cases have already been referred by 
UNHCR to the U.S., Australia, Canada and the Netherlands. End 
note.) Noting that UNHCR recognition of the group made Nong 
Khai a different issue than Petchabun, Witten warned that 
forcible return of that group to Laos would be a "major 
issue" for the United States. Similarly, a RTG policy of 
indefinite detention will become an increasingly difficult 
 
BANGKOK 00002041  002 OF 003 
 
 
challenge for the RTG.  Suggesting that the U.S. "has the 
real key to solving the problem" in its bilateral 
relationship with the Government of Laos, Tawin responded 
that the RTG focus at the moment was improving the conditions 
of detention.  The NSC therefore is considering moving the 
Nong Khai group to a newly constructed IDC at Mukdahan, also 
along the Thai - Lao border.  Tawin averred that allowing 
third country resettlement would be an implicit criticism of 
Laos - "we would say that there is political persecution in 
their country."  The NSC chief asserted that "many" of the 
Nong Khai group would return to Laos voluntarily, but are 
prevented from doing so by clan leaders who wish to resettle 
abroad. 
 
5.  (C) Witten also pressed for release of the Nong Khai 
detainees with the MFA's Anusorn Chninowana, Director General 
of the Intentional Organization Division. Anusorn promised to 
"look into options" for the group, remarking that "Thailand 
does not want to spoil its humanitarian record" regarding 
vulnerable groups from neighboring countries. The senior MFA 
official also promised to discuss the immediate release 
option with the NSC. 
 
----------------------- 
The Petchabun Detainees 
----------------------- 
 
6. (SBU) During a seven-hour visit to the RTARF-run camp at 
Petchabun on July 30, PDAS Witten and RefCoord reviewed the 
operations of the Catholic Organization for Emergency Relief 
and Refugees (COEER), a PRM-funded NGO providing food, 
water/sanitation, and overseeing medical care for the 
remaining 4,700 Lao Hmong. COERR took over assistance in the 
camp after the withdrawal of NGO Doctors without Borders in 
May. No gaps in assistance during the transition occurred, 
and many MSF staff were re-hired by the new NGO. After a slow 
beginning, the Hmong residents have begun the trust the new 
NGO and visitors to the clinic are now at MSF-era levels. 
COERR managers, and the RTARF camp commander, separately 
told Witten that they were satisfied with the arrangement to 
date and that there was no friction. A brief walking tour 
through the camp proper was also done, although a armed 
military presence made free interaction with the residents 
difficult. No obvious cases of malnutrition  were seen, an 
impression confirmed by COERR workers, who said the major 
health concerns were respiratory ailments and the high number 
of home births.  There is an average of one birth a day in 
the camp, and many mothers refuse to travel to the local 
government clinic, preferring traditional Hmong mid-wives to 
assist. 
 
7.  (SBU)  Witten met with 16 Hmong representatives 
(including, at his request, six women) at a nearby army 
conference room in order to dispel rumors (some emanating 
from U.S.-based relatives and advocacy groups) that the U.S. 
was planning a large-scale resettlement program similar to 
that done for 15,000 Lao Hmong at Wat Tham Krabok in 
2004-2005.  Several Hmong leaders calmly stated in response 
that they feared return to Laos, and requested that UNHCR be 
allowed to accept their refugee applications. The Hmong 
complained that in February 2009 the RTARF had closed a 
market along the camp fence which provided fresh food, and 
that people lacked sufficient protein. (Comment: RefCoord 
confirmed later with COERR that SPHERE standards on caloric 
intake were being maintained in the camp. End Comment.) 
 
---------------------------------- 
NSC: "No Objections" to IOM Role 
---------------------------------- 
 
8.  (C)  At the Thai National Security Council, the lead 
policy agency on the Lao Hmong, Witten pressed for IOM 
involvement to improve transparency and voluntariness in the 
return process currently underway.  PRM has funding available 
to support IOM's return and repatriation project, first 
proposed to the RTG in July 2008.  Witten suggested that 
truly voluntary returns would increase if there was a 
transparent process with a trusted international organization 
involved. NSC Secretary General Tawin responded that IOM 
assistance to the Lao Hmong (up to the Lao border) "is not a 
big issue" and the RTG was currently discussing modalities. 
Tawin, who heads the Bangkok-level committee intended to 
review the 1,423 family case files (comprising some 7,800 
people) vetted by camp level teams in January 2008, revealed 
further details of the process.  A comprehensive review of 
the cases by a second tier, Bangkok-level committee has not 
been done.  Rather, a working group comprised of mid-level 
officials from the NSC, MFA and RTARF review the files of any 
Hmong in Petchabun who have indicated a desire to repatriate. 
 
BANGKOK 00002041  003 OF 003 
 
 
 Tawin stated that if there are any questions on the 
suitability of a return, further information is requested 
from the camp. "About eight percent" of the original 7,600 
inhabitants of Petchabun were "screened in" (i.e. found to 
have protection concerns) by the RTG, according to Tawin.  To 
date, only a handful of the screened-in group volunteered to 
repatriate to Laos. 
 
9. (C) At the Thai MFA, PDAS Witten suggested that the 
majority of the remaining Petchabun group will likely not 
qualify for protected status, and proposed improving the 
voluntary return process to allow more repatriations, 
gradually  whittling down to a small residual group which 
could then be addressed.  Noting that the Lao Hmong in 
Petchabun were illegal immigrants subject to deportation, 
Director General Anusorn Chninowana expressed frustration 
that "we are being nice to them - why are we being blamed for 
being nice?"  Anusorn described the RTG vetting process in 
Petchabun as "more or less the same" as that for the Burmese 
refugees in the nine established camps, and promised Witten a 
copy of the form used by the interview teams.  The RTG does 
not want to make the internal screening process public, 
fearing the GOL "will raise questions about it."  Anusorn 
closed the hour-plus conversation by asserting that any 
solution to the Petchabun issue will depend on improving U.S. 
- Lao relations, and he urged continued negotiations on the 
Lao Hmong in Vientiane. 
 
----------------------------------------- 
RTARF Issues Invite to Tripartite Meeting 
----------------------------------------- 
 
10.  (C)  PDAS Witten told RTARF Lt. General Nipat Thonglek, 
head of the RTG interagency working group overseeing the 
return process from Petchabun, that any people determined to 
have protection needs should not be forcibly returned, and 
that third country resettlement was not the only option. 
General Nipat responded by describing the current return 
process, which has seen 15 rounds of repatriations since 2007 
under a bilateral MOU with the GOL calls for all returns to 
be completed by December 30, 2009.  (Comment: the original 
MOU specified December 30, 2008, but according to the GOL 
"political uncertainty" in Thailand in 2008 caused the delay. 
End comment.)  General Nipat divided the Petchabun group into 
two camps: economic migrants who do not wish to return to 
Laos, preferring resettlement abroad, and "the eight percent" 
who have "personal reasons for not going back." Nipat said 
the latter group would be discussed for the first time with 
his GOL counterpart, Brigadier General Bouaxieng Champaphahn, 
on August 7 in Petchabun, and extended an unusual invitation 
for U.S. participation in the talks. Witten accepted the 
invitation, noting it would be the first time all three 
governments had met in the same room to discuss the issue of 
Lao Hmong. 
 
11. (U) PDAS Witten cleared this cable. 
 
JOHN