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FM AMEMBASSY TBILISI
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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0215
RUEHVEN/USMISSION USOSCE PRIORITY 2268
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 4833
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 TBILISI 000843 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2019 
TAGS: PREL OSCE GR RS KZ GG
SUBJECT: GEORGIA: DFM NALBANDOV ON UN, OSCE 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 760 
     ¶B. TBILISI 821 
 
TBILISI 00000843  001.2 OF 002 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador John F. Tefft for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Nalbandov 
summoned the Ambassador April 29 to request further U.S. help 
in encouraging the UN Secretary General to title his report 
"Situation in Abkhazia, Georgia."  He also identified 
particular redlines for Georgia in the negotiations for a new 
UN mandate or UNSC resolution: the language must retain 
reference to Georgia's territorial integrity; the six-point 
cease-fire agreement is the only document in force and 
therefore needs to be referenced; and the Geneva process is 
the only operating venue for talks and must be affirmed.  He 
added that Georgia opposed any appearance in New York by 
Abkhaz de facto "government" representatives.  Regarding the 
May 18-19 meeting of the Geneva process, Nalbandov said 
Georgia sought a plenary session.  In connection with the 
OSCE's Annual Security Review Conference in June, Nalbandov 
explained Georgia's position regarding the agenda language. 
The Ambassador agreed to convey Georgia's concerns to the 
Department.  End summary. 
 
UN NEGOTIATIONS 
 
¶2. (C) Following up earlier comments (ref A), Nalbandov 
restated Georgia's request that the United States encourage 
the UN Secretary General (UNSYG) to title the upcoming report 
something along the lines of "Situation in Abkhazia, 
Georgia."  Nalbandov said he had the impression that the 
UNSYG himself would be deciding on the title, so it would be 
important to convey our encouragement directly to him or his 
staff. 
 
¶3. (C) Nalbandov also listed some of Georgia's redlines in 
the negotiation of a new UN mandate and resolution, although 
he cautioned this was not necessarily an exhaustive list. 
First, a resolution must retain reference to Georgia's 
territorial integrity.  That reference would preferably be 
explicit, but at the very least must be via citation of 
earlier resolutions (such as UNSCR 808) that use the phrase. 
Second, the August 12, 2008 six-point cease-fire agreement, 
as the only agreement relating to the conflict still in 
force, must also receive reference.  Third, any resolution 
must also make reference to the Geneva process, which is the 
only functioning venue for international negotiations. 
Nalbandov noted that the inclusion of the internally 
displaced persons issue within the framework of the Geneva 
process was one reason it was so important to Georgia. 
 
¶4. (C) In his final point about the UN process, Nalbandov 
reiterated Georgia's opposition to any involvement or 
appearance by the Abkhaz in the discussions in New York, in a 
formal or informal capacity, including an Arria-style meeting. 
 
GENEVA AND OSCE 
 
¶5. (C) Nalbandov told the Ambassador that Georgia supported 
the holding of a plenary session at the May 18-19 session of 
the Geneva process.  He noted that the Abkhaz de facto 
"government" representatives have still not committed to 
participating, but the holding of a plenary session is more 
important to Georgia than the participation of the Abkhaz. 
He said Georgia had communicated this preference to EU 
Special Envoy Pierre Morel. 
 
¶6. (C)  Nalbandov also offered an explanation of Georgia's 
position on the agenda for the OSCE's Annual Security Review 
Conference (ASRC), to be held in June (ref B).  After 
QConference (ASRC), to be held in June (ref B).  After 
reviewing the history of the negotiations over the text, 
Nalbandov noted two key points for Georgia.  First, the 
language that Georgia originally proposed, "with special 
focus on the armed conflict in August 2008," used text 
approved by the entire OSCE at the Helsinki Ministerial in 
November 2008, and should therefore be non-controversial. 
Second, Georgia is concerned that, if the language does not 
unambiguously refer to the Georgia-Russia war, the 2010 
chairman-in-office of the OSCE -- Kazakhstan -- could have an 
easier time avoiding a discussion of the war when it sets the 
agenda for the 2010 ASRC.  (Nalbandov added that this second 
issue is very sensitive, and he would not want it discussed 
openly.)  Thus, Georgia would be willing to accept a 
compromise along the lines of "with special focus on the one 
(conflict, a word used earlier in the sentence) that took 
place after the 2008 ASRC," but the current Greek version -- 
"with special focus on serious developments that led to the 
 
TBILISI 00000843  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
deterioration of the security situation since the 2008 ASRC" 
-- left too much room for future avoidance of the August 2008 
war itself. 
TEFFT