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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2019 
TAGS: KACT MARR PARM PREL RS US START
SUBJECT: START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, GENEVA (SFO-GVA-I): 
START FOLLOW-ON NEGOTIATIONS, JUNE 1, 2009, AFTERNOON 
SESSION 
 
REF: A. STATE 50910 
     ¶B. 08 MOSCOW 3720 
     ¶C. MOSCOW 1331 
 
Classified By:  A/S Rose E. Gottemoeller, United States 
START Negotiator.  Reasons:  1.4(b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (U) This is SFO-GVA-I-002. 
 
¶2.  (U) Meeting Date:  June 1, 2009 
                Time:  3:00 - 5:10 P.M. 
               Place:  Russian Mission, Geneva 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶3.  (S) The U.S. and Russian Delegations to the START 
Follow-on Negotiations continued discussions initiated 
earlier in the day.  Russia presented detailed comments on 
the U.S. paper entitled "Elements of the START Follow-on 
Treaty" (REF A) that had been provided in Moscow in May 2009. 
 Russia continued to object to U.S. plans to deploy 
conventional warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs and stated that 
non-nuclear warheads should be included within the warhead 
limits of the new treaty.  The Russian Delegation stated that 
U.S. proposals were vague regarding limitations for deployed 
missiles and associated verification.  Moreover, there should 
be no special limitations or verification provisions with 
regard to mobile missiles.  The Russians again reiterated 
their position that the U.S. Portal Monitoring Facility at 
Votkinsk would be closed by December 5, 2009.  The Russian 
Delegation also stated that START telemetry provisions should 
not be preserved under the new treaty.  With regard to the 
Moscow Treaty, Russia believed it should be superseded by the 
new treaty. 
 
¶4.  (S) The Russian Delegation again raised concerns about 
the security assurances that Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine 
have sought, and their desire to participate in the START 
Follow-on Negotiations.  The Russians believed the United 
States and Russia should present a joint position to these 
countries, but that security assurances beyond those already 
provided were not warranted, although they could be 
reiterated with regard to all states to which they applied. 
 
¶5.  (S) The U.S. Delegation responded that the U.S. and 
Russian positions are consistent, and that a joint 
presentation was not necessary.  Should Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine raise the issue within the START Joint Compliance 
and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the U.S. and Russian 
Delegations could direct them to the April 1, 2009 joint 
statement by the Presidents that clearly stated that the new 
treaty would be a bilateral agreement.  Discussion of 
security assurances was not appropriate within the JCIC. 
 
------------------------ 
RUSSIAN COMMENTS ON U.S. 
PAPER ON "ELEMENTS OF A 
START FOLLOW-ON TREATY" 
------------------------ 
 
¶6.  (S) Antonov made the following comments on the U.S. paper 
 
 
concerning "Elements of a START Follow-on Treaty" presented 
to Russia during the May 19-20 meetings in Moscow (REF  A): 
 
- The U.S. and Russian proposals for Section I on General 
Obligations and Limitations were very close.  However, use of 
the expression "operationally deployed strategic nuclear 
warheads (ODSNW)" by the United States throughout its paper 
raised questions.  In addition, Russia's paper on "ICBMs and 
SLBMs with Non-Nuclear Warheads" raised additional questions 
and Russia was eager for U.S. comments. 
 
- Section II of the U.S. paper provided Central Limits and 
Counting Rules and represented a departure from START 
concepts.  To a considerable extent the U.S. paper coincided 
with the October 23, 2008 U.S.-proposed agreement.  In 
particular, it focused on limiting ODSNWs and placed 
non-nuclear warheads on strategic delivery systems outside of 
the limitations of the treaty.  This type of double 
accounting was counter-productive.  Such an approach could 
have far-reaching, destabilizing effects with regard to 
nuclear non-proliferation.  Russia tried to make this point 
in Moscow and hoped that the United States had considered 
Russia's perspective. 
 
- The U.S. paper did not contain counting rules for deployed 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.  Overall, the U.S. paper was 
vague with regard to limitations on strategic delivery 
vehicles.  Reductions on deployed missiles could continue but 
verification of the reductions would stop. 
 
- The U.S. paper proposed limits on deployed launchers of 
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, although launchers 
associated with the deployment of missiles not tested for 
nuclear weapon delivery would not be captured.  Russia would 
like to discuss this further.  Terminology may require 
further detail and coordination. 
 
- Strategic delivery vehicles are an integral part of 
strategic offensive arms (SOAs).  This position was included 
in Russia's December 15, 2008 paper (REF B).  To be viable 
and effective, the new treaty should have verified reductions 
for strategic delivery vehicles and the warheads on them. 
 
- The U.S.-proposed adaptation of START Treaty components, 
including procedures for elimination, notification, 
verification, and the use of a JCIC-type body.  The United 
States also proposed subsequent talks regarding disarmament. 
Russia believed it reasonable to discuss these issues in 
further detail after key provisions regarding the follow-on 
treaty were agreed. 
 
- Regarding mobile missiles, Russia was proceeding from the 
understanding that there would not be specific limits on 
these types of missiles.  Russia was against any limitations 
specific to mobile missiles. 
 
- On May 20, 2009, Russia presented its position regarding 
Votkinsk (REF C).  Again, Russia was sure that this issue 
must be closed by December 5, 2009.  There was no room for 
maneuvering on this point.  (Begin comment:  This point was 
recorded as delivered, both through interpretation and in 
English by Antonov.  The statement that the Votkinsk "issue 
must be closed" was slightly ambiguous in that it was a 
 
 
different phrasing than used before.  Previous statements in 
Moscow made it clear that Russia was insisting that the 
Votkinsk Portal Monitoring Facility must be closed by 
December 5, 2009.  End comment.) 
 
- Finally, it was unreasonable to preserve obligations to 
exchange telemetric information under the new treaty. 
 
¶7.  (S) Antonov then provided the following comments on the 
U.S. Delegation paper, delivered on May 20, 2009, on the 
rationale for using verification measures to more closely 
correlate warheads and delivery vehicles (REF C): 
 
- The U.S. paper touched upon a number of technical aspects 
regarding verification. 
 
- The United States sought to unite limits on strategic 
nuclear warheads as under the Moscow Treaty with limits on 
strategic delivery vehicles as under START.  However, the 
United States used the term ODSNW with regard to the 
strategic nuclear warhead limitations, which is a term 
recognized only by the United States. 
 
- The United States did not believe that ICBMs and SLBMs 
should be subject to the treaty. 
 
¶8.  (S) Antonov provided the following comments on the U.S. 
points delivered in Moscow on the relationship between the 
Moscow Treaty and the START Follow-on treaty (REF C): 
 
- Russia was proceeding from the basis of the tasking 
presented by the Russian and U.S. Presidents per their 
instructions issued on April 1, 2009.  The Presidents were 
clear that Russia and the United States were to develop a 
new, full-scale legally-binding arrangement on reductions and 
limitations of strategic offensive arms.  Russia and the 
United States should be focused on this objective.  In this 
regard, it was logical that the Moscow Treaty should cease to 
exist upon entry into force of the new treaty. 
 
¶9.  (S) Gottemoeller thanked Antonov for the Russian comments 
on the U.S. points and papers provided during the May 19-20 
meetings in Moscow, and noted that Antonov's presentation, 
when combined with the additional feedback provided earlier 
 
in the day, provided a thorough understanding of Russia's 
position. 
 
------------------- 
FURTHER EXPLANATION 
OF U.S. APPROACH 
------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) Referring to the hybrid approach proposed by the 
United States, Gottemoeller made the following points to 
clarify the U.S. objective and rationale: 
 
- START provided an excellent foundation for a new treaty. 
At the same time, however, the United States and Russia had a 
different relationship than that which existed when START was 
negotiated:  the United States and Russia were no longer in 
the grips of the Cold War, and were cooperating, even on 
strategic nuclear issues. 
 
 
- Gottemoeller herself was insistent on the inclusion in the 
preamble of the U.S. "Elements" paper of the statement that 
the United States and Russia sought to bring their nuclear 
postures "into alignment with our post-Cold War relationship 
-- no longer enemies, no prospect of war between us, and 
cooperating where mutually advantageous," and was pleased 
that Russia's vision for the new treaty adopted this and 
other points. 
 
- This was the basis of the hybrid approach:  the United 
States wanted to take advantage of the proven worth of START, 
both conceptually and experientially, but wanted also to take 
advantage of experience gained by the Moscow Treaty, which 
focused more on the operational capability of each Side. 
 
- She understood the Russian concern that operational 
capabilities represented only a piece of the equation, and 
that non-deployed missiles could still pose a threat.  For 
that reason, the United States was intent on addressing this 
in the new treaty and working on ideas for transparency and 
confidence-building measures to ameliorate these concerns. 
This would be an ongoing dialogue, as the United States was 
still considering within its own Government specific 
verification and transparency measures. 
 
----------------------------- 
U.S. COMMENTS ON RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN THE MOSCOW TREATY AND 
THE START FOLLOW-ON TREATY 
----------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) Gottemoeller asked Brown to provide additional 
comments regarding the relationship between the Moscow Treaty 
and the START Follow-on Treaty.  Brown made the following 
points: 
 
- The U.S. Delegation paper provided in Moscow presented 
options on the relationship between the Moscow Treaty and the 
START Follow-on Treaty. 
 
- There was no requirement that a subsequent agreement 
supersede the Moscow Treaty.  Per Article IV, paragraph 2 of 
the Moscow Treaty, the Moscow Treaty "may" be extended by 
agreement of the Parties or superseded earlier by a 
subsequent agreement.  Unlike START, the Moscow Treaty did 
not specify that the subject of a subsequent treaty be the 
reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.  Thus, 
the United States and Russia had complete freedom with regard 
to superseding the Moscow Treaty by the START Follow-on 
Treaty. 
 
- The position presented by Russia earlier in the day was 
clear.  From his perspective as a legal advisor, the Russian 
approach was the most elegant approach; it would be difficult 
to manage those elements of the Moscow Treaty that should 
remain in force together with a START Follow-on Treaty. 
There would be issues concerning definitions and various 
other provisions.  Thus, the Russian approach was the 
simplest path forward. 
 
¶12.  (S) Responding to Brown's comments, Kotkova concurred 
from a Russian legal perspective; supersession of the Moscow 
Treaty was the simplest approach, though creating additional 
 
 
articles in the new treaty to deal with a continuing 
relationship to the Moscow Treaty would be more challenging 
and, thus, interesting for lawyers.  Since the new treaty 
would be short, however, a short statement regarding the 
relationship, i.e., supersession, made the most sense. 
 
---------------------------------- 
U.S. COMMENTS ON RUSSIAN PAPERS 
PROVIDED IN MOSCOW CONCERNING THE 
DEPLOYMENT OF NON-NUCLEAR WARHEADS 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S) Warner commented on views expressed in two of the 
papers Russia had provided to the United States in Moscow 
regarding potential U.S. plans for equipping ballistic 
missiles with non-nuclear warheads.  Russia's paper entitled 
"ICBMs and SLBMs with Non-Nuclear Warheads" presented two 
arguments.  First, the paper argued that proceeding with the 
deployment of non-nuclear warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs would 
be de-stabilizing, and could spark a new arms race involving 
other countries.  Second, however, was the idea that if such 
warheads were deployed they should be considered nuclear.  In 
Russia's second set of opening remarks presented in Moscow, 
Russia argued that the new treaty should make it 
impermissible to convert for nuclear armaments ICBMs and 
SLBMs that had been developed for non-nuclear armaments. 
 
¶14.  (S) Warner continued that, regardless of the three 
somewhat different positions expressed by Russia, the United 
States still held a different position.  The parties to the 
new treaty should have as an option the deployment of 
non-nuclear warheads on strategic offensive missiles, and 
these warheads should not count against the ceiling on 
nuclear warheads.  The United States was prepared to discuss 
verification measures to enable the sides to distinguish 
between nuclear and non-nuclear warheads on strategic 
offensive missiles, and recognized that the U.S. and Russian 
positions reflected important differences that required 
negotiation. 
 
¶15.  (S) Antonov responded that this was one of the 
fundamental differences between the United States and Russia, 
and Russia would like a better understanding of U.S. plans 
with regard to the deployment of non-nuclear warheads on 
strategic systems.  While Russia's early warning capabilities 
would improve over time, they would never be able to 
determine whether a missile in flight was armed with a 
conventional or nuclear warhead.  Any launch of an ICBM or 
SLBM would be considered to involve a nuclear warhead, in the 
same manner as had been described by the United States in the 
past with regard to the U.S. position.  Russia had considered 
various approaches to this problem with respect to the new 
treaty, but required a better understanding of U.S. plans in 
order to develop an approach.  If the United States only 
intended to deploy 20 such systems, then counting their 
warheads as nuclear would not impact overall strategic 
potential if the limit for nuclear warheads were 1,700, and 
it would make accounting and verification much simpler. 
Without clarification regarding U.S. plans, however, Russia 
assumed the United States was attempting something behind its 
back. 
 
¶16.  (S) Antonov asked about use controls for conventional 
 
 
ICBMs and SLBMs, questioning whether they would be at the 
same standard as controls for nuclear weapons, and 
questioning who would have the authority to approve their 
use.  Russia wanted to engage in a dialogue on the subject 
and was frustrated that when it expressed its concerns in the 
past it had been told that its concerns were not serious.  He 
suggested that U.S. Government officials often argued that 
Russia's concerns were not serious but then once out of 
government and working as non-governmental organization (NGO) 
experts, they changed their position, suggesting that as 
government experts they were pursuing a policy and not 
seriously analyzing Russia's concerns.  Russia's approach to 
this was simply to prohibit such weapons.  In this way 
Russia's concerns would not just be "allayed" as the United 
States had sought before; they would be eliminated.  The 
issue did require more discussion, but it needed to be 
resolved. 
 
¶17.  (S) Gottemoeller replied that changes in views as 
officials left government and began work at NGOs was one 
issue, and that changes in Administrations was another and, 
in fact, was an advantage in the democratic process that 
enabled new ideas into government thinking.  The United 
States was engaged in reviews of previous policy, seeking to 
identify new ideas and good ideas from the past.  However, to 
be clear, the U.S.-proposed draft agreement of October 23, 
2008 was not a basis for the U.S. current position on a START 
Follow-on Treaty. 
 
¶18.  (S) Antonov responded that he appreciated the processes 
of U.S. policy development.  "e noted that, with regard to 
missile defense, there had been a lot of news about the 
"third site" in Europe and some investigations into its 
financing, and that some of the plans are being frozen or 
postponed.  However, what he did not want to see with regard 
to this was Washington only making a half decision by just 
freezing the funding that was proposed for a third missile 
defense site in Europe.  A better approach would be to 
completely reject the third site; cutting funding may allay 
some concerns but by itself did not eliminate them.  A 
decision to eliminate this site would make the START 
Follow-on Treaty negotiations much easier. 
 
------------------------------- 
BELARUS, KAZAKHSTAN AND UKRAINE 
------------------------------- 
 
¶19.  (S) Gottemoeller stated that the United States had 
studied Russia's paper entitled "Intentions of Belarus, 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine."  The issue of these countries' 
intentions and objectives touched on U.S. nuclear policy and 
was an aspect of the Nuclear Posture Review.  At the JCIC, 
and in bilateral meetings, the United States had told these 
countries that the 1994 Budapest security assurances remained 
in force.  The United States did not believe it was necessary 
to make a joint U.S.-Russian presentation to these countries 
at the upcoming JCIC; the United States and Russia could 
continue to make their points independently, though their 
positions were the same.  The United States believed that the 
concerns of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine had been allayed. 
 Gottemoeller asked whether Russia had heard otherwise. 
 
¶20.  (S) Antonov responded that he was in close contact with 
 
 
his counterparts in these countries and, in every context 
they raised the issue of both the security assurances and 
their participation in the START Follow-on Treaty.  Ukraine, 
in particular, argued that because they were not party to any 
military-political bloc they should have security assurances 
from the major military powers, especially the P-5.  Russia 
had rejected this because Ukraine had received assurances as 
a non-nuclear weapon state under the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty (NPT).  Russia insisted that there were no different 
classes for security guarantees; all non-nuclear weapons 
states under the NPT had received them.  Informally he 
suggested that, when a new treaty is signed, Russia and the 
United States could issue a joint statement that expressed 
appreciation for the removal of nuclear weapons from their 
territory, and their contribution to the NPT.  Language could 
also be considered for the preamble of the new treaty. 
 
¶21.  (S) Gottemoeller replied that the United States had been 
considering this issue in the context of the 2010 NPT Review 
Conference.  The notion of a joint statement upon treaty 
signature was interesting and should be considered further. 
 
¶22.  (S) Antonov responded that Russia was prepared to 
address the issue of security assurances at the NPT, but in 
the context of all NPT states.  He suggested that, should 
Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine sense a difference in the 
U.S. and Russian approaches, they would try to pull Russia 
and the United States apart, so it was important that the two 
countries be united in their position.  Belarus, Kazakhstan 
and Ukraine would surely raise the issue at the JCIC, so it 
was important that the United States and Russia coordinate a 
response. 
 
¶23.  (S) Gottemoeller affirmed that the United States would 
continue to express its commitment to the 1994 Budapest 
Statement.  As for their involvement in START Follow-on, 
Presidents Obama and Medvedev already made clear in their 
April 1, 2009 joint statement that the new treaty would be a 
bilateral agreement.  If the issue were raised in the JCIC, 
the heads of the U.S. and Russian Delegations could refer to 
the April 1 Joint Statement.  Otherwise it was not a JCIC 
issue. 
 
¶24.  (S) Subsequent to the meeting, the Russian Delegation 
provided a written copy of their paper "On Comments on the 
U.S. Documents during the First Round of Negotiations."  That 
translation will be provided septel (SFO-GVA-I-003). 
 
¶25.  (U) Documents exchanged. 
 
- Russia: 
 
    -- Russian Paper on "How the Russian Side Envisions the 
New START Treaty," dated June 1, 2009. 
 
¶26.  (U) Participants. 
 
U.S. 
 
Ms. Gottemoeller 
Mr. Brown 
Mr. Buttrick 
LtCol Comeau 
 
 
Mr. Couch 
Mr. Dunn 
Mr. Elliott 
Mr. Fortier 
Col Hartford 
Mr. Johnston 
Mr. Kron 
Dr. Look 
Mr. Siemon 
Mr. Taylor 
Dr. Warner 
Ms. Gross (Int) 
Dr. Hopkins (Int) 
 
RUSSIA 
 
Amb Antonov 
Mr. Belyakov 
Mr. Ermakov 
Mr. Ilin 
Mr. Izrazov 
Mr. Koshelev 
Ms. Kotkova 
Mr. Lychaninov 
Mr. Malyugin 
Col Novikov 
Col Ryzhkov 
Mr. Schevtchenko 
Mr. Semin 
Mr. Smirnov 
Mr. Trifonov 
Mr. Ubeev 
Mr. Vasiliev 
Col Zaytsev 
Mr. Lakeev (Int) 
 
¶27.  (U) Gottemoeller sends. 
STORELLA