INFO  LOG-00   EEB-00   AID-00   A-00     CA-00    CCO-00   CG-00    
      COME-00  CTME-00  INL-00   DOEE-00  DOTE-00  PDI-00   DS-00    
      DHSE-00  EUR-00   FAAE-00  FBIE-00  VCI-00   H-00     TEDE-00  
      INR-00   INSE-00  IO-00    L-00     CAC-00   MOFM-00  MOF-00   
      M-00     VCIE-00  NEA-00   DCP-00   NRC-00   NSAE-00  ISN-00   
      OCS-00   OMB-00   NIMA-00  PA-00    PM-00    GIWI-00  PRS-00   
      P-00     ISNE-00  DOHS-00  FMPC-00  SP-00    IRM-00   SSO-00   
      SS-00    USSS-00  NCTC-00  ASDS-00  CBP-00   R-00     SCRS-00  
      PMB-00   DSCC-00  PRM-00   DRL-00   G-00     SCA-00   NFAT-00  
      SAS-00   FA-00    SWCI-00    /000W
                  ------------------67E5B8  181037Z /38 

   
O R 181046Z MAY 09
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4030
INFO CIA WASHDC
AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD 
JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
AMEMBASSY KABUL 
AMCONSUL KARACHI 
AMEMBASSY LONDON 
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 
NSC WASHINGTON DC
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR 
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
AMCONSUL LAHORE

C O N F I D E N T I A L LAHORE 000095 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/5/2019 
TAGS: PGOV PTER PK
SUBJECT: MODERATE ISLAMIC LEADERS IN PUNJAB LOOK TO U.S. FOR GUIDANCE 
AND MONEY 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Bryan Hunt, Principal Officer, Consulate Lahore, 
U.S. Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  Although historically divided by sometimes violent 
sectarian differences, Punjab's Islamic religious leaders have found 
common cause in recent years in pressing for a moderate alternative to 
the Taliban-style Islam increasing in Pakistan's Pashtun areas.  While 
infiltration by well-funded radical madrassas and clerics has occurred, 
particularly in southern and western areas of the province, the 
province's premier religious institutions and clerics from all sects 
-- Brailvi, Deobandi, Ahl-e-Hadith, and Shi'a -- are in general agreement 
to oppose Taliban-style Islam and are open to engagement with and eager 
for funding from the United States. In a religious environment in which 
the ability to distribute patronage in the form of "charity" is directly 
tied to influence, moderate clerics are slowly but steadily losing ground 
to their oftentimes better funded radical counterparts. End Summary. 
 
Brailvi Communities 
 
¶2. (C) Punjab's Brailvi community can be broadly divided into 
two categories:  the Ulema -- who serve in mosques as prayer leaders 
and sermon givers -- and the Pirs -- Sufi spiritual leaders often 
believed to have mystic powers who generally dispense advice, guidance, 
and charity through the province's extensive network of shrines.  While 
extreme sectarian chauvenism based on religious dogma and tradition can 
and does exist among certain segments of the Brailvi Ulema, even these 
most extreme sectarians have no tradition of forcible imposition of their 
narrowly construed religious beliefs/traditions on others in society and 
rarely engage in violence -- Sunni Tehrik being the notable exception. 
Among the Brailvi Pirs, sectarian and religious bigotry is virtually 
unknown, and many Pirs have followers from multiple sects and even in a 
few cases from other religions.  The general philosophy of the Pirs is to 
promote harmonious existence among diverse communities through focusing 
on spiritual enlightenment and community service.  Where Pirs have 
engaged in violence, it has generally been intra-familial strife over 
which heir was to inherit the mantel of authority (and finances) after a 
Pir's death. 
 
¶3. (C) The Brailvi Ulema are well organized in the religious 
movement Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat, which has a clear elected leadership 
and hierarchy structure. This social organization (which also has aims 
of eventually becoming a viable political party) tends to focus on the 
promotion of Brailvi religious ideology, lobbying for Brailvi inclusion 
in provincial and federal religious bodies, and occasional pressure 
campaigns/demonstrations calling on the government to counter 
Deobandi/Ahl-e-Hadith influence (today often referred to as 
Talibanization).  Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat has ties with both the Pakistan 
Peoples Party in Sindh and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz in the 
Punjab. The attempt to form a separate Brailvi political party under the 
late Mufti Noorani, Jamaat Ulema Pakistan (JUP), largely failed.  Even 
before Noorani's death, several Brailvi Alim split from the party to 
form their own factions. Noorani's decision to take the JUP into the 
Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) religious alliance undercut much of its 
credibility.  While JUP still has a handful of elected representatives 
in both Sindh and Punjab, its influence in the Brailvi community is 
minimal. 
 
¶4. (C) The Tanzeem-ul-Madaras, the Brailvi madrassas board, is 
the Jamaat Ahl-e-Sunnat's primary challenger for organized influence 
among the Brailvi Ulema. The Tanzeem-ul-Madaras is, in the Punjab, 
dominated by Sarfraz Naeemi, head of Lahore's largest and best 
financed madrassa Jamia Naeemia. Sarfraz Naeemi is a conservative 
Brailvi with traditionally strong anti-Western views and little 
tolerance for non-Brailvi Islamic leaders.  His supporters were 
largely responsible for the violence that accompanied the Danish 
cartoon riots in Lahore in February 2006.  Naeemi has close political 
ties to the Sharif brothers, having served as their personnel cleric, 
and the Sharif family is believed to remain his primary financial 
patron.  While Naeemi's checkered past makes him a difficult ally, he 
has been outspoken against Talibanization and is in the leadership of 
civil society's anti-Taliban movement in the Punjab. 
 
¶5. (C) As a response to the Deobandi extremist group 
Sipah-e-Sahaba's (SSP's) forcible occupation of Brailvi mosques in 
Karachi and SSP's assassination of Brailvi clerics, a group of 
radical Brailvi Ulema formed the militant organization Sunni 
Tehrik.  Sunni Tehrik had as its principal objective the use of 
violence, including targeted assassination, to "defend" the Brailvi 
community from Deobandi advances.  At its height, Sunni Tehrik was 
most powerful in Karachi and Hyderabad with lesser but nonetheless 
significant influence in the Punjab.  Its growing influence in urban 
Sindh ultimately brought it into open and often violent conflict 
with the secular Muttahida Quami Movement (MQM).  Sunni Tehrik's 
senior leadership was devastated in a 2005 bomb attack in Karachi 
during which most of its senior leaders were murdered.  The 
organization has only partly recovered, and although it has not 
formally eschewed violence, it has also not actively targeted 
Deobandis in recent years.  Despite statements from Foreign Minister 
Makhdoom Shah Mehmood Qureshi, post does not consider Sunni Tehrik 
an appropriate entity with which to engage against the Taliban due 
to its previous history of terrorism and its waning influence in the 
broader Brailvi community. 
 
¶6. (C) The Pirs are a divisive group with only a minimally clear 
hierarchy and competing personal religious and political agendas. 
Cooperation among them is limited as each Pir views the other as a 
potential competitor for followers, money, and influence.  Three 
of the four Sufi schools of thought have a clear living heir to 
their South Asian founder, who is generally accorded slightly 
hire status than other Pirs of the same school of thought -- 
Makhdoom Iftikhar Gilani of the Qadriya school (a PML member of 
the Provincial Assembly from Uch Sharif), Makhdoom Chishti of the 
Chishtia school (based in Pak Pattan and affiliated with the PML-N), 
and Makhdoom Zamrud Bokhari of the Naqshbandia school (custodian of 
the Jalal-ud-Din Bokhari Surkh Posh Shrine in Uch Sharif and 
largely apolitical).  The fourth, the Suhrwardiya school ostensibly 
headed by Foreign Minister Qureshi, is divided as to whether or not 
Makhdoom Qureshi is the rightful heir.  Attempts to unite the Pirs 
through the Jamaat Ahl-e-Mushaikh organization, headed by Pir 
Fazl-e-Haq of Faisalabad, have been only marginally successful. 
 
¶7. (C) The Pirs traditionally exercised influence and gained 
followers through the provision of social services (free food, 
medical camps, free lodging) at their shrines.  These good works 
were financed by the wealthier of their followers who made regular 
donations to the Pir and/or the shrine in order to obtain God's 
favor.  A handful of the Pirs were also gifted with substantial 
tracts of agricultural land, held in the name of the shrine, which 
continue to provide them and their families with an income today. 
A proliferation of descendants, the creation of numerous small 
shrines, and disputes over inheritance of the shrines has weakened 
the current generation of Pirs and divided the financial base of 
their followers into smaller and smaller units. The decision by the 
government to take over the administration of the shrines and 
collection of donations to the shrines through the Auqaf Department 
has taken away a significant portion of the Pirs' incomes. 
Charitable activities through larger shrines and by more prominent 
Pirs still occur but on a far smaller scale than in the past.  Many 
of the less prominent Pirs have completely sacrificed this portion of 
their spiritual inheritance. 
 
The Shi'a 
 
¶8. (C) Like the Brailvi, the Shi'a are divided into two primary 
groups -- the Ulema and the Pirs.  Much of what hold true for the 
Brailvi Pirs holds equally true for their Shi'a counterparts.  The 
one notable exception is that most of the Shi'a Pirs have 
effectively abandoned their religious role and have become 
traditional feudal landlords, leaving the Shi'a Ulema to dominate 
this religious sect.  The Shi'a Ulema, however, unlike their Brailvi 
counterparts have no overriding structure.  The Shi'a political 
party, Tehreek-e-Islami-Pakistan and its madrassa board are disparate 
organizations, although as a whole, the Shi'a are united in their 
vigorous opposition to the Taliban and can play a crucial role in the 
anti-Taliban movement.  Dealing with the Shi'a Ulema on an individual 
basis, however, is essential for success. 
 
 
¶9.  (C) A comparatively small number of Shi'a Ulema are heavily 
influenced by Iran and take a strong anti-Western orientation. 
These Ulema have been the primary ideological backers of the now 
largely defunct terrorist group Sipah-e-Mohammad and the radical, 
sometimes violent student group, the Imamia Students Organization. 
The majority of the Shi'a Ulema, even if they receive funds from 
Iran or Iranian backed groups, are largely independent and equally 
critical of Iran and the West. 
 
Deobandi 
 
¶10. (C) While the Deobandi sectarian ideology is largely 
responsible for the birth of the Taliban, there are a small but 
influential number of moderate Punjabi Deobandi leaders, who are 
opposed to the radicalization that has occurred within their 
Islamic sect.  These Deobandi leaders, while conservative in their 
personal beliefs and behaviors, reject the notion of imposition of 
their ideology by force, believe in participation in the democratic 
process, and see considerable value both in intra-faith and inter- 
faith dialogue.  Some even go so far as to claim themselves 
hereditary Pirs in an attempt to link themselves to more moderate 
Sufi traditions. These moderate Deobandi draw their inspiration 
from Deobandi leaders in India, who have largely rejected the 
concept of violent armed struggle.  In recent weeks, many of these 
moderate Deobandi leaders have spoken out against the Taliban. 
 
¶11. (C) The center of moderate Deobandi thought in the Punjab is 
in Lahore at the Jamia Ashrafia and the Badshahi Mosque.  Both of 
these institutions and their leaders -- Maulana Abdul Khabir Azad 
and Maulana Fazl-ur-Rahim -- have long-standing links to Deobandi 
groups in India, have condemned vigorously extremism and terrorism, 
and have shown a willingness to work with the USG to promote a more 
tolerant form of Deobandi Islam.  Given their influence in Deobandi 
circles, owing largely to the prestige of their institutions and 
forefathers, these leaders are well-positioned to moderate Deobandi 
statements, thought, and actions.  Although they have no influence 
over the Taliban, these Punjabi Deobandi leaders are willing to 
press their co-religionists to adopt a harder anti-Taliban stance 
through the Wafaq-ul-Madaris al-Arabiya, the Deobandi madrassa 
board in which they have a partial ally in Secretary General Qari 
Hanif Jalandhry. 
 
Ahl-e-Hadith 
 
¶12. (C) The Ahl-e-Hadith are generally seen as the most radical 
of Pakistan's Islamic sects, drawing their inspiration from Saudi 
Arabia's Wahhabi school of thought.  The community, however, is a 
fractured one between violent extremists who are linked to 
Lashkar-e-Tayyaba, and as such derive considerable funding from 
Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, and their more moderate but less well- 
financed opponents.  The opposition to Lashkar-e-Tayyaba in the 
Punjab is split between three personality-driven Ahl-e-Hadith 
organizations, the Markazi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith, the Jammat 
Ahl-e-Hadith Ropri of Abdul Wahab Ropri, and the Jamiat Ulema 
Ahl-e-Hadith of Qazi Abdul Qadir Khamosh. 
 
¶13. (C) The most influential of these three groupings, thanks to 
a recent merger is the Markazi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith jointly headed 
by Allama Sajid Mir and Allama Hafiz Zubair Ahmed Zaheer.  Both 
of these leaders have already issued strongly worded statements 
against the Taliban.  While Allama Sajid Mir is a very recent, 
and it would seem opportunistic, champion of moderation, Allama 
Zaheer has a long-standing, positive relationship with the USG. 
Given their combined influence in religious circles, engagement 
through the Markazi Jamaat Ahl-e-Hadith is the most effective way 
to reach moderate Ahl-e-Hadith leaders. 
 
Financing is the Key 
 
¶14. (C) The one unifying factor between these various moderate 
groupings is a severe lack of financing in comparison to their 
radical counterparts.  The proliferation of madrassas and 
"charitable" activities linked to extremist clerics in southern 
and western Punjab is a direct challenge to the on-the-ground 
influence of moderates.  These extremist clerics, who continue 
to receive regular infusions of cash from backers in Saudi Arabia 
and Gulf states, are able to use patronage to increase their 
followers and their influence in erstwhile moderate strongholds. 
For moderates to stem effectively this growing tide of 
radicalization, they will need access to greater cash reserves 
than are currently available to them. These groups all welcome 
engagement with the USG, and believe that association with and 
financial support from the United States will increase rather 
than undercut their influence.  All moderate clerics consistently 
highlight the need for financial assistance. 
 
¶15.  (C) Post is planning several outreach efforts to this 
community and will explore possible strategic communication 
programs to engage moderate voices. 
 
 
HUNT