VZCZCXRO1340
PP RUEHBZ RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHNK #0323/01 1311612
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 111612Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8402
INFO RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE
RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0628
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 2170
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0975
RUEHDO/AMEMBASSY DOHA 0565
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN 0643
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE 0200
RUEHSM/AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM 0046
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RUEHDS/USMISSION USAU ADDIS ABABA
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0642
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1086

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NOUAKCHOTT 000323 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/10/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KDEM KHUM MR
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S LUNCHEON WITH ANTI-COUP POLITICAL 
PARTIES 
 
REF: A. NOUAKCHOTT 0289 
     ¶B. NOUAKCHOTT 0312 
     ¶C. NOUAKCHOTT 0321 
 
Classified By: DCM Dennis Hankins for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  During a lunch with the Ambassador, RFD and 
FNDD political leaders talked about repression of 
demonstrations, President of the Senate Ba M'Bare's 
"presidency," and the role played in the political crisis by 
Mauritania's neighbors.  The FNDD and RFD asked the U.S. to 
pressure France into firmly opposing the coup, and declared 
that they had little faith in the Senegalese mediation, which 
they do not perceive as neutral and disinterested.  While all 
parties participated in the luncheon, divisions between the 
FNDD and RFD remain obvious.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  Leaders of RFD and FNDD parties attended a lunch 
hosted by DCM in honor of recently-returned Ambassador 
Boulware on May 7.  RFD's Ahmed Ould Daddah, who was in 
Zouerate for a political rally, was represented by the 
party's Chief of Staff Ismael Ould Amar.  FNDD guests 
included Messaoud Ould Boulkheir (president of the National 
Assembly and APP), Mohamed Ould Maouloud (president of UFP), 
Ba Mamadou Alassane (president of PLEJ), Boidiel Ould Houmeid 
(president of PNDD-ADIL), and Member in Charge of External 
Relations Mohamed Lemine Ould Mohamed Moussa on behalf of 
Tawassoul president Jemil Ould Mansour. 
 
¶3. (C)  Opposition leaders were in low spirits and did little 
to conceal it.  When greeted with the traditional "Ca va?," 
some frankly responded they were "not doing so well." 
Mohamed Ould Maouloud, Ould Boulkheir, Alassane and Ould 
Houmeid arrived late as they were coming directly from a 
sit-in demonstration at the Ministry of the Interior, which 
was interrupted by the announcement of spiritual leader Imam 
Bouddaha Ould Bousseiry's death.  Comment:  Imam Bousseiry's 
death follows by one week the passing of Imam Mohamed Salem 
Ould Addoud, another of Mauritania's beloved spiritual 
leaders.  Mauritanians have been deeply affected by these 
losses and many make a connection between the deaths and the 
climate of division in the country.  They think something 
must be really wrong in Mauritania if the country has been 
deprived of these saintly mens' presence at almost the same 
time.  End comment.  One of the first things Ould Boulkheir 
asked the Ambassador was to put pressure on France to oppose 
the coup and refuse to recognize the June 6 election. 
 
--------------------------------- 
THE CLIMATE OF REPRESSION SOFTENS 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C)  Guests noted a shift in the regime's approach to 
demonstrations.  During the past week, demonstrations have 
been authorized and the police has refrained from repressing 
them.  The last violently repressed demonstrations were the 
women's sit-in in front of the United Nations building and 
the Palais de Justice sit-in (Ref A and B).  The 
demonstration in front of TV Mauritanie, the joint FNDD/RFD 
march and the joint FNDD/RFD youth march took place without 
incident (Ref C).  Alassane wanted to know who had given the 
orders to violently repress demonstrations.  There was little 
consensus on whether it was the Wali of Nouakchott or 
Director General of National Security (DGSN) General Hadi, 
but guests agreed the orders were ultimately coming from the 
High State Council (HSC).  Guests described General Hadi as a 
"crazy man," stating that even members of his family feared 
his brutality.  Ould Maouloud pointed out that the women's 
demonstration stirred disagreements on the policy towards 
demonstrations between the HSC's radical and more moderate 
factions.  As the repression at the Palais de Justice was the 
last time police used force to disperse demonstrators, 
Maouloud suspects the HSC faction favorable to freedom of 
expression finally won. 
 
------------------------------ 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000323  002 OF 004 
 
 
M'BARE'S POWER OR LACK THEREOF 
------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C)  The discussion then shifted to President of the 
Senate and interim President Ba M'Bare.  The guests aired 
negative opinions about M'Bare, who they criticized for being 
weak and lending himself to the military's game.  They noted 
M'Bare's appointment as interim president is only symbolic 
and that in reality he has no power -- General Aziz's 
portrait still presides over government offices.  Alassane 
argued that, as interim President, M'Bare could reschedule 
the election and take actions to redress the situation.  Ould 
Boulkheir reacted very strongly by saying that M'Bare had no 
power because he had no constitutional legitimacy.  Alassane 
insisted that the FNDD and RFD should talk to M'Bare and 
convince him to reschedule the election.  Most guests 
rejected this idea, stating it was not realistic.  Ould 
Houmeid pointed out that M'Bare's family had said M'Bare is 
"afraid" and that all his movements are under close 
surveillance by the military. 
 
---------------------- 
MAURITANIA'S NEIGHBORS 
---------------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  The RFD's Ould Amar argued that Senegal and Morocco 
are conspiring to destabilize Mauritania.  According to Ould 
Amar, these countries want a weak Mauritania in order to 
"divvy up the territory" and fully pursue their "interests" 
here.  Ould Amar stressed that Aziz, who is of Moroccan 
descent and was raised in Senegal, has surrounded himself 
with a "little Rabat," a group of individuals partial to 
Morocco's interest.  A discussion ensued about Cheikh Ould 
Horma, one of Aziz's main advisors.  Ould Horma's father, 
Ahmedou Ould Horma, was the first Mauritanian deputy during 
the French colonial period.  After failing to be re-elected 
and receiving assassination threats in Dakar, he moved to 
Morocco to promote Mauritania's annexation by Morocco.  After 
many years, he was invited by the Mauritanian government to 
return to Mauritania.  His children are now influential in 
Mauritanian circles of power and keep close ties to Morocco. 
 
¶7. (C)  Ould Amar highlighted the role played by Qadhafi in 
shaping Morocco's policy towards Mauritania.  He stressed 
that Morocco and Qadhafi were now on good terms thanks to the 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD).  The Moroccans 
allowed Qadhafi to use CEN-SAD to implement his regional 
agenda and supported CEN-SAD's role as an election observer 
in Mauritania. 
 
¶8. (C)  Guests declared themselves puzzled with Algeria's 
radical change in policy towards Mauritania.  Algerians, who 
were originally opposed to the coup, have seemingly become 
favorable to the junta.  They commented on the recent 
television interview by Algerian Minister for Maghreb and 
African Affairs Abdelkader Messahel, in which he said the 
June 6 elections would "normalize the situation" in 
Mauritania.  The guests were puzzled at Algeria's change of 
position and could not pinpoint the cause. 
 
¶9. (C)  Mali's change of attitude towards the junta was also 
discussed.  Guests stated that Mali had accepted the junta 
because they were afraid General Aziz would use his influence 
to fuel the Touareg revolt if Mali continued to reject the 
regime.  Maouloud characterized the junta's policy as 
"blackmail" against Mali.  Ould Houmeid asserted that during 
the "last attack" (presumably he meant the attack on Malian 
forces in Nampala in December 2008), the Touaregs had 
received help from Mauritania. 
 
-------------------------------- 
NO FAITH IN SENEGALESE MEDIATION 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C)  Ambassador Boulware asked guests for their views of 
the Senegalese mediation and if they wanted the U.S. to speak 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000323  003 OF 004 
 
 
with the Senegalese on their behalf.  Ould Boulkheir 
responded he had "no faith" in the Senegalese mediation.  He 
stated it was obvious the Senegalese were working for the 
junta.  He suspects the junta wants to delay the elections 
and is using the Senegalese to introduce that item in the 
negotiation agenda to make it seem like a concession to the 
opposition.  Ould Boulkheir feels the FNDD has been trapped 
for too long in the junta's agenda and that they will 
participate in this agenda if they ask to delay the 
elections.  The FNDD's and RFD's goal is to thwart the coup 
d'etat, said Ould Boulkheir.  Moving the elections by a few 
months does not change anything if they cannot ultimately 
achieve that goal.  Guests pointed out that the Senegalese 
were keen on moving forward with the mediation and that 
Senegalese Foreign Affairs Minister Cheikh Tidiane Gadio was 
arriving in Mauritania the next day.  Comment:  Gadio arrived 
that same day with a plan drafted by President Wade.  The 
FNDD, while still suspicious, seems inclined to now consider 
it as a basis for discussion -- SEPTELs will report on 
Ambassador's May 11 meeting with President Abdallahi and 
DCM's meeting with FNDD "Foreign Minister" Ould Maouloud. 
End comment. 
 
¶11. (C)  Ould Houmeid, who sat morosely for most of the lunch 
(at times with his head in his hands), came out of his 
silence to stress the role that Qadhafi had played in 
obstructing a solution to the crisis.  He said the Benin 
Ambassador to the AU had been sent home because he made a 
statement against Qadhafi's handling of the Mauritanian 
crisis.  According to Ould Houmeid, this event has dissuaded 
others from challenging Qadhafi's decisions. 
 
¶12. (C)  Ould Maouloud further expounded on Ould Boulkheir's 
statements.  According to Ould Maouloud, the FNDD wants the 
military to reach the conclusion they need to reschedule the 
election on their own.  The FNDD refuses to ask for a delay 
as it does not want General Aziz to use the election as a 
bargaining chip by saying "I'll reschedule the election if 
the FNDD gives up Abdallahi's return and if the RFD accepts a 
military candidacy."  Ould Maouloud thought Aziz was already 
convinced of the need to delay the election, but was trying 
to get a "deal" that would have the FNDD and RFD yield on 
their two redlines.  Ould Maouloud stated that Aziz's 
unilateral agenda was set without consulting the FNDD or the 
RFD.  They therefore refuse to acknowledge his agenda by 
asking him to move the elections.  They told Ambassador and 
DCM that they would rather see the election take place on 
June 6 than give Aziz more time than he has already had. 
 
¶13. (C)  The guests feel that they have failed if Aziz is 
able to start his campaign.  "If nothing happens before May 
15," Ould Maouloud said, "that means we will start applying 
our agenda."  Ould Amar also said "the next 10 days are 
decisive," implying that the RFD would also change its 
tactics.  Comment: The presidential campaign is scheduled to 
start on May 22.  Maouloud and Amar did not explain why they 
were using the May 15 date as a point of reference, what 
event they were expecting would happen before that date, and 
what agenda the FNDD/RFD plans to adopt.  Nevertheless, their 
statements sounded like a threat of more violent tactics. 
End comment. 
 
¶14. (C)  Comment:  The luncheon was amicable with multiple 
statements of support for the U.S. position in the aftermath 
of the coup.  Divisions between the FNDD and RFD concerning 
the role of President Abdallahi remained clear.  The RFD's 
Ould Amar made his FNDD partners bristle when he argued that 
the Constitutional Council's decision that there was a 
"presidential vacancy" was an unfortunate but unappealable 
fact meaning that "Ba M'Bare is now the president of 
Mauritania."  Ould Boulkheir challenged the legal foundation 
of a ruling that cited documents such as the declarations of 
the High State Council on an equal footing with the 
constitution.  Ould Amar made clear that the RFD saw the need 
for consensual elections as an exit strategy for Mauritania 
-- but made clear that Abdallahi's return was not necessarily 
 
NOUAKCHOTT 00000323  004 OF 004 
 
 
an important element in that process.  End comment. 
 
BOULWARE