VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHYN #1278/01 2011348
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 201348Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY SANAA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2315
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0195
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 1649
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

S E C R E T SANAA 001278 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ARP:AMACDONALD 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDRG PTER YM
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT SALEH PRESSES FOR VISIT TO WASHINGTON 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Stephen A. Seche for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (S)  A clearly agitated President Saleh complained to the 
Ambassador July 20 that it was a negative recommendation from 
Embassy Sana'a that was preventing the White House from 
extending an invitation to him for an official visit with 
President Obama.  The Ambassador clarified to Saleh that his 
recommendation has been, and remains, that the visit should 
be scheduled at a moment that will allow the two presidents 
to highlight  the success of our bilateral relations in key 
areas such as counter-terrorism, and political and economic 
reform.     Noting that he will travel to France in 10 days, 
Saleh pressed for an answer from the White House as to 
whether he should plan on adding Washington to his itinerary. 
 End Summary. 
 
¶2.  (S)  During a very spirited discussion that lasted nearly 
30 minutes, President Saleh and the Ambassador spoke candidly 
about internal crises in Yemen confronting his government, 
and what the USG contribution to solving these crises should 
be. The Ambassador began the meeting by noting President 
Obama's continued desire to welcome Saleh to the White House, 
and our continued gratitude to Saleh for his cooperation on 
the disposition of Yemeni GTMO detainees.  The key question, 
the Ambassador stated, was to identify the most appropriate 
time for the visit, to maximize its positive impact and 
further our bilateral goals.  At that point, Saleh launched 
somewhat inexplicably  into extended criticism of the Yemeni 
opposition and US Embassy contacts with it, claiming that 
the Embassy accepts unquestioningly the view of the 
opposition and reports it back to Washington unchallenged. 
Saleh asserted:  "I gave the opposition its legitimacy and I 
can take it away from them."  The Ambassador reminded the 
President that it was his responsibility and that of his 
Embassy to engage both the ruling party and the opposition. 
He added that the President seemed to be under the 
misapprehension that US Embassy officials met with the 
opposition to encourage them to create problems for the 
government; on the contrary, the Ambassador said, "we 
encourage them to find a way to participate fully in the 
political process in this country in order to benefit the 
people of Yemen." 
 
¶3.  (S)  Saleh then stated that "I have heard from Washington 
that you (the Ambassador) have recommended against my 
visiting at this time" because of unhappiness with the way 
the President is managing the internal problems facing the 
country.  The Ambassador said a Presidential visit to 
Washington without some clear progress on key issues would 
likely mobilize Saleh's critics and generate a negative 
environment that would benefit neither government, nor the 
bilateral relationship.  Saleh asked for an example of where 
progress was needed, and the Ambassador suggested a 
successful operation against Al Qaeda in the Arabian 
Peninsula would be welcome.  The President responded sharply 
that his government has invited the USG to come into Yemen 
and support operations against senior AQAP leadership 
figures.  The Ambassador said that we are cooperating closely 
with ROYG security services on such operations at present and 
continuing intensive training of these services so they can 
act effectively against terrorist organizations.   Saleh said 
he couldn't understand why we were "suspicious" of Yemen's 
commitment to the counter-terrorism, noting that Yemen 
suffers far more than the United States as a result of it. 
The Ambassador said:  "I'm not suspicious.  I'm simply 
impatient, as I know you are," for results. 
 
¶4.  (S)  Saleh identified counter-terrorism cooperation as 
one of the three subjects he wanted to discuss with President 
Obama.  The other two were: 
 
*     GTMO detainees:  Saleh said that it was up to the USG 
to decide what it wants to do with Yemeni detainees ) return 
them to Yemen or convince the Saudis to take them.  He 
pressed, however, for funding, from either our government or 
the Saudi government ) for a rehabilitation facility, noting 
that he was willing to place the detainees in a "hotel" until 
the facility was ready to house them permanently.  The 
Ambassador replied that he respectfully disagreed with he the 
President's suggestion, raised during their last meeting, to 
use the grounds of the former US Embassy in downtown Sanaa 
(now under renovation as a boutique hotel) as a facility for 
returning detainees, noting that an earlier proposal to use 
an abandoned military base near Aden seemed far more 
appropriate.   The Ambassador also noted that he has been 
pressing for a decision on the funding for a Yemeni 
rehabilitation facility and hoped that ongoing discussions in 
Washington would produce one soon. 
* Political  reform:  Saleh insisted, as he has before,  that 
the Southern Movement is under control, and that the ROYG 
recognizes the need to devolve authority to the individual 
governorates.   The Ambassador proposed an additional subject 
for discussion in Washington: 
* Economic revitalization:  The Ambassador asserted that the 
international donor community is looking to the President for 
direction in this key area.  "We want to undertake 
initiatives that will stabilize your economy, address the 
issue of unemployment, but we need you and your government to 
identify for us those areas where we should be focusing our 
assistance."   In response, Saleh asked that the USG 
intervene with GCC countries to encourage them to accept more 
Yemeni workers, noting the salutary effect this would have on 
Yemen's unemployment problem. 
 
¶5.  (S)  As the conversation drew to a close, the President 
said that he will be travelling to France in 10 days to 
discuss with the GOF the ongoing investigation into the crash 
of the Yemenia Air flight near the Comoros Islands on June 
30, and sales of liquefied natural gas once Yemen exports 
begin.  (Comment.  It is unclear what the president has in 
mind in this second instance, since contracts already exist 
for export of LNG from Yemen over the next 20 years to South 
Korea and the United States.  End comment.)  He said he would 
postpone his trip to Paris and go first to Washington if that 
was the preference of the Obama Administration.  The 
Ambassador promised to convey his message to Washington and 
return with a response as quickly as one was received.  Saleh 
said as the Ambassador departed, "if I don't go (to 
Washington) now, I will never go." 
 
¶6.  (S)  Comment.  This Embassy has made no bones about the 
fact that it believes that it would be a mistake to invite 
Saleh to the White House before he demonstrates a serious 
resolve to address the multiple internal challenges he 
confronts at the moment.  It is quite easy to imagine that 
Yemen's Ambassador to Washington is the individual 
responsible for passing this message back to President Saleh, 
although that does beg the question as to how Ambassador 
al-Hajjri learned of Embassy Sanaa's  view.   All that aside, 
we still believe it would be a mistake to reward Saleh for 
his inactivity in the face of serious internal crises by 
inviting him to Washington at this time.  We don't take his 
threat to "never" travel to Washington seriously, and believe 
he will accept the invitation when and if we extend it.  End 
Comment. 
SECHE