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DE RUEHC #4643 1740215
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA IMMEDIATE 0000
INFO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0000

S E C R E T STATE 064643 
 
SIPDIS 
GENEVA FOR JCIC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2029 
TAGS: PARM PREL KACT KTIA START JCIC US RS
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE FOR U.S. DELEGATION TO U.S./RUSSIA 
NEGOTIATIONS ON START FOLLOW-ON TREATY, GENEVA, 
SWITZERLAND, JUNE 22-24, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 041125 
     ¶B. STATE 050911 
     ¶C. STATE 050910 
     ¶D. STATE 060343 
     ¶E. STATE 060487 
     ¶F. STATE 061832 
     ¶G. MOSCOW 01347 
     ¶H. GENEVA 00419 (SFO-GVA-I-007) 
 
Classified By: Rose Gottemoeller, VCI.  Reason:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (U) Assistant Secretary for Verification, Compliance, 
and Implementation, Rose Gottemoeller, is scheduled to 
head the U.S. delegation in continuing negotiations 
regarding a START follow-on treaty with Russian MFA 
Director of Security and Disarmament Affairs Anatoliy 
Antonov, in Geneva, Switzerland on June 22-24, 2009. 
 
¶2. (S) GUIDANCE: Delegation may draw from previous 
guidance and U.S. nonpapers (reftels) to discuss U.S. 
views relating to a START Follow-on treaty.  Delegation is 
authorized to reach ad referendum agreement on the text of 
a joint understanding for the July 6-8 U.S.-Russia Summit, 
containing the U.S. proposals in the draft Joint 
Understanding provided in Moscow (Ref E).  If agreement is 
not possible on a document containing these U.S. 
proposals, delegation should work to obtain a bracketed 
text with the Russian delegation framing the issues that 
prevent agreement.  Delegation should report on all 
meetings as expeditiously as possible. 
 
¶3. (S) GUIDANCE, continued:  To contribute to the 
discussion regarding a START Follow-on treaty, Delegation 
may provide the texts in paragraphs 4-10 below to the 
Russian Delegation in the form of non-papers.  Delegation 
should inform the Russian Delegation that these papers 
contain official U.S. responses to the Refs G and H papers 
that Russia provided in May and early June.  If asked 
whether the U.S. has a response to the Opening Remarks of 
the Russian Head of Delegation at the May 19 first plenary 
meeting, Delegation may state that the U.S. believes our 
response (Ref F) to the Russian Vision paper also 
addresses the points made in the May 19 Opening Remarks 
paper. 
 
¶4. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of 
U.S. response to Ref G para 17 Russian paper: 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
(Date) 
 
U.S. Response to the Russian Paper on "Procedures for 
Negotiations between the Russian and U.S. Delegations to 
Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement," dated May 20, 2009 
 
- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation 
paper from the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow entitled 
"Procedures for Negotiations between the Russian and U.S. 
Delegations to Draft a New START Follow-on Agreement." 
 
- The United States agrees with the proposals of the 
Russian Federation concerning the procedures for drafting 
the new agreement.  The United States notes, however, that 
it does not consider the procedures and examples provided 
by the Russian Federation to be exhaustive; additional or 
alternative procedures, meetings, and forms of documents 
may be adopted based on mutual agreement throughout the 
negotiating process. 
 
- The United States agrees that negotiations concerning 
the START Follow-on agreement will be held in confidence 
and the United States will protect the information 
provided to it by the Russian Federation, and will presume 
the same of the information it provides to the Russian 
Federation.  In this regard, the United States notes that 
some information presented to the Russian Federation by 
the United States may be marked SECRET, depending upon its 
classification level within the parameters of U.S. 
classification guidance. 
 
- The United States notes that, in response to Russian and 
U.S. inquiries, the Swiss authorities have already made an 
offer that would ensure that Heads and Members of 
delegations, as well as experts, translators, 
interpreters, and other personnel supporting this work 
will be able to obtain the necessary visas and status to 
conduct negotiations in Geneva. 
 
- The United States does not consider that this will in 
any way have an impact on the possibility of conducting 
meetings and negotiations in other locations, including 
Moscow, Washington, D.C., or other sites as mutually 
agreed. 
 
End text. 
 
¶5.  (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of 
U.S. response to Ref G para 18 Russian paper: 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
(Date) 
 
U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On 
Completion of Continuous Monitoring Activities at the 
Production Facility for Mobile ICBMs at Votkinsk," dated 
May 19, 2009 
 
 
- The United States has reviewed the Russian paper 
provided during the May 19, 2009, meeting in Moscow. 
 
- The United States believes, as stated in its non-paper 
of May 19, 2009, "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty," 
that perimeter and portal continuous monitoring is an 
example of existing verification provisions in the current 
START Treaty that should be carried forward in the new 
treaty. 
 
- Continuous portal monitoring at production facilities of 
ICBMs for mobile launchers was included in the START 
Treaty to assist both sides with the difficult task of 
verifying the number of mobile ICBMs that could be 
deployed in/on mobile launchers.  The United States views 
portal monitoring at production facilities of ICBMs for 
mobile launchers as an essential transparency and 
confidence building measure in the proposed START 
follow-on treaty.  On a reciprocal basis, the United 
States is willing to discuss additional verification 
measures to those START measures currently available that 
would help Russia assess U.S. strategic offensive systems 
that are identified in the START follow-on treaty. 
 
- As for the draft JCIC Agreement on Principles and 
Procedures for Completion of Continuous Monitoring 
Activities at the Monitored Facility at Votkinsk and the 
letters of exchange on the use of ground transportation 
and settlement of accounts in connection with this 
provided by the Russian Federation on January 26, 2009, 
the United States assures the Russian Federation that the 
United States has studied those documents but believes 
that it is premature to provide a response at this time. 
 
End text. 
 
¶6.  (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of 
U.S. response to Ref G para 21 Russian paper: 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
(Date) 
 
U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On U.S. Plans to Equip 
ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry 
Vehicles," dated May 20, 2009 
 
- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation 
paper entitled "On U.S. Plans to Equip ICBMs and SLBMs 
with Non-nuclear ("Conventional") Reentry Vehicles," which 
was provided at the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow. 
 
- The United States cannot agree to the Russian-proposed 
bans on ICBMs or SLBMs with non-nuclear warheads. 
 
- As the United States stated in its non-paper of May 19, 
2009, entitled "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty," 
non-nuclear warheads on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs would not 
count toward the operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warhead limits of the treaty. 
 
- The United States believes that appropriate verification 
measures could be developed for such deployed ICBMs and 
SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not deployed on 
systems declared to be for non-nuclear use. 
 
- As for the Russian Federation's suggestion that the term 
"warhead," as it is defined in the START Treaty, should be 
retained, the United States notes that, as was pointed out 
in the U.S. "Elements" paper of May 19, some terminology 
will need to be changed to meet the needs of the new 
treaty. 
 
End text. 
 
¶7.  (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of 
U.S. response to Ref G para 22 Russian paper: 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
(Date) 
 
U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On Security Guarantees 
for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties to the START Treaty 
(START) in connection with the Expiration of the Treaty," 
dated May 20, 2009 
 
- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation 
paper from the May 20, 2009, meeting in Moscow "On 
Security Guarantees for Non-Nuclear-Weapon States Parties 
to the START Treaty (START) in connection with the 
Expiration of the Treaty." 
 
- The United States recognizes the interests and proposals 
that have been put forward by Belarus, Kazakhstan, and 
Ukraine regarding extension of START, participation in the 
START Follow-on agreement, and obtaining reaffirmation of 
the security assurances provided in connection with their 
accession to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as 
non-nuclear weapons States. 
 
- In general, the United States agrees with the views 
expressed by the Russian Federation in its paper. 
Specifically, the United States agrees that the expiration 
of START does not affect the security assurances for 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine contained in the 1994 
Budapest Memoranda. 
 
- The United States believes it is important, however, to 
consider, together with the Russian Federation, approaches 
for recognizing the contributions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine in the area of nuclear disarmament while also 
recognizing that the United States and Russian Federation 
remain firmly committed to the security assurances that 
they have already provided, and that the expiration of the 
START Treaty does not affect these assurances in any way. 
 
- The United States is considering the Russian 
Federation's proposal to draft a joint Russian-U.S. 
statement.  In the context of START expiration, such a 
statement could reaffirm the security assurances provided 
in 1994 to Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. 
 
- In sum, the United States believes that it is necessary 
to address the interests and concerns expressed by 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in an approach that 
includes consultations between the United States and the 
Russian Federation.  We look forward to continued 
consultations on this subject.  This work should be 
conducted in parallel with our work on negotiating a 
bilateral agreement to replace the START Treaty, but it 
should not detract from it. 
 
End text. 
 
¶8.  (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of 
U.S. response to Ref G para 23 Russian paper: 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
(Date) 
 
U.S. Response to the Russian Paper "On the 
Interrelationship between Strategic Offensive and 
Strategic Defensive Arms," dated May 19, 2009 
 
- The United States has reviewed the Russian Federation 
paper from the First Plenary meeting on May 19, 2009, in 
Moscow "On the Interrelationship between Strategic 
Offensive and Strategic Defensive Arms." 
 
- The United States recognizes that the development of the 
new treaty concerning reductions and limitations in 
strategic offensive arms is directly tied to the national 
security interests of both the United States and the 
Russian Federation. 
 
- The United States acknowledges that the Russian 
Federation has concerns regarding U.S. missile defense 
programs.  The U.S. and Russia are addressing these 
concerns in a separate process. 
 
- As the sides draft the text for the new treaty, the 
United States will be willing to consider language Russia 
may propose for the preamble that includes a general 
reference to this interrelationship on the understanding 
that this would be the only reference to defensive arms in 
the new treaty. 
 
- The United States believes this reflects a practical 
approach for recognizing the interests of both countries 
within the parameters of a new treaty, the subject of 
which is reductions and limitations in strategic offensive 
arms, as agreed by our Presidents. 
 
End text. 
 
¶9.  (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of 
U.S. response to Ref G para 24 Russian paper: 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
(Date) 
 
U.S. Comments on the Russian Federation Paper "On the 
Intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to 
Participate in Working out the New Agreement to Replace 
the START Treaty," dated May 20, 2009 
 
- The United States has reviewed your paper from the May 
20, 2009, meeting in Moscow and again assures the Russian 
Federation that it has made clear to Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
and Ukraine its intention to pursue a bilateral agreement 
with Russia on further reductions in our strategic nuclear 
forces. 
 
- This commitment was confirmed in the April 1, 2009, 
joint statement issued by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in 
London. 
 
- The United States notes that it is studying the 
Ukrainian non-paper, "Ukraine's position in connection 
with expiration of the Treaty," provided at JCIC-XXXIV in 
Geneva on June 10, 2009.  We plan to respond to Ukraine 
through diplomatic channels.  We would be interested in 
hearing the Russian Federation's views on this paper. 
 
End text. 
 
¶10. (S/Releasable to the Russian Federation) Begin text of 
U.S. responses to Russian delegation questions presented 
in Ref H paper on June 2, 2009: 
 
U.S. Non-paper 
(Date) 
 
Responses To Questions of the Russian Side in Connection 
with the U.S. Paper "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty" 
of May 19, 2009 
 
Question 1.  Paragraph (e) of Section I, General 
Obligations and Objectives," says that the U.S. seeks to 
work cooperatively with Russian Federation to reduce 
strategic nuclear arsenals as part of our efforts to 
"strengthen deterrence for both sides" (the original 
reads: "strengthen deterrence for both sides"; the 
translation received from the U.S. delegation reads: 
"strengthen mutual deterrence").  We would ask the U.S. to 
explain in greater detail exactly what it means here.  Are 
we really talking about "mutual deterrence" or about 
deterrence in a "multilateral" context? 
 
Answer.  The primary purpose of nuclear weapons is to 
strengthen deterrence for both sides, and as we reduce the 
number of nuclear warheads, the reductions must not weaken 
our ability to deter but strengthen it on a global scale. 
The United States believes that strengthened deterrence 
for both sides will strengthen strategic stability.  The 
United States looks forward to hearing Russia's views on 
this idea. 
 
Question 2.  In Subsection A of Section II, "Central 
Limits and Counting Rules," the U.S. anticipates that a 
"small number of spare strategic nuclear warheads" would 
not be considered to be operationally deployed.  We would 
like to receive detailed explanations as to what portion 
of the total number of warheads could constitute the 
aforementioned "small number." 
 
Answer.  The United States continues to study this 
question and will provide a response at a later date. 
 
Question 3.  The same subsection provides for a "warhead 
limit" and goes on to say that "the central limit would be 
on operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads."  We 
would request clarification as to whether the U.S. side 
has in mind that besides the "central limit" on 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the new 
treaty could provide for some other limits on warheads, 
and if so, what warheads. 
 
Answer.  The U.S. answer to this question was provided in 
the U.S. non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW and the U.S.-proposed 
text of a joint understanding regarding the START 
Follow-on treaty.  One limit would be on the aggregate 
total of operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads 
for each nation.  The other limit would be on the 
aggregate total of deployed ICBMs and their associated 
launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, 
and deployed heavy bombers for each nation. 
 
Question 4.  Why does the U.S. use different approaches to 
counting warheads on ballistic missiles (ICBMs, SLBMs) and 
on heavy bombers? 
 
Answer.  The U.S. side's approach is drawn directly from 
the way it is implementing the Moscow Treaty.  The 
difference in treatment between ballistic missiles and 
bombers reflects a 1991 commitment the U.S. made and 
followed through on to remove heavy bombers from 
day-to-day alert status.  Neither the U.S. nor Russia 
routinely maintains ODSNW loaded on their deployed heavy 
bombers.  However, as SNDVs, deployed heavy bombers 
logically have associated ODSNW. 
 
Question 4a.  Specifically which facilities does the U.S. 
anticipate classifying as "a specified weapon storage area 
associated with or directly supporting a heavy bomber 
base" (Section II, Subsection A)? 
 
Answer.  The specified weapon storage areas (WSAs) would 
be agreed by the sides to identify WSA sites that would 
contain ODSNW for use by deployed heavy bombers.  This 
would include specified WSAs containing such ODSNW that 
are collocated with the deployed heavy bombers at the same 
base, as well as specified WSAs containing such ODSNW that 
are located apart from the air base. 
 
Question 5.  In Subsection B of Section II, the U.S. 
proposes establishing limits on deployed launchers of 
ICBMs, deployed launchers of SLBMs, and deployed heavy 
bombers.  We would request clarification as to the reason 
for this proposal, which provides for lumping together in 
the same limits deployed launchers for strategic delivery 
vehicles - ICBMs and SLBMs - and one of the types of 
delivery vehicles - heavy bombers. 
 
Answer.  The U.S. answer to this question was provided in 
the U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW of June 12, 2009. 
For strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. approach 
would continue to use the START conventions for counting 
deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed 
SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy 
bombers (subject to agreed changes for non-nuclear 
delivery systems and to reduce costs of eliminating 
launcher systems). 
 
Question 6.  Subsection B of Section II contains the 
wording "ICBMs and SLBMs tested for nuclear weapon 
delivery."  We would ask you to clarify the specifics of 
this wording, taking into account that according to the 
understanding between the Parties at the time the START 
Treaty was concluded, all their ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers subject to the Treaty are nuclear weapon delivery 
vehicles.  Does the U.S. side have in mind producing and 
testing new types of ICBMs and SLBMs in a non-nuclear 
configuration? 
 
Answer.  The United States believes the START Follow-on 
Treaty should limit ODSNWs and SNDVs, and the 
U.S.-proposed arms control measures would apply to these 
systems.  A system specifically developed for and tested 
for non-nuclear use will not be subject to treaty limits. 
 
Question 7.  We would ask you to provide a more detailed 
explanation as to what is meant by launchers "that are no 
longer capable of supporting operational ICBMs or SLBMs." 
What are the criteria the U.S. side intends to use to 
define the transfer of a launcher into this category? 
What are the criteria for "considerable time and expense"? 
 
Answer.  The U.S. answer to these questions was provided 
in the U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and ODSNW of June 12, 2009. 
Specific proposals may be captured under Conversion or 
Elimination text to be provided during negotiations. 
 
Question 8.  In the context of Subsection D of Section II, 
which deals with "deployment of non-nuclear warheads," the 
following question arises:  do technical methods of 
verification exist which would make it possible to 
guarantee that the other Party could identify that a 
reentry vehicle in flight is conventionally armed? 
 
Answer.  The United States believes that appropriate 
verification measures could be developed for such deployed 
ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that nuclear warheads are not 
deployed on systems declared to be for non-nuclear use. 
These verification measures would not be intended to apply 
to the discrimination of ICBMs or SLBMs in flight.  The 
United States believes that the sides could explore ways 
in which special launch notifications and related measures 
could mitigate Russian concerns. 
 
Question 9.  In the context of Subsection E of Section II, 
which deals with terminology:  Is a definition of the term 
"new type," for example, necessary if the new treaty does 
not provide for limitations applicable to ICBMs and SLBMs? 
 
Answer.  The terms that will apply in the new treaty will 
be subject to negotiation.  The United States presumes 
some terms from START would be carried forward and may 
require modification or adaptation. 
 
Question 10.  In Section IV, "Elimination," elimination 
procedures for only silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy 
bombers are cited as examples of elimination procedures. 
Does the U.S. side have in mind that in the new treaty the 
application of elimination procedures would be limited 
specifically to silo launchers and heavy bombers? 
 
Answer.  The examples cited by the United States - silo 
launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers - are illustrative 
but not necessarily complete.  The U.S. side does not 
exclude the possibility of simpler and less expensive 
elimination procedures for all SNDVs. 
 
Question 11.  Section V, "Notifications, Monitoring, and 
Verification," proposes retaining and adapting, "as 
appropriate," the main START Treaty provisions concerning 
data exchange, notifications, and inspections.  We would 
request clarification as to how the U.S. side intends to 
accomplish this task, given its approach that provides for 
rejecting the reduction and limitation of an aggregate 
number of ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
Answer.  The U.S. approach is to limit both SNDVs and 
ODSNW.  We propose retaining or adapting, as necessary, 
START provisions concerning data exchange, notifications, 
and inspections consistent with this approach.  This is a 
subject for discussion within the negotiations. 
 
Question 12.  Subsection C of Section V, which deals with 
verification, proposes adapting relevant START Treaty 
provisions for new treaty's requirements.  Since the U.S. 
position does not provide for reduction and limitation of 
the aggregate number of ICBMs, a question arises as to 
whether verification of ICBMs and SLBMs is necessary, 
especially in view of the fact that Russian ICBMs and 
SLBMs are maintained, stored, and transported either as 
assembled missiles without launch canisters or as 
assembled missiles in launch canisters, while U.S. 
missiles are maintained, stored, and transported in stages 
of such missiles. 
 
Answer.  The U.S. approach is to limit both SNDVs and 
ODSNW.  As such, many START verification provisions remain 
applicable.  This is a subject for discussion within the 
negotiations. 
 
Question 12a.  And if ICBMs and SLBMs are subject to 
verification, as the U.S. side proposes, then in that case 
what should be the goal of verification, given that 
counting of ICBMs and SLBMs is not envisaged? 
 
Answer.  As stated in the answer to question 3, the other 
limit, in addition to an ODSNW limit, would be on the 
aggregate total of deployed ICBMs and their associated 
launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, 
and deployed heavy bombers for each side.  The goal of 
verification is to verify that the aggregate number of 
ICBMs and their associated launchers, SLBMs and their 
associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers does not 
exceed the agreed limit.  The U.S. Non-paper on SNDV and 
ODSNW of June 12, 2009 clarifies that for strategic 
nuclear delivery vehicles, the U.S. approach would 
continue to use the START conventions for counting 
deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed 
SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy 
bombers. 
 
Question 12b.  In this context a question also arises as 
to the advisability of conducting exhibitions to confirm 
the relevant technical characteristics of ICBMs and SLBMs 
and exchanging telemetric information in connection with 
flight tests of these missiles -- in the absence of any 
qualitative limitations for these strategic delivery 
vehicles. 
 
Answer.  Exhibitions are valuable transparency and 
confidence building measures that afford a side the 
opportunity to observe that the declared relationship 
between an ICBM or SLBM and its associated launcher is 
accurate. 
 
Question 13.  Questions concerning Section VIII.  In the 
U.S. version, the duration of the Treaty is defined as 
5-10 years.  It is anticipated that the new levels will be 
reached in 3-5 years. Does the U.S. side envisage 
establishing a strict time line for phasing -- if phasing 
is provided for -- as is done in the START Treaty? 
 
Answer.  The U.S. side does not envisage a strict timeline 
for phasing periods.  In addition, the U.S. does not 
object to the Russian-proposed seven year reduction 
period. 
 
End text. 
CLINTON