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S E C R E T GENEVA 000445 
 
SIPDIS 
 
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DIA FOR LEA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I): 
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, MORNING SESSION, JUNE 2, 2009 
 
REF: A. STATE 50910 
     ¶B. GENEVA 443 (SFO-GVA-I-001) 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 1331 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-005. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 2, 2009 
                Time:  11:00 a.m. - 1:00 p.m. 
               Place:  U.S. Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) At the third meeting of the second session of the 
START Follow-on discussions, the Russian Delegation asked 
numerous questions they characterized as to help them 
understand the logic and the principles of the U.S. proposal 
for the "Elements" to be included in the START Follow-on 
Treaty (REF A).  The majority of the questions dealt with 
Russia's continued objection to U.S. plans to deploy 
conventional warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs.  They also stated 
that non-nuclear warheads should be included within the 
warhead limits of the new treaty.  The Russian Delegation 
also expressed concern with U.S. statements about how 
reducing warheads under the START Follow-on Treaty could 
strengthen deterrence.  In clarifying the U.S. intent, the 
U.S. Delegation explained that, in the U.S. view, both Sides 
must reduce strategic offensive arms (SOAs) in a way that 
reinforces strategic stability and strengthens deterrence. 
The Russian Delegation also said that U.S. proposals were 
vague regarding limitations and associated verification for 
deployed missiles and questioned why the United States did 
not want to limit ICBMs and SLBMs. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation said Russia is open to format 
for the Presidential statements and suggested using the term 
"statement" as a convenient convention. 
 
------------ 
INTRODUCTION 
------------ 
 
¶5.  (S) U.S. Head of Delegation Gottemoeller welcomed the 
Russian Delegation to the U.S. Mission by complimenting them 
on their ability to provide Russia's "vision" for elements 
that should be included in a START Follow-on Treaty that were 
provided on the previous day (REF B).  Although she did not 
agree with all of the elements, she recognized this positive 
achievement by the Russian Delegation.  As for the work plan 
for the meeting, Gottemoeller suggested that the Russian 
Delegation provide its questions on the U.S. Paper on 
"Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty" that was delivered in 
Moscow (REF A), and perhaps the U.S. Delegation could provide 
some answers.  Gottemoeller also said that the U.S. 
Delegation was ready to provide some initial questions to 
Russia's vision paper, but would be unable to provide a 
formal response during this session. 
 
¶6.  (S) Antonov agreed with Gottemoeller's suggested work 
plan, and stated that perhaps the approach of questions and 
 
answers would help to develop some positive ideas.  He also 
suggested that the Sides could exchange ideas on how to 
develop the draft statement by the Presidents for the July 
Summit.  He said that Russia was open regarding the format 
for the report.  It could either be a joint communique or an 
aide memoire, but he was more familiar with the use of the 
term "statement."  He said that there should also be a 
discussion of how to format a report to the foreign 
ministers.  Finally, he said that there was one other small 
technical issue that was raised in Moscow concerning the 
common work with Swiss authorities on the process of 
accreditation for the START Follow-on delegations; however, 
he was not prepared to discuss it because he did not have his 
papers with him. 
 
-------------------------- 
RUSSIA'S QUESTIONS ON U.S. 
PAPER ON ELEMENTS OF A 
START FOLLOW-ON AGREEMENT 
-------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S) Antonov opened the discussion of the U.S. elements 
paper by stating that it was hard to understand the U.S. 
hybrid approach between the START Treaty and the Moscow 
Treaty.  He said that, in order for Russia to better 
understand the U.S. approach, it was important for Russia to 
ask questions.  The discussion of the U.S. paper was not 
intended to oppose the positions contained in it; the Russian 
Delegation was merely trying to find commonality among the 
Russian and U.S. approaches.  He said he wanted to understand 
the logic and principles in the paper as a necessary step 
before beginning the practical work of negotiating the new 
treaty. 
 
¶8.  (S) Antonov said that discussion of Russia's principal 
concerns on the U.S. paper would be based on technical issues 
that had been raised within the Russian Delegation and the 
discussion would only serve to provide Russia's initial 
response. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SECTION I - GENERAL OBLIGATIONS 
AND OBJECTIVES, SUB-PARAGRAPH (E) 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Antonov said that his first question related to what 
the U.S. meant by the phrase "strengthening deterrence" and 
what was its meaning for both sides.  Antonov said that he 
did not understand the logic behind how it would be possible 
to strengthen deterrence on both Sides while reducing 
operationally deployed strategic nuclear warheads (ODSNW). 
Gottemoeller explained that, as both Sides reduce the number 
of ODSNW, these reductions should not erode our capability to 
deter; reductions in nuclear warheads should not impact our 
mutual security.  Antonov said that the concept sounded good 
but it was important that the wording convey the right 
meaning. 
 
¶10.  (S) Look said that Antonov had hit on a central feature 
of the U.S. proposal.  The primary purpose of nuclear weapons 
is to strengthen deterrence and as we reduce the number of 
nuclear warheads, the reductions must not weaken our ability 
to deter but strengthen it.  During the Cold War, we talked 
about this in terms of strategic stability; as we reduce 
 
nuclear weapons we strengthen stability.  Look continued by 
saying that this is the philosophy of the first section of 
the U.S. paper and provides purpose for the new treaty.  He 
went on to say that during the Cold War we were adversaries. 
The purpose of reductions during that time was to reduce the 
threat of war from the other side.  Today, we are no longer 
enemies and we no longer have the threat of war against one 
another, thus we are seeking reductions under this new 
agreement based on a different purpose.  As we do this, we 
need to keep in mind that it will be important to strengthen 
deterrence. 
 
¶11.  (S) Antonov said that he had mixed feelings on what Look 
had said; for the most part, Look seemed to have it right. 
He stated that the deterrence/nuclear warhead relationship is 
clear.  He stated that, while he was not dismissing 
deterrence, it was his view that a new treaty that would 
establish a connection that would strengthen deterrence while 
reducing nuclear weapons did not make sense to him.  He 
reiterated that we need to think about how our work towards 
reducing nuclear weapons to enhance strategic stability would 
be understood by the world as a positive signal of our 
commitments toward  the complete elimination of nuclear 
weapons in accordance with Article VI of the NPT.  Antonov 
said that we should examine this issue again later. 
 
--------------------------- 
SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS 
AND COUNTING RULES, 
PARAGRAPH A:  WARHEAD LIMIT 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) Antonov stated that he would like the United States 
to clarify its proposal on warhead limits.  He said the U.S. 
paper stated that there will be a "small number of spare 
strategic nuclear warheads...located at specified heavy 
bomber weapons storage areas."  Antonov requested 
clarification of what the United States meant by "small 
number."  Gottemoeller stated that the United States was 
studying this issue and would provide an answer at a later 
meeting. 
 
¶13.  (S) Antonov stated that the next question also dealt 
with warhead limits.  He stated that the first bullet 
referred to a central limit on ODSNW.  He wanted the United 
States to clarify what were the central limits on ODSNW and 
would there be some other type of limit on warheads? 
Gottemoeller said that the United States was continuing its 
work in Washington on clarifications to the U.S. approach to 
ODSNW, but the central limits to ODSNW would compare to the 
limits in the Moscow Treaty.  Antonov said that his question 
seemed to have been misunderstood by the U.S. Delegation, so 
he promised to provide all questions in writing later. 
 
---------------------------- 
SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS 
AND COUNTING RULES, 
PARAGRAPH C:  COUNTING RULES 
---------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) Antonov said that the next question had to do with 
counting rules.  He wanted to know why the United States 
proposed different counting rules for ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy 
bombers.  Gottemoeller stated that dealing with heavy bombers 
 
under START was complex and there were many different ways in 
which they were counted.  In fact, some types of heavy 
bombers that carried only gravity bombs were counted with 
only one warhead.  Under START,  it was too complex to count 
the actual number of weapons on each heavy bomber.  For this 
new treaty, in general, the United States is looking at new 
ideas for verification and transparency measures that will 
enhance our ability to count warheads.  Warner added that, 
under the U.S. proposal, the actual number of warheads 
associated with deployed ICBMs and SLBMs can be counted on 
ballistic missiles, counting warheads on heavy bombers 
presents a different problem.  Heavy bombers do not carry 
nuclear warheads day-to-day like they did when U.S. heavy 
bombers were maintained on "strip alert."  Today, heavy 
bombers are not routinely armed.  He said that this was 
another example of how the situation is different today 
regarding the relationship between nuclear warheads and 
delivery vehicles.  Gottemoeller stated that the United 
States would provide answers in writing and would provide a 
more detailed amplification of the U.S. ideas during the next 
session. 
 
¶15.  (S) In a follow-up question, Antonov asked whether the 
United States could explain and provide an example of what 
the United States meant by a "specified weapons storage area 
supporting heavy bomber air base."  Again, Gottemoeller said 
that these descriptions and further analysis were being 
worked in Washington. 
 
--------------------------------- 
SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS 
AND COUNTING RULES:  LIMITS ON 
DEPLOYED LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS, 
SLBMS, AND DEPLOYED HEAVY BOMBERS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to explain why it 
had failed to include ICBMs and SLBMs in the limit on 
deployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and on deployed heavy 
bombers.  Gottemoeller responded that the Russian 
Delegation's question gets to the heart of the matter.  She 
also wanted to thank Ambassador Strel'tsov for this question 
that was asked in Moscow (REF C).  She stated that, based on 
this question, Section II of the U.S. elements paper was 
being worked in Washington and that the U.S. would have to 
get back to the Russian Delegation later. 
 
¶17.  (S) Regarding the first bullet of the same section and 
paragraph, Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to explain what 
it meant by the phrase "for ICBMs and SLBMs tested for 
nuclear weapon delivery."  He stated that, under START, all 
ICBMS, SLBMs and heavy bombers are subject to the treaty and 
are delivery vehicles for nuclear warheads.  He wanted to 
know if the United States had planned to test new types of 
ICBMs and SLBMs with non-nuclear armaments.  Gottemoeller 
said that this was a question for the U.S. Delegation to take 
back to Washington. 
 
¶18.  (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Delegation to explain what it 
meant by the phrase "launchers that are no longer capable of 
supporting operational ICBMs and SLBMs, and heavy bombers 
that have been converted to non-nuclear only roles or could 
not be returned to operational status without considerable 
time and expense."  He asked specifically what are the 
 
criteria for converting launchers to this category and what 
does "considerable time and expense mean?"  Antonov said 
that, for Russia, time was the critical factor.  Gottemoeller 
noted that certain systems that are now derelict and 
non-functioning are still counted under START and that, since 
existing START elimination procedures are very expensive, 
neither Side has chosen to employ them to get old ICBM silo 
launchers and heavy bombers off the books as long as they can 
be accommodated within the high START limits.  Consequently, 
the United States was proposing to simplify the elimination 
process for such systems, a point that Antonov had earlier 
agreed with. 
 
---------------------------------- 
SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS AND 
COUNTING RULES, PARAGRAPH D: 
DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR WARHEADS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Antonov challenged the validity of the U.S. 
statement that verification measures could be employed to 
distinguish non-nuclear/conventional warheads from nuclear 
warheads, but did so by asserting that the Russian Side knows 
of no verification procedures that would "guarantee" the 
identification of a non-nuclear warhead being carried by a 
ballistic missile that was in flight.  Gottemoeller asked 
Antonov to explain what he meant by "guarantee."  Antonov 
said that Russia wanted 100 percent assurance that a missile 
in flight contained a conventional warhead.  Gottemoeller 
stated that such assurance would normally be supplied through 
launch notifications and related measures.  Warner said that 
any verification measures noted in the U.S. paper would be 
applied to warheads on ballistic missiles that were contained 
in their silo or SSBN launchers prior to any launch and not 
to the discrimination of ICBMs or SLBMs in flight.  Antonov 
asked if the United States planned to maintain command and 
control of the possible launch of conventionally-armed 
long-range ballistic missiles at high levels comparable to 
those that would be used for nuclear-armed missiles.  Warner 
answered that, if the United States developed such missiles, 
they would have robust command and control systems and launch 
authority would rest at the very highest levels of the U.S. 
Government. 
 
¶20.  (S) Gottemoeller stated that these types of systems were 
theoretical at this point and would require further 
discussion.  Antonov stated that if these types of systems 
described by Warner were theoretical, then why should we 
consider non-nuclear warheads on strategic offensive arms. 
If such non-nuclear ICBMs or SLBMs have some deterrence 
value, then they should be considered as nuclear. 
Gottemoeller stated that the emphasis of non-nuclear warheads 
in the U.S. elements paper is based on results of discussions 
that have taken place in military strategies, military 
doctrine or other fora.  Gottemoeller stated that the issues 
related to non-nuclear warheads will provide for interesting 
discussions as we continue our dialogue on this issue. 
 
-------------------------- 
SECTION II, CENTRAL LIMITS 
AND COUNTING RULES, 
PARAGRAPH E:  TERMINOLOGY 
-------------------------- 
 
¶21.  (S) Antonov asked the United States to explain why a 
term for "new type" was needed, given that the U.S. proposal 
did not contain limits on ICBMs and SLBMs.  Gottemoeller 
stated that the Sides should return to this question during 
the afternoon meeting because the U.S. Delegation would 
present a similar question to the Russian Delegation 
regarding Russia's vision paper. 
 
------------------------ 
SECTION IV:  ELIMINATION 
------------------------ 
 
¶22.  (S) Antonov asked Gottemoeller to explain why the United 
States had only envisioned simplified elimination "procedures 
for silo launchers of ICBMs and heavy bombers" and not other 
items that would be accountable under the treaty. 
Gottemoeller explained that these were only examples and that 
other items would also require elimination procedures. 
 
--------------------------- 
SECTION V:  NOTIFICATION, 
MONITORING AND VERIFICATION 
--------------------------- 
 
¶23.  (S) Antonov asked the U.S. Side to explain which "basic 
START data exchanges, notifications, and inspection 
provisions, would be retained and adapted, as appropriate." 
Gottemoeller explained that many provisions would be retained 
while some would be adapted, when that appeared appropriate. 
 
¶24.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian Paper containing Comments on the U.S. 
Documents Received During the First Round of Negotiations, 
dated June 1, 2009. 
 
¶25.  (U) Participants. 
 
U.S. 
 
Ms. Gottemoeller 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
LtCol Comeau 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kron 
Dr. Look 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Belyakov 
 
Mr. Ermakov 
Mr. Ilin 
Ms. Ivanova 
Mr. Izrazov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Lychaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Schevtchenko 
Mr. Semin 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Trifonov 
Mr. Ubeev 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Col Zaytsev 
Ms. Komshilova (Int) 
Mr. Lakeev (Int) 
 
¶26.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
STORELLA