VZCZCXRO2306
OO RUEHDBU RUEHPW
DE RUEHBUL #1093/01 1191605
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
O 291605Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY KABUL
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8677
INFO RHEHAAA/NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON DC
RUEHC/DEPT OF AGRICULTURE WASHINGTON DC 0119
RUCNAFG/AFGHANISTAN COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
RHMFIUU/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC
RHEFHLC/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 06 KABUL 001093 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR SRAP, SCA/FO, SCA/A, NEA/SCA/EX 
STATE PASS TO AID FOR ASIA/SCAA 
AGRICULTURE FOR FAS MICHENER 
NSC FOR WOOD 
OSD FOR HEIDI MEYER 
CENTCOM FOR CG CSTC-A, CG CJTF-101 POLAD 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: AMGT APER PGOV PREL ETRD EFIN AF
SUBJECT: Afghanistan's USG Civilian Uplift - Defining its structure, 
timing, and costs 
 
Ref: A) 08 Kabul 2985, B) 08 Kabul 2970, C) 08 Kabul 40 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
¶1. To implement the President's Strategy for Afghanistan and 
Pakistan, Embassy Kabul requires immediate funding and hiring 
authority to increase U.S. civilian staff.  Our purpose is to build 
security, governance and development capacity in the Afghan 
government across all lines of operation at the national and 
sub-national levels.  GIRoA has responded enthusiastically to the 
planned significant American civilian increase, and has requested 
more advisors and mentors in specific disciplines.  Based on our 
current projections of U.S. staff requirements in support of U.S. 
objectives with Afghanistan, we believe we need  421 civilian 
positions across all agencies under Chief-of-Mission (COM) authority 
to Mission Afghanistan.  This will nearly double the current level 
of 502 civilian staff.  This number assures that the U.S. will 
continue in addition to contract out substantial program 
requirements and to fund the best NGO programs.  We also assume that 
other coalition parners will make at least modest contributions of 
personnel as well as funds.   End Summary. 
 
¶2. All agencies acting in Afghanistan under Chief of Mission 
authority should understand that, for maximum effectiveness, for the 
good order and discipline of the mission, to lower costs, and to 
minimize waste, fraud and abuse, their civilians must be deployed in 
accordance NSDD-38 on minimum 12-month assignments.  COM will 
approve shorter, TDY deployments on a limited case-by-case basis 
only when necessary to accomplish specific short term missions.  COM 
will not approve the use of consecutive short-term TDYs to 
substitute for permanent staffing requirements.  Those agencies who 
have been staffing permanent requirements via successive TDYs 
therefore should immediately initiate necessary NSDD-38 requests and 
identify permanent staff to meet current and future requirements in 
Afghanistan. 
 
---------------  -------------------------- 
Civilian Uplift Complements Troop Increases 
---------------  ---------------------------- 
¶3. Additional civilians deployed from Kabul down to the local level 
across Afghanistan, at every level of planning, dialogue and 
decision-making, will advance our counterinsurgency goalseven as 
coalition and Afghan military and police forces move through the 
"shape" and "clear" phases of counterinsurgency.  In the "hold" and 
"build" phases, governance and development are even more critical to 
the success of counterinsurgency.  Through our existing presence and 
participation in Task Forces and Provincial Reconstruction Teams 
(PRTs), we have begun to establish a shared understanding of USG 
goals and priorities across military and civilian agencies, using an 
integrated "board of directors" approach at the country team level. 
However, true fusion of effort remains to be accomplished from the 
national down to the local level.  The civilian increase will enable 
such intra-USG unity of effort at all levels and should also expand 
context and cooperation with host nation local officials and 
communities, with coalition countries' military and civilian 
operations and with international NGOs. 
 
¶4. The additional positions will provide action officers and program 
managers at national and sub-national levels, and across the 
spectrum of critical skill sets, from rule of law and governance, to 
agriculture, education and other economic development specialities. 
We must fill the positions with strong candidates quickly to 
correspond with the new wave of 17,000 U.S. troops already arriving 
in Regional Command East (RC-E) and Regional Command South (RC-S) 
and to achieve effects in advance of the August national election. 
Securing funding for these positions is of paramount importance. 
This cable defines the needed staffing levels, skill sets, and 
hiring time frames for new staff. 
 
¶5. For positions outside Kabul, we have worked with the U.S. 
military and coalition partners to select locations where the 
addition of tailored civilian expertise will create transformational 
effects timed to developments on the ground.  Over time, in 
consultation with coalition partners and GIRoA, we also expect to 
 
KABUL 00001093  002 OF 006 
 
 
deploy some civilians to the north (Mazar-e Sharif) and west (Herat) 
at American and ISAF-country-operated facilities.  The new District 
Support Teams (DSTs) will reside on existing Forward Operating Bases 
(FOBs) and Combat Outposts (COPs).  The U.S. and ISAF military 
command do not need to create new platforms and locations for DSTs. 
 
 
¶6. Military support for security, mobility, and logistics will be a 
critical component to enable the sharp increase of civilians under 
COM authority.  We factored into our planning the absorptive 
capacity -- U.S. civilian, military and Afghan -- and requirements 
needed.  Critical to this effort will be flexible hiring mechanisms 
such as 3161 authority and Limited Non-Career Appointments (LNAs) 
which will enable us to identify and hire personnel with the right 
skill sets and experience.  We recommend the creation of an 
inter-agency office in Washington to coordinate field support and 
personnel deployments across all civilian agencies, much as was 
ultimately established for Iraq.  Some agencies have expressed the 
need to deconflict hiring mechanisms if this concept is to succeed. 
 
------------------- 
Multi-Agency Effort 
------------------- 
¶7. New positions in Afghanistan under consideration in the FY-08 
supplemental request from all agencies would total 421.  There are 
many more positions with separate funding mechanisms.  Of the 421, 
we will fill , totaling seven new positions in Kabul by June 2009. 
Another 155 will arrive by March 2010.  Those hires would be 
comprised of the following offices and agencies: various State 
Department and USAID elements, Department of Justice (DOJ) 
prosecutors and the FBI(Legal Attache), Department of Treasury, 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Transportation 
(DOT), Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and Health and Human Services (HHS/CDC).  We 
also plan to fill 49 slots in the field by June 2009 and an 
additional 202 by March 2010.  These positions will come from State 
(including INL), USAID, USDA, and DEA. We are providing charts with 
continuous updates of agency, position details and numbers to SRAP, 
SCA/A, and NEA/SCA/EX. 
 
---- 
USDA 
---- 
¶8. Department of Agriculture (current authorized: 13 positions) has 
confirmed plans for 43 new employees, 27 of whom are in the 
supplemental request, comprised of four in Kabul and 39 in the 
provinces.  Of these, one person would be deployed by June 2009 and 
the remainder would be deployed within three months of funding 
approval.  Employees would be direct USG hires.  Of the 43, 6 would 
be based in Kabul and 37 in other areas of Afghanistan, the heaviest 
concentration of which will support the main military COIN activity 
in the south and east, without neglecting the north and west. 
 
------- 
HHS/CDC 
------- 
¶9. HHS/CDC (new permanent presence) has requested one position for a 
USG direct hire and has NSDD-38 approval from the Chief of Mission. 
The position will be located in Kabul.  CDC expects this individual 
to deploy by June 30.  CDC hopes to deploy a second person under the 
supplemental shortly thereafter. 
 
--- 
DHS 
--- 
¶10. DHS (no current authorized positions) confirms it is seeking 
funding for a new office with 11 direct hire positions in Kabul. 
The initial group can deploy within 60 days, pending funding 
approval. The existing Border Management Task Force (BMTF) plans to 
continue running its border mentor program, which includes two 
direct hire employees and several contractors deployed throughout 
Afghanistan.  Funding for those BMTF positions, with up to a total 
of 50 contractors over the next 15 months, is under consideration 
through Department of Defense funding mechanisms. 
 
 
KABUL 00001093  003.2 OF 006 
 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
DOJ - Legatt, DEA, US Attorneys, US Marshals 
-------------------------------------------- 
¶11. DOJ plans to increase its civilian presence in Afghanistan in 
four distinct areas.  FBI (Legatt - current authorized: 3 positions) 
plans to augment its current staff of three in Kabul with 19 
additional permanent staff who will arrive this summer.  LegAtt 
understands the new policy in para. 2: no more short term TDYs will 
be approved except as needed for defined, short-term missions.  FBI 
has completed the NSDD-38 authorizing the hiring of six of these 
positions but has not resolved the agency's internal issues 
regarding 12-month assignments versus TDYs.  The Criminal Division 
(current authorized: 6 positions) is planning three new direct hire 
positions in Kabul (Note: We understand that these positions are not 
included for funding through the supplemental request.  However, DOJ 
underscores that it needs additional funding to fill these positions 
immediately . End note.) The U.S. Marshals Service (current 
authorized: 4 positions) will not add any new positions, but has 
requested funding for temporary duty premium pay, personal 
protective gear, tactical equipment, and training to efficiently and 
effectively conduct its mission.  Like FBI, the Marshall's Service 
heretofore has relied on successive TDYs to staff its 4 permanent 
positions, and must now identify personnel for 12-month 
assignments. 
 
¶12. Also under DOJ, the DEA (current authorized: 81 positions) 
projects it will have a permanent staff of 81 USG direct hires and 
mistakenly presumed to include an average of 15 temporary duty 
assignees on the ground by the start of FY2010.  Like FBI and the 
Marshall's service, DEA must revise its plans to limit TDY personnel 
to the few specific short-term missions that may arise, and initiate 
NSDD-38 requests for permanent needs.  DEA currently has 13 
permanent staff in Kabul and anticipates the arrival of the first 24 
additional staff by September.  DEA is working to confirm housing 
for these additional staff and currently has enough desks.  Once the 
full complement of staff is on the ground, DEA will deploy five 
enforcement teams to Kabul, Kunduz, Jalalabad, Kandahar, and Herat. 
These teams would be housed and work in forward operating bases 
(FOBs) currently under construction by the Department of Defense. 
DEA will also work with Afghan investigative law enforcement to set 
up sensitive investigative counternarcotics units and a national 
interdiction unit. 
 
-------- 
Treasury 
-------- 
¶13. Treasury: Treasury (current authorized: 3 positions) plans to 
increase its current staff of three to a total of seven permanent 
positions.  New Treasury staff will work in Kabul and provide 
intermittent support to the field.  Personnel in Kabul will work at 
ministries, creating no new need for individual office space on the 
Embassy compound.  The positions will be filled with personal 
services contractors (PSCs), to arrive in Kabul soon after funding 
is received. 
 
-------------------- 
Transportation - FAA 
-------------------- 
¶14. Secretary of Transportation has proposed to create an Office of 
Transportation Attache.  It would include eight direct hire 
transportation experts in addition to Federal Aviation 
Administration contingent.  This proposal is currently unfunded, and 
not part of the pending supplemental request.  FAA (current 
authorized: 3 positions) is actively recruiting for three additional 
USG direct hire employees to be located in Kabul.  FAA expects these 
positions will be deployed within months after funding is approved. 
The total proposed DOT contingent of 13, including both DOT and FAA, 
includes eight DOT and five FAA direct hires. 
 
----- 
USAID 
----- 
¶15. USAID:  USAID (current authorized: 156 positions) is planning 
178 new employees, 43 of whom would be located in Kabul, with the 
remainder employed in the provinces.  Staff vacancy announcements 
 
KABUL 00001093  004 OF 006 
 
 
are already posted and ongoing; USAID has identified approximately 
50 possible candidates.  USAID will use various hiring methods to 
fill positions and plans to deploy 21 personnel as part of the 
priority 56 positions (4 to Kabul and 17 to the provinces) by end of 
June, with the remaining 157 personnel to arrive by September. 
Employees will be hired under various authorities including direct 
hire, annuitants, EFMs, PSCs and FS Limited. 
 
----- 
State 
----- 
¶16. State:  We estimate additional Department of State hiring, 
including a restructured executive office, INL, Diplomatic Security, 
and consulates in Herat and Mazar-e Sharif, will fill a total of 155 
new positions in Afghanistan between June 2009 and March 2010.  Of 
the initial June tranche of 34 personnel, 31 will deploy to the 
provinces.  Four of these will be INL rule of law advisors.  An 
additional three people will provide PRT support from Kabul.  In 
addition, Diplomatic Security plans to deploy 31 positions in June, 
including two officers at each of the new consulates.   State, like 
USAID, plans to use a combination of hiring authorities including FS 
Officers, limited appointments (LNAs) and temporary hiring 
authorities in each case, for assignments not less than 12 months. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
The Importance of "the Field" 
----------------------------- 
¶17. While Kabul is the hub of information and decisions for Mission 
Afghanistan, transformational counterinsurgency success will come in 
the field.  By March 2010, a total of 205 more employees of State, 
USAID and USDA would be in place throughout the country.  To achieve 
these gains, we propose the greatest personnel increases outside the 
capital, described in detail in the agency descriptions above.  Our 
proposal adds civilians at the division, brigade, battalion, 
provincial and district levels - through PRTs, Task Forces, and 
District Support Teams (described below).  By June 2009, we envision 
an additional 60 State Department, USAID and USDA employees will be 
deployed beyond Kabul, including 11 State Department employees at 
each of our new consulates Herat and Mazar-e Sharif. 
 
---------------------- 
District Support Teams - Taking Governance to the People 
---------------------- 
¶18. The Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) 
signaled a shift toward decentralized governance in 2007 by 
establishing the Independent Directorate of Local Governance (IDLG), 
which reports directly to the office of the Presidency.  Among 
IDLG's primary functions is engaging with provincial and district 
officials to increase their capacity to deliver basic services to 
their populations.  In addition, the Ministry of Rural 
Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD) works closely with Community 
Development Councils.  To more directly support the GIRoA effort to 
build sub-national capacity, we propose a new platform for 
integrated civ-mil effort, called District Support Teams (DSTs). 
DSTs would be staffed with a minimum of three civilians each, 
employing tailored expertise - such as agriculture, urban planning 
or rule of law - to maximize the civilian contribution to the 
integrated effort.  By tailoring skills sets to the needs in 
particular key locations, we will be better placed to seize 
opportunities in governance, development and strategic 
communications for transformational effect. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Regional Commands South and East - Bringing the Interagency Civilian 
Increase Together 
-------------------------------- 
¶19. In U.S.-led Regional Command-East (RC-E), our civilian structure 
is already well-established.    We plan to augment our already 
strong position at division, task force brigade and PRT levels, with 
additional State and AID officers at the combined joint task force 
(division) in RC-E.  We also plan three pilot DSTs by June 2009, and 
hope to have a total of 10 DSTs in RC-E by March 2010. 
 
¶20. Civilian-military integration of effort will be critical in 
 
KABUL 00001093  005.2 OF 006 
 
 
Regional Command-South (RC-S) as additional U.S. forces flow into 
the region.  We propose to stand up RC-S DSTs in Garmsir, Spin 
Boldak and Shah Wal-i Kot by June, with three or four specialized 
civilian staff on each location's civilian-military team.  For 
maximum effect in advance of the Afghan elections, these DSTs should 
be created in parallel with the arrival of the Marine Expeditionary 
Brigade (MEB) and the Stryker Brigade this summer.  The DST-based 
civilians would provide mentoring, program management, and expertise 
on governance, provision of basic services (water, electricity), 
municipal finance, and rule of law, among other things, and would be 
LNA or 3161 hires through State, USAID or USDA.  Like RC-E, we hope 
to open a total of 10 DSTs by March 2010 in the south. 
 
¶21. Embassy Kabul has created a detailed civilian 'command and 
control' chart, which parallels the military hierarchy.  A new 
component of this effort will be the Senior Civilian Representative 
position based at RC-S headquarters to coordinate USG civilian 
efforts with senior military and coalition partners. 
¶22. In addition to State, AID and USDA personnel, Drug Enforcement 
Agency (DEA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and State INL 
plan significant increases in training, mentoring and law 
enforcement efforts in RC-S.  These agencies have detailed RC-S 
plans already in place that have been developed in cooperation with 
the U.S. and coalition military. 
 
¶23. Working with our international partners in RC-S, especially the 
Canadians, British and Dutch (reftels A, B, C) will hold another key 
to our success.  Embassy Kabul recommends pursuing Memoranda of 
Understanding (MOU) with these countries to detail the life support 
and security protection our coalition partners will provide for USG 
employees working from coalition facilities.  Many coordinated 
projects are already in place and should continue, such as border 
protection infrastructure and staff training being done in 
partnership with the Canadians at Spin Boldak.  We plan to increase 
the opportunities for partnerships in many other areas as our 
capabilities increase. 
 
----------------------------- 
Challenges - Cooperation, Logistics, and Training 
----------------------------- 
¶24. For positions in Kabul, living quarters and office space 
(especially CAA space for processing classified information) will be 
pressed beyond limits in the next three to six months.  We'll need 
supplemental funding to sustain our growth. 
 
¶25. Above all else, the civilian increase will require enhancements 
in Embassy Kabul's capacity to absorb, process, and deploy large 
numbers of civilians on their way to the field.  Ensuring that 
incoming civilians receive a robust introduction to the U.S. 
Mission's vision and approach to the challenges of Afghanistan will 
strengthen the civilian role as part of our effective 
civilian-military teams in the field. 
 
¶26. Increasing the civilian presence in Afghanistan will require 
extensive coordination with U.S. and ISAF military commands  at 
every step of the process.  This will require new processes and 
thinking for both civilians and the military.  The U.S. military 
command has expressed strong support for more civilian capacity 
deployed throughout Afghanistan. 
 
¶27. As we expand our integrated effort downrange, it will be 
important to provide common pre-deployment training whenever 
possible, to link the civilians and the military unit they will be 
working with in the field.  Most of our civilian PRT representatives 
heading to U.S.-led PRTs already train with the military units with 
which they will be working.  We should work to incorporate as many 
of the new civilians - from all agencies - as possible into 
appropriate military training, especially at Camp Atterbury 
(formerly at Fort Bragg).  For our PRT reps serving at PRTs led by 
our international partners, we are already taking advantage of 
opportunities for training with coalition forces, and will seek to 
increase those opportunities. 
 
¶28. At the battalion and company level, civilians will partner with 
junior military officers who likely have little experience 
 
KABUL 00001093  006 OF 006 
 
 
partnering with civilians.  This requires that the roles, 
responsibilities and functions of the civilian members of these 
civ-mil teams be clearly articulated to all and captured in military 
guidance and training. 
 
¶29. The successful execution of a civilian increase in the field 
will require the resolution of several critical security and 
logistical issues.  The most critical issue will be working with our 
military colleagues to find security and mobility solutions that 
allow civilian and military elements to carry out their missions. 
These solutions will need to include: a) integrating military and 
civilian missions where possible; b) some re-prioritization of 
current activities; and c) the allocation of additional 
security/mobility assets (military and civilian, including air 
assets).  The Embassy will work closely with the military battle 
space owner in each location to determine additional force 
protection requirements and availability, and what will be necessary 
to allow civilians to effectively do their jobs, especially in 
highly kinetic environments such as RC-E and RC-S. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
Afghan colleagues (LES/FSNs), family members (EFMs) 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
¶30. We will need significant additional Locally Employed Staff 
(LES/FSNs) as partners in our efforts.  Within the next two weeks we 
expect to complete and report our plans for the number of Afghan 
colleagues required to help accomplish the tasks before us.  We will 
also need to hire additional family members to round out our 
American staffing. 
 
------------- 
Looking Ahead 
------------- 
¶31. Conditions in Afghanistan change quickly, and the Mission will 
remain flexible to meet the needs on the ground.  The 421 positions 
described in this cable will give us greater visibility into 
conditions on the ground, helping us define any future requirements 
and seize counter-insurgency opportunities to create rapid and 
meaningful effects.  We anticipate that we will shift some positions 
and locations of our civilian increase to meet evolving demands and 
opportunities.  In addition, we project much larger increases in 
DEA, SIGAR, PRTs, and other agencies, particularly in RC-S. 
 
RICCIARDONE