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PP RUEHDBU RUEHIK RUEHLN RUEHPOD RUEHSK RUEHVK RUEHYG
DE RUEHKV #0793/01 1321557
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 121557Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY KYIV
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 7782
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 05 KYIV 000793 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR, EUR/UMB, EEB/OMA 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: EFIN EREL ETRD PGOV PREL XH UP
SUBJECT: NEC'S LIPTON WARNS OF UKRAINE'S ECONOMIC HAZARDS 
 
REF: A. KYIV 758 
     ¶B. KYIV 757 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary.  Special Assistant to the President for 
International Economic Affairs David Lipton and Treasury DAS 
for Europe Eric Meyer met with a wide range of high-level 
Ukrainian policy makers, businessmen, and bankers on April 
26-28.  Lipton warned of possible dangers to Ukraine's 
economy, and offered advice to Ukraine's leaders on the 
banking sector and the budget deficit.  End summary. 
 
Dangers Ahead 
------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Lipton warned his interlocutors on April 26-28 that 
Ukraine faced considerable economic risks and that the severe 
economic crisis could turn out to be "catastrophic."  Ukraine 
needed to stay on track with the IMF if it wanted to avoid a 
further deterioration of confidence, but it also had to do 
more.  An exogenous event such as a further meltdown in the 
world's financial markets, or a default by a state company 
could lead to a further run on banks and the NBU's reserves, 
leading to another swift fall in the exchange rate.  That, in 
turn, would be a disaster for the banking system and the 
broader economy. 
 
Lipton's Message to the NBU 
--------------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Lipton told acting National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) 
Governor Volodymyr Krotiuk that Ukraine needed to work more 
swiftly and with clear guidelines to recapitalize Ukraine's 
banking system and take decisive steps to liquidate banks 
that would be unable to survive the crisis.  The NBU and GOU 
did not have the luxury to wait until after the presidential 
elections, he said, since the banking sector was 
deteriorating rapidly and any delays in implementing a strong 
policy would only allow the situation to become worse.  He 
asked Krotiuk for the status of the NBU's and GOU's 
recapitalization and resolution plans. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Krotiuk noted that the regulatory basis for bank 
recapitalization was "99 percent done."  The NBU had adopted 
a number of resolutions simplifying the process to inject and 
get regulatory approval for fresh bank capital.  Other 
resolutions will make it easier for temporary administrators 
to reduce the capital value of existing shareholders, and the 
NBU is working with the Ministry of Finance to get Rada 
approval for a draft law that would strengthen 
administrators' ability to reduce capital.  A new law raising 
maximum levels of bank deposits insured by the country's 
deposit insurance fund now meant that about 98 percent of all 
deposits were insured, although Krotiuk conceded that the 
money currently available to the fund was vastly insufficient 
to actually cover deposits in the event of large-scale bank 
liquidations.  The NBU had identified the first seven banks 
that would be capitalized using public funds, and the MOF was 
prepared to move forward with the recapitalization, although 
it still needed to decide whether additional audits were 
necessary. 
 
Lipton: Administrators Need Clear Instructions 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (SBU) Lipton said NBU-appointed temporary administrators 
needed clear instructions when they assumed control of banks. 
 In particular, they should have the ability to write down 
shareholders to zero and compel non-deposit creditors to 
participate in restructuring losses if an administered bank 
is determined to have negative equity.  For the NBU's 
recapitalization and resolution plan to be viable and 
convincing, such instructions needed to be known to all 
stakeholders, Lipton said.  In a lengthy reply, Krotiuk and 
his colleagues from the NBU's banking supervision department 
pointed out that administrators would have the power to write 
down shareholders.  However, Krotiuk said the administrators 
would initiate negotiations with creditors to restructure a 
bank's liabilities (primarily through prolongation) when a 
bank's exposure was determined not to be serviceable. 
Calling on the deposit insurance fund to pay out depositors 
would not work, he said, because it is severely underfunded 
and not sufficient for even the first seven banks.  He 
admitted that he did not fully understand Lipton's point 
about the need to write down creditors if necessary. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Lipton pointed out that prolongation had a political 
 
KYIV 00000793  002 OF 005 
 
 
component in the case of bank insolvency.  Taxpayer money 
would be necessary to return a bank with negative equity to 
solvency if existing shareholders would not contribute and it 
was deemed that the bank was worth rescuing.  There was a 
political risk committing taxpayers' money if existing 
creditors were not expected to participate in a bank's 
rescue.  Many could ask why public money should be committed 
if non-deposit creditors, who had willfully taken on a risk 
and received interest for doing so, were not subject to the 
pain of restructuring.  Krotiuk conceded that "there was 
still a discrepancy in views" on how to implement the 
recapitalization and resolution process, adding that Lipton's 
points were "very interesting and would be considered." 
 
Exchange Rate Management 
------------------------ 
 
¶7. (SBU) Krotiuk and an NBU colleague from the currency 
department stated that they were "proud" of the NBU's 
transparent system of intervention, which was designed to 
overcome "fluctuations" in the forex market.  Lipton told the 
NBU's Krotiuk that the NBU needs to communicate a clear 
policy on its exchange rate interventions.  The markets do 
not understand whether the NBU's current policy to smooth 
"fluctuations" refers to the use of a fixed amount of 
reserves that can be used for interventions or is tantamount 
to setting an exchange rate target.  Krotiuk did not say 
explicitly that the NBU would observe the IMF's foreign 
reserve (NIR) floor, in the event that the NBU needed to rely 
on reserves to defend a rapidly depreciating currency.  NBU 
staff were unable to explain the exchange rate policy beyond 
referring to the IMF floor. 
 
NBU Refinancing Policy Non-Transparent 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Lipton asked the NBU to explain whether its tender 
system for refinancing was based on price or volume.  The 
NBU's Krotiuk informed Lipton that the central bank does not 
fix either price or volume.  Instead, it collects and reviews 
application from banks that provide a proposed rate and 
volume.  Lipton suggested that this was not a transparent 
auction, as the NBU decides how much to lend and to whom.  A 
more transparent system should have been in place 15 years 
ago, Lipton suggested to us in private, and will remain an 
essential impediment to generating trust between the NBU and 
banks. 
 
Pynzenyk, Poroshenko, Bankers Downbeat on NBU 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Former Finance Minister Viktor Pynzenyk, who 
resigned earlier this year, told Lipton that the 
recapitalization plan was still not being implemented quickly 
enough.  During an animated dinner conversation hosted by the 
Ambassador and also attended by businessman Viktor Pinchuk, 
the NBU's Petro Poroshenko, Ambassador Roman Shpek of Alfa 
Bank, Raiffeisen Aval chairman Volodymyr Lavrenchuk, and 
former Finance Minister Oleh Mytiukov, Pynzenyk questioned 
whether the procedures for liquidation were actually in 
place.  Too many high level GOU officials still did not 
understand the concept of recapitalization and resolution, he 
said.  In addition, the NBU did not have qualified talent to 
manage the resolution and recapitalization program, Pynzenyk 
said, urging the U.S. to provide experts for the central 
bank.  Poroshenko, Chairman of the NBU Supervisory Council (a 
non-executive position with some, albeit limited influence 
over the governing board), also said the recapitalization 
plan needed to be implemented more rapidly, and more 
transparently.  Representatives from several foreign banks 
separately echoed these views, telling Lipton that major 
aspects of the GOU's and NBU's recapitalization plan were 
still unclear.  They were also skeptical that any western 
banks would be interested in purchasing and recapitalizing 
Ukrainian banks in the current environment.  There was 
agreement that the largest state-owned Russian banks might be 
able and interested in using the crisis to buy up Ukrainian 
banks.  Otherwise, only the state-owned Ukrainian banks 
Oshchadbank and Ukreximbank could be expected to come to the 
rescue of other banks in the current environment. 
 
¶10. (SBU) The country heads of Citibank, BNP Paribas, and 
Unicredit all said they remained committed to Ukraine and 
expected to increase their capital as stipulated by the NBU 
after the recent completion of the IMF-mandated diagnostic 
tests.  However, they also noted that a decline in assets 
 
KYIV 00000793  003 OF 005 
 
 
today meant not as much capital may be needed as per the 
November assessments.  BNP Paribas country director Dominique 
Menu qualified his bank's commitment, saying that it would 
stay "if the regulatory environment remains stable."  The 
NBU's supervisory measures to deal with the crisis were 
making it increasingly difficult for his bank to work 
rationally, he said.  All conceded that they were also 
planning to weather the crisis by a severe contraction of 
their exposure. 
 
¶11. (SBU) The bankers agreed that asset quality in the 
banking system was deteriorating rapidly.  Non-performing 
loans in some sectors were estimated to reach between 30 and 
40 percent by the end of the year.  Banks were already in a 
process of massively rescheduling their loan portfolios, 
primarily through prolongations but also some reductions in 
net present value.  Retail clients continued to make efforts 
to service their debts, whereas problems were mounting 
rapidly with loans to small and medium sized enterprises, 
many of whom were simply walking away from their debts. 
Banks' exposure to Ukraine's largest companies, particularly 
in the metallurgical industry, were set to become the next 
big challenge, Lipton heard.  All the big steel players had 
hired western investment banks as restructuring advisors and 
were not investing in their companies at the moment.  Big 
Ukrainian borrowers were still able to service the interest 
component of their debts through their cash flows, and banks 
were rolling over short-term loans to the companies. "You 
have no other choice," Lipton told them.  They said servicing 
the capital component of long-term debts has become the 
biggest problem, and that would be at the center of 
restructuring discussions, with banks likely taking 
"haircuts" in the process. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Taking non-performing loans into liquidation and 
seizing collateral was not an option for banks, several 
bankers said.  "The court system here simply won't work in 
our favor," Citibank country head Nadir Shaikh told Lipton. 
In addition, most banks had a long-term interest in their 
Ukrainian clients and were interested in maintaining 
relationships with the expectation that such an approach will 
pay off when the crisis has passed. 
 
¶13. (SBU)  Lipton asked bankers what needed to be done to 
improve the operating climate for banks.  BNP's Menu said the 
general regulation of the economy has to be simplified and 
improved.  BNP paid dearly for Ukrsibbank "but now felt 
cheated," Menu said, because it expected that the GOU would 
use the good times before the crisis to move forward on 
economic reform when the price was far less.  He suggested 
that the USG should push for the creation of a council on 
banking reform, situated in the NBU with full access to the 
central bank's leadership and staffed by banking experts from 
major western countries in addition to local officials. 
Citibank's Shaikh said foreign banks needed the ability to 
hedge the currency risk of the capital that they inject into 
their Ukrainian subsidiaries.  Earlier, this had been 
possible by depositing foreign exchange with the NBU, but the 
central bank abolished this practice before the crisis hit, 
telling banks that "we don't need your reserves." 
 
Budget Deficit Politics 
----------------------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) President Yushchenko, Prime Minister Tymoshenko, 
and other key interlocutors told Lipton that Ukraine requires 
financing for a budget deficit that amounts to at least 4 
percent of GDP (reftel).  He agreed with the President that 
the National Bank cannot resort to monetizing, as emissions 
would have a strongly inflationary effect.  Expenditures need 
to be managed, so as not to lead to inflation.  Budget 
spending must also be cut, when necessary and possible, by 
additional legislation. 
 
¶15. (SBU) Former Finance Minister Pynzenyk doubted that the 
envisaged budget deficit could be financed.  Separately, 
Lipton asked Acting Minister of Finance Umanskiy whether the 
budget would perform as envisaged, and how the GOU hoped to 
finance the budget deficit that it had negotiated with the 
IMF.  Umanskiy conceded that projecting the budget's 
performance would remain difficult because of the unstable 
and deteriorating economic situation.  The MOF's biggest 
challenge at the moment was ensuring spending discipline. 
About ninety-five percent of all outlays were 
non-discretionary.  A sense of entitlement had arisen with 
regards to social spending, which had risen rapidly in recent 
 
KYIV 00000793  004 OF 005 
 
 
years, Umanskiy said, and it was difficult to convince 
politicians to cut spending.  The GOU was also fearful of 
submitting draft budget amendments with spending cuts to the 
Rada, for the parliament could turn around and approve 
spending increases instead. 
 
¶16. (SBU) Lipton noted that budget arrears should be avoided, 
though it was not evident how widespread arrears have become. 
 Umanskiy said arrears were not an issue.  IMF representative 
Max Alier told Lipton that he had seen no direct evidence of 
budget arrears, though he noted that the Prime Minister 
revealed at a recent press conference that she had been 
reducing the GOU's stock of arrears.  Most stories of arrears 
are referred to as "bumpy payments," said Alier, with the 
exception of vast amounts of VAT reimbursements that are owed 
to exporters.  However, Umanskiy admitted there was a problem 
with the Tax Administration.  Alier also noted that tax 
compliance was deteriorating rapidly, and he could not 
project whether this would continue or stabilize. 
 
Lipton: No Bilateral Budget Support 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Umanskiy conceded that the GOU had yet to identify 
funding sources for most of the projected budget deficit.  He 
said the GOU now expected a budget deficit of UAH 50 billion 
($6.25 billion).  About UAH 10 billion could be covered 
through further savings and other fiscal means, leaving a 
financing need of UAH 40 billion ($5 billion), "which could 
be higher."  He told Lipton that the GOU had engaged in 
"encouraging" discussions with the EU, Japan, and Russia over 
bilateral support, and he said that Ukraine hoped the U.S. 
would be open to supporting Ukraine as well. 
 
¶18. (SBU) Lipton told all interlocutors that the U.S. 
Congress was highly unlikely to appropriate money for budget 
assistance to Ukraine, especially in light of the 
Administration's pending request to bolster U.S. 
contributions to the IMF by $100 billion.  Thus, any further 
budget support for Ukraine would likely come through the IMF 
and the World Bank, pending satisfactory progress on 
conditionalities and approval by each institution's board. 
He also told Umanskiy that the idea of a donor's conference 
had little chance of success and should not be pursued. 
(Note:  Umanskiy was the only interlocutor who brought up the 
issue of bilateral budget support.  It appears that the 
President, Prime Minister, and their respective advisors had 
been warned off this topic by the Ukrainian embassy in 
Washington and/or by Deputy Prime Minister Nemyria, who had 
been told by high-level U.S. officials prior to the spring 
meetings of the IMF and World Bank that bilateral budget 
financing was not likely forthcoming from the U.S.  End note.) 
 
¶19. (SBU) In his discussion with Umanskiy, Lipton recounted 
his roundtable conversation with bankers, who had told him 
that NBU paper was a far more attractive investment that 
Ukrainian government bonds, because the NBU tended to pay 
more realistic interest rates on the debt it issued to banks. 
 He asked Umanskiy how the GOU intended to finance the 
deficit when, by all accounts, the international capital 
markets would remain frozen, particularly for countries like 
Ukraine, and when, domestically, there was either no market 
or a banking sector unwilling to lend to the government. 
Umanskiy conceded that the GOU had problems selling its debt 
domestically, but he said the MOF planned to coordinate its 
funding strategy more closely with the NBU.  He also said the 
GOU was planning to issue domestic bonds denominated in 
foreign currency that would target the large amounts of cash 
dollars being held by the country's population.  Bonds would 
be issued in both U.S. dollars and euros, and would carry an 
8 percent coupon.  The MOF also planned to issue 
UAH-denominated bonds with an interest rate of 16 percent. 
He did not suggest that the proceeds would be sufficient to 
cover the remaining budget deficit in the absence of 
alternative sources of funding. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Lipton's visit highlighted the enormous challenges 
still facing Ukraine's budget financing and banking sector. 
More than eight months since the crisis began, the country's 
bank recapitalization program is still not off the ground, 
with key procedural impediments being complicated by 
administrative ineffectiveness in the government and NBU.  A 
plan for the budget and banks may be in place, but questions 
 
KYIV 00000793  005 OF 005 
 
 
about the adequacy of crisis response linger as each lacks 
clarity, requires significant financing, and may turn out to 
be hamstrung by politics, corruption, and bureaucratic 
inefficiency.  End comment. 
 
¶21.  (SBU) Treasury DAS Meyer cleared this cable. 
TAYLOR