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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFISS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHHMUNA/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 001485 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR PHU 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF TH LA
SUBJECT: ENGAGEMENT ON LAO HMONG ISSUE YIELDS CONTINUED 
DIALOGUE BUT LITTLE PROGRESS 
 
REF: A. BANGKOK 1340 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH RTARF) 
     ¶B. BANGKOK 1305 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH DPM) 
     ¶C. BANGKOK 1225 (NGO PULLS OUT OF PETCHABUN) 
     ¶D. BANGKOK 1223 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH FM) 
     ¶E. BANGKOK 1028 (RTG DIALOGUE ON NONG KHAI HMONG) 
     ¶F. BANGKOK 888 (AMB JOHN RAISES HMONG WITH FM) 
     ¶G. BANGKOK 822 (SUMMARY OF HMONG SITUATION) 
     ¶H. BANGKOK 650 (AMBS RAISE HMONG WITH RTG) 
 
BANGKOK 00001485  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: A/DCM ROBERT D. GRIFFITHS, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) Summary:  U.S. Ambassador to Laos, Ravic Huso, met 
with Thai Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) International 
Organizations Deputy Director General Ittiporn Boonpracong, 
and Royal Thai Armed Forces (RTARF) Border Division Chief LTG 
Niphat Thonglek on June 11 and 12 to discuss the ongoing 
custody of Lao Hmong in Thailand.  The RTG position has not 
changed substantially regarding continued repatriations but 
both the MFA and the RTARF offered assurances that returns 
would be "voluntary" and expressed their interest in 
discussing "out of the box" options for dealing with those 
Hmong whom the Thai have identified as being at risk should 
they return to Laos.  Separately, the office of United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) described its 
focus on the smaller group of detained Hmong at Nong Khai 
(Ref G), and the International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) indicated it anticipated an increasing role in 
repatriations from Petchabun.  Finally, Ambassador David 
Lipman, Head of the Delegation of the European Commission to 
Thailand, Burma, Laos and Cambodia, briefed Ambassador Huso 
on EU support of a proposed project that would involve 
independent monitoring of Hmong who return to Laos. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment:  The RTG remains intent on returning as many 
Hmong as possible to Laos and is prepared to use both 
inducements and pressure to achieve this goal.  However, Thai 
officials recognize the damage that would result to 
Thailand's image and international relations should they use 
overt force to compel returns.  The Thai also recognize that 
not all the Hmong will "volunteer" to return and, in fact, 
have identified an unspecified number who they believe would 
be at risk should they return.  The Thai are interested in 
more discussions with the U.S. on the options for addressing 
the protection needs of this population.  End Summary and 
Comment. 
 
RTG INTERLOCUTORS STAY THE COURSE 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador Huso engaged LTG Niphat Thonglek on Hmong 
issues over lunch on June 11, 2009.  Niphat had recently 
returned from a trip to Laos with the RTARF Chief of Defense 
Forces (Ref A) and said that the main issues discussed were 
border demarcation and the Hmong situation.  Referring to 
accusations from Doctors Without Borders (MSF) and others 
that the Thai had used arbitrary arrests as a tactic to 
isolate the Huay Nam Khao (HNK) camp leaders and pressure 
them to agree to return to Laos or face incarceration, Niphat 
instead characterized these individuals as genuinely "bad 
boys."  He complained that the MSF decision to pull out of 
the camp was "political" and that the alleged interference by 
the Thai Army in their activities was trumped up.  He 
extended an impromptu invitation to Ambassador Huso to visit 
HNK to see the refugees himself, a suggestion that was 
politely but firmly declined.  (Note:  Embassy had also 
declined Niphat's earlier invitations to witness border 
repatriation ceremonies out of concern that our presence 
might be misinterpreted as U.S. support for repatriation. 
End Note.)  When asked, Niphat insisted that all further 
repatriations would be on a voluntary basis.  Ambassador Huso 
pressed him to define "voluntary" and Niphat replied that the 
RTARF would not use physical force or compulsion but would 
use inducements and psychological pressure to encourage 
returns to Laos.  (Note: Although Niphat may hold this 
position, we remain concerned that the RTARF is committed to 
closing HNK by the end of this fiscal year and may be 
prepared to use physical coercion, see Ref C.) 
 
BANGKOK 00001485  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
¶4. (C) Niphat demonstrated a clear willingness to engage in 
"end game" discussions about the disposition of a residual 
group at HNK whom the RTG had determined have demonstrated a 
connection to U.S.-trained forces pre-1975 and who may have 
continued their resistance afterwards.  These individuals and 
their families, Niphat acknowledged, unlike the majority whom 
he characterized as economic migrants, may have a credible 
fear of persecution.  Ambassador Huso reiterated the 
importance of transparency regarding the screening process 
that led to the identification of those with a reasonable 
fear of persecution.  He stressed that it would be extremely 
helpful for the U.S. to have information regarding these 
persons.  Also, the U.S. has historical and other sources of 
information that would assist in the identification of Hmong 
who would be at risk.  Niphat acknowledged our longstanding 
request for access to the Thai lists but made no promises to 
deliver the information. 
 
¶5. (C) In a separate meeting, MFA Deputy Director General 
Ittiporn Boompracong repeated prior comments on the need for 
"out of the box" solutions to the Lao Hmong problem (Ref D). 
He stressed that the RTG had an interest in keeping the Hmong 
issue from undermining the overall Thai-Lao bilateral 
relationship.  He also expressed the Thai desire to address 
the humanitarian and refugee concerns of the international 
community.  He defended the RTG screening process, saying 
that it was based on decades of Thai experience in dealing 
with refugee issues in cooperation with international 
partners.  He did not, however, offer any assurances that the 
Thai would provide the details of the process and the 
decisions reached, although Ambassador Huso pressed him 
repeatedly to do so.  Ambassador Huso urged him to take 
concrete measures to improve transparency regarding the 
degree to which the return process was truly voluntary. 
Ittiporn reiterated that MSF's withdrawal from HNK (Ref C) 
had prompted a very negative reaction within the RTG, 
resulting in the suspension of discussions with IOM to 
involve that agency in monitoring Hmong returnees from HNK to 
the border.  He indicated that talks with IOM could resume in 
a "few weeks." 
 
¶6. (C)  Ambassador Huso strongly suggested to Ittiporn that 
the Thai should open immediately a discussion with the U.S. 
and other concerned parties regarding the Hmong who the Thai 
had identified as being at risk because of prior association 
with the U.S. during the war.  A long-awaited and critical 
first step would be for the Thai to provide the U.S. with the 
names and interview results.  With that information, the U.S. 
could review its own sources of information and would also 
have a clearer understanding of both the size and composition 
of the group.  Ambassador Huso pointed out that providing the 
information would be very much in the Thai interest. 
Ittiporn raised the Lao proposal to allow Hmong who returned 
to Laos from HNK to resettle if third countries wished to 
take them as immigrants.  Ambassador Huso pointed out that 
this proposal - even if it were confirmed - would be 
inconsistent with basic principles and norms concerning 
asylum-seekers.  Even so, Ambassador Huso said the U.S. was 
always interested in an open discussion with the Thai.  He 
stressed again that transparency on the part of the Thai 
would be key to a productive dialogue. 
 
IOM INCREASINGLY POSITIVE WHILE UNHCR DESPAIRS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (SBU) Ambassador Huso followed up a positive recent 
discussion with IOM representatives in Laos in a meeting with 
RefCoord and IOM representatives in Bangkok.  The outgoing 
IOM Regional Representative for Southeast Asia, Irena 
Vojackova, concurred with Ambassador Huso's assessment that 
the incremental progress IOM was making in establishing 
itself with anti-trafficking and migrant return programs in 
Laos could lead to a role in assisting and monitoring Hmong 
returnees from HNK.  The IOM Rep affirmed that she intended 
to take a step-by-step approach to gain the confidence of the 
GOL.  IOM, she said, intended to focus for now on the GOL 
 
BANGKOK 00001485  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
half of the equation, until the dust had settled from the MSF 
pullout. (Ref C) 
 
¶8. (C) In contrast, UNHCR Regional Representative Raymond 
Hall was focused almost entirely on the situation of the 158 
Lao Hmong in Nong Khai who had received Person of Concern 
status from the UNHCR almost 3 years ago.  He appeared to 
have concluded that UNHCR had no ability to influence the 
Thai regarding the HNK situation.  He believed that the RTG 
was prioritizing its bilateral relationship with Laos above 
the humanitarian concerns of the international community. 
Also, it was impossible for UNHCR to operate effectively in 
HNK because of the lack of transparency.  In discussion of 
Nong Khai, Hall said he was hopeful that the Hmong there 
would not be sent back, but thought the Thai would not 
release them locally or allow for third-country resettlement 
until the current high-level of attention and interest had 
died down. 
 
EU WEIGHS IN 
------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Ambassador Huso met EC Delegation Head Lipman, who 
shared details of his recent trip to a project funded by the 
EC near Pha Lak, the Lao village created to accept returnees 
from Petchabun who had no links to established communities or 
relatives to care for them.  He indicated that the EU's 
information suggested that the returnees were receiving 
assistance as promised and land to farm, and that there had 
been no reports of ill-treatment.  Ambassador Huso also 
discussed an NGO request for funding from the EU for a 
project aimed at bringing the Lao government into a 
confidential discussion with leaders of the Hmong diaspora 
who remained hostile to the GOL. The EU officials confirmed 
that they were in the final stages of funding the project. 
Ambassador Huso urged them to ensure that there was a clear 
commitment on the part of the NGO and the Lao government to 
include a "Phase 2" that involved confidence-building 
measures, specifically regular independent access to Hmong 
returnees as well as those Hmong who have surrendered to 
government authority over the last several years.  Ambassador 
Lipman agreed that this would be critically important to the 
success of this initiative. 
 
¶10. (U) This cable has been cleared by Ambassador Huso. 
JOHN