VZCZCXRO4341
PP RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR
DE RUEHRH #0903/01 1911352
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 101352Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1141
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000903 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, EEB/ESC/IEC(SULLIVAN), AND INR/EC(WOOD) 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/08/2019 
TAGS: EPET ENRG PREL OVIP OPEC SA
SUBJECT: SAUDI OPEC GOVERNOR PROVIDES CODEL TOUR D'HORIZON 
 
Classified By: DCM David Rundell, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary and comment:  Congressman Alan Grayson 
(D-FL) met OPEC governor for Saudi Arabia Dr. Majid Al-Moneef 
with DCM June 29.  Moneef provided an unusually detailed tour 
d'horizon of his views on the oil business and OPEC.  He 
expressed satisfaction that the price of oil was moving back 
up towards the $70 - $80 range Saudi leaders say they 
consider fair, although he noted with mild amazement that the 
Kingdom's excess production capacity has risen from its 
longtime target of 1.5 - 2 million barrels of oil per day to 
around 4 million.  Overall the U.S.-educated OPEC governor 
seemed confident but not complacent about the health of his 
country's most important economic sector.  End summary and 
comment. 
 
OPEC GOVERNOR BRIEFS CONGRESSMAN 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Congressman Alan Grayson introduced himself to Saudi 
OPEC governor Dr Majid Al-Moneef as a member of the House 
Financial Services Committee, saying he long had been 
interested in Saudi Arabia and energy and was pleased to 
visit the country as part of his first official visit abroad. 
 
SAUDI ENERGY POLICY: MAINTAIN 
EXCESS PRODUCTION CAPACITY 
----------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Moneef said that the Kingdom was "important" not 
just because of its vast oil reserves and huge production but 
because of the ability it had demonstrated over many years to 
increase production capacity while international demand has 
grown.  The Kingdom, he said, has been able to avoid 
political and technical problems that have hampered 
production in other oil producing countries, allowing it to 
provide needed increments when others could not. 
 
¶4. (C) Moneef explained that the fundamental tenet of Saudi 
Arabia's energy policy for decades has been to maintain a 1.5 
to 2 million barrels of oil per day (mbpd) excess production 
capacity.  He said the Kingdom's excess production capacity 
today is approximately 4 mbpd, with current production around 
8 mbpd.  Comparing this large surplus to the country's 
average daily production in the 1980s, which he described as 
"around 5" mbpd revealed just how large this idle capacity 
is, and how expensive it is to maintain.  Nevertheless, he 
explained, "We were able to use our spare capacity during the 
Iranian revolution, the Iran-Iraq war, the Iraq-Kuwait war, 
and the turmoil in Venezuela in 2003" to stabilize oil 
markets.  He said the secret of Saudi success was to continue 
building and maintaining additional production capacity even 
when demand has fallen.  He emphasized, "We don't mothball," 
and to the contrary, he said, Saudi Arabia is the "Federal 
Reserve of oil." 
 
¶5. (C) Financial Services Committee Professional Staff Member 
Dennis Shaul asked how much of the current 4 mbpd excess 
production capacity was heavier grades of crude.  Moneef 
replied that overall 65% of Saudi crude produced was Arab 
Light, and the country sought to maintain this ratio, even 
last year when it cut production relatively deeply.  Only if 
it attempted to produce at levels approaching its maximum 
sustained production capacity would that ratio begin to shift 
significantly in the direction of heavier grades of crude, 
Moneef said.  He concluded that although current Saudi policy 
means the Kingdom is stuck with 4 mbpd excess production 
capacity "slack,... at least we have it." 
 
OPEC DECISIONMAKING 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (SBU) Asked if it was harder for OPEC to agree on 
production increases or decreases, Moneef explained that most 
OPEC members were producing at or near their marginal 
capacity, and Saudi Arabia was one of the few countries that 
still had flexibility on production decisions.  Consequently, 
the Kingdom had increased production from 2002 to 2008 while 
other countries had been unable to do so.  Nevertheless, 
decreasing production was hard for most other OPEC members, 
since they did not have the Kingdom's fiscal discipline or 
financial freedom to reduce oil sales voluntarily.  Moneef 
said most OPEC members were willing to increase production, 
"even Angola and Libya," but in general terms, investment in 
these countries has been insufficient. 
 
¶7. (C) Asked which countries were hardliners within OPEC (in 
terms of opposing production increases), Moneef replied that 
this had changed over time; however, in addition to Iran and 
Venezuela, which he said both were "happy to see oil at 
$100," Libya increasingly was joining the hardliners' camp as 
a vocal opponent of proposals to increase production.  Saudi 
Arabia, he claimed, frequently had to remind other members 
that the agreement that founded OPEC set an objective to keep 
the oil market balanced, and not to maximize prices. 
 
¶8. (C) When asked about quotas, Moneef replied that OPEC 
meetings result in decisions on production levels but do not 
impose quotas.  He told the Congressman that OPEC identified 
production targets for its members by studying world demand 
and production among non-OPEC members and then allocating 
production for members at levels that in theory would fulfill 
the residual demand.  Asked if therefore OPEC production 
deliberations occurred "automatically," Moneef replied, "In 
practice, yes, but coordination and meetings remain 
necessary."  He continued, "The market does not work on its 
own.  When we want to increase production, we talk to our 
customers and call an OPEC meeting...  There's a decision 
element to it."  Asked which member countries had outlooks 
similar to the Saudis within OPEC.  Moneef cited the GCC, as 
well as "Nigeria, sort of." 
 
GOVERNOR SAYS INTERNATIONAL DEMAND 
SHAPES SAUDI PRODUCTION AND PRICING 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Moneef said that in early 2008 when oil prices were 
soaring to record levels, demand was falling, and although 
current demand for oil has recovered somewhat from when it 
"tanked" later in 2008, it still remains "below 2008 levels." 
 The OPEC Governor estimated that overall there had been a 
3.2 mbpd decrease in demand.  Chinese demand for oil was up 
significantly, with U.S. demand up somewhat less.  Moneef 
said that U.S. requests had declined from mid-2008 to May 
2009 but now were picking up.  He said incremental demand was 
expected to mainly be from China, and to a lesser extent the 
U.S. but that European demand for Saudi crude was expected to 
drop. 
 
¶10. (C) Moneef said the price formula that Saudi Aramco sent 
its customers had resulted in fewer requests (in Aramco 
parlance, "nominations") for Saudi oil.  As a result, the 
OPEC governor said, the Saudis cut production 1.7 mbpd and 
the rest of the reduced demand had been absorbed by 
production cuts in other countries.  Moneef asserted that 
Saudi Arabia does not typically "cut production" but instead 
raises prices to reduce demand.  Aramco customers, he said, 
mainly want Arab Light oil, and often they are reluctant to 
buy the medium/heavy oil that the Saudis sell in addition to 
higher grade product.  However, he said over the past two 
months, nominations had gotten "better, much better." 
 
¶11. (C) Moneef predicted that the current 2.5 mbpd reduction 
in international demand would not persist, since it was due 
to the international financial crisis, which he said would be 
over in a few years.  Chinese demand in particular would pick 
up soon.  Nevertheless, in 10 or 15 years oil prices would 
return to record levels set last year.  European production 
was declining.  Maybe Abu Dhabi could increase somewhat, and 
the Iraqis even more.  Russia would not increase production. 
Brazil would be able to increase production further by 
exploiting unconventional and deep-sea reserves. 
 
¶12. (C) Asked whether it was true Saudi oil only cost $1-2 
per barrel to produce (excluding indirect costs), Moneef 
emphasized that Aramco's costs had increased significantly in 
recent years.  Operating costs were higher (labor, materials, 
and technology), and it was necessary to drill more 
development wells than before.  The cost to bring each new 
barrel of oil to market, he said, had grown much more 
expensive.  Development costs for the Shayba field in the 
Saudi Empty Quarter had cost $5K/barrel, which he estimated 
translated to $5 billion overall.  In any case, Saudi 
marginal production costs for petroleum differ by field.  The 
Khurais field brought back on stream had been producing 
before and therefore production infrastructure already was in 
place.  In contrast, the isolated Shayba field in the 
Kingdom's barren southeastern Empty Quarter had double or 
even triple the operating cost.  Although capital costs were 
increasing, the OPEC governor acknowledged that Saudi "and 
someday Iraqi" oil still had the lowest production costs of 
any country. 
 
¶13. (C) Asked what oil price Saudi Arabia assumed for 
planning, Moneef said the Finance Ministry and MinPet used 
separate numbers and for the latter the estimates varied over 
time.  The 2004 MinPet price plan assumed $40/barrel, he 
said.  Assumptions for the Manifa field were "higher," while 
the price for Shayba had been based on a conservative price 
of $15-18/barrel.  Asked for Saudi oil's break even price, 
Moneef said that last year the Saudi budget assumption was 
$45/barrel, but that was based on the government running a 
"small" deficit.  For a balanced budget, he said the price 
would need to be $55/barrel. 
 
DECLINE RATES AND PEAK OIL 
-------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) Asked about the peak oil theory, Moneef said the 
decline rate for Saudi oil fields averaged 4% for the 
Kingdom, compared to 6-8% worldwide.  He said "peak oil 
exists since petroleum is a depletable resource but the peak 
is not around the corner.  Maybe 10-20 years from now.  The 
UK has peaked already but most OPEC members have not. 
However, the important thing is it's not what's underground 
that counts for this.  Investment is what matters.  Also 
technology.  Saudi assessments of their reserves are much 
higher than they used to be."  He said Saudi Arabia used to 
think that its production would peak circa 1980-95 but this 
turned out to be "totally" inaccurate.  He concluded that 
"the human factor" remained the most important resource in 
the oil business. 
 
SPECULATION 
----------- 
 
¶15. (C) Moneef was asked for his views on the role 
speculation has played in "volatile" oil markets in recent 
years.  The Saudi OPEC governor noted that the fundamentals 
currently did not support wild price swings, while the close 
correlation with both falling value of the dollar against 
other currencies and the international crisis affect on oil 
prices was prima facie evidence of a link between these 
factors.  This happened along with a sharp increase in 
activity on energy markets.  Oil has become an investment 
medium, he said.  Moneef asserted that Saudi Arabia supports 
increased oversight of energy markets.  The Saudi government 
was happy to see steps taken to study strengthening 
regulations, he said, and there always were going to be 
geopolitical factors as well as fears of peak oil.  Now 
geopolitical fears were decreasing and/or have been factored 
into prices.  Moneef said the Saudi view was that speculation 
represented approximately $40 of the overall oil price when 
it was at its height.  Now that was lower.  He said the Saudi 
government was following this issue closely and considers 
improving transparency and communication to be two of the 
best actions that could be taken to reduce speculative 
volatility. 
 
¶16. (C) Asked what regulatory reforms the U.S. could 
institute in Moneef's view, to reduce impact of speculation 
on oil markets, he said transparency and cooperation amongst 
exchanges would be best.  Perhaps strong position limits.  He 
said the Saudis are watching discussion of this in the United 
States with great interest. 
 
TECHNOLOGY, RENEWABLES, AND THE FUTURE 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (C) On Saudi use of advanced technology in the oil 
sector, Moneef explained that from 1998 onwards, the Kingdom 
began using horizontal drilling and now was injecting water 
and in some cases gas to increase production.  He described 
how Saudi Arabia has been financing experiments in Canada on 
carbon capture and storage (CCS) on a project with Canada, 
Norway, the UK, and the Netherlands (called by others the 
"Four Kingdoms" project).  Moneef said the Saudi government 
also was "looking for" a CCS project to undertake in Saudi 
Arabia.  However, "We don't need it yet," he said.  (NB:  A 
senior International Oil Company executive posted to Riyadh 
told Econoff July 7 that the Saudis expected foreign firms to 
pay for any CCS projects implemented in the Kingdom.) 
 
¶18. (C) Moneef said that Saudi Arabia remains interested in 
solar energy and the King Abdullah University of Science and 
Technology (KAUST) opening in September was being built with 
solar panels for "heating and other" purposes.  However, the 
OPEC governor expressed skepticism about solar energy as a 
technology in general.  Although Saudi Arabia was working 
hard to develop its use of the technology further, he said, 
the technology remains uneconomical for the Kingdom while 
fossil energy remains so plentiful and cheap domestically. 
Asked about the break-even point for renewable energy 
sources, Moneef said U.S. biofuel began to make sense only 
with oil costing $80-90/barrel.  He estimated that oil 
costing $70 would make developing "some" tar sands and 
Brazil's deepwater oil reserves economical, "but not with oil 
at $40-50." 
 
¶19. (SBU) Asked whether the Saudi oil business would be 
fundamentally the same 50 years from now, Moneef said in 20 
years oil's share in the international energy mix will have 
declined.  He said he saw unconventional oil production 
increasing significantly around the world by 10-15 years from 
today.  Tar sands, heavy oil, and deep water production off 
the coasts of Brazil and West Africa will have begun to have 
a significant effect on the overall petroleum market, he 
said.  In Saudi Arabia, gas liquids likely would play a much 
more significant role in the future.  He estimated that 70% 
of future increments would be unconventional. 
 
FINANCE 
------- 
 
¶20. (C) Asked how Saudi Arabia financed energy projects, 
Moneef explained that upstream projects all were internally 
financed out of Aramco's budget.  In contrast, downstream 
projects were 60% borrowed and 40% equity, with joint 
ventures organized differently.  For example, he said, 
refinery construction projects typically were planned to have 
an internal rate of return of 14-15%.  When the financial 
crisis hit, Saudi Aramco and MinPet had reexamined pending 
refinery investments, including the Total refinery project 
(in the Eastern Province) aimed at sending refined products 
to Asia, and the Conoco refinery project (along the Red Sea) 
that was to supply product to the Mediterranean and other 
points West.  Luckily, he said, the previous $12 billion 
Conoco project's cost had dropped $2.4 billion.  This mainly 
was due to reducing material costs as many regional projects 
had been cancelled.  While the 2007 price of oil had averaged 
$70, he said, MinPet had assumed $50 for these projects.  On 
the Fujian refinery project in China, he said, Saudi 
investment had led to a doubling of capacity at the refinery, 
and there eventually would be a tripling of capacity. 
 
FUTURE OF SAUDI OIL SALES 
------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) Asked if the Saudis would consider participating in 
commodity markets directly (instead of dealing with 
established customers via nominations), Moneef said this 
would not happen.  Saudis view themselves as physical 
producers and sellers of petroleum, and if they sell directly 
into commodity markets, they will unduly affect prices and be 
blamed even more for high prices.  He emphasized, "We don't 
want to get involved in that."  Asked what was the "right 
price" of oil, Moneef said oil's price needs to provide 
sufficient revenue for producers and encourage investment, 
including in alternative energy sources.  Therefore the Saudi 
view was that it would be good for oil to be around $70. 
However, he reiterated that the Kingdom's main energy policy 
hinged not on price but on maintaining a 1.5 - 2 mbpd spare 
capacity, which he described as a mandate by the Kingdom's 
most senior policymakers for the past 30 years. 
 
NOPEC 
----- 
 
¶22. (C) Moneef mentioned the recurring U.S. draft NOPEC 
legislation as an example of an issue that would be 
considered by the Saudi economic deputies committee of the 
Saudi Supreme Economic Council (described septel).  In 
addition to MinPet Assistant Minister for Petroleum Affairs 
HRH Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman, who is a regular Post 
interlocutor on this issue, Moneef said MFA Under Secretary 
for Economic and Cultural Affairs Yousef Saadon and Deputy 
Minister of Finance for Economic Affairs Hamad Al-Baz'y were 
key players.  He also mentioned Abdulrahman Abdulkarim 
(counselor to Oil Minister Naimi, with rank equivalent to 
Deputy Minister) as a key player in NOPEC discussions. 
 
¶23. (C) Moneef was asked how Saudis set compensation for 
energy sector personnel.  Why not sharply increase salaries, 
and how were they set?  Moneef said Aramco had faced 
significant employee attrition a few years ago, mainly to the 
financial sector.  It updated its survey of "similar 
employers," looking at (among others) banks and the country's 
petrochemical giant SABIC.  Aramco updated the survey, 
adjusted salaries, and now tries to "stay a little ahead" of 
other firms in terms of salaries.  He joked that the 
financial sector no longer was luring away candidates (thanks 
to the financial crisis). 
 
¶24. (U) Congressman Grayson did not have the opportunity to 
clear this telegram. 
ERDMAN