Keep Us Strong WikiLeaks logo

Currently released so far... 64621 / 251,287

Articles

Browse latest releases

Browse by creation date

Browse by origin

A B C D F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W Y Z

Browse by tag

A B C D E F G H I J K L M N O P Q R S T U V W X Y Z

Browse by classification

Community resources

courage is contagious

Viewing cable 09HELSINKI151, FINLAND: MEDVEDEV'S FIRST VISIT A "PROMISING

If you are new to these pages, please read an introduction on the structure of a cable as well as how to discuss them with others. See also the FAQs

Understanding cables
Every cable message consists of three parts:
  • The top box shows each cables unique reference number, when and by whom it originally was sent, and what its initial classification was.
  • The middle box contains the header information that is associated with the cable. It includes information about the receiver(s) as well as a general subject.
  • The bottom box presents the body of the cable. The opening can contain a more specific subject, references to other cables (browse by origin to find them) or additional comment. This is followed by the main contents of the cable: a summary, a collection of specific topics and a comment section.
To understand the justification used for the classification of each cable, please use this WikiSource article as reference.

Discussing cables
If you find meaningful or important information in a cable, please link directly to its unique reference number. Linking to a specific paragraph in the body of a cable is also possible by copying the appropriate link (to be found at theparagraph symbol). Please mark messages for social networking services like Twitter with the hash tags #cablegate and a hash containing the reference ID e.g. #09HELSINKI151.
Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
09HELSINKI151 2009-04-24 15:43 2011-04-24 00:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Helsinki
VZCZCXRO8575
RR RUEHAG RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHHE #0151/01 1141543
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 241543Z APR 09
FM AMEMBASSY HELSINKI
TO RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 4988
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4931
INFO RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 HELSINKI 000151 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/NB FOR ALAN MELTZER, NSC FOR J.HOVENIER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/22/2019 
TAGS: EIND ENRG ETRD FI PREL RS
SUBJECT: FINLAND: MEDVEDEV'S FIRST VISIT A "PROMISING 
BEGINNING" 
 
Classified By: Charge D'Affaires Michael A. Butler for reasons 1.4(b) a 
nd (d) 
 
1. (C) SUMMARY.  President Halonen came away very satisfied 
from Russian President Medvedev's first visit to Finland on 
April 20-21.  Having forged a good relationship with Putin, 
Halonen seeks a good rapport with his successor, and 
Medvedev's self-deprecating and modest demeanor went over 
well with his Finnish audience.  The visit left the Finns no 
more certain about a division of power between Medvedev and 
Prime Minister Putin, as the former failed to deflect any 
points to the PM on the largely bilateral and economic 
agenda.  Halonen's preference is to focus on those concrete 
bilateral issues, so while Medvedev addressed his proposed 
European Security Pact, he did so in a speech and the two 
barely touched on the subject in private.  Halonen saw little 
progress on the bilateral agenda, but the economic downturn 
has removed the urgency of some matters like wood export 
tariffs.  However, the promising beginning seen in the 
Presidents' relations may prove beneficial when those issues 
regain their prior urgency. END SUMMARY. 
 
Medvedev Impresses Finnish Audience 
----------------------------------- 
 
2. (C) In an April 24 meeting, Finnish President Halonen's 
advisor Aleksi Harkonen expressed to PolChief the President's 
satisfaction with Russian President Medvedev's first visit to 
Finland on April 20-21.  Harkonen said that the "clearly 
post-Soviet" Medvedev's easy-going, self-deprecating and - 
most importantly - modest attitude went over very well with 
his Finnish audience.  MFA Russia Unit Director Maimo 
Henriksson confirmed a comfortable interaction in an April 22 
meeting with Polchief, adding she (Henriksson) was surprised 
and impressed by Medvedev's "calm and relaxed" demeanor 
throughout numerous meetings and events (her surprise 
stemming from his ability to speak unaided, at length and in 
detail about bilateral relations with Russia's small 
neighbor, and the ease with which this "civil servant and 
attorney from St. Petersburg" handled the pomp of a state 
visit). (NOTE: A Social Democratic parliamentarian opined to 
Polchief on April 23 that Medvedev's "poorly delivered 
speech" at the University of Helsinki showed that him to be a 
civil servant relatively new to politics.  END NOTE.) 
 
3. (C) As is typical even in high-level visits, the agenda 
focused largely but not exclusively on bilateral economic and 
trade issues.  As Harkonen put it, "These are issues we want 
solved, and we wanted to see what the President had to say." 
The Finns found it interesting that at no time did Medvedev 
say that an issue raised did not fall to him but to the Prime 
Minister, so that the "division of labor" between the two 
remained unclear. Medvedev made no promises and never said, 
"I will fix this," which Harkonen found more welcome than the 
long-remembered and empty "I will take care of this" promises 
of President Yeltsin. The Finns intend to raise the same 
issues with PM Putin in Helsinki in June. (NOTE: Foreign 
Ministers Stubb and Lavrov spoke extensively during the 
course of the visit, but according to Harkonen the substance 
did not vary from that of the Presidents' conversations. END 
NOTE.) 
 
Topics: U.S., Nordstream, But No Security Pact 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
4.  (C) According to Henriksson, the two presidents spoke of 
the change in U.S.-Russian relations, with both commenting 
positively not only about President Obama but also President 
Bush.  President Medvedev expressed a favorable personal 
impression of the latter while acknowledging disagreement "on 
almost all issues."  Halonen noted Finland's historic role in 
U.S.-Russian/Soviet relations, and offered to play the same 
role as required, to which Medvedev responded positively if 
not concretely. 
 
5. (C) President Halonen expressed her hope that Russia would 
join the WTO.  Medvedev responded that the process is a "two 
way road," and that Russia needed U.S. and European support, 
a response Henriksson interpreted as "don't blame us." 
Though press reports stated that Halonen asked Medvedev to 
address his proposed European security pact in a speech at 
the University of Helsinki, Harkonen said the two spoke very 
little about the pact, and Finland was not asked to do 
anything in relation to it.  Publicly, Halonen did not voice 
support for the pact, saying only that the matter bears 
examination. 
 
6. (C) The Presidents spoke of the EU's Baltic Strategy and 
 
HELSINKI 00000151  002 OF 002 
 
 
the Northern Dimension, with Halonen commenting on the need 
to cooperate with Russia on environmental issues; for 
example, as St. Petersburg's waste water treatment becomes 
less of an issue, attention should turn to projects designed 
to decrease runoff into the Baltic Sea from many poultry 
farms in the St. Petersburg area.  The two also spoke of the 
Nordstream pipeline project, with Halonen stressing that 
Finland's role is non-political and focused solely on the 
environmental impact.  She explained that in July the 
government would assess the sufficiency of Nordstream's 
submission, and if deemed sufficient the next step would be 
two environmental approvals, one from the Ministry of Labor 
and Economy and one from a regional authority (regarding 
water quality).  Medvedev voiced no particular concerns about 
the length of the process.  (NOTE: Henriksson referred to the 
Finns' need to repeatedly explain their non-political, 
environmentally-based procedures, saying that the Russian 
perspective is "if the Prime Minister supports something he 
simply orders it done."  END NOTE.) 
 
No Joy on Bilateral Issues 
-------------------------- 
 
7. (C) Halonen made no headway on the bilateral issues 
routinely raised, e.g., Medvedev gave no indication Russia 
would postpone indefinitely a wood export tariff increase. 
Halonen requested a loosening of Russian restrictions on 
property ownership, as many Finns are interested in 
purchasing land in parts of Karelia, a region lost to Russia 
after the Continuation War in the mid-1940s.  Medvedev 
responded that the law restricting such sales in border 
regions (described as "vague and poorly defined" Henriksson) 
would not change, though he blamed problems on Russia's 
eastern border, not the Finnish border.  Halonen also pressed 
for Finnish access to Russian high-tech and construction 
sectors, on the latter not only in housing construction but 
opportunities for Finland's expertise in building 
"multi-purpose structures," e.g., in relation to the Olympics 
to be held in Sochi.  Medvedev welcomed greater market access 
on both sides, indicating Russia's desire to compete for bids 
related to construction of another nuclear plant in Finland. 
 
8. (C) COMMENT:  Halonen enjoyed good relations with Putin 
when he held the Presidency. Part of her success in achieving 
such relations came from avoiding critical or provocative 
public statements, and keeping the agenda to concrete 
bilateral concerns like wood tariffs.  Apparently unfazed by 
occasional criticism in the press of a too-cozy relationship 
(e.g., a supposedly slow and noncritical response to the 
Georgia crisis), Halonen appears to favor the same approach 
with Medvedev.  While the Finns made little progress on their 
bilateral agenda, Halonen appears to have forged a rapport 
with Medvedev. That rapport may prove beneficial in an 
eventual economic upturn when certain bilateral issues like 
wood tariffs regain their prior urgency.  END COMMENT. 
 
BUTLER