VZCZCXYZ0001
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHBUL #2103/01 2101619
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291619Z JUL 09 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0428
INFO RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 7637

UNCLAS KABUL 002103 
 
FOR the Secretary from Ambassador Eikenberry 
 
CENTCOM FOR COMMANDER AND ALSO CSTC-A, USFOR-A 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EAID ABUD AFIN AF
SUBJECT: ADDITIONAL FY 2010 BUDGET REQUIREMENTS FOR AFGHANISTAN 
 
REF: A) KABUL 1762, B) KABUL 1776 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY. Madame Secretary: Embassy Kabul has concluded a 
rigorous analysis of U.S. Government civilian assistance programs 
required to effectively implement the President's strategy for 
Afghanistan and Pakistan.  Success will be contingent upon balanced 
gains in the fields of security, economic development and 
governance.  Based upon our review, we have determined that 
additional resources totaling $2.515 billion are required beyond 
currently available funds and funds already requested in Fiscal Year 
(FY) 2010 if we are to show progress over the next 14 months.  Our 
estimated need for additional civilian staffing has been sent 
separately (reftel A).  We have provided a detailed expl 
anation of 
the additional requirements separately to Deputy Secretary Lew, to 
the Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan (SRAP) 
Ambassador Holbrooke, and to the Acting Director of Foreign 
Assistance (F). END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) In implementing the President's strategy for Afghanistan, 
we have adopted an array of innovative tools and approaches (reftel 
B).  Additionally, we have rigorously examined the resources 
required to make substantial progress over the next 14 months. 
 
¶3.  (SBU) In undertaking our analysis, we calculated that success 
will be measured by how well we: 1) rapidly shift U.S. assistance to 
support counterinsurgency efforts in the South and East; 2) 
implement an aggressive agricultural strategy that will stimulate 
rural economies and increase incomes and jobs; 3) build the 
credibility of the Afghan government by channeling more funding 
through their most capable ministries and "Afghanize" our assistance 
programs by including many more Afghans in program design and 
implementation, among other steps; and 4) target more U.S. 
assistance to the provincial and district level through smaller, 
more flexible contracts enabled by our rapidly expanding civilian 
presence outside of Kabul. 
 
¶4. (SBU) We have determined that the following additions to our FY 
2010 budget are needed to implement the President's strategy: 
 
a.) (SBU) As the military increases its counterinsurgency campaign 
in southern and eastern Afghanistan, we require an additional $521 
million for targeted stabilization programs in areas of conflict. 
 
b.) (SBU) An expanded program in agriculture ($572 million increase) 
and economic growth ($106 million increase) will further stimulate 
the creation of jobs in the licit economy and provide economic 
opportunity for the Afghan people. 
 
c.) (SBU) Additional funding ($190 million) for roads, vertical 
structures (e.g. school buildings), and civil aviation is critical 
to provide the infrastructure that permits economic growth. 
 
d.) (SBU) The continued development of the justice and law 
enforcement sectors ($221.4 million increase) is essential to 
provide an alternative to an inhumane but rapid "Taliban justice" 
and to inspire confidence in Afghan government institutions. 
 
e.) (SBU) Additional funding for national and sub-national 
governance programs ($194.9 million increase) will accelerate our 
efforts to build Afghan capacity to fulfill the basic 
responsibilities of government and should improve popular 
perceptions of the Afghan government. 
 
f.) (SBU) We must accelerate our efforts to "Afghanize" our foreign 
assistance through increased funding for the World Bank-managed 
Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund ($450 million) and through 
direct budget support ($190 million), which will place increased 
responsibility on the Afghan government to deliver basic services to 
the Afghan people. 
 
g.) (SBU) Finally, we are requesting additional funding ($70 
million) for community-based demining programs. 
 
¶5. (SBU) The funding requested above ($2.515 billion in total) is in 
addition to currently available funds and to the President's FY 2010 
base budget request that is now under consideration by Congress. 
Though we will seek additional funding for other sectors in FY 2011 
(including power, health, education, strategic communications, 
counter-narcotics and civil society), we believe that we have 
sufficient funding for FY 2009-2010 in these sectors.   Available 
and anticipated funds for Afghanistan are $6.9 billion, which 
includes the existing pipeline (estimated at $1.5 billion), FY 2009 
appropriations ($2.6 billion) and the request level in the FY 2010 
Congressional Budget Justification ($2.8 billion).  We have 
calculated all the existing funding streams into our request. 
 
------------------------ 
BACKGROUND & METHODOLOGY 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (SBU) We have developed this budget proposal through intensive 
collaboration with Deputy Secretary Jacob Lew, Acting Director of 
Foreign Assistance Richard Greene, and SRAP Ambassador Holbrooke and 
their teams.  We have reasoned that we must accept the challenge of 
managing substantially higher amounts of funds in order to realize 
the strategic gains required over the next 14 months.  We have 
focused our budget requirements on priorities that also incorporate 
innovative approaches and new operational models for managing these 
increased funds.  For example, we will provide direct budget support 
to the Afghan government and increased funding for the World 
Bank-managed Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) that do 
not require significant increases in USG management because 
appropriate compliance and oversight mechanisms are already in 
place.  New stabilization programs will be accompanied by large 
increases in personnel and the introduction of USAID's Office of 
Transition Initiatives' (OTI) expertise.  We will introduce direct 
assistance for agriculture, extend a large and successful 
agricultural voucher program, and expand U.S. Department of 
Agriculture's presence and programs, which will accelerate our 
expenditures of funds.  We are also pursuing increased managerial 
flexibilities and decentralized authorities to allow us to move more 
rapidly.  We will continue to work closely with the Special 
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) and other 
Inspectors General to help assure accountability and effectiveness 
(reftel B). 
 
¶7.  (SBU) This prioritized request for additional resources 
represents a 91 percent increase above the original 2010 request of 
$2.767 billion.  We understand that there are serious competing 
budget needs, but I know you demand our best judgment of the budget 
and staffing levels required for success in the months ahead. 
 
¶8.  (SBU) If the additional resources are unavailable, we will 
reassess what we can achieve.  Meanwhile, we have embarked on 
programs possible with our existing funds, including the pipeline, 
as well as funds anticipated in FY2010.  We have refocused 
stabilization and agriculture activities in priority districts to 
support the counterinsurgency strategy (COIN); with additional 
FY2010 funding, we could increase the number of districts covered 
and the depth of our assistance.  We will provide modest increases 
to our contributions to the Afghan government, the ARTF and the 
National Solidarity Program; with additional FY2010 funding, we 
could increase these contributions and more effectively build the 
capacity and credibility of the Afghan government.  With additional 
FY2010 resources, the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement (INL) would be able to increase our funding for critical 
programs in the justice and corrections sectors, two areas central 
to improving the rule of law and the perception of access to justice 
in Afghanistan.  Similarly, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) could build capacity in the civil aviation sector and begin to 
install surveillance and air-to-ground communication systems is 
necessary to improve the air traffic system safety and to increase 
civilian and military traffic. 
 
----------- 
ASSUMPTIONS 
----------- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) During our rigorous review, we made the following 
assumptions, all of which will be feasible but challenging to 
obtain: 
 
-- a.) (SBU) We will be able to recruit and fully staff the selected 
programs (Stabilization, Agriculture, Governance, and Economic 
Growth.). 
 
-- b.) (SBU) Collaborating with agency headquarters, we will 
streamline current USG processes for approval of new programs and 
reprogramming of resources, requiring a proper balance of risk 
versus benefit.  At the field level, we will enhance our own 
measures of risk mitigation and accountability, including rigorous 
annual performance reviews, increased levels of civilian oversight 
of contractors, and close coordination with SIGAR and other 
Inspectors General. 
 
-- c.) (SBU) The Department will also seek substantial levels of 
funding resources in the FY 2011 budget for areas such as power, 
education and health, for which we are not including additional 
FY2010 requests. 
-- d.) (SBU) Sufficient mobility and force protection 
will be 
available to program implementers in the field.  Given current 
conditions, security costs can be as much as 40 percent of project 
costs in areas of violent conflict and post-conflict areas. 
 
-- e.) (SBU) The upcoming August 2009 elections will not result in a 
significant decrease in the capabilities and willingness of Afghan 
officials to cooperate with us on the implementation of our foreign 
assistance programs. 
 
¶10.  (SBU) Additional FY 2010 funding would increase effort in those 
areas prioritized under 
 the Administration's new strategy, 
prioritize support for Afghan-led capacity building efforts at all 
levels, focus on COIN regionally, increase local procurement 
initiatives, and channel increased funding through the Afghan 
national budget. 
 
---------- 
CONCLUSION 
---------- 
 
¶11.  (SBU) All agencies at post are now working together under a 
whole-of-government approach to achieve the goals specified in the 
Administration's strategy: we are working as teams, not 
individualized agencies.  We are collaborating across our Country 
Team to integrate population security with building effective local 
governance, economic development, and sustainability.  Likewise, we 
also are cooperating closely with US Forces/Afghanistan and 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), with our coalition 
partners, with international organizations, and especially with our 
hosts, the government of Afghanistan, and Afghan civil society 
leaders.  We believe that the newly requested funding is vital to 
the success of the President's strategy over the next 14 months and 
that we can use it efficiently and responsibly.  I ask for your 
support, and stand ready to discuss our proposal with you further at 
your pleasure. 
 
 
EIKENBERRY