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PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSR
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P 191221Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MOSCOW 001268 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/18/2019 
TAGS: PREL PGOV RS FI MD
SUBJECT: RUSSIAN MFA ON TRANSNISTRIA 
 
Classified By: A/Pol M/C David Kostelancik for reasons 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary and Comment.  Transnistria Conflict 
Negotiator Nesterushkin told us May 18 that DFM Karasin was 
planning to visit Chisinau and Tiraspol May 26-27 to pressure 
Smirnov to revoke the travel ban on Ambassador Chaudhry and 
EU negotiator Miszei, in order to make possible the next "3 
plus 2" meeting.  Nesterushkin did not rule another "2 plus 
1" meeting between President Medvedev and the Moldovan and 
Transnistrian leaders, calling that meeting format 
"indispensible."  However, Russia was leaving to the OSCE the 
organization of a "5 plus 2," which Nesterushkin saw as 
slipping to autumn.  He defended Transnistria's reluctance to 
meet and called Smirnov's interest in maintaining power 
"natural and understandable."  Russia appears to be playing 
both sides of the table, assisting in setting up "3 plus 2" 
talks and contemplating another "2 plus 1" summit, but not 
engaging on the more important revival of the "5 plus 2" 
format.  End Summary and Comment 
 
---------------------------------- 
Russian engagement on Transnistria 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Russian Transnistria Conflict Negotiator Valeriy 
Nesterushkin told us May 18 that DFM Karasin was planning to 
visit Chisinau and Tiraspol May 26-27, and would use the 
visit to pressure Smirnov to revoke the travel ban on 
Ambassador Chaudhry and EU Transnistria negotiator Kalman 
Miszei, in order to make possible a "3 plus 2" meeting on 
Transnistrian soil.  He did not expect Karasin to delve into 
the issue of reviving the "5 plus 2" talks proper, though, 
leaving that task to OSCE Ambassador Philip Remler. 
Nesterushkin noted that Remler on May 13 had already failed 
to convince Smirnov to lift the travel ban. 
 
¶3.  (C) In addition to the "5 plus 2" negotiation track, 
Nesterushkin did not rule out another invitation by President 
Medvedev to a "2 plus 1" meeting with the Moldovan and 
Transnistrian leaders, but cautioned that such a decision was 
premature until the new Moldovan government had been formed. 
However, he called the "2 plus 1" format that brought the 
leaders into direct dialogue "indispensible," and posited 
that a new "2 plus 1" meeting would use the March 18 joint 
declaration as a starting point. 
 
¶4.  (C) Nesterushkin said that Moldovan Foreign and European 
Integration Minister Andrei Stratan also had raised 
Transnistrian settlement prospects with Foreign Minister 
Lavrov during his May 5 visit to Moscow.  However, 
Nesterushkin downplayed the significance of that discussion, 
saying the talks progressed no further than agreement that 
the conflict should be resolved "as soon as possible," 
without going into detail.  The uncertainty of Stratan's 
position in the future GOM further reduced the impact of 
Stratan's visit, Nesterushkin added. 
 
---------------------- 
Going slow on 5 plus 2 
---------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Nesterushkin said that the plan of the April 28 "3 
plus 2" meeting to hold an informal "5 plus 2" on the margins 
of the OSCE CSBM conference in Helsinki June 29-30 had fallen 
apart.  Neither the time nor the venue of the talks called 
for in the March 18 joint statement by President Voronin and 
Smirnov were possible, due to the Greek OSCE chairmanship's 
need to prepare the June 27-28 meeting on European security 
in Corfu, as well as Finland's refusal to host the "5 plus 
2."  Nesterushkin could not provide an explanation for the 
Finnish reaction. 
 
¶6.  (C) While Ambassador Remler was attempting to find 
another time and venue for the "5 plus 2" meeting, 
Nesterushkin thought it "realistic" to expect the meeting to 
slip to September or October, given that the new Moldovan 
government had not yet formed, and that the summer break was 
coming fast. 
 
¶7.  (C) Despite Russia's engagement on setting up "3 plus 2" 
meetings, Nesterushkin said that Russia's influence on 
Smirnov was limited.  Transnistria was "not ready" for a "5 
plus 2" meeting, and it was "quite natural and 
understandable" that Smirnov did not want to lose his 
leadership position as a result of a conflict resolution.  He 
allowed Smirnov might be persuaded if he were offered 
 
MOSCOW 00001268  002 OF 002 
 
 
sufficient benefits, but so far "nobody has come forward to 
offer him any." 
BEYRLE