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Viewing cable 09HELSINKI242, FINLAND: POLITICAL PARTY CONSENSUS BREAKS ON NATO

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09HELSINKI242 2009-06-26 09:00 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXRO9615
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0242/01 1770900
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 260900Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5034
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000242 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR J.HOVENIER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2019 
TAGS: FI MARR PGOV NATO
SUBJECT: FINLAND: POLITICAL PARTY CONSENSUS BREAKS ON NATO 
POLICY 
 
REF: A. 09 HELSINKI 79 
     B. 09 HELSINKI 127 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Michael A. Butler for reasons 1.4(b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  With opposition parties rejecting the 
Government's defense and security white paper on June 16, 
Finland saw a highly unusual break in its traditional "grand 
political consensus" on foreign and security policy. 
Opposition and governing coalition parties blamed each other 
for the broken consensus, which had at its base a 
disagreement on Finland's possible NATO membership.  Having 
quietly walked together up to NATO's doorstep, Finland's 
political parties are unable to reach a consensus on the 
crucial next action: to walk through the door or not. 
Opposition parties seek to stop what they see as an 
inexorable move towards membership; they also may seek to 
exploit public opposition to membership and reverse 
successive electoral losses by making the next elections a 
referendum on NATO.  The main parties in the governing 
coalition lack internal unity on the question of NATO 
membership, but have ample time before the next parliamentary 
and presidential elections to craft positions.  As the 
parties assess the fallout from the broken consensus, the 
Embassy will continue to contribute to a fact-based public 
debate about NATO that stresses its long-standing and 
continuing contributions to European security, its consensus 
decision making, and its cooperation with the EU.  END 
SUMMARY. 
 
OPPOSITION REJECTS DEFENSE WHITE PAPER 
 
2. (C) On June 16 the Finnish Parliament approved the 
Government,s quadrennial defense and security white paper 
(REFS A and B).  In a highly unusual move, within the Foreign 
Affairs Committee and in the plenary session opposition 
parties complained about the paper's treatment of Finland's 
possible NATO membership and its formula for defense spending 
increases, and voted nearly unanimously against the paper. 
(NOTE: The populist True Finns (TF) party provided the only 
opposition support for the paper.  In a March meeting with 
Pol/Econ Chief, TF leader Timo Soini said that regardless of 
his party's disagreement with the governing coalition - e.g., 
regarding NATO membership - the TF supports a single Finnish 
voice on security matters.  END NOTE.)  The opposition's move 
was highly unusual because traditionally Finland's foreign 
and security policies follow a broad political consensus that 
includes the governing coalition and opposition parties. 
Though drafted by the Government, the white paper should 
reflect that consensus, and support for it in the Parliament 
should encompass all political parties. 
 
FINGER POINTING OVER LOST CONSENSUS 
 
3. (SBU)  The opposition and governing coalition parties 
pointed at each other for the failed consensus.  Opposition 
parties complained that the white paper,s points departed 
from an earlier cross-party consensus reflected in a 2008 
security report by group of parliamentarians; that report 
referred to "cooperation" with NATO, not the white paper's 
"strong case" for membership.  In the June 16 plenary session 
a parliamentarian for the leading opposition Social 
Democratic Party (SDP) said that in the absence of a 
consensus Finland's security policy would reflect 
"small-scale politics" and would not be coherent or 
trustworthy.  Members of the governing coalition denied that 
the 2008 security report reflected a political consensus, and 
therefore the opposition parties made the historical move of 
breaking consensus in voting against the white paper. 
 
OPPOSITION SPIES ELECTION ISSUE? 
 
4. (C) In a June 16 meeting with Pol/Econ Chief, Olli-Pekka 
Jalonen, Counselor to the Parliament,s Foreign Affairs 
Committee, described the SDP,s action as particularly 
unusual.  By rejecting the white paper the SDP implicitly 
criticized President Halonen, who has ruled out pursuing NATO 
membership during her term but nevertheless approved the 
white paper's more positive language regarding NATO 
membership. (NOTE: The popular Halonen came up through the 
SDP ranks, but as President is formally unaffiliated. END 
NOTE.)  Eyeing the SDP's difficulties in finding a message, 
and its dwindling support over the last few election cycles, 
Jalonen suspects the SDP is considering making NATO 
membership a prominent issues in the next parliamentary 
elections (2011). 
 
HELSINKI 00000242  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
GOVERNING PARTIES DON'T WANT SPOTLIGHT ON NATO? 
 
5. (C) The two main parties in the governing coalition would 
not necessarily welcome a spotlight on NATO in the next 
elections. Publicly, Prime Minister Vanhanen dismissed the 
opposition's claim that his government broke the consensus, 
and emphasized that the white paper did not depart from the 
existing policy that "the NATO option remains and Finland 
does not close the window of opportunity" for membership. 
Privately, the Prime Minister had difficulty maintaining a 
consensus within his own Center Party (CP) regarding the 
white paper.  CP parliamentary staff told Pol/Econ Chief that 
some CP parliamentarians needed reminders that their party 
supported (and the Prime Minister approved) the "strong case" 
language on NATO.  Jalonen complained that the Defense 
Committee Chair, Juha Korkeaoja (CP), barged into a Foreign 
Affairs Committee meeting and spoke about the NATO language 
"like a member of the opposition." The CP remains deeply 
divided on the question of Finland's NATO membership. 
 
6. (SBU) The National Coalition Party (NCP), which leads in 
national opinion polls, is the party most supportive of 
trans-atlantic links, and NCP-member Foreign Minister Stubb 
is an unabashed NATO supporter (while also supporting a 
strong role for the EU in Finland's foreign and security 
policy).  However, with popular support for NATO membership 
at 27 percent and opposition over 50 percent, NCP members 
might not wish to be painted as simply the "pro-NATO" party 
in an election.  The NCP also lacks unanimity on NATO 
membership: current presidential-poll frontrunner Sauli 
Niinisto recently expressed doubts in public about a Finnish 
NATO membership application.  Not surprisingly, then, in 
parliamentary debate over the white paper Stubb stressed that 
Finnish security has three main elements - the EU, NATO and 
Nordic Defense Cooperation - and that all are important and 
not rivals. 
 
COMMENT 
 
7. (C) Having found the means to quietly move together up to 
NATO's doorstep, Finland's political parties may have reached 
a point where the next action will not be based on a broad 
political consensus: to walk through the door or not. 
Wishing to stop what it sees as an inexorable move over the 
threshold, opponents of membership appear willing to risk 
public ire about the lost foreign/security policy consensus 
in order to exploit public doubts about NATO (and reverse 
successive electoral losses).  The CP and NCP can wrap 
themselves in the current "maintain the NATO option" policy 
while they assess the public reaction to the breakdown in 
consensus, and also defer decisions (and internal debates) 
about how to address NATO membership in the next 
parliamentary and presidential elections. As the parties 
consider their options, the Embassy will continue to 
contribute to a fact-based public debate about NATO that 
stresses its long-standing and continuing contributions to 
European security, its consensus decision making, and its 
cooperation with the EU.  END COMMENT. 
 
BUTLER