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FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
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INFO RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 KABUL 000809 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PREL AMGT ABLD APER CVIS AF
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR DEPUTY SECRETARY LEW 
 
¶1. (SBU) Embassy Kabul warmly welcomes your visit. 
 
¶2. (SBU) The coming year will take its identity from the 
Afghan presidential election, and from increased US military 
deployments.  Implementing the new strategy will require 
significant resources to enhance our current diplomatic 
support platform.  We continue to face tough challenges in 
Afghanistan, particularly on the security and governance 
front.  The President's Strategic Review for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan has delineated the way forward in Afghanistan. 
Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Holbrooke 
is leading the effort to take a more integrated, regional 
approach here.  Conditions remain more nuanced than the 
negative drumbeat often coming from the media.  Advances in 
security do not grab headlines the way a spectacular suicide 
attack does.  Progress in development continues.  National 
and international will is holding, but poor governance and 
corruption are corrosive problems.  The Afghan response to 
President Obama's strategy for Afghanistan has been 
overwhelmingly positive, including a strong public 
endorsement from Karzai.  This suggests that he too is 
looking to turn the page on the period of disagreement and 
growing tensions in our relationship. 
 
Resource Issues 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU)  Upgrading Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif --  Planning is 
underway to stand up these two locations by June 1.  Funding 
sources and specific requirements are being determined, to 
support projected seven-person State with other agency 
personnel at each site. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Housing and desks in Kabul --  Frequently-amended 
staffing projections have complicated planning, but we expect 
30-50 new USDH on compound by July, and 100 by the end of the 
year.  20 trailers (40  beds) will be ready for occupancy by 
early May, with another 40 trailers (80  beds) ready by 
end-August.  We currently have 60 spare desks (unclassified 
areas) and plan to increase to 100 by rearranging and "dense 
packing" work areas.  Our classified office space is at 
maximum capacity, so new requirements would displace current 
occupants. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Airwing --  State received 08 supplemental ($19m) 
and 09 bridge supp ($36m) funds for added air assets.  INL 
Airwing (Patrick AFB and Kabul), at SCA's request, conducted 
a study to determine best type of aircraft and acquisition 
method (purchase or lease) to meet projected needs.  The 
study indicates purchase, with 2-3 aircraft arriving December 
2009 at the earliest. 
 
¶6. (SBU) Added air transport requirements as we open Herat 
and Mazar, and in the runup for elections, will not be met 
with current plans.  Leasing via an existing USAID Air 
contract appears a reasonable alternative, getting aircraft 
here as early as July.  A third possibility would be 
chartered hours from existing in-country air service 
providers.  Commercial carriers KamAir and Safi Airways might 
also be options. 
 
¶7. (SBU) New apartment and office construction --  OBO 
intends to award contracts for a 200-unit apartment building 
and 530-desk unclassified office annex on the existing 
embassy compounds in Kabul.  Construction should begin by 
early 2010 and be completed in late 2011.  Existing housing 
and services trailers (the Afghan "Brothers" cafeteria) will 
be displaced to other locations on-compound. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Acquiring additional land --  for staff growth and 
relocating the LGF guard camp (Camp Sullivan), prospects are 
good for getting 25-30 acres of MoD-controlled parcels from 
the GIRoA, but we will need to continue to raise this at high 
levels (MoD, MFA, Karzai) until resolved.  Murky land titling 
and competing ownership claims may delay or complicate 
acquiring the land.  To make the 25-30 acres usable, we need 
to acquire the "TAYL panhandle," a 1-acre strip separating 
our compound from the 25-30 acres noted above.  The panhandle 
is attached to the main TAYL property, 6-acres slated for 
Marriott hotel construction starting April 2009, also 
adjacent to our CAFE compound and bordering Massoud Circle. 
OPIC has loaned TAYL funds for the project.  A US investor 
owns 25% of TAYL.  We also want to acquire a 3.5 acre 
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) property adjacent to the 
north end of our embassy-side compound.  However, in 
exchange, MoPH would like a new ministry building ($19m), 
disproportional to the $4-5m appraised value of the current 
MoPH site. 
 
¶9. (SBU) SIVs - Special Immigrant Visas --  The 2009 Omnibus 
Appropriations Act included 1500 SIVs per year for the next 
five years for USG and USG-contractor employees with one year 
of service who face a threat related to their employment. 
 
KABUL 00000809  002 OF 004 
 
 
This has the potential to significantly increase LES/FSN 
turnover, if large numbers of LES pursue this SIV, as we 
expect they will. 
 
Elections 
--------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The August 20 presidential election continues to 
color every aspect of political life here.  Karzai's 
popularity has fallen - dramatically in some areas and among 
some constituencies.  But overall the Asia Foundation poll 
found that 66 percent of the population still thought the 
national government was doing a "very good" or "somewhat 
good" job (compared to 80 percent in 2007).  In our view, it 
is Karzai's election to lose so long as political opposition 
leaders continue to quarrel among themselves and fail to 
unite behind a credible opposition candidate.  Opposition 
coalition United Front has signaled Dr. Abdullah Abdullah 
will be its candidate, but has not yet made an official 
announcement - reportedly due to ongoing internal discussions 
aimed at securing broader UF support for an Abdullah 
candidacy.  Insecurity and corruption are the President's 
greatest vulnerabilities.  Karzai installed Interior Minister 
Atmar in October 2008 to turn up the heat on both problems. 
Atmar is working hard, but timeis too short for dramatic 
improvement before elections. 
 
¶11. (SBU) An expected rise in insecurity in the south during 
elections is prompting some - including Karzai, other 
Pashtuns and some RC-South partners - to raise the specter of 
Pashtun disenfranchisement and possible illegitimacy of the 
vote.  Predicted disruptions of voter registration, however, 
did not take place, even in the south and we are confident 
that voting itself will go forward, not least because of the 
arrival of additional U.S. combat brigades and the growth of 
the Afghan army at more than 2500 troops per month.  We 
expect some election violence, however. 
 
Debate Over Transitional Authority 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) The earlier election date debate has been resolved. 
 The opposition now has shifted its focus to challenging the 
legitimacy of Karzai remaining in office beyond May 22, the 
date on which his term expires under the Afghan constitution. 
 The issue is executive authority following May 22 and 
through August 20 to the inauguration of the next president. 
Opposition leaders' claims that they are motivated by 
constitutional concerns ring hollow given their alternatives 
are equally extra-constitutional.  However, there is genuine 
concern among some Afghans and the international community 
that Karzai will use his office inappropriately to leverage 
support for his re-election.  We recognize this concern, but 
believe it is important for Afghanistan to maintain 
continuity of leadership throughout this period, especially 
during the summer fighting season and in the lead-up to 
elections.  We have therefore encouraged the opposition to 
focus its efforts on successful elections rather than on 
political posturing.  At the same time, we have asked Karzai 
to publicly support the principles of a level-playing field 
for all candidates. 
 
¶13. (SBU) The Supreme Court weighed into the debate March 29 
issuing a statement saying the President and his two Vice 
Presidents should continue in office based on the principles 
of the Afghan constitution and sharia law, as well as the 
same logistical concerns that led to political consensus 
supporting a later election date than is prescribed in the 
constitution.  The opposition objected to the Supreme Court 
statement, accusing Karzai of engineering it.  The Court's 
comment is not binding, but does add political weight to 
Karzai staying in place until elections.  The Department of 
State issued a public statement March 30 strongly supporting 
and welcoming the Court's statement, adding the U.S. believes 
continuity of government is critical during this period and 
contributes to creating stability.  We expect the 
transitional authority issue to be resolved eventually 
through some political consensus in which Karzai remains in 
office until the election. 
 
Security 
-------- 
 
¶14. (SBU) Seventy percent of the violence continues to occur 
in about 10 percent of the 365 districts.  Coalition and 
Afghan security forces have increased our area of control. 
The Taliban response has been a forced shift in tactics from 
insurgency to terrorism designed to challenge the will of 
Afghans and the international community.  Ordinary Afghans 
feel less safe because of this switch, and as result of 
rising criminality, especially kidnappings. 
 
¶15. (SBU) President Obama's decision to deploy 17,000 U.S. 
 
KABUL 00000809  003 OF 004 
 
 
troops is concrete support of the U.S. commitment to improve 
Afghan security.  A number of coalition partners are also 
increasing their troop contributions, but it's clear the U.S. 
will continue to provide the lion's share of international 
security support to Afghanistan.  Afghan National Security 
Forces (ANSF) will be undermanned for the foreseeable future. 
 The recently-released Strategic Review contained U.S. 
acknowledgment that the ANSF must be expanded but it was not 
specific on the questions of "how much" and "how fast." 
Presently there are about 82,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) 
soldiers, 81,000 Afghan National Police, and about 59,000 
international military personnel to maintain security.  The 
ANA is growing at more than 2,500 per month and is projected 
to reach its currently authorized strength of 134,000 in 
¶2011.  The current ANP authorized strength is 82,000. 
International forces are expected to top 80,000 by late 2009. 
 We and the international community are working closely with 
MOI Atmar to accelerate police reform and training, develop 
more intelligence-based policing, significantly reduce 
corruption, and create vetted, specialized police units. 
 
¶16. (SBU) We and the U.S. military are also cooperating with 
President Karzai's initiative to energize renewed community 
responsibility for security in their locality, without 
re-creating local militias.  The Afghan Public Protection 
Force (APPF) is still in development stage, and will be an 
official ANSF organization under the Minister of Interior. 
In the pilot phase, district councils and local shuras 
nominated over 200 local - but tribally integrated - 
community guards per district. These candidates were vetted 
by the Minister of Interior and National Directorate of 
Security.  CSTC-A and U.S. Special Forces trained the 
trainers and ODA SOF will provide the guards with mentoring 
oversight for local defense within the boundaries of the 
community.  The first members of the Afghan Public Protection 
Force just graduated from training March 26.  The pilot 
program is underway in Wardak Province. 
 
Governance 
---------- 
 
¶17. (SBU) Karzai struggles to maintain a balance between 
institutional and traditional informal governance, in an 
environment of poverty, social exhaustion, illicit power 
centers arising from decades of political breakdown, 
governmental incapacity, criminality, and insurgency. 
Electoral dynamics are further complicating the problem, 
leading Karzai to make expedient decisions on one hand, but 
also to appoint top-flight leaders like Atmar who seem 
capable of delivering police services on the other.  There 
are no easy answers, and neither Karzai nor the international 
community can fight all battles all the time.  That said, we 
will look for improved Afghan performance on the governance 
front with increased U.S. civilian presence and capacity 
building assistance from both the U.S. and other donors. 
 
¶18. (SBU) In Kabul, the focus is on capacity building, 
creation of a merit-based, professional bureaucracy, and 
delivery of services to the public.  Strong ministries 
include Foreign Affairs, Defense, Public Health, Education, 
Finance, Rural Development, and Counter-Narcotics.  The 
Central Bank is well-led.  Interior and Agriculture have new, 
better leadership.  We work closely with those entities.  We 
also work effectively with the other ministries, but mixed 
agendas or a legacy of weakness slow progress.  For instance, 
the Supreme Court and the Ministry of Justice suffer from the 
acute lack of qualified professionals, a history of judicial 
decision-making that combines elements of Sharia, tribal, and 
now Western law, and a lack of national consensus on the way 
forward. 
 
¶19. (SBU) Outside Kabul, U.S. civilian and military efforts 
are aimed at strengthening both the Afghan central 
government's role and that of local government.  We work 
equally with traditional leadership structures, as well as 
those who gained power through force or wealth during the 
days of conflict, but have proven themselves ready to 
cooperate with constitutional government and rule of law. 
Lack of local consensus, traditionally weak connections 
between the capital and localities, long-standing rivalries 
and distrust among communities, and the presence of 
illegitimate insurgent or criminal spoilers complicate the 
task.  The goal is responsive, reliable leadership in local 
communities, which binds them to the capital in a reciprocal 
way.  The Embassy working with U.S. Forces Afghanistan 
(USFOR-A) created an Integrated Civil Military Action Group 
(ICMAG) as a means to enhance unity of effort across all 
military and civilian agencies, with initial focus on 
Regional Command-East (RC-E).  This group is now expanding 
its effort to RC-South as the U.S. presence increases in that 
region in the coming months.  The ICMAG's mandate includes 
joint civilian-military planning assessments and operations 
from the national to the local level. 
 
KABUL 00000809  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
Taliban Reconciliation 
---------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) Reconciliation with Taliban or other insurgent 
leaders is controversial here.  Many welcome the possibility 
of reduced violence and instability via a possible 
reconciliation with the Taliban, while others (mainly 
non-Pashtuns, women, and certain civil society groups) fear a 
Pashtun deal that could come at the expense of their 
interests.  So far, all reconciliation efforts have been 
premised on respect for the constitution, and no ties to 
Al-Qaeda, which has allowed us to support these initiatives. 
Although last year's Saudi attempt to begin talks about talks 
generated much interest, there has since been little concrete 
progress in that or any other initiative. 
 
Narcotics: Serious Challenges Remain; Some Positive Trends 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶21. (SBU) Poppy cultivation remains a difficult challenge, 
particularly addressing the nexus between narcotics 
traffickers and insurgents; a challenge further complicated 
by widespread public corruption.  However, there is some good 
news; poppy cultivation dropped 19 percent in 2008, the first 
reduction since 2005.  Poppy-free provinces grew from 13 to 
18, or to more than half of all provinces.  Three formerly 
major poppy cultivating provinces - Badakhshan, Balkh, and 
Nangarhar - have succeeded in eliminating or nearly 
eliminating poppy cultivation.  However, the narcotics 
challenge continues in the south, where seven provinces now 
account for 98 percent of the country's opium, and 
trafficking is bound to the insurgency.  Together with the 
UK, we are backing Helmand Governor Mangal's initiative to 
eliminate narcotics cultivation in a 100-square mile area of 
Helmand through an intensive information campaign, 
agricultural assistance, and Afghan army-protected 
eradication.  The Afghan Police's Poppy Eradication 
Force (PEF) with security support from the Afghan Army's 
Counter Narcotics Infantry Kandak (CINK) is currently 
conducting eradication in Helmand province in 
narcotics-growing areas where there is heavy presence of 
anti-government forces. 
 
International Community and Afghanistan 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶22. (SBU) Relations between the government and the 
international community are uneven.  International support is 
holding, as demonstrated by broad international support for 
the Administration's comprehensive policy and increased, 
closer policy consultation with key partners.  There has been 
real improvement in bilateral relations with the Zardari 
government of Pakistan, although there is strong skepticism 
here that Zardari can ever extend control over Pakistan's 
military and intelligence apparatus.  The UN presence is 
strong, but SRSG Kai Eide has not yet been able to play the 
key coordination role hoped for, not least because of 
insufficient budgetary and personnel commitment from New York. 
 
¶23. (SBU)  There are often disagreements between the 
internationals and the Afghan government regarding issues of 
corruption, governance, rule of law, freedom of the press, 
and other areas.  Internationals bridle, for example, when 
Karzai attributes the bulk of corruption in Afghanistan to 
international aid donations.  The most important gap between 
the government and the coalition is over the issue of 
civilian casualties:  there are efforts moving towards 
agreement on the balance between necessary security 
operations and necessary protections for civilians, including 
an agreement signed by General McKiernan and Afghan Minister 
of Defense Wardak, aiming to minimize civilian casualties 
through increased coordination between ANSF and coalition 
forces. 
 
¶24. (SBU) Karzai's enthusiastic public response to the 
release of the President's Strategic Review marked a dramatic 
shift from his relentless criticism of the U.S. (and the 
international community) earlier this year.  Karzai said he 
was in full agreement with the new U.S. strategy, that it was 
exactly what Afghans were hoping for and had Afghanistan full 
support.  This change in tone suggests Karzai is ready to 
turn the page in U.S.-Afghan relations and move past the 
recent period of disagreement and increased tension sparked 
by civilian casualties and fanned by Karzai's concerns 
regarding the level of support he could expect from a new 
U.S. administration. 
WOOD