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DE RUEHIK #0024/01 1171016
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R 271016Z APR 09
FM AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0443
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHIK/AMCONSUL THESSALONIKI 0486

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 THESSALONIKI 000024 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PGOV SOCI GR TU
SUBJECT: THESSALONIKI:  GREECE IMPLEMENTING PROMISED MEASURES FOR 
TURKISH MINORITY, BUT KEY ISSUES (MUFTIS AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION) 
REMAIN UNRESOLVED 
 
REF: A. 07 THESSALONIKI  019;  B. THESSALONIKI 12 
 
THESSALONI 00000024  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
¶1.       (SBU) SUMMARY:  The Greek Government continues to 
implement several measures it announced in February 2007 (Ref A) 
aimed at addressing concerns of the Turkophone Muslim minority 
in Thrace, northeastern Greece.   While the GoG has made 
progress in hiring imams and cancelling taxes on Muslim 
charitable foundations, Turkophone Muslims complain that little 
has been done to meet their key demands such as better 
education, the right to choose muftis and to self-identify as 
Turkish.   Recent EU, UN and COE reports urging the GoG to 
address these issues, coupled with multiple European Court of 
Human Rights rulings against Greece, could provide some impetus 
for progress.  Domestic politics, however, will limit the GoG's 
ability to take any steps that might appear as unreciprocated 
concessions to Turkey.  END SUMMARY 
 
SLOW PROGRESS ON MUSLIM RIGHTS MEASURES ANNOUNCED IN 2007 
 
¶2.      (SBU)  The Greek Government continues to implement 
measures it announced in February 2007 (Ref A) aimed at 
addressing concerns of the Turkophone Muslim minority in Thrace 
(northeastern Greece).  The following is an update on the status 
of key minority concerns, based on recent Post contacts and a 
March 18 visit to Thrace by Greek Desk Officer Adam Scarlatelli 
and ConGen staff, which included meetings with former New 
Democracy (ruling party) MP and lawyer Ilhan Ahmed, Turkophone 
Muslim journalist Cemil Kapsa and Thrace-based MFA Director of 
Political Affairs, Ambassador Alexandros Alexandris.   [Note: 
Ahmed and Kapsa both visited the U.S., in 2005 and 2007 
respectively, as part of International Visitor Programs on Young 
Muslim Leaders.   End Note] 
 
-- CANCELLATION OF DEBT OWED BY WAKFS (Muslim religious 
foundations):  In March 2007, Parliament voted to cancel tax 
debts owed by wakfs, estimated at about 12m .  However, the tax 
authorities in Thrace have still not received instructions from 
the Ministry of Finance to proceed with implementation of the 
measure.  According to former ND MP Ilhan Ahmed, this was 
because by law, a processing fee amounting to 3.6 percent of the 
amount of debt owed (approximately 400,000 ) had to be paid to 
the state first.  In most cases, the wakfs could not afford to 
pay that amount and so the issue of the debt forgiveness 
remained unresolved.  Based on negotiations that concluded 
recently, the Ministry of Finance has decided to make an 
exception and to waive the fee.  Mr. Ahmed believes that once 
this obstacle is removed, implementation of the law will occur 
immediately. 
 
-- EDUCATION: The GoG promised in February 2007 to improve 
education for the Muslim minority, including creating "second 
chance" schools that would allow adults to obtain high school 
diplomas.   Local contacts report that there are six such 
schools, with over 400 adult participants.   Minority primary 
schools (which offer bilingual education in Greek and Turkish) 
are "adequate," according to journalist and Muslim activist 
Cemil Kapsa, but other Muslims complain that the quality of 
instruction is far below that of mainstream public schools. 
Kapsa stressed the need for more minority secondary schools, 
since the two existing are ones over-crowded and of inferior 
quality.   Also, since pre-school education became compulsory in 
2008, Kapsa has called on the GoG to introduce minority 
kindergartens with instruction mostly in Turkish and some Greek. 
   The GoG is reportedly considering establishing bilingual 
kindergartens offering Turkish, Pomak or Romani, depending on 
student needs.  The Turkish government, through its consulate in 
Komotini, Thrace, is reportedly funding a variety of informal 
schools for Turkophone Muslims, including Turkish language 
kindergartens and religious schools.  The GoG opposes Turkey's 
role as politically-inspired meddling in Greek domestic affairs. 
 Under a 1968 agreement, Greece and Turkey exchange a small 
number of teachers for their respective minorities.  As the 
number of Greeks in Istanbul has dwindled, Greece has sent fewer 
teachers.  Since the 1970s Greece has also sought a reduction in 
the number of teachers sent by Turkey, arguing for reciprocity 
and also for allowing local Turkophone Greeks to fill minority 
teaching positions. 
 
-- MUSLIM QUOTA IN CIVIL SERVICE: The GoG undertook in February 
2007 to create a Muslim quota for Greece's highly coveted civil 
service positions, similar to the 0.5 percent quota already in 
place for Muslims in Greek universities.  (Note:  Muslims are 
approximately 1.0 percent of the population.)   The GoG has not 
yet passed a law for implementing such a quota.   MFA Political 
Affairs Director for Thrace Ambassador Alexandris stated that 
the measure is being implemented de facto, with the first 
appointments having taken place in September 2008.  He was 
unable to provide specific data, other than the hiring of seven 
Muslims as professional soldiers in the Greek Army, as well as a 
 
THESSALONI 00000024  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
group of recently hired Muslim forest rangers.  The GoG has also 
hired 183 imams as religious teachers (see below).  It is 
unclear how the GoG plans to fill 0.5 percent of Greece's large 
public sector workforce with Muslims. 
 
--HIRING OF 240 IMAMS: The government committed itself in 
February 2007 to hire 240 imams to assist in the religious 
education of the Muslim minority in Thrace, paid by the state as 
public servants, in the same manner as Greek Orthodox priests. 
According to the MFA's Alexandris, the GoG hired 183 imams in 
January 2009 and they received their first state pay checks in 
March 2009. The Ministry of Education & Religion had identified 
240 candidates, but only 183 met the educational requirements 
stipulated by law, e. g. a primary education certificate. 
Muslims are divided over the desirability of the measure.  While 
former MP Ahmed called it "brave", Mr. Kapsa argued that the 
minority opposes imams being GoG employees appointed by 
Christians and would prefer the imams to be paid by the Muslim 
community, from revenues generated by the wakfs.  The GoG, he 
said, should pay imams only in cases when the community lacks 
funds. 
 
 --"STATELESS" MUSLIMS": The GoG promised in February 2007 to 
re-instate citizenship for the remaining stateless persons in 
Thrace who lost Greek citizenship under a provision in the Greek 
Constitution (repealed in 1998) that deprived thousands of 
ethnic Turks of Greeks of citizenship.    The MFA's Alexandris 
claimed that very few cases are outstanding and that all 
applications are being processed  "efficiently".  He was not 
aware of a backlog of applications, though he acknowledged  some 
stateless people may not  have applied for re-instatement of 
citizenship due to the high cost of the fee (around 1,500) (Ref 
B).  Muslim activists claim the number of stateless people 
seeking reinstatement is 350-500. 
 
NO PROGRESS ON KEY DEMANDS:  MUFTIS AND SELF-IDENTIFICATION 
 
¶3.   (SBU) The GoG continues to resist two key demands of the 
Turkophone Muslim minority:  the right to choose their muftis 
and the right to self-identify as Turks.  (Note:  Thrace Muslims 
chose their muftis, in consultation with government authorities, 
until 1985, when the GoG assumed full control over the 
appointments.  End Note).  The MFA's February 2007 initiative 
did not address either demand.   The GoG argues that since 
muftis exercise judicial authority (deciding family and civil 
matters in accordance with Shari'a law), they must be appointed 
by the state.  Consequently, there exist two sets of muftis, the 
official muftis appointed and paid by the GoG, and the 
unofficial muftis elected by male members of the Muslim 
community and paid by the local community.   After several ECHR 
rulings that criticized Greece's treatment of the unofficial 
muftis, as well as reports in the past few months by the EU and 
UN minority and human rights experts (see para 6 below), the MFA 
is reportedly reviewing the matter.  According to GoG contacts, 
the MFA has consulted with academic experts on possible 
solutions, including a proposal to allow Muslims to appoint 
muftis provided that muftis no longer exercise judicial 
authority. 
 
¶4.   (SBU) Many GoG officials view the movement to elect 
independent muftis as part of a Turkish strategy to gain control 
over Thrace's 150,000 Muslims and possibly to reclaim Thrace 
itself one day.  Visits by senior Turkish officials to Thrace, 
increased Turkish investment in Thrace, and perceived Turkish 
meddling in local politics have fueled such suspicions.  Turkey 
reportedly pays the salaries of the unofficial muftis (called 
"pseudo-muftis" by their detractors) as well as many imams and 
religious teachers in Thrace, through its consulate.  Unofficial 
muftis have been quoted in the media making politically 
provocative statements such as "Thrace is part of Turkey." 
Greek diplomats also argue that Turkish government statements on 
behalf of Thrace Turks, on muftis and other minority issues, are 
an attempt to gain leverage in other disputes with Greece, 
including with regard to Halki Seminary, the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and Greek minority in Istanbul.  Greece rejects 
such linkages. 
 
¶5.  (SBU) The GoG is particularly sensitive to pressure from 
Turkey and others to allow Turkophone Muslims the right to 
identify themselves collectively as "Turkish."  Greece contends 
that since the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne mentions only one 
minority, Muslims, no other group in Thrace can call itself a 
minority.  Furthermore, most Greeks consider any suggestion that 
there is a Turkish minority in Thrace as provocative and linked 
to perceived Turkish designs on Thrace.  Greece refuses to 
recognize and has even prosecuted NGOs that use the word 
"Turkish" in their names.  The European Court of Human Rights 
ruled in March 2008 that such prosecution violated the groups' 
 
THESSALONI 00000024  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
right to freedom of association.  Greece appealed the decision 
and lost, but has not altered its policy.  While the government 
recognizes the right of individuals to self-identify, it 
continues to consider groups such as the Turkish Union of Xanthi 
and Turkish Consultative Council as hostile to the Greek state 
and refuses to accord them NGO status.   The issue of ethnic 
identity has divided the Thrace Muslim population.  For example, 
Slavic speaking Muslims (Pomaks) complain they are pressured by 
ethnic Turks to declare themselves Turkish.  Officially, the 
Greek government recognizes just one Muslim minority but states 
that there are Pomak, Roma, and Turkophone "communities" within 
that minority. 
 
COULD EU, COE AND UN CRITICISM OF GOG PROVIDE IMPETUS FOR CHANGE? 
 
¶6.   (SBU) Recent EU and UN reports have criticized several 
aspects of the GoG's treatment of the Thrace Muslim minority.  A 
February 19, 2009 report by Europe's Commissioner for Human 
Rights Thomas Hammarberg on "Human Rights of Minorities" in 
Greece (based on a December 2008 visit) recommended that Greece 
open a dialogue with Muslims on the establishment of direct 
election of muftis coupled with the withdrawal of their judicial 
authority.  Hammarberg also expressed concern about Greek 
restrictions on the Turkophone minority's freedom of 
association.  He criticized Greece's refusal to comply with ECHR 
decisions supporting the minority's right of 
self-identification, which had, inter alia, created additional 
work for the Court in the form of repeated cases against Greece. 
 Additionally, on March 24, the Committee on Legal Affairs of 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) 
called on both Greece and Turkey to recognize the "freedom of 
ethnic self-identification."   A February 18, 2009 report by UN 
Independent Expert on Minority issues in Greece by Gay McDougall 
(based on a September 2008 visit) similarly criticized Greece's 
refusal to recognize Thrace Muslims' "Turkish" ethnicity. 
McDougall called Greece's interpretation of the term "minority" 
as too restrictive, and urged compliance with "the post-1945 
legal framework of modern human rights treaties."  She condemned 
the government appointment of muftis as an infringement on 
freedom of religion, and stated that the muftis "should be 
chosen by their religious communities."  Like Hammarberg, she 
favored restricting the authority of muftis to "religious duties 
that do not infringe fundamental rights." 
 
¶7.   (SBU) COMMENT:   The GoG has refused to allow Turkish 
minority self-identification and election of muftis because both 
issues are strongly identified with perceived Turkish 
interference in Thrace affairs.   The steady accumulation of 
ECHR rulings against Greece's treatment of the Muslim minority, 
combined with recent highly publicized EU, UN and COE criticism, 
offers Greece a small face-saving opportunity to resolve 
long-standing points of contention with Thrace Muslims, i.e. 
under the political cover of UN and EU recommendations.   The 
MFA has taken note of increased U.S. and international scrutiny 
of Greece's treatment of its Muslim minority, and seems to be 
reviewing proposed solutions.   The GoG is unlikely, however, to 
adopt any new measures that could be cast by the resurgent 
opposition as concessions to Turkey.  A significant gesture by 
Turkey toward its Greek minority would create an opening for 
reciprocal steps, but Greece will reject any formal linkage. 
Greece insists for example that Turkey is obliged to address 
longstanding Greek minority concerns in the context of its 
European aspirations (not as a trade-off with Greece), and that 
Thrace Muslim rights issues are not on the bilateral agenda. 
Post will continue to encourage the GoG to implement the 2007 
initiatives, ECHR decisions and other measures that will 
strengthen minority rights in accordance with European 
conventions and treaties as well as its stated goal of being a 
European model for the treatment of minorities. 
YEE