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S E C R E T GENEVA 000451 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I): 
(U) START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 2, 2009, AFTERNOON 
SESSION 
 
REF: A. STATE 50910 
     ¶B. GENEVA 443 (SFO-GVA-I-001) 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-006. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 2, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 - 5:15 P.M. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) U.S. and Russian Delegations continued the second 
round of START Follow-on negotiations on the afternoon of 
June 2, 2009 at the U.S. Mission in Geneva, Switzerland.  The 
Russian Delegation asked questions related to the 
verification, duration, and further reductions beyond the 
START Follow-on Treaty portions of the U.S. paper entitled 
"Elements of the START Follow-On Treaty," which had been 
provided during the first round of negotiations in Moscow 
(REF A).  The delegations also exchanged ideas pertaining to 
the potential format and context of the required report to 
the Presidents for a July Summit, but no decision was 
reached.  The Russian Delegation suggested two documents, one 
a joint statement for Presidents and a second negotiator's 
report for foreign ministers containing a summary of 
negotiations.  The U.S. Delegation stated that a single 
document for Presidents was the appropriate approach and that 
the United States was inclined to conclude a more detailed 
report along the lines of the 1992 Joint Understanding that 
had been exchanged between the United States and the Russian 
Federation regarding the framework for the START II 
negotiations. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation also stated that any 
commitment for further reductions needed to be considered 
cautiously.  Special conditions were needed for reductions to 
occur in the future.  The U.S. Delegation stated that the 
issue of further reductions was important to both Presidents 
and needed to be discussed.  The delegations agreed to meet 
again on the morning of June 3, 2009, to discuss the schedule 
of events prior to the July Summit, U.S. questions pertaining 
to the Russian vision paper provided earlier (REF B), and 
approaches to accreditation with the Swiss. 
 
 
MORE RUSSIAN QUESTIONS 
ON U.S. "ELEMENTS" 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S) Gottemoeller opened the meeting at the U.S. Mission 
and invited the Russian Delegation to continue providing 
questions related to the U.S. paper entitled "Elements of the 
START Follow-on Treaty," which the Russian Delegation had 
started but did not complete prior to the conclusion of the 
morning session (REF B).  (Begin comment:  The Russian paper 
was subsequently provided and will be sent SEPTEL 
(SFO-GVA-I-007).  End comment.) 
 
 
 
 
QUESTION 1:  VERIFICATION 
------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) Antonov directed attention to paragraph C of Section 
V entitled "Verification" of the U.S. "Elements" paper and 
questioned the need to have ICBMs and SLBMs subject to the 
treaty.  He asked whether it was really reasonable to have 
the basic START verification provisions (such as RVOSI, data 
update inspections, exhibitions, and the exchange to 
telemetry) when there was no limit on ICBMs and SLBMs. 
Gottemoeller responded that such questions required further 
study.  However, the U.S. Delegation had similar questions 
related to the verification procedures proposed in the 
Russian paper entitled "How the Russian Side Envisions the 
New START Treaty," so it was a question for both delegations 
to continue to consider. 
 
 
QUESTION 2:  DURATION 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Antonov moved to the Section in the U.S. "Elements" 
paper entitled "Entry into Force and Duration."  The United 
States proposed that the duration of the treaty be 5-10 years 
with the period to reach limits being 3-5 years.  He asked 
whether it would be better to establish a firm timeframe for 
reaching limits for eliminations, as was required by START. 
Gottemoeller replied that no decision had been made.  START 
defined specific phases for eliminations, which were 
important to the treaty, while the Moscow Treaty did not. 
She suggested that this was an example of when a hybrid of 
the two treaties could be incorporated into the follow-on 
treaty. 
 
 
QUESTION 3:  COMMITMENT TO 
NEGOTIATE FURTHER REDUCTIONS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Antonov emphasized that the questions asked were only 
preliminary questions.  The Russian Delegation wanted to 
better understand the U.S. approach.  While Russia was 
opposed to some aspects of the U.S. proposal, it favored 
other parts.  He then moved to his final question which 
related to the last paragraph of the U.S. non-paper on 
further reductions beyond the START Follow-on Treaty.  He 
stated that, while the inclusion of tactical nuclear warheads 
and the goal to eliminate all nuclear weapons were fair and 
the objectives were well-fixed, special conditions were 
needed for them to occur in the future.  All of the elements 
were already reflected in the preamble with the reference to 
Article VI of the NPT, and the goal of the elimination of all 
nuclear weapons was clearly stated.  President Obama's own 
words stated that perhaps the elimination of nuclear weapons 
would not occur in his lifetime.  Therefore, the Russian 
Delegation was not ready to assume obligations for future 
negotiations on further radical reductions before the 
parameters of the START Follow-on Treaty were even 
established.  It would be important to first see how the 
implementation of the START Follow-on Treaty progressed, 
cautioning that non-aligned states would claim that not 
 
 
enough was being done regardless of what was agreed to. 
Antonov did not believe that there was a double standard. 
Russia was in favor of a world free of nuclear weapons, but 
the work to get there needed to be based on the principle of 
"undiminished security for all," a phrase he admittedly stole 
from the CFE Treaty. 
 
¶9.  (S) Gottemoeller reminded Antonov that the issue of 
further reductions was important to both Presidents, 
considering that it had been part of President Obama's Prague 
speech and President Medvedev's Helsinki speech.  The issue 
was inescapable, so the importance of tackling it before the 
NPT Review Conference next year must be recognized.  She 
pointed out that the term that Antonov had used, obligation, 
had a legally-binding feel to it, whereas the United States 
looked at it as being a commitment, which would be 
politically-binding.  In either case, Russia and the United 
States must continue to consider this issue and should commit 
to it. 
 
 
THE REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTS 
---------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Antonov concluded the afternoon session with a 
presentation on the view of the Russian Delegation as to what 
a report by the negotiators to the Presidents at the July 
Summit in Moscow might look like.  He said that both 
delegations needed to concentrate on a shared view for a 
joint document outlining the progress made during the 
negotiations for the Presidents to possibly sign in July. 
The document could take the form of a Joint Statement, a 
Joint Communique, or an Aide Memoire and he was flexible on 
what it might be called.  Antonov explained that there also 
needed to be a second document, which would be the 
negotiators' report that would be submitted to the foreign 
ministers, who would then pass it on to their respective 
Presidents.  The report to the ministers would be a brief 
summary of the results of the sessions held to date. 
 
¶11.  (S) Regarding the report to the Presidents, Antonov 
stated that the report would confirm the mandate from the 
Presidents and fix the objectives of a START Follow-on 
Treaty.  The report should be a brief, concise document, 
possibly consisting of only three paragraphs.  The first 
paragraph would summarize the progress made during the first 
stage of the negotiations.  The second paragraph would 
reconfirm the mandate to continue efforts to reach agreement 
on a treaty and could include agreed numbers associated with 
the aggregate ceilings on strategic nuclear warheads and 
strategic delivery vehicles.  However, agreed numbers were 
not required for this report and their absence would not be 
considered to be a failure.  The third paragraph would 
identify the specific tasks to be achieved by the 
negotiators.  Well understood phrases should be used, but 
modified as necessary.  Antonov continuously emphasized that 
he was open to U.S. proposals regarding this important report. 
 
¶12.  (S) In response to Antonov's question about what the 
United States envisioned for the joint statement, 
Gottemoeller offered that the United States was inclined to 
conclude a more detailed report along the lines of the 1992 
Joint Understanding that had been exchanged between the 
 
 
United States and the Russian Federation regarding the 
framework for the START II negotiations.  Such a report 
should discuss concrete elements to be included in the 
potential treaty under negotiation, including the key 
aggregate ceilings as appropriate.  Antonov cautioned against 
trying to agree on specific numerical limitations in the 
short time remaining before the Summit, given the existence 
of apparent differences by the two Sides on a number of 
issues. 
 
¶13.  (S) Responding to Gottemoeller's question as to how a 
report to ministers related to the report to the Presidents, 
Antonov said that the negotiators needed to go through their 
respective ministers, who have direct access to the 
Presidents.  As such, he foresaw the document only being a 
couple of sentences reporting that the negotiators had 
fulfilled their directive and reporting progress towards that 
end. 
 
¶14.  (U) Documents exchanged.  None. 
 
¶15.  (U) Participants: 
 
U.S. 
 
Ms. Gottemoeller 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
LtCol Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kron 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Belyakov 
Mr. Ermakov 
Mr. Ilin 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Izrazov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Lychaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Schevtchenko 
Mr. Semin 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Trifonov 
Mr. Ubeev 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Col Zaytsev 
 
 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
Mr. Lakeev (Int) 
 
¶16.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
STORELLA