VZCZCXRO6486
RR RUEHAG RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHROV
DE RUEHHE #0162/01 1251344
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 051344Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4945
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNOSC/ORGANIZATION FOR SECURITY COOPERATION IN EUROPE
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL 0093
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4992

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000162 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/23/2018 
TAGS: FI MARR PGOV PREL
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR FOREIGN MINISTER STUBB'S VISIT TO 
WASHINGTON MAY 11, 2009 
 
REF: A. (A) 09 HELSINKI 150 
     ¶B. (B) 09 HELSINKI 151 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael A. Butler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb arrives in 
Washington as the Finns enjoy considerable international 
acclaim for their efforts in international crisis management, 
not only as a result of their effective Chairmanship of the 
OSCE last year, but also for the award of the Nobel Peace 
Prize to former President Martti Ahtisaari. The Finns seek 
ways to showcase their comprehensive civilian-military crisis 
management policy, and Afghanistan provides a litmus test for 
that approach. Generally the Government aims to maintain 
current levels of international participation, though earlier 
this year it approved increases on military, civilian and 
development contributions in Afghanistan.  Stubb also has 
called for a re-thinking of Finland's and the West's 
relations with Russia as their eastern neighbor undergoes 
significant change driven by the global economic downturn. 
 
¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED. Stubb's visit provides an 
opportunity to thank the Finns for their important work in 
Afghanistan, the Balkans, and most recently within the OSCE, 
and to (1) encourage Finland to continue to play a 
constructive role in promoting peace and security through 
Euro-Atlantic and other international institutions; (2) urge 
the Government to fill promised contributions and commit to 
increased future military, civilian and development 
assistance to Afghanistan; and (3) urge Finnish leaders to 
publicly support a common U.S.-EU policy on Russia.  Stubb is 
spearheading Finland's campaign for a UN Security Council 
Seat for 2013-14, and may seek to enlist our support. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
Political Overview 
------------------ 
 
¶3. (SBU) Our relations with Finland are excellent.  Prime 
Minister Matti Vanhanen and his Cabinet share responsibility 
for the implementation of Finnish foreign policy with 
President Tarja Halonen. Vanhanen leads a center-right 
governing coalition that has placed high importance on 
working through the EU and on improving Finland,s 
partnership with NATO and its overall relationship with the 
United States.  Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb hails from 
the center-right cabinet member that most vocally supports 
strong transatlantic ties.  While Stubb does not hide his 
support for Finland's eventual NATO membership, he publicly 
hews to the GOF's policy that despite a "strong case" 
favoring membership Finland will remain in the Partnership 
for Peace during this government's tenure (ending in 2011). 
(NOTE: President Halonen has ruled out seeking NATO 
membership during her term, which ends in 2013.  END NOTE.) 
Stubb, as Chairman-in-Office in the OSCE, helped broker a 
cease-fire in Georgia last August and - unusual for a Finnish 
leader - condemned the action, albeit as OSCE Chair. 
 
Comprehensive approach to crisis management 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Finnish participation in international peacekeeping 
operations dates back to the Sinai in the 1950s.  The Finns 
describe their approach to international crisis management as 
comprehensive, seeking to utilize all resources - civilian 
and military, public and private - to best advantage.  The 
GOF maintains an international military presence in key 
locations, including Afghanistan (110) and Kosovo (440), and 
aims for an overall civilian participation abroad of 150. 
The Finns' approach encounters considerable domestic 
constraints.  Owing to a deeply entrenched notion that in war 
(including two against Russia during World War II) the Finns 
have always stood alone, Finland devotes the vast majority of 
military resources to territorial defense, with only a 
relatively small amount for crisis management operations. 
The GOF spends EUR 100M/year to support the roughly 700 
troops abroad; it has proposed an increase of EUR 50M/year, 
intended to maintain current levels. 
 
Increasing in Afghanistan Comprehensively 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Afghanistan, where the Finns have provided military, 
civilian and development assistance since 2002, presents the 
Finns the opportunity to demonstrate their commitment to 
their comprehensive approach.  After a period of policy 
deadlock, in early 2009 the GOF approved plans to temporarily 
double its military contingent (to 210), located at the 
Swedish-led PRT in Mazar-e-Sharif, in support of the upcoming 
 
HELSINKI 00000162  002 OF 002 
 
 
presidential elections; to increase participation in 
Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams; and to double its 
contribution of civilian police trainers to EUPOL (to 18-20). 
 Finland also will increase development assistance by 1 
million euros per year, reaching EUR 16M/year by 2013.  We 
welcome those increases, though they are relatively modest 
compared to the contributions of their Nordic neighbors, 
particularly on the military side.  Stubb likely would 
acknowledge the political challenge within the GOF and the 
Parliament in securing further military increases. In the 
absence of additional military contributions, the Finland 
should fill promised slots and exploit untapped civilian 
expertise beyond police trainers, e.g., in building 
government institutions. 
 
A new approach to Russia 
------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Russia is Finland,s largest bilateral trading partner 
and its primary energy supplier, and Finns are proud of the 
way they have managed their relations with Russia through the 
Cold War and up to the present day.  That management 
typically involves careful public statements by government 
officials calculated not to provoke.  Stubb wants to change 
that style, and he spearheaded the GOF's adoption in April of 
a "Russia Action Plan," a set of realistic guidelines to 
govern relations with its neighbor (REF A).  The Plan 
recognizes the importance for Finland that Russia have an 
open democracy, a modernizing economy and stable social 
conditions, and it envisions cooperation without the usual 
practice of sidestepping challenges and deficiencies on the 
Russian side.  Stubb does not limit his call for new thinking 
to Finland, evidenced by his comments at the March 4 
Transatlantic dinner in Brussels, seeing in Russia's ongoing 
transition an opportunity for improving relations with the 
West. (NOTE: President Medvedev made his first visit to 
Finland in April (REF B), and met President Halonen (Stubb 
met with Foreign Minister Lavrov).  Prime Minister Putin 
visits Finland later in May.  END NOTE.) 
 
Central role for the EU 
----------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) As the most public supporter of Euro-Atlantic 
institutions in the GOF, Stubb also strongly supports the 
EU's central role within Finland's foreign policy.  The 
Russia Action Plan calls for promotion of bilateral relations 
as well as active development of the EU's policy towards 
Russia.  Having placed such importance on the EU, many Finns 
have become critical of and frustrated with its performance. 
Stubb has said that the EU's dependence on Russia for energy 
provides leverage over Russia the EU has not utilized. The 
Action Plan notes Russian frustration with, and interest in 
exploiting, EU policy incoherence and internal differences. 
GOF officials also have criticized the EU's lack of strategic 
vision on Afghanistan, being more distracted at the highest 
levels by mundane tasks like counting the number of civilian 
experts. 
 
BUTLER