VZCZCXRO5941
PP RUEHGI
DE RUEHGI #0155/01 1891149
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P R 081149Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY BANGUI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0980
INFO RUEHAB/AMEMBASSY ABIDJAN 0007
RUEHKH/AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM 0286
RUEHKI/AMEMBASSY KINSHASA 0296
RUEHLC/AMEMBASSY LIBREVILLE 0197
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0141
RUEHNR/AMEMBASSY NAIROBI 0141
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0476
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0462
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0128
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0458
RUEHGI/AMEMBASSY BANGUI 1236

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGUI 000155 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/C 
USUN FOR DMUERS 
PARIS FOR RKANEDA 
LONDON FOR PLORD 
AFRICOM FOR JKUGEL 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM PINR CT
SUBJECT: NDELE REMAINS THE LOCUS OF THE THREATS TO THE CARG 
 
REF: A. (09 BANGUI 152) 
     ¶B. (09 N'DJAMENA 247). 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: Ndele, Central African Republic (CAR) remains 
the locus of a serious threat to Central African political 
stability. While the Northeast and west maintain their violent 
potential, the Patriotic Convention for Justice and Peace 
(CPJP)goes into the rainy season increasingly political, 
reinforced by the dissident elements of the Democratic Front for 
the Central African People (FDPC), and unengaged politically by 
the Central African Government (CARG). As such, unless they are 
forcefully engaged in the coming months, the CPJP may indeed 
pose the single greatest threat to the CARG. END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (SBU) As noted in previous reporting, the CPJP remains a 
largely unknown entity. The CPJP was originally said to be made 
up of UFDR members of the Rounga tribe who broke with the Goula 
dominated UFDR after being expelled from the diamond fields near 
Sam Ouandja. The Sultan/Mayor of Ndele (Consider source: The 
Sultan is distrusted by Bangui as a Rounga sympathizer.) 
maintains that there are former elements of the Presidential 
Guard in the CPJP, but is not clear to us if this means that 
they are political leaders or merely military advisors/trainers. 
Former Minister of Defense, Charles Massi has declared himself 
to be the spokesman of the group, but as his home is in the 
extreme west of the country and he has no previous engagement in 
the Ndele region, his role and importance are not clear In any 
case, while Massi is currently languishing in a Chadian jail as 
of early June 2009, the CPJP remains very active. Political 
commentators from the Birao area tell us that this group is not 
connected in any way with the Kara/Gouala conflict in the Birao 
area. 
 
¶3. (SBU) On June 13, the Central African Army (FACA) was 
ambushed by the CPJP on the road from Ndele to the Chadian 
border and lost at least three soldiers. (Independent, 
unconfirmed reports claim that the FACA left several additional 
dead on the field.) While an immediate move towards Ndele is 
always possible, a move towards Bangui, grows increasingly 
remote by the day as the roads turn into muddy quagmires with 
the rains. Also, as of now, the CPJP do not appear to have the 
motorized capacity to set off on the road to Bangui. They do not 
appear to have the political interest either. Thus, they will 
mostly likely settle for a compromise solution, such as renewed 
access to diamond mines taken by the Goula of the Union of 
United of Democratic Forces (UFDR) after the CARG/UFDR accords 
of 2007. Yet, the time off during the rainy season could give 
them occasion to conjure up bigger dreams. While Post believes 
the former to be most likely, the later scenario cannot be 
counted out. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Multiple sources have informed Post that despite a 
peace deal agreed to between Abdoulaye Miskine of the FDPC and 
the CARG, dissident members of his group have set out to join 
the CPJP. Post estimates that ten to fifty members of the FDPC 
headed out on foot to Ndele in the last month to join the CPJP, 
probably as guns for hire, though possibly for ideological 
reasons. The later would be troubling and lend credence to the 
theory that the CPJP are not hoodlums looking to be demobilized 
and paid (Bangui 124) but may instead feel they have legitimate 
grievances against the CARG - making them all the more 
dangerous. Thus, while President Bozize has scored a reasonable 
political victory in decommissioning the troublesome FDPC, not 
all of Miskine's soldiers will go quietly and the CPJP, already 
the major menace to the CARG, may be stronger for it. 
 
¶5. (SBU) A meeting with the French Defense Attache (PROTECT) on 
June 23, 2009 brought to light a development which, if true, 
could change the entire balance of power in the CAR. On June 7, 
the ANT (Chadian Army) stopped two, of what is thought to have 
been eight to ten, pickups carrying 120 AK-47s, two .50 caliber 
machine guns, ammunition, anti-personnel and anti-tank mines. 
AmEmbassy N'djamena was briefed by the Chad Government on the 
seizure and was told that the arms were destined for Chadian 
rebels (09 N'Djamena 247). But French INTEL now says that half 
of the weaponry was destined for the CAR (being that they were 
stopped in Bahr Keita, Chad, after crossing Central African 
 
BANGUI 00000155  002 OF 002 
 
 
territory north of Birao, it seems logical that the weapons are 
heading for the CPJP north of Ndele). The DATT was very 
perturbed by this possibility because he said that there are now 
not more than 120 AK-47's between the rebels in Birao and North 
of Ndele and that this would signal a surge in combat 
capability. He further speculated that the financing and origin 
of the arms were probably two pronged - some money coming from 
Khartoum, but he also suspects that the Chadian rebels are 
trying to create instability in both northern CAR and southern 
Chad to ease ANT pressure upon them in Eastern Chad. Furthermore 
the ethnicities of the region cross the CAR/Chad border and 
therefore the CPJP may be receiving aid due to clan ties as 
well. 
 
¶6. (SBU) On June 13 the Ambassador met with Minister of 
Equipment Samba-Panza, the ``Ministre Resident'' of the Ndele 
region, prior to the latter's visit to Ndele. Ambassador shared 
observations from his own trip to the region in February and 
asked for the Minister's views upon his return. On July 2, Samba 
Panza told the Ambassador and visiting CAR Desk Officer that: 
 
-- He had warned the local FACA to cease physical threats 
against the Sultan. He stressed that there must be no incidents 
during or after his visit (Note: The FACA are going house to 
house in the Rounga neighborhoods searching for arms and 
arresting ``rebels''). 
 
-- The Sultan has applied to President Bozize for permission to 
come to Bangui and discuss the situation. 
 
Samba-Panza is generally well regarded and was Minstre Resident 
for Ndele once before. His visit could provide the CARG with an 
opening for political engagement. He told the Ambassador that he 
believes that the President will meet the Sultan. 
 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT: Recently, a very well informed Embassy source 
said he has solid evidence of ANT/FACA cooperation between 
Golongoso and Nanga, northwest of Ndele. Another source said 
there has been an uptick of Chadian Gendarmerie presence along 
the border north of Ndele. This is promising for the CARG if 
true, for there have been other signs that Bozize has recognized 
the threats to him and is trying to act: 
 
-- A mediation team sent to Birao (09 Bangui 152). 
-- The peace accord concluded with Miskine and the FDPC. 
-- A shakeup in the Presidential Guard with a respected colonel 
taking its reins. 
 
But Post still believes that Bozize faces in the CPJP a much 
tougher challenge than he can solve militarily. He must become 
an honest arbiter between the troublesome ethnicities and groups 
of the North - from the APRD to the UFDR - and deliver to them 
not only short term infusions of cash through demobilization 
efforts but long term development and leadership. Post has yet 
to see this level of statesmanship from the president and though 
he has made promising gambits, further optimism is not yet 
merited. END SUMMARY. 
COOK